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 PREFACE 
Is it possible to facilitate international cooperation through positive incentives, and if so, what 
are the advantages, the drawbacks, and the risks of such a strategy for the providers and 
recipients of positive incentives? This was the principal research question of a project carried 
out between 1996 and 1998 by six political scientists and led by Thomas Bernauer from the 
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich and Dieter Ruloff from the University of 
Zurich.1 While the theoretical propositions developed in this project were evaluated on the 
basis of case studies in the field of arms control and non-proliferation, the authors suggested 
that the analytical framework developed in the project could generate useful insights into the 
role of positive incentives in fostering international cooperation in issue-areas beyond arms 
control, such as international trade policy or international environmental politics. 
Participating in the aforementioned project as a research assistant and co-author of one 
empirical chapter had definitively cemented my interest in the politics of positive incentives. I 
therefore did not hesitate long to follow the suggestion of the authors to analyze the role of 
positive incentives in the field of international environmental politics. In doing so, I focused 
on the international efforts to solve one specific transnational environmental problem: The 
nuclear safety threat posed by the continued operation of unsafe nuclear reactors in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Former Soviet Union (FSU). This 
subject has not only proven to be a useful testing ground to evaluate the theoretical 
propositions developed in this book, but was in itself a fascinating and challenging research 
topic. 
Various individuals have made this study possible. First and foremost I am indebted to 
my longstanding teacher in International Relations, Thomas Bernauer, Professor at the Center 
for International Studies (CIS) of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, who has 
guided my research effort from the beginning and never got tired of providing me with 
valuable advice and assistance on tricky theoretical and methodological issues. Next, I would 
like to thank the following individuals for providing me with information or helping me gain 
access to important information sources for the empirical analysis. To begin with, I would like 
to thank Lars Larsson, former Director of the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA), who granted me 
two long interviews in London in March 1998 and March 2000, and Günther Grabia 
                                                 
1  The findings of this research effort were published in: Bernauer, Thomas, and Dieter Ruloff, eds. (1999). The 
Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Controls. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 
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(operation leader for the Ignalina and Leningrad projects), Didier Rousseau (operation leader 
for the Chernobyl, Kola and Novovoronezh projects) and Max Schnellmann (Principal 
Manager of the EBRD’s Nuclear Safety Unit), for their help in clarifying various issues 
pertaining to the nuclear safety projects of the NSA. I would also like to thank Antony 
Frogatt, independent energy consultant and author of various reports on nuclear energy issues 
in Eastern Europe, who provided me with invaluable information and advice. 
I am also greatly indebted to Ann MacLachlan, head of the European office of 
Nucleonics Week in Paris, who constantly kept me up to date on recent developments in the 
field. Furthermore, I would like to thank Tim Gabruch and Charu Jasani, Research Officers at 
the London-based Uranium Institute, who were very helpful in providing me with information 
not easily accessible in Switzerland and Peter Hählen, General Secretary of the Swiss 
Association for Atomic Energy, who granted me free access to the on-line databank 
‘NucNet’. I am also grateful to Dr. Frank Marty and Dr. Peter Moser for their helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this study, and to Raphaël Tschanz for his essential ‘IT’ 
support in finalizing the last draft of this study. Finally I would like to thank my wife Judith 
who never got tired of encouraging and supporting me. 
 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
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EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the revolutions that transformed the political landscape of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) in 1989-1991, the West was abruptly 
confronted with a severe nuclear safety threat emanating from the former socialist Eastern 
bloc: The continued operation of unsafe Soviet-designed civilian nuclear reactors. In 
1990/1991 Western nuclear safety experts had for the first time gained unrestricted access to 
Soviet-built nuclear power plants that had so far been carefully shielded from foreign 
scrutiny. These experts had concluded that the continued operation of a large number of the 
total 58 operational nuclear reactors in CEE and the FSU posed unacceptable safety risks and 
that a serious accident could occur unless urgent action was undertaking. Their conclusions 
sparked widespread fears in the West that a repetition of the 1986 Chernobyl tragedy was 
imminent: The meltdown and subsequent explosion of the fourth unit of the Chernobyl 
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) on 26 April 1986 had not only seriously contaminated vast tracts 
of land in the then existing Soviet Union, but had also exposed the populations of various 
Western European countries to sharply elevated levels of radiation, caused considerable 
economic damage and had dealt a serious blow to the political viability of nuclear power in 
the West. 
Faced with the alarming prospect of yet another Chernobyl-style nuclear catastrophe, 
Western states called on the countries of CEE and the FSU to close their most dangerous 
Soviet-designed nuclear reactors as soon as possible. However, these countries argued that 
they could not afford to comply with such closure demands: They did not only heavily depend 
on the power generated at these units, but were deeply concerned about the economic and 
social costs of closure. This unappealing situation prompted various Western countries and 
organizations into offering significant amounts of nuclear safety and other assistance in 
exchange for commitments on the part of various CEE and FSU governments to prematurely 
close unsafe Soviet-designed nuclear reactors. What subsequently followed in the field of 
international nuclear safety cooperation amounted not only to one of the most extensive, but 
also to one of the most contentious transfers of conditional environmental assistance in the 
history of international environmental politics. 
Without going so far as to claim that the story of Western nuclear safety assistance to 
the countries of CEE and the FSU represents a paradigmatic case in international 
environmental politics, it is beyond doubt that it captures important aspects of both the most 
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pressing transnational environmental problems and the likely response to them. To begin 
with, the safety threat posed by the continued operation of unsafe Soviet-designed nuclear 
reactors constituted a transnational environmental problem, or in abstract terms, a negative 
externality: The safety threat did not only affect the specific country from which it emanated, 
but also many third countries. As such the nuclear safety threat posed by the continued 
operation of unsafe Soviet-designed nuclear reactors was a matter of international concern. 
Second, the nuclear safety problem in CEE and the FSU was characterized by asymmetric 
preferences and capacities: Whereas the relatively affluent Western countries were strongly 
interested in high levels of nuclear safety and disposed over the financial and technical means 
to secure this objective, the less well-off countries operating unsafe Soviet-designed nuclear 
reactors lacked both the immediate incentives and the capacities to secure high levels of 
nuclear safety, in particular if this meant prematurely closing their unsafe nuclear reactors. 
Thus the underlying structure of the nuclear safety problem in CEE and the FSU—i.e. 
asymmetric preferences and capacities—impeded domestic efforts to reduce or eliminate the 
risk of a nuclear accident and necessitated international cooperation. In this respect the 
nuclear safety problem resembles other transnational environmental problems whose solution 
depends to varying degrees on the active participation of the capacity-poor countries of the 
developing world or of the so-called countries in transition. Finally, the specific cooperation 
strategy by which the concerned Western states and organizations predominantly sought to 
induce and enable the countries of CEE and the FSU to cooperate in the nuclear safety field—
the provision of positive incentives—is a policy tool which in the past years has been 
increasingly employed to promote international environmental cooperation, in particular in 
North-South and East-West environmental politics. 
For the reasons outlined above, the various transactions that materialized in the field of 
international nuclear safety cooperation provide rich empirical material against which the 
principal research question of this study can be evaluated: When and how can positive 
incentives foster international cooperation so as to solve transnational environmental 
problems in effective and efficient ways and what are the problems that typically arise when 
bringing positive incentives to bear. This research question is relevant both for practical and 
theoretical reasons. As noted above, various concerned countries have in the past years 
increasingly resorted to cooperation strategies involving positive incentives, in particular in 
those cases in which the active participation of capacity-poor countries is critical for the 
success of any cooperative endeavor. Moreover, with a view to the fact that the amount of 
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available resources to combat transboundary environmental degradation is often seriously 
limited, concerned governments and organizations contemplating the use of positive 
incentives in international environmental affairs have an evident interest in using their 
resources as efficiently as possible. As such there are practical reasons to acquire a better 
understanding of the advantages and drawbacks of positive incentives. On the other hand, the 
theoretical literature in International Relations has with some rare exceptions not yet 
systematically analyzed the role of positive incentives in fostering international environmental 
cooperation. Although various theories posit that positive incentives can be useful in 
facilitating international cooperation, we lack systematic knowledge on the conditions under 
which positive incentives are effective and efficient and on the problems that arise when 
employing positive incentives. 
Aspiring to enhance our practical and theoretical knowledge of positive incentives, I 
draw and expand on existing theoretical insights into the role of this policy tool and develop 
an analytical framework designed to explain and evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of 
positive incentives. The outcomes to be explained in this study are the effectiveness and 
efficiency of positive incentives. Positive incentives are conceptualized as transactions, i.e. as 
transfers of positively valued resources, such as money, technology and know-how, from one 
actor to another with the aim of driving the behavior of the recipient in a direction that is 
desirable from the point of view of the provider. The effectiveness of a transaction denotes the 
extent to which the provision of positive incentives drove the behavior of the recipient state in 
a direction desired by the provider state. The efficiency of a transaction refers to the cost-
effectiveness of positive incentives. In evaluating the efficiency of a transaction I basically 
seek to determine whether the providers of positive incentives paid too much for what they 
gained in terms of environmental benefits resulting from the behavioral changes on the part of 
the recipient. The concept of efficiency used in this study encompasses two related, 
nevertheless distinct dimensions. The first dimension of efficiency relates to the question of 
whether the employment of cooperation strategies other than positive incentives—i.e. positive 
issue-linkage, negative incentive, cognitive and normative strategies—could have led to 
comparable or superior externality-reducing behavioral changes on the part of the recipient 
country at a lower or comparable cost. The second dimension of efficiency relates to the 
question of whether alternative ways of employing positive incentives—i.e. the funding and 
implementation of other capacity-building measures—could have resulted in comparable or 
superior externality-reducing behavioral changes on the part of the recipient country at a 
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lower or comparable cost. The explanatory concepts of the analytical framework are 
operationalized in terms of problems that arise when designing and implementing positive 
incentives and that may have an impact on the effectiveness and/or efficiency of a transaction. 
These problems, which are derived from game theory, negotiation analysis, economic theories 
and International Relations theory in general and build upon the results of empirical research 
on incentives in various areas of international relations, are summarized below. 
Extortion: A recipient state may seek to extract payments from provider states by 
bluffing the latter into believing that it would generate or increase a negative externality 
if not rewarded for refraining from doing so. Since the recipient would not have 
delivered on its threat regardless of whether its payment demand was met, extortion 
may mislead provider states into paying too much for what they receive in terms of 
environmental benefits. In addition, extortion may deter provider states from engaging 
in mutually beneficial transactions. Problems of extortion can thus negatively affect the 
efficiency (first dimension) and/or effectiveness of a transaction. 
Moral Hazard: The prospect of external aid may induce a potential recipient state to 
engage in overly risky behavior because it expects that other countries will provide the 
necessary resources to reduce the harmful effects of its risky behavior to an acceptable 
level. Moral hazard behavior may mislead the provider states into paying too much for 
what they receive in terms of environmental benefits: If the recipient state had not been 
certain that it would receive aid, it would have been less willing to engage in risky 
activities. In addition, moral hazard behavior can discourage provider states from 
engaging in transactions. Moral hazard problems can thus impinge on the efficiency 
(first dimension) and/or effectiveness of a transaction. 
Information and distribution problems: These two problems are closely related. 
Information problems derive from the fact that provider and recipient states have 
incomplete information about the other’s future preferences and behavior. Distribution 
problems arise because the provider and the recipient states have an incentive to 
enhance their net-benefits by manipulating information on the costs and benefits of 
cooperation. Such behavior may lead to protracted negotiations and even to their failure. 
Moreover, negotiations may falter simply due to the fact that provider and recipient 
states have incomplete information on the exact value of the object under negotiation. 
Information and distribution problems can negatively affect the effectiveness of a 
transaction. 
Enforcement problems: The successful implementation of environmental assistance 
programs may be negatively affected by enforcement problems. Provider states may 
lack the means to enforce international environmental agreements, or they may be 
reluctant to do so for normative or practical reasons, or because such action often 
inflicts considerable economic and political costs on the enforcing states as well. Hence 
enforcement problems can impinge on the effectiveness of a transaction. 
Problem-Definition: This problem is based on the assumption that not all capacity-
building measures selected for funding and implementation by the provider states are 
equally cost-effective. Which capacity-building measures donors chose to fund and 
implement is determined by what is referred to here as problem-definition, i.e. the 
specific way donors define an environmental problem. The specific problem-definition 
donors adopt is strongly determined by the specific interests of donor governments and 
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domestic interest groups. In short, problem-definition may have negative implications 
for the efficiency (second dimension) of a transaction. 
“Slippery slope effect“: This problem captures the risk that resources transfers aimed at 
enabling a recipient state to renounce an undesirable behavior and adopt a new desirable 
behavior may unintentionally induce and/or enable the recipient state to continue its 
previous undesirable behavior, albeit at marginally less detrimental levels. For example, 
a recipient may be reluctant or incapable to immediately close an outdated facility 
whose emissions have harmful effects on other countries. Donors may thus offer to 
modernize the facility in exchange for a commitment on the part of the recipient to 
definitely close the facility in the near future. However, once the facility has been 
modernized, the recipient may have even less incentive to definitely close it than before. 
The “slippery slope effect” can thus hamper the effectiveness of a transaction. 
Coordination problems among provider states: Such problems typically arise when 
there is more than one donor and tend to vary according to the specific nature of the 
benefits the donors expect to gain from addressing a transnational environmental 
problem. In the case of public benefits, the donors may have to cope with disputes over 
which donor should provide which amount of resources and why. Such burden-sharing 
problems may lead to a sub-optimal provision of resources. If the benefits to be gained 
are predominantly private, then a competition for these private benefits may break out 
in the donor group. Such competition may frustrate any attempt to establish a united 
donor front and hence allow the recipient to circumvent the conditions donors may seek 
to impose on their aid programs. Coordination problems can thus negatively affect the 
effectiveness of a transaction. 
 
The theoretical propositions of the analytical framework boil down to the following basic 
hypothesis: The more the designated problems crop up in a transaction both in terms of their 
occurrence and intensity, or conversely, the less successful the provider states are in coping 
with these problems, the lower the effectiveness and/or efficiency of the transaction. That 
said, it must be emphasized that the basic analytical framework is not so much designed to 
allow for rigorous hypothesis testing but rather aims to provide a checklist of problems that 
typically arise when employing positive incentives. Indeed, instead of attempting to precisely 
measure the influence of each problem on the effectiveness and/or efficiency of a transaction, 
I aim to identify the problems that may arise in a transaction and evaluate and explain whether 
and how they individually or collectively affected the outcomes to be explained in empirical 
cases. 
Methodology and Case Studies 
In empirically evaluating the theoretical propositions developed in the analytical framework, I 
adhere to a research strategy that focuses on qualitative case studies. A qualitative case study 
approach is useful when few cases exist, the perspective is dynamic, a quantification of the 
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major variables of interest is difficult, and the aim is to cast the analytical net deep rather than 
wide. Indeed, a qualitative case study approach allows us to look for evidence about whether 
a particular explanatory variable influenced the dependent variable via a hypothesized causal 
pathway (Mitchell and Bernauer 1998: 7). In this study a “case” is conceptualized as a 
transaction, i.e. the process of providing positive incentives in exchange for behavioral 
changes on the part of the recipient. Each case study involves the analysis of a transaction 
over time and concludes with an assessment that is structured along the following lines. I first 
explore the extent to which the recipient country changed its behavior in a direction desired 
by the provider countries. Second, I describe the various cooperation strategies and capacity-
building measures employed by the provider countries to influence the behavior of the 
recipient. In a third step I determine the extent to which the observed behavioral change on 
the part of the recipient country was influenced by the provision of positive incentives and 
evaluate the effectiveness of the transaction. In a fourth step I provide an assessment of the 
efficiency of the transaction by evaluating whether the provider countries could have secured 
larger net-benefits by resorting to a cooperation strategy other than positive incentives or by 
employing positive incentives in different ways, i.e. funding alternative capacity-building 
measures. Finally, I assess the extent to which the theoretically predicted problems in 
designing and implementing positive incentives shaped the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
transaction. 
In analyzing each transaction I adhere to the “process tracing” method. This research 
method is used to unpack the sequence of events that make up the bargaining and 
implementation process and to trace the connections between the individual events that 
constitute the complex story of cause and effect (Victor et al. 1998). In addition, it should be 
noted that the efficiency of transactions is evaluated by means of counterfactual analysis. 
Counterfactuals are descriptions of what would have happened under different conditions. 
Although such thought experiments do not add any empirical information, they aid in 
describing how a particular factor has had an influence on the outcome to be explained and 
help clarify the causal pathway suggested by the author’s analysis (Fearon 1991; Tetlock and 
Belkin 1996). As far as the data for the empirical analysis is concerned, they have been 
largely derived from published sources such as professional journals in the field of nuclear 
energy, daily newspapers and periodicals, and reports and fact sheets by international 
organizations such as the European Union (EU), the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the World Bank. The published sources have been complemented 
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and crosschecked by information gained from personal interviews with officials at the 
Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) and experts of nuclear safety developments in CEE and the 
FSU. 
The propositions of the analytical framework are investigated by means of case studies 
derived from one specific issue-area of international environmental politics: The nuclear 
safety problem in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Former Soviet Union (FSU). 
This issue-area has been selected for empirical analysis because the international effort to 
reduce and eliminate the risk of an accident at a nuclear power plant in CEE and the FSU 
involved several explicit transactions between Western provider and Eastern recipient 
countries, thereby providing rich empirical material for case studies on the potential and 
problems of positive incentives. Moreover, I have chosen to limit the empirical analysis to 
only one issue-area in order to hold constant as far as possible certain exogenous variables, 
such as the characteristics of the recipient countries involved in the transactions as well as the 
specific situation structure underlying and the nature of the transnational environmental 
problem at hand. Indeed, all the recipient countries are located in the same geographical 
region and were coping—although admittedly to different degrees—with similar challenges 
arising from the transformation process towards democratic institutions and free-market 
economies. Furthermore, the nuclear safety problem in all recipient countries was strongly 
determined by asymmetric preferences and capacities and could be addressed by similar 
means. In short, my choice to focus on only one issue-area of international environmental 
politics has both advantages and drawbacks. On the one hand, it enhances the internal validity 
of the causal inferences drawn from the case studies conducted in this study and allows for 
more robust comparisons across the examined cases. On the other hand, it restricts to a certain 
degree the possibility of generalizing the findings of this study to other issue-areas of 
international environmental politics. 
The research design of this study necessitates that the specific case studies derived 
from the nuclear safety problem in CEE and the FSU involve the analysis of transactions in 
which the donor states provided or attempted to provide positively valued resources in 
exchange for risk-reducing and risk-eliminating behavioral changes on the part of the 
recipient countries. In other words, my case selection relates to those nuclear safety assistance 
programs that included a significant degree of conditionality. Within the overall international 
effort to improve nuclear safety in CEE and the FSU, I have identified seven distinct 
transactions involving the provision of positively valued resources in exchange for risk-
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reducing and risk-eliminating behavioral changes. The seven selected transactions reveal 
considerable variation on both the dependent and independent variables. Indeed, both the 
effectiveness and efficiency of positive incentives differ in the selected transactions, and these 
differing degrees of effectiveness and efficiency can be attributed to a host of theoretically 
predicted problems which vary both in their occurrence and intensity in and among the 
selected transactions. In the following I briefly summarize the seven selected transactions and 
their outcomes. 
Case Study I: In June 1993, the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) concluded a grant 
agreement with the Bulgarian government. The NSA agreed to provide ECU 24 million for 
near-term safety upgrades at the four older units of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) 
and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) promised to allocate an unspecified amount of 
favorable loans for various energy projects in exchange for the commitment on the part of the 
Bulgarian government to prematurely close Kozloduy units 1-4 by 1997/1998. In early 1998 
the Bulgarian government refused to comply with its closure commitments on the grounds 
that international funding for the rehabilitation of the country’s energy sector had not 
sufficiently materialized and announced plans to further upgrade Kozloduy units 1-4 for long-
term operation. With a view to the fact that the provision of positive incentives reduced to a 
certain extent the risk of a nuclear accident at the Kozloduy NPP, but failed to secure the early 
closure of the plant’s four oldest units, the effectiveness of the transaction was rather low. The 
transaction was efficient in the sense that the employment of no other cooperation strategy 
could have secured a more favorable outcome (first dimension of efficiency). However, the 
transaction did involve serious inefficiencies in the sense that the Western donors could have 
secured superior behavioral changes on the part of Bulgaria at a comparable cost by 
employing positive incentives in a different way (second dimension of efficiency). 
Case Study II: In February 1994, the NSA concluded a grant agreement with the 
Lithuanian government. The NSA agreed to allocate around ECU 40 million for near-term 
safety upgrades at the Ignalina NPP and IFIs promised to provide an unspecified amount of 
low-interest loans for the rehabilitation of Lithuania’s power sector in exchange for the 
commitment on the part of the Lithuanian government to comply with certain measures aimed 
at securing the early closure of the Ignalina NPP. By early 1998 it had become apparent that 
the Lithuanian government was keen on keeping the Ignalina NPP in operation as long as 
possible. The effectiveness of the transaction was rather low: While the provision of positive 
incentives did enhance safety levels at the Ignalina NPP, the Lithuanian government was 
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evidently bent of eschewing its NSA commitments and taking measures to prolong the service 
lives of Ignalina units 1-2. The efficiency of the transaction was high in the sense that the 
employment of no other cooperation could have led to a comparable or superior behavioral 
change on the part of Lithuania at a lower or comparable cost (first dimension of efficiency). 
However, the transaction did involve serious inefficiencies because it cannot be ruled out that 
the Western donors could have secured a more favorable outcome by employing positive 
incentives in a different way (second dimension of efficiency). 
Case Study III: Throughout 1994 and 1995, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) sought to conclude a deal with the Slovak government according to 
which the Slovak Republic would receive a substantial amount of low-interest loans for the 
completion and upgrading of two modern, partly built nuclear reactors at the Mochovce NPP 
in exchange for the commitment to prematurely close two unsafe units at the Bohunice NPP 
by the year 2000 or once the two Mochovce units were completed. The EBRD continued to 
press for this deal despite widespread allegations that funding the construction of a gas-fired 
power plant would be more cost-effective than financing the Mochovce completion project. 
After drawn out negotiations, the Slovak government rejected the EBRD’s closure deal in late 
1995. The effectiveness of the attempted transaction was low: The EBRD failed to extract a 
firm closure commitment from the Slovak government by offering positive incentives. As 
such the attempted transaction was ineffective in driving the behavior of the recipient country 
in a direction desired by the donors. Whereas the transaction was efficient in the sense that the 
Western donors could not have enhanced their net-benefits by employing another cooperation 
strategy (first dimension of efficiency), the transaction did involve potentially serious 
inefficiencies because it is not impossible that the Western donors could have secured a more 
favorable result by employing positive incentives in a different way (second dimension of 
efficiency). 
Case Study IV: Since it had become evident by 1998 that the Slovak Republic, 
Lithuania and Bulgaria were planning to abandon previous closure commitments and to 
prolong the service lives of their high-risk nuclear reactors, the European Commission 
intervened into the ongoing closure dispute to secure the earliest possible closure of these 
nuclear reactors. From late 1998 on, the Commission sought to extract “realistic” closure 
commitments from the three Eastern European applicant countries by employing a negative 
incentive strategy, i.e. it linked the respective countries’ prospects to begin EU membership 
negotiations to a cooperative stance on the closure issue. After the three applicant countries 
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had realized that the Commission’s issue-linkage was credible, they sought to make the 
establishment of closure deadlines conditional on the provision of sufficient compensation. 
After months of haggling over the exact closure deadlines and the amount of compensation, 
the Commission succeeded in extracting “realistic” closure commitments from all three 
countries in late 1999 by offering each country a substantial amount of positive incentives in 
the form of decommissioning aid. The Slovak Republic promised to close Bohunice units 1-2 
in 2006 and 2008. Lithuania agreed to close Ignalina unit 1 by 2005 and to decide on a 
definitive closure date for unit 2 in 2004. Finally, Bulgaria pledged to shut down Kozloduy 
units 1-2 in 2003 and to fix a definitive closure date for Kozloduy units 3-4 in 2002. It is 
expected that Kozloduy units 3-4 will be closed in 2006-2008/10. Whereas Lithuania’s 
closure commitments were fully in line with the Commission’s original closure demands, the 
closure schedules conceded by the Slovak Republic and Bulgaria were somewhat delayed 
compared to what the Commission had originally demanded. 
The effectiveness of these three transactions varied slightly: Whereas the effectiveness 
of the transaction between the Commission and Lithuania was high, the effectiveness of the 
other two transactions in which the Commission sought to extract “realistic” closure 
commitments from the Slovak Republic and Bulgaria was rather high. This assessment is 
based on the following considerations. Although the Commission’s negative issue-linkage 
strategy was no doubt instrumental in securing these closure schedules, it is doubtful whether 
this cooperation strategy alone would have been successful. Hence the provision of positive 
incentives was most likely a necessary means to secure “realistic” closure commitments. On 
the other hand, the specific closure schedules conceded by the Slovak Republic and 
Bulgaria—in contrast to those conceded by Lithuania—were not fully in line with the 
Commission’s original closure demands. The efficiency of the three transactions was high, 
both in terms of the first and second dimension of efficiency: It is highly unlikely that another 
cooperation strategy and/or way of employing positive incentives could have secured 
comparable or superior behavioral changes on the part of the three applicant countries at a 
lower or comparable cost. 
Case Study V: From early 1994 on, the G-7/EU and Ukraine were engaged in 
negotiations over the premature closure of the Chernobyl NPP. The closure of the remaining 
operational units of the Chernobyl NPP (units 1 and 3) had become an object of contention 
due to the Ukrainian parliament’s October 1993 decision to rescind its earlier resolution to 
close these two units by the end of 1993 and to upgrade the ill-fated plant for long-term 
 Introduction 11 
operation. Deeply concerned about the prospect of the crippled and highly symbolic 
Chernobyl NPP being granted a new lease on life, the G-7/EU sought to induce the Ukrainian 
government to close Chernobyl units 1 and 3 as soon as possible and to refrain from restarting 
Chernobyl unit 2. After almost two years of diplomatic wrangling over the amount of money 
requested by the Ukrainian government, the negotiating parties concluded in December 1995 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in which the Western donors agreed to provide $2.3 
billion in assistance in exchange for the closure of the Chernobyl NPP by 2000. The MoU 
envisaged around $500 million in grants for various projects related to the plant’s early 
closure and $1.8 billion in loans for the completion of the two partly built Khmelnitsky-2 and 
Rovno-4 reactors (the so-called K2/R4 project) and the modernization of existing 
hydroelectric and thermal power plants. Implementation of the MoU turned out to be a 
problem-ridden and bumpy process, mainly because disagreement prevailed over the question 
of whether the Western donors should fund the K2/R4 project which had been found by an 
independent panel of experts not to represent the least-cost investment for Ukraine’s energy 
needs. Nevertheless, on 15 December 2000, a year later than anticipated by the MoU and only 
days after the Western donors had tentatively approved loans for the K2/R4 project, the 
Ukrainian government ordered the definitive closure of the Chernobyl NPP. The effectiveness 
of the transaction was rather high: Despite some delay, the provision of positive incentives 
succeeded in inducing and enabling the Ukrainian government to prematurely close the 
Chernobyl NPP. Although the transaction was efficient in the sense that the employment of 
no other cooperation strategy could have led to a more favorable result (first dimension of 
efficiency), it is highly likely that the Western donors could have secured at least a 
comparable behavioral change on the part of Ukraine at a lower cost by employing positive 
incentives in a different way (second dimension of efficiency). 
It should be noted that one transaction that materialized in the nuclear safety field has 
been excluded from analysis: In June 1995 the NSA concluded a grant agreement with the 
Russian Federation in which it agreed to allocate ECU 76 million for various safety upgrade 
projects at three Russian NPPs. I have opted to exclude this transaction from analysis because 
the NSA grant agreement with the Russian Federation did not contain any strict closure 
requirements. Indeed, in exchange for the NSA grants the Russian government merely 
pledged to set up new regulatory regimes for the continued operation of ten of the country’s 
15 oldest nuclear reactors and to incorporate least-cost energy planning considerations into 
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the licensing process of these units.1 In short, since the degree of conditionality in this NSA 
agreement was rather low in the sense that the Russian government was not obliged to 
undertake costly, risk-eliminating behavioral changes, I have refrained from conducting a 
case study on the transaction between the NSA and the Russian Federation. 
Each case study conducted in this book is basically designed to analyze a transaction 
between one donor, or group of donors, and a recipient country. One specific case study, 
however, departs from this basic structure: In Case Study IV three distinct transactions 
between one donor—the European Commission—and three different recipient countries—the 
Slovak Republic, Lithuania and Bulgaria—are examined in the context of a separate and 
single case study. The following reasons explain why I have opted to analyze these three 
transactions not in the three preceding case studies (Case Studies I-III), but in the context of a 
separate and single case study. To begin with, although the transactions analyzed in Case 
Study IV constitute in effect a sequel of the transactions examined in Case Studies I-III, the 
former transactions differ from the latter in that they involve a different donor. Indeed, since it 
was evident by 1998 that the efforts of the EBRD and the NSA to secure the premature 
closure of high-risk nuclear reactors in the Slovak Republic, Lithuania and Bulgaria had failed 
or were likely to fail, the European Commission intervened into the ongoing closure dispute 
and sought to extract “realistic” closure commitments from all three Eastern European 
applicant countries by employing a combination of negative and positive incentives. 
Second, there are practical reasons for examining the transactions between the 
European Commission and the three applicant countries in a separate case study. A significant 
part of Case Study IV explores the political and economic background to the European 
Commission’s intervention into the closure dispute. Since it would be impractical to elaborate 
on this important background information in Case Studies I-III, I have decided to construct a 
separate case study which first provides this information and then examines the individual 
bargaining processes between the European Commission and the three applicant countries. 
Finally, practical reasons also explain why I integrated the three distinct transactions into one 
                                                 
1 Specifically, the Russian government pledged to guarantee the proper functioning of the Russian nuclear 
safety authority (GAN) and to introduce new licensing procedures for the country’s oldest nuclear reactors. 
In addition, the Russian authorities agreed to perform in-depth safety assessments both on the eight nuclear 
reactors slated to be upgraded under the NSA agreement and on units 1 and 2 of the Kursk NPP. On the basis 
of these safety assessments, GAN was expected to determine whether these ten nuclear reactors complied 
with the new licensing regime and what kind of safety improvements would be required to justify their 
continued operation beyond 1997/1998. The Russian government also agreed not to restart Kursk unit 1 
before 1998, and only then if the new licensing procedures were in place and the in-depth safety assessments 
had been carried out (NW, 17 April 1997: 1, 6-8). 
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single case study and refrained from conducting three individual case studies on these 
transactions. Since the European Commission’s attempt to extract “realistic” closure 
commitments from the three applicant countries was undertaken in the context of ongoing EU 
membership negotiations, the bargaining processes between the European Commission and 
the three applicant countries were all rather similar. Thus, in order to avoid onerous 
repetitions, I have opted to analyze these three distinct transactions in the context of one 
single case study. 
This study goes beyond the existing political science literature in terms of its empirical 
coverage of the nuclear safety problem in CEE and the FSU. The following brief review of 
the few existing studies on this specific issue-area of international environmental politics 
seeks to substantiate this claim. Barbara Connolly and Martin List (1996) have arguably 
produced one of the most informative analyses of the international effort to reduce the risk of 
nuclear accident in CEE and the FSU. Their study highlights a host of contractual and other 
problems the Western donor countries encountered when providing nuclear safety assistance 
in exchange for commitments on the part of Eastern European governments to prematurely 
close unsafe Soviet-designed nuclear reactors. Prominent among the problems they identify 
are the Western nuclear lobby’s capture of the nuclear safety assistance programs, 
coordination problems among the donor countries and the risk that nuclear safety assistance 
would prolong the service lives of slightly improved, nevertheless still unsafe nuclear power 
plants. Their empirical findings are intriguing and have provided invaluable input to this 
study. Nevertheless, their study suffers from a number of shortcomings. First, their empirical 
analysis focuses on the overall Western approach to the nuclear safety problem and thus fails 
to examine in detail and over time the various transactions that materialized between the 
Western donors and the Eastern recipient countries. In this respect the authors of this study 
can be reproached for simply lumping different transactions into one case study. Second, 
Connolly and List exclude almost completely from discussion a number of important 
transactions, in particular those between the Western donor states and the countries of the 
FSU. Finally, their empirical analysis of the Western nuclear safety assistance programs 
extends only to the mid 1990s. It is therefore doubtful whether the rather limited timeframe of 
their analysis allows for definitive conclusions as to whether and how the identified problems 
had an impact on the effectiveness of the West’s nuclear safety programs. 
Robert Darst (1997, 2001) has also analyzed the nuclear safety problem in CEE and 
the FSU from a political science perspective. Specifically, he evaluates the Western response 
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to the safety threat posed by the continued operation of unsafe Soviet-designed nuclear 
reactors in terms of three risks inherent in resource transfers: Polluter life extension, 
environmental blackmail and moral hazard. While including an overview of the West’s 
overall approach to the nuclear safety problem in CEE and the FSU and a brief discussion of 
the Western attempt to secure the premature closure of the Ignalina NPP in Lithuania, the 
main thrust of his empirical analysis focuses on the protracted bargaining process between the 
G-7 and Ukraine over the closure of the Chernobyl NPP. On the basis of this case study Darst 
explores the possibility of environmental blackmail in international environmental politics. 
Specifically, he seeks to determine how and why the Ukrainian government was successful in 
extracting a substantial amount of resources from the West by threatening to resuscitate the 
ill-fated Chernobyl NPP. His empirical analysis of the protracted negotiations between the G-
7 and Ukraine is impressive and the conclusions he draws are convincing. However, Darst’s 
account of the nuclear safety problem in CEE and the FSU is incomplete in various respects. 
To begin with, he focuses extensively on the transaction between the G-7 and Ukraine and 
fails to conduct in-depth case studies on the other transactions that materialized in the nuclear 
safety field. Moreover, his analysis of the bargaining process between the G-7 and Ukraine 
over the closure of the Chernobyl NPP is limited to the evaluation of only one problematic 
dimension of resource transfers, i.e. environmental blackmail. He thus ignores other important 
problems that affected the effectiveness and efficiency of this transaction. 
In comparison to the existing studies discussed above, this book provides a more 
comprehensive and in-depth empirical analysis of almost all transactions that materialized in 
the nuclear safety field. Moreover, it explores a wider range of problems that have combined 
to hamper the Western donors’ strategy of essentially “buying” nuclear safety from the 
countries of CEE and the FSU. Finally, the empirical analysis conducted in this book spans a 
much longer time period, i.e. from the early 1990s to late 2000. This extended timeframe 
makes it possible to analyze many important recent developments in the nuclear safety field 
that earlier studies could not take into account and thus allows for more informed judgments 
as to how and to which extent the identified problems shaped the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the various transactions that materialized in the nuclear safety field. 
Key Results 
The empirical analysis of the various transactions that materialized in the nuclear safety field 
suggests that the employment of positive incentives can be an effective policy tool to foster 
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international environmental cooperation. Indeed, in four examined transactions, the 
employment of positive incentives was rather effective in driving the behavior of the recipient 
in a direction desired by the donors. In addition, I did not find any outright failures in the 
sense that when positive incentives were provided they did not have any impact on recipient 
behavior. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the effectiveness of positive incentives 
varied significantly across the examined transactions, and that all but one of the seven 
examined transactions failed to be fully effective. The most important problems in designing 
and implementing positive incentives that shaped the effectiveness of transactions were the 
following. 
Information and distribution problems negatively affected the effectiveness of at least 
two examined transactions. Indeed, uncertainties regarding the “real” intentions of the 
recipient countries and incomplete information about the exact price and value of the object 
under negotiation and the most cost-effective approach to induce and enable the recipient 
countries to prematurely close unsafe nuclear reactors hampered the negotiation and/or 
implementation of agreements. Moreover, the efforts by recipient countries to gain the 
maximum amount of compensation in exchange for the least costly environmental measures, 
i.e. the latest possible closure schedules, often protracted negotiations. 
Enforcement problems hampered the effectiveness of at least four examined 
transactions. On the one hand, the Western donors often lacked the means to enforce 
agreements. On the other hand, the Western donors proved to be rather reluctant to strictly 
enforce agreements. This had much to do with the fact that strategic or economic policy goals 
often overshadowed environmental objectives. In other words, donors were often unwilling to 
put their strategic and/or economic policy goals at risk for the sake of securing recipient 
compliance with international environmental agreements. This reluctance to enforce 
agreements was reinforced by a widespread perception that the capacities of the Eastern 
recipient countries to cooperate in the nuclear safety field were seriously constrained and that 
this was one of the main reasons why the recipients were unwilling to comply with closure 
commitments. 
The “slippery slope effect” proved to be a problem that seriously hampered the 
effectiveness of transactions. In two examined transactions, the provision of Western funds 
for near-term safety upgrades at unsafe Soviet-designed nuclear reactors encouraged and 
enabled the recipient countries to keep their slightly improved, nevertheless still unsafe 
nuclear reactors in operation beyond the scheduled closure dates. In other words, the funding 
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of capacity-building measures designed to enable the recipient country to adopt a new, 
desirable behavior had the unintentional and perverse effect of increasing the recipient’s 
incentives and capacities to continue its previous, undesirable behavior, albeit at somewhat 
lower levels of risk. 
Finally, coordination problems among the donors also proved to be a serious problem 
in driving the behavior of the recipients in a direction desired by the donors. Coordination 
problems negatively affected the effectiveness of at least three transactions either by 
preventing donors from taking decisive action and mobilizing a sufficient amount of resources 
or by undermining Western attempts to establish a united donor front capable of imposing 
closure conditions on recipients. 
The empirical analysis presents a somewhat more ambivalent picture regarding the 
efficiency of positive incentives. On the one hand, all examined transactions were efficient in 
the sense that no other cooperation strategy could have secured comparable or superior 
behavioral changes on the part of the recipient countries at a lower or comparable cost. This 
finding has much to do with the fact that under conditions of strong asymmetric preferences 
and capacities, the employment of positive incentives is often the only practical cooperation 
strategy. Moreover, the efficiency of the examined transactions was not negatively affected by 
extortion or moral hazard problems. Indeed, none of the Eastern recipient countries bluffed 
the Western donors into assuming that they would prolong the service lives of their unsafe 
nuclear reactors if not paid for refraining from doing so. The Eastern recipient countries either 
did not explicitly threaten to prolong the safety threat posed by their unsafe nuclear reactors if 
not compensated for, or if they did, as in the case of Ukraine, they would have probably 
delivered on their threat if the Western donors had refused to provide compensation. In 
addition, the empirical analysis did not uncover any compelling evidence that the Eastern 
recipients engaged in moral hazard behavior. Indeed, it is rather unlikely that the prospect of 
gaining Western nuclear safety assistance induced the Eastern recipient countries to accept 
higher levels of risk at their nuclear facilities and to refrain from investing their own resources 
to alleviate the nuclear safety problem. 
On the other hand, it must be emphasized that all but three of the examined 
transactions involved potentially serious inefficiencies in the sense that the Western donors 
could have possibly secured comparable or superior behavioral changes on the part of the 
Eastern recipient countries at a lower or comparable cost by employing positive incentives in 
different ways. The most important problem that shaped the efficiency of transactions in this 
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respect relates to how the donors defined the environmental problem at hand, or in other 
words to the specific problem-definition adhered to by the donors. Indeed, in most examined 
transactions the Western donors adopted a rather one-sided problem-definition that was 
closely geared to the commercial interests of their domestic nuclear industries and/or to their 
own political and strategic interests. This specific problem-definition resulted in a strong pro-
nuclear bias in the Western donors’ funding strategy that ultimately precluded the funding and 
implementation of other, potentially more cost-effective capacity-building measures designed 
to solve the nuclear safety problem in CEE and the FSU. 
This book is structured along the following lines. Chapter 2 develops the analytical 
framework that is designed to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of positive incentives 
in international environmental politics. Chapter 3 provides an introduction to the physical and 
political basics of the nuclear safety problem in CEE and the FSU. Chapters 4 to 8 form the 
heart of this book: They contain detailed case studies on the various transactions that 
materialized in the nuclear safety field. Finally, the results of the five in-depth case studies are 
summarized and compared in chapter 9. 
 
 

 Do ut des (give in order to receive) 
- A basic axiom of all social sciences 
 
 
2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The analytical framework that guides the empirical research conducted in this book is 
structured as follows. In the first section I define some of the key concepts used in this study, 
discuss the theoretical and practical relevance of the research question and review the state of 
the art on positive incentives and international cooperation. In the second section I explore 
from a theoretical perspective when positive incentives are most likely to be employed. This 
section demonstrates that positive incentives are an important means to foster international 
cooperation in externality situations involving asymmetric preferences and/or capacities. In 
the third section I introduce the theoretical starting point for analyzing the effectiveness and 
efficiency of positive incentives with a discussion of the intriguing findings by Ronald Coase. 
This section elaborates on Coase’s general proposition that market transactions can solve 
externality problems in a socially optimal way and that transaction costs pose the most serious 
obstacles to such pareto-improving exchanges. In the fourth and final section of this chapter I 
further develop this general proposition by systematically identifying which types of 
transaction costs are critical to successful cooperation and how they can be reduced or 
overcome. This section is structured into two parts. The first part elaborates on the outcomes 
to be explained, i.e. the effectiveness and efficiency of transactions, and discusses how these 
concepts are measured. The second part focuses on the explanatory concepts of the basic 
analytical framework and specifies eight problems that may arise when designing and 
implementing positive incentives in international environmental politics. 
2.1 Key Concepts, Relevance of Research Question and State of the Art 
The following section is structured as follows. In a first step I outline the research question 
and define some of the key concepts used in this study. In a second step I discuss the practical 
and theoretical relevance of the research question and review the existing political science 
literature on positive incentives and international cooperation in order to establish the state of 
the art. 
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Research Question and Key Concepts 
This study aims to enhance our theoretical and practical knowledge on the advantages and 
drawbacks of a commonly used, nevertheless far from adequately understood policy 
instrument designed to facilitate international environmental cooperation: Positive incentives. 
Specifically, I address the following research question: When and how can positive incentives 
foster international cooperation aimed at solving transnational environmental problems in an 
effective and efficient way, and what are the problems that arise in employing this policy 
instrument. The research question contains several key concepts that are outlined below. 
In this study I examine ways and means to cope with so-called transnational 
environmental problems. An environmental problem is transnational when it has or threatens 
to have negative effects on the environment not only within, but also outside the borders of 
the country in which its causes lie. On an abstract level, we can liken transnational 
environmental problems to those situations involving what social scientists commonly refer to 
as negative externalities. Negative externalities are the costs resulting from the production or 
consumption of goods that are not included in the price of these goods and negatively affect 
third parties. Thus, whenever the behavior of one state imposes costs on other states—in the 
environmental realm typically in the form of pollution and other undesirable side effects of 
economic activity—a situation involving negative externalities arises. Negative externalities 
affecting the natural environment can be distinguished in terms of their scale. Most negative 
externalities in the environmental realm occur on a regional scale. For example, air pollution 
originating from heavy industry in the United Kingdom during the 1960s and 1970s 
threatened to destroy large forest tracts in Scandinavia, or the chloride emissions of French 
mines into the river Rhine seriously affected waterworks and farmers in downstream states 
such as the Netherlands. More recently negative externalities affecting the natural 
environment have been increasingly observed on a global scale. For example, ozone-depleting 
chemicals, produced and consumed in any country of the world, threaten to destroy the life-
preserving stratospheric ozone layer for everyone. Carbon dioxide resulting from the 
combustion of fossil fuels contributes to climate change that threatens to have unpredictable 
and irreversible global environmental effects. And future generations in all nations of the 
world may suffer, albeit in ways not yet known, by a loss of biodiversity in tropical forests 
(Keohane and Levy 1996). 
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Situations involving negative externalities generate a demand for international 
cooperation.1 This is so because in such situations the externality-generating behavior of one 
or more states imposes unintended costs on other states. The states bearing the costs of the 
negative externality—the so-called victim states—have an interest to alleviate the negative 
externality. They will thus try to induce the externality-generating state—the so-called 
perpetrator state—to alter its undesirable behavior. A cooperative outcome in such situations 
is achieved whenever the perpetrator state adopts its behavior to the preferences of the victim 
states, i.e. when it alleviates or eliminates the negative externality it produces by its current or 
previous behavior. Thus for the purposes of this study I define international cooperation as 
the process by which a perpetrator state adjusts its behavior in response to influence attempts 
by victim states and thereby reduces the negative effects of its behavior on victim states. 
Achieving and sustaining cooperative outcomes in international environmental politics 
is by no means an easy venture. Since states are assumed to behave rationally in the sense that 
they try to maximize their utility, states will often only engage in international cooperation 
and alter their behavior when they perceive an appropriate balance of cost and benefits in 
doing so. One common way of inducing states to cooperate is to provide incentives. Basically, 
two types of incentives can be distinguished, negative incentives (sanctions and threats) and 
positive incentives (side-payments and compensation). Positive incentives can materialize in 
two distinct ways: Either by the provision of material incentives within the issue-area 
currently under negotiation between two or more states or by linking various non-related 
issues with each other (positive issue-linkage). This study focuses on the former type of 
positive incentives and defines positive incentives as transfers of positively valued resources, 
such as money, technology, or know-how, from one actor to another with the aim of driving 
the behavior of the recipient in a direction that is desirable from the point of view of the 
provider. 
The primary aim of this study is to explore the conditions under which the 
employment of positive incentives can be an effective and efficient means to foster 
international environmental cooperation and alter the externality-generating behavior of 
recipient countries. Hence, the outcomes to be explained in this study are the effectiveness 
                                                 
1 Externalities can be either negative or positive. A demand for cooperation can certainly also arise in 
situations involving positive externalities, for example when a producer of a positive externality seeks to 
induce those actors benefiting from the positive externality to contribute to the costs of its production. 
However, to simplify matters I limit the following discussion to situations involving negative externalities, 
which indeed are more often experienced in international environmental politics. 
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and efficiency of positive incentives. When assessing the effectiveness of positive incentives, 
I am interested in determining how successful the employment of positive incentives was in 
causing the recipient country to alter its externality-generating behavior, either by behaving in 
ways it would otherwise not or by terminating or redirecting prior patterns of behavior. The 
effectiveness of positive incentives is thus defined as the extent to which the provision of 
positive incentives drove the recipient country’s behavior in a direction desired by the 
provider state and thus reduced the negative externality at hand. 
The efficiency of positive incentives is a somewhat more complex concept. When 
assessing the efficiency of positive incentives, I am basically interested in determining 
whether the employment of positive incentives was cost-effective in driving the recipient 
country’s behavior in a direction desired by the donor state. In other words, the efficiency of 
positive incentives relates to the question of whether the provider countries paid too much for 
what they gained in terms of environmental benefits resulting from the behavioral changes of 
the recipient country. The concept of efficiency used in this study encompasses two related, 
nevertheless distinct dimensions. The first dimension of efficiency relates to the question of 
whether the employment of cooperation strategies other than positive incentives could have 
led to comparable or superior externality-reducing behavioral changes on the part of the 
recipient country at a lower or comparable cost. This question is based on the assumption that 
different cooperation strategies vary in terms of their cost-effectiveness in reducing negative 
externalities. The second dimension of efficiency relates to the question of whether alternative 
ways of employing positive incentives could have led to comparable or superior externality-
reducing behavioral changes on the part of the recipient country at a lower or comparable 
cost. This question takes into account that provider countries typically have a choice to fund 
different measures aimed at enabling the recipient country to alter its externality-generating 
behavior, and is based on the assumption that different capacity-building measures vary in 
terms of their cost-effectiveness in reducing negative externalities. 
Finally, I am interested in examining the problems that arise when designing and 
implementing positive incentives in international environmental politics, and how these 
problems can be overcome. The theoretically derived problems that appear in relation to 
transactions are hypothesized to negatively affect the effectiveness and/or efficiency of 
positive incentives. They are thus the explanatory variables of the analytical framework. 
These problems are outlined in detail in the final section of this chapter. 
 Analytical Framework 23 
Relevance of Research Question and State of the Art 
Analyzing the effectiveness and efficiency of positive incentives and examining the problems 
that may arise when employing this cooperation strategy is relevant both from a practical and 
theoretical point of view. On the practical side, the use of positive incentives has become 
increasingly frequent and potentially important in international environmental politics in 
recent years. In the past, states typically sought to cope with transnational environmental 
problems by concluding international declarations and conventions on the protection of the 
natural environment or by establishing new international organizations and NGOs (Hurrell 
and Kingsbury 1992; Bergesen and Parmann 1994). However, by the late 1980s various 
concerned governmental and non-governmental actors realized that this approach was not 
working effectively in many areas of international environmental affairs. Specifically, it had 
become evident that the effective solution of an increasing number of transnational 
environmental problems depended on the active cooperation of so-called capacity-poor 
countries, i.e. in particular developing countries or countries in transition, and that the latter 
were unable and/or unwilling to participate in cooperative ventures without the financial and 
technical assistance of wealthier countries.2
Hence, in the early 1990s a significant change in strategy occurred with the emergence 
of a number of international environmental assistance programs to low-capacity countries. It 
was the 1990 London amendment of the Montreal Protocol which for the first time in the 
history of international environmental politics formally entitled developing countries to obtain 
resource transfers from wealthier countries—in the order of $200 million—as compensation 
for their participation in and compliance with a global environmental agreement. Moreover, in 
the same year the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors established the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) that is designed to support environmental programs in countries 
lacking the financial, technical and administrative means to cope with environmental 
problems of a regional or global nature. Finally, in 1992 the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio, the so-called Earth Summit, officially recognized the 
need for substantial resource transfers in the field of international environmental protection. 
The action plan adopted at this UN conference, the so-called Agenda 21, called for the 
transfer of resources in the order of $125 billion annually between 1993 and 2000 from the 
                                                 
2 The notion that effective international cooperation to protect the natural environment required resource 
transfers from wealthy to poor countries was first popularized in 1987 by the so-called Brundtland report 
(Connolly and Keohane 1996: 13). 
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rich to the poor countries to address at least the most urgent environmental problems (Sand 
1999; Simonis 1994). 
In short, various concerned states and international organizations have in recent years 
recognized that resource transfers are a potentially necessary means to solve a number of 
regional and global environmental problems and as a result have increasingly resorted to this 
cooperation strategy. On the other hand, the experience of the past decade shows that the 
resources potential donor states are willing or able to allocate for transnational environmental 
issues often fall short of the required amount. Indeed, only a relatively small fraction of the 
sum called for at the United Nation’s 1992 Earth Summit has been mobilized since, and as the 
United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development has realistically concluded, “the 
outlook for the growth of aid from industrialized countries is bleak” (Blumenfeld 1994: 3). 
Hence, both the growing popularity of resource transfers in international environmental 
politics and the obvious need to use as efficiently as possible the often limited amount of 
resources available for international efforts to combat transboundary environmental 
degradation testify to the practical relevance of the research question pursued in this study. 
This study is also relevant from a theoretical point of view since the existing political 
science literature on positive incentives generally fails to systematically explore the 
conditions under which positive incentives are successfully applied to foster international 
environmental cooperation and what kind of problems arise when bringing positive incentives 
to bear. The theoretical foundations for investigating the role of positive incentives were laid 
four decades ago by the economist Ronald Coase. In his seminal article “The Problem of 
Social Cost” (1960) Coase demonstrated that domestic disputes over negative externalities 
could be successfully resolved by bargaining among the producers and victims of negative 
externalities—i.e. in the absence of government intervention—and that the ultimate allocation 
of resources would be socially optimal, irrespective of the initial distribution of property 
rights. Moreover, Coase argued that the main obstacles to such welfare-enhancing exchanges 
were so-called transaction costs, i.e. the costs of negotiating and implementing such 
arrangements. In short, Coase proposed that market exchanges—for example compensation or 
side-payments—could lead to welfare-enhancing solutions of externality problems provided 
that the transaction costs of such exchanges were not too high. 
Two decades after the publication of Coase’s seminal article, John Conybeare (1980) 
discovered the relevance of his theoretical insights for the study of international politics. 
Conybeare’s aim was to contest the international organization view that a federal world 
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government or other supranational structures were necessary means to deal with the growing 
number of international externalities. Specifically, he discussed Coase’s theory with regard to 
several international problems, such as international trade and finance, nuclear proliferation 
and various other issues, in an attempt to demonstrate that market solutions to such problems 
were already globally efficient or could become efficient if property rights and liabilities were 
more clearly allocated. Conybeare’s major contribution was to introduce Coase’s arguments 
to international relations theory. However, he did not further develop Coase’s arguments in 
the sense of identifying which types of transaction costs were crucial for efficient market 
solutions to international externality problems, nor did he systematically test the relevant 
propositions. 
Prompted by the growing popularity of resource transfers in international affairs since 
the early 1990s, a small but growing number of researchers has in recent years rediscovered 
this older literature and has begun to explore in more detail when resource transfers may be 
successfully employed. The collaborative research effort led by Robert Keohane and Marc 
Levy is particularly noteworthy in this respect (Keohane and Levy 1996). The principal aim 
of this project was to examine the conditions under which resource transfers are effective in 
strengthening environmental policies in recipient countries. Towards this end the various 
contributors to this project conducted a number of case studies on environmental assistance 
programs to Central and Eastern Europe and various developing countries. Many of the 
empirical findings derived from the individual case studies are certainly valuable from a 
policy-oriented point of view and have also to a certain extent informed my own research. 
Nevertheless, the findings have certain limitations, in particular due to the project’s rather 
broad research design. Specifically, the analytical framework that guides the contributors’ 
empirical research does not systematically derive from theory the major problems in 
designing and implementing resource transfers. Rather, it is built around three causal 
pathways dubbed the three C’s—i.e. sufficient concern, solutions to contracting problems, 
and adequate capacity—which are hypothesized to determine the effectiveness of resource 
transfers. However, the conditions under which these three causal pathways are activated are 
not derived from theory and specified in the analytical framework, but are explored within the 
individual case studies. As such the findings of this collective research effort generally fall 
short of providing theoretically informed and systematic knowledge on the role of positive 
incentives in fostering international environmental cooperation. 
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In two publications Robert Darst (1997, 2001) has analyzed the risks of the strategy 
Western countries have adopted to deal with various transnational environmental problems 
originating from the countries of the FSU: Resource transfers, or what he terms “transnational 
subsidization”. Darst hypothesizes that in international environmental affairs this strategy 
gives rise to three main risks: Resource transfers may encourage greater environmental risk-
taking by potential recipients (moral hazard), result in what he dubs “polluter life 
extension”—i.e. the modernization, rather than replacement, of polluting facilities—and lead 
to blackmail attempts by would-be recipients. He then discusses various cases of East-West 
environmental cooperation to explore when and how these three risks may hamper the 
effectiveness of environmental assistance programs, and what kind of strategies donors can 
pursue to minimize them. By highlighting three important problems that may arise when 
employing positive incentives, Darst has certainly contributed to our understanding of this 
cooperation strategy. Nevertheless, since he focuses on merely three problematical 
dimensions of this cooperation strategy, his work falls short of providing a systematic and 
exhaustive account of the role of positive incentives in fostering international environmental 
cooperation. 
Other major theoretical work on positive incentives and international cooperation can 
be found in a series of working papers by Ronald Mitchell and Patricia Keilbach (1998, 
1999). Seeking to explain variation in the mechanisms international institutions typically 
adopt to alter state behavior, these two researchers have demonstrated that depending on 
situation structure states tend to resort to different cooperation strategies. Although their 
theoretical argument does not explain under which circumstances positive incentives are 
effective and efficient in promoting international cooperation, it is nonetheless of relevance 
for the purposes of this study because is provides interesting insights as to when, i.e. in what 
kind of situation structure, positive incentives are likely to be employed by states. Their 
findings will thus be outlined in more detail in a separate section of this chapter. 
Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff (1999) have conducted the most explicit research 
so far on the advantages and drawbacks of positive incentives in fostering international 
cooperation. The major contribution of the collaborative research project led by these two 
political scientists was to develop a coherent analytical framework to analyze the 
effectiveness and efficiency of positive incentives and to systematically evaluate their 
theoretical propositions by means of case studies in the field of arms control and nuclear non-
proliferation. Obviously, my research draws extensively on the theoretical work of that 
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project. Nevertheless, this study is distinct in two respects: First, it rectifies a number of 
incoherent or weak spots in the theoretical arguments of Bernauer and Ruloff and expands on 
their work by integrating recent theoretical insights. Second, it explores the role of positive 
incentives in a different issue-area of international politics, i.e. in international environmental 
affairs. In sum, by building upon and synthesizing the theoretical insights of recent research 
this study aspires to close a number of research gaps in the theoretical literature on positive 
incentives and international cooperation. 
2.2 Situation Structure and the Employment of Positive Incentives 
When are states likely to employ positive incentives to promote international environmental 
cooperation and why? Drawing extensively on recent work by Mitchell and Keilbach (1999) 
and Mitchell (1998, 1999), this section aims to provide a theoretically informed answer to the 
question above. This section is structured along the following lines. In a first step I describe 
three different types of externality situations states commonly face when seeking cooperative 
outcomes. In a second step I outline three strategies that states may employ to promote 
international cooperation: Positive incentives, negative incentives and issue-specific 
reciprocity. Finally, I discuss in which externality situation which of the three cooperation 
strategies is likely to be employed by states. 
It has already been pointed out that externalities resulting from the uncoordinated 
behavior of one or more states generate a demand for international cooperation. The logic 
behind this argument is straightforward: In an interdependent world, the uncoordinated 
behavior of one or more states often imposes unintended costs on other states, and those states 
bearing the costs of the externality have an incentive to promote cooperation. The existing 
literature on international cooperation generally builds upon the argument that externality 
situations generate a demand for cooperation. However, many analysts of international 
cooperation have overlooked the fact that externality situations differ in terms of their 
underlying structures. Mitchell and Keilbach (1999) have rectified this shortcoming in the 
existing literature by demonstrating that the structure of externality situations varies along two 
significant dimensions. One dimension of situation structure relates to the interacting states’ 
preferences to cooperate: In some externality situations all interacting states are dissatisfied 
with the status quo and thus have incentives to cooperate, even though the payoffs of 
cooperation may be unevenly distributed. Thus, their preferences to cooperate are symmetric. 
In other externality situations not all interacting states are dissatisfied with the status quo and 
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some states may therefore have no incentives to cooperate. Their preferences to cooperate are 
thus asymmetric. The other dimension of situation structure relates to the interacting states’ 
capacities to cooperate: In some externality situations all interacting states are capable of 
cooperating in the sense that they dispose over the financial, technical and administrative 
means to alter their externality-generating behavior. Thus, their capacities to cooperate are 
symmetric. In other situations not all interacting states have the capacity to alter their 
externality-generating behavior. Their capacities to cooperate are thus asymmetric.3
In short, on the basis of whether the interacting states’ preferences and/or capacities to 
cooperate are symmetric or asymmetric, we can broadly distinguish among three different 
types of externality situations states commonly face when seeking to achieve cooperative 
outcomes. In the following I delineate these three differently structured externality situations 
with the help of simple examples derived from international environmental politics. 
Externality Situations Involving Symmetric Preferences and Capacities 
The underlying structure of such externality situations is best illustrated by the following 
example involving a lake being shared by two relatively affluent states. Assume that each 
state uses the lake for drinking water purposes and that each state pollutes the lake with 
sewage. In this simple example both the preferences and capacities of the two states to 
cooperate are symmetric. Their preferences are symmetric because both states are dissatisfied 
with the status quo. Indeed, each state generates an externality that imposes costs on the 
other—the lake water is undrinkable for both states due to the mutual disposal of sewage into 
the lake. In this example there is no clear-cut distinction between victim and perpetrator state 
because each state perceives itself as being victimized by the externality-generating behavior 
of the other. Since both states are dissatisfied with the status quo, they both have incentives to 
cooperate: Each state reckons that the net-benefits to be gained from collectively abating 
pollution exceed the net-benefits of both the status quo and of unilaterally abating pollution. 
Their capacities to cooperate are symmetric because both states dispose over the financial, 
                                                 
3 The existing literature on international cooperation generally fails to take these two dimensions of situation 
structure into account. Indeed, most theories of international cooperation posit that states cooperate either to 
achieve common interests or to avoid common aversions. In other words, it is assumed that all interacting 
states are dissatisfied with the status quo and that all states have incentives to cooperate. At the same time it 
is also implicitly assumed that all interacting states are capable of adopting alternative behaviors that can 
alleviate the externality. Consequently, international cooperation is often analyzed with respect to only one 
specific type of situation, i.e. when both the preferences and capacities of interacting states to cooperate are 
symmetric (Mitchell and Keilbach 1999; Mitchell 1999). 
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technical and administrative means to alleviate the externality, for example by building and 
operating expensive sewage disposal plants. 
Although all interacting states have an interest to cooperate in such externality 
situations, they still face incentives to defect. This is so because in such situations each state 
may reckon that it could gain even larger net-benefits from unilateral defection than from 
mutual cooperation. The example above illustrates this incentive structure: While both states 
perceive benefits in collectively building and operating expensive sewage disposal plants, 
each state prefers that the other build and operate a sewage disposal plant while abstaining 
from such costly action itself. However, if both states act upon this incentive structure, they 
will be unable to overcome the uncooperative status quo, even though both states perceive the 
status quo as suboptimal.4 In short, even when interacting states share symmetric preferences 
and capacities to cooperate, they are still confronted with incentives to defect. As a result, it 
may be difficult for the interacting states not only to achieve, but also to sustain cooperative 
solutions to externality problems. 
Externality Situations Involving Asymmetric Preferences 
A typical example for situations involving asymmetric preferences is a river being shared by 
two states, with one state located upstream and the other downstream. Assume that both states 
pollute the river while also using it for drinking water purposes. In this example, the 
interacting states’ preferences to cooperate are asymmetric: The downstream and upstream 
states do not share a mutual dissatisfaction with the status quo and consequently they do not 
have similar incentives to cooperate. The downstream state is certainly dissatisfied with the 
status quo because it is harmed by the externality produced by the upstream state. The 
downstream state (the victim state) thus prefers a cooperative outcome in which the upstream 
state (the perpetrator state) alters its externality-generating behavior. The upstream state, 
however, is not necessarily dissatisfied with the status quo because the costs of its externality-
generating behavior can be almost fully externalized. Moreover, the upstream state is not 
harmed by the pollution produced by the downstream state. Since the upstream state has no or 
only few incentives to incur the costs of pollution abatement, it prefers the status quo to any 
                                                 
4  In game theoretic terms, the incentive structure underlying the lake example above is that of a mixed motive 
game such as the well-known “Prisoner’s Dilemma” or the “Tragedies of the Commons”. Situations 
involving symmetric preferences and capacities also resemble coordination games in which all interacting 
states are indifferent among the possible coordinated outcomes so long as the uncoordinated status quo 
outcome is avoided. 
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cooperative outcome. The aforementioned example of two states sharing a lake can also 
involve asymmetric preferences if we include the assumption that one state has alternative 
sources of drinking water (state A) and the other does not (state B). State A may be indifferent 
to the pollution produced by state B precisely because it has alternative sources of drinking 
water. State B, however, is not indifferent to the pollution produced by state A because it 
depends on the lake for its drinking water. State B therefore prefers a cooperative outcome in 
which state A stops polluting the lake. In short, states face considerable cooperation problems 
in situations involving asymmetric preferences. 
The two examples outlined above indicate that asymmetric preferences can arise for 
many reasons. In the following I elaborate on one important reason why states typically face 
asymmetric preferences in international environmental politics: Large income differentials 
between states. It is widely assumed that with increasing income per capita, the demand for 
so-called “post-material“ goods such as environmental protection grows. The governments of 
developed countries whose populations already enjoy relatively high standards of living tend 
to be willing to engage in international environmental cooperation. This is so because their 
populations place a relatively high premium on a clean environment and thus lobby their 
respective governments for internationally coordinated environmental measures (Cairncross 
1992; Turner et al. 1994). The governments of less well-off states, however, often lack the 
incentives to engage in international environmental cooperation. On the one hand, the 
governments of poor countries face more painful trade-offs than governments of rich 
countries. Indeed, since the financial, technical and administrative resources of hard-pressed 
countries are highly constrained, their choices involve severe opportunity costs: Resources 
devoted to environmental protection can no longer be used for other urgent needs such as 
economic development. As a consequence, governments of poor states tend to discount the 
future benefits of environmental protection more than governments of rich countries. On the 
other hand, they face practically no internal pressure to engage in international environmental 
cooperation due to the absence of large domestic constituencies calling for environmental 
protection. In sum, large differences in per capita income do not only determine the 
discrepancy between existing levels of environmental quality in rich and poor countries, but 
also their respective preferences to engage in international environmental cooperation 
(Connolly and Keohane 1996: 12-13). 
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Externality Situations Involving Asymmetric Capacities 
In contrast to situations involving asymmetric preferences in which the perpetrator state lacks 
incentives to cooperate, the fundamental cooperation problem in situations involving 
asymmetric capacities relates to the insufficient capacities on the part of the perpetrator state 
to alter its externality-generating behavior. Indeed, even if the perpetrator state prefers to 
cooperate, the lack of domestic financial, technical or administrative resources may prevent 
the perpetrator state from alleviating the externality it produces. Such problems have been 
frequently observed in North-South and East-West environmental politics in which the poorer 
countries of the South and Eastern Europe have experienced considerable difficulties in 
implementing environmental projects or complying with international environmental 
agreements (Keohane and Levy 1996). We can thus characterize situations involving 
asymmetric capacities as those situations in which the victim state prefers that the perpetrator 
state adopt some new externality-reducing behavior that the perpetrator state may prefer to 
adopt but cannot. 
Although the clear-cut distinction between situations involving asymmetric 
preferences and situations involving asymmetric capacities is certainly useful for analytical 
purposes, in reality the distinction may prove elusive since capacity problems on the part of 
the perpetrator state tend to influence its own preferences for cooperation. In this respect 
capacity problems are endogenous to problems of asymmetric preferences: States with 
insufficient financial, technical or administrative capacities tend to abstain from participating 
in international environmental negotiations and from entering into international agreements. 
States can thus also face situations in which both preferences and capacities are asymmetric. 
In such situations the victim state prefers that the perpetrator state adopt some new 
externality-reducing behavior that the perpetrator state both does not want to and cannot 
adopt. However, to simplify matters I have refrained from categorizing a fourth type of 
situation involving asymmetric preferences and capacities. 
Three cooperation strategies 
The description of the three externality situations demonstrates that those states which prefer 
to cooperate, i.e. the victim states or those states dissatisfied with the status quo, encounter 
various obstacles in achieving and sustaining cooperative outcomes. Cooperation problems 
commonly arise due to one or a combination of the following three factors: Perpetrator states 
32 Analytical Framework 
may have incentives to defect, they may lack incentives to engage in cooperation or they may 
have insufficient capacities to alter externality-generating behavior. As a result, victim states 
must employ cooperation strategies to counter incentives to defect and to make cooperation a 
more attractive and possible course of action for the perpetrator state. 
One cooperation strategy commonly employed by states involves the provision of 
positive incentives. However, states often have other cooperation strategies at their disposal, 
and depending on the circumstances, they may favor one cooperation strategy over the other. 
Consequently, the main question pursued in this section—i.e. when do states tend to rely on 
positive incentives to foster international cooperation and why—is best addressed by 
assessing when states are likely to use positive incentives instead of other available 
cooperation strategies. So what other types of strategies can states employ to foster 
international cooperation? To keep the following discussion as simple as possible, I limit the 
number of potentially available cooperation strategies to two alternative cooperation 
strategies: Negative incentives and issue-specific reciprocity. In the following I briefly 
describe each cooperation strategy. 
Positive incentives—as conceptualized in this study—involve transfers of positively 
valued resources, such as money, technology, or know-how, from one actor to another. When 
adhering to a positive incentive strategy, the victim state makes the following contingent 
offer: It promises to provide positively valued resources if the perpetrator state agrees to alter 
its externality-generating behavior, but also threatens to withhold the provision of these 
resources if the perpetrator state refuses to cooperate. The victim state’s contingent offer 
manipulates the material consequences of the perpetrator state’s choice between cooperation 
and non-cooperation as follows: If the perpetrator state cooperates, it will receive the 
positively valued resources, but if it does not cooperate, it will be denied the provision of 
positively valued resources. The logic behind the conditional provision of positively valued 
goods is to make cooperation more attractive by increasing the net-benefits the perpetrator 
state believes it may gain from altering its externality-generating behavior. Apart from 
influencing the incentive structure of the perpetrator state, the provision of positively valued 
resources can also create new opportunities for the perpetrator state to engage in cooperation 
if it lacks the capacities to do so. 
Negative incentives involve sanctions and threats designed to impose costs on other 
states. When adhering to a negative incentive strategy, the victim state makes the following 
contingent offer: It promises to abstain from imposing sanctions if the perpetrator state agrees 
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to alter its externality-generating behavior, but also threatens to impose sanctions if the 
perpetrator state does not cooperate. The victim state’s contingent offer manipulates the 
material consequences of the perpetrator state’s choice between cooperation and non-
cooperation as follows: If the perpetrator state cooperates, it will evade the sanctions 
threatened by the victim state, but if it does not cooperate, it must be prepared to suffer the 
costs of the threatened sanctions. The logic behind the threat is to make cooperation relatively 
more attractive to the perpetrator state by increasing its perceived costs of not altering its 
externality-generating behavior. 
Issue-specific reciprocity involves what other analysts of international cooperation 
have termed an “intertemporal linkage within an issue area” (Mitchell and Keilbach 1999). 
When adhering to a strategy of issue-specific reciprocity, the victim state makes the following 
contingent offer: It promises to adopt a desirable externality-mitigating behavior if the 
perpetrator state does likewise, but also threatens to continue or to revert to an undesirable 
externality-generating behavior if the perpetrator state refuses to cooperate or defects. The 
victim state’s contingent offer manipulates the material consequences of the perpetrator 
state’s choice between cooperation and non-cooperation as follows: If the perpetrator state 
cooperates, it will gain whatever benefits accrue to it from sustained mutual cooperation. 
However, if it does not cooperate, it will not gain whatever benefits accrue to it from 
sustained mutual cooperation, or in case of defection from a cooperative outcome, it will lose 
such benefits. 
In the following I discuss in which of the three different externality situations which 
cooperation strategy—positive incentives, negative incentives or issue-specific reciprocity—
is most likely to be employed by states. 
Cooperation Strategies in Situations Involving Symmetric Preferences and Capacities 
In such externality situations all interacting states are dissatisfied with the uncooperative 
status quo outcome and therefore have incentives to cooperate. Moreover, all interacting 
states have the capacity to achieve a cooperative outcome if they prefer so. However, states 
continue to face incentives to defect because each state prefers unilateral defection to mutual 
cooperation. Which cooperation strategy will states most likely adhere to in such situations? 
Issue-specific reciprocity has been identified by various analysts of international cooperation 
as the most promising cooperation strategy under such circumstances because it allows states 
to reach cooperative outcomes rather smoothly and usually provides states with an adequate 
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enforcement mechanism. On the one hand, issue-specific reciprocity resolves bargaining 
problems rather simply by providing strong and simple focal points for agreement. Imposing 
nominally equal obligations on all interacting states—for example all states halt their 
externality-generating behavior, reduce the externality they produce by equal amounts, or 
adopt some common process or technology to alleviate the externality—is often considered to 
conform to the criterion of fairness and tends to prevent the rise of “stingy” bargaining 
behavior by concealing the quite different compliance burdens and cooperation benefits 
involved (Mitchell and Keilbach 1999). On the other hand, issue-specific reciprocity can also 
resolve enforcement problems rather effectively. For example, in the lake example outlined 
above a state which free-rides on the pollution abatement efforts of the other can be induced 
to cooperate by retaliatory measures (i.e. retaliatory defection) on the part of the latter since 
each state prefers mutual cooperation to the non-cooperative status quo. 
Although the employment of negative or positive incentives is conceivable in 
situations involving symmetric preferences and capacities, states are less likely to rely on 
these two cooperation strategies because issue-specific reciprocity provides a much more 
cost-effective and equitable way of achieving and sustaining cooperative outcomes. 
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that negative or positive incentives may be employed 
by states to bolster a strategy of issue-specific reciprocity, especially then when the latter’s 
enforcement mechanisms are inadequate. Indeed, in some circumstances, for example when 
there is a large number of interacting states, it may prove impossible to threaten retaliatory 
defection due to collective action problems or due to the difficulties involved in focusing the 
effects of retaliatory defection on the initial defector state (Mitchell and Keilbach 1999). 
Thus, under certain circumstances issue-specific reciprocity may require some fine-tuning 
with negative or positive incentives in order to counter incentives to defect. 
Cooperation Strategies in Situations Involving Asymmetric Preferences 
In such externality situations not all interacting states are dissatisfied with the uncooperative 
status quo outcome. The preferences to cooperate are therefore unevenly distributed among 
the interacting states: While the victim states have a strong interest in cooperation, the 
perpetrator states may prefer the uncooperative status quo. Which cooperation strategy will be 
most likely employed in such situations? Issue-specific reciprocity is bound to be ineffective 
in such situations because the preferences of the perpetrator state are independent of the issue-
specific behavior of the victim state. Indeed, a downstream state will not be able to induce an 
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upstream state to change its externality-generating behavior by simply threatening to also 
pollute the river. The same logic applies to the example in which two states share a lake but in 
which one state has alternative drinking water resources while the other does not: The former 
state is unlikely to be enticed to stop polluting the lake by means of retaliatory defection by 
the latter. 
Nevertheless, in situations involving less pronounced asymmetric preferences, states 
have occasionally adhered to two “soft” types of issue-specific reciprocity. In lowest common 
denominator solutions states conclude agreements in which each state accepts the same 
environmental obligations, for example the same amount of emission reductions. Such 
obligations are established at the level that the most reluctant state is willing to comply with. 
The resulting level of emission reductions is thus small enough to minimize cost and benefit 
differentials among the states with asymmetric preferences. Although such lowest common 
denominator solutions may be conducive to achieving cooperation, such a strategy is hardly 
desirable from the viewpoint of those states strongly interested in an effective solution to the 
problem since the resulting level of environmental protection measures is determined by the 
maximum offer of the least interested state, and in various instances, the least interested state 
may just prefer the uncooperative status quo. In differential regulation states conclude 
agreements in which all participating states in principle have equal environmental obligations, 
but which allow for exceptions and grace periods for those states least interested in complying 
with such obligations. Well-known international environmental agreements that provide for 
differentiated obligations include the second SO2 Protocol under the LRTAP regime of the 
ECE and the Montreal protocol on the protection of the stratospheric ozone layer. Differential 
regulation promises to involve more substantial environmental obligations than lowest 
common denominator solutions because the resulting level of pollution abatement measures is 
determined more by the individual preferences of participating parties than by the maximum 
offer of the most reluctant state. However, even differential regulation may prove totally 
ineffective if the behavior of the perpetrator state is crucial to solving the environmental 
problem at hand and if it has no interest in changing its behavior. 
In situations involving asymmetric preferences states will tend to rely either on 
negative or positive incentives. This is so because these two cooperation strategies directly 
address the fundamental cooperation problem in such externality situations: The perpetrator 
state’s lack of interest to cooperate. Indeed, both negative and positive incentives are designed 
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to enhance the perpetrator state’s incentives to cooperate by increasing the benefits and/or 
lowering the costs of cooperation to the perpetrator state. 
Cooperation Strategies in Situations Involving Asymmetric Capacities 
In situations involving asymmetric capacities states are likely to employ positive incentives 
because this cooperation strategy addresses the fundamental cooperation problem in such 
externality situations: Insufficient capacities on the part of the perpetrator state. Indeed, the 
transfer of money, technology and know-how can increase the capacity of perpetrator states 
otherwise not able—and thereby perhaps also not willing—to cooperate. In contrast, negative 
incentives are unlikely to be employed by states in such situations since the fundamental 
cooperation problem does not relate to the perpetrator state’s lack of interest in cooperation, 
but to its insufficient capacities to cooperate. Although it is theoretically conceivable that 
negative incentives may coerce a perpetrator state into developing such capacities, in practice 
this is most unlikely to occur. Issue-specific reciprocity is also a non-starter in such situations 
since the issue-specific behavior of the victim state is unrelated to the perpetrator state’s 
capacities to alter its behavior. 
The discussion above allows us to return to the main question of this section: When 
are states likely to rely on positive incentives to promote international environmental 
cooperation and why? It has been shown that positive incentives are most likely to be 
employed by states in externality situations involving asymmetric capacities. Indeed, a 
positive incentive strategy is the only cooperation strategy discussed in this section which can 
adequately solve the fundamental cooperation problem—insufficient capacities—states 
encounter in this externality situation. Moreover, positive incentives have been identified as a 
promising cooperation strategy in situations involving asymmetric preferences. However, in 
contrast to situations involving asymmetric capacities, states are likely not only to rely on 
positive incentives, but may also employ negative incentives in such situations. Finally, 
positive incentives are less likely to be employed by states in situations involving symmetric 
preferences and capacities. Indeed, states will tend to rely on other cooperation strategies such 
as issue-specific reciprocity in such situations, although they may employ negative or positive 
incentives as a means to buttress or fine-tune a fundamentally reciprocal agreement. 
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2.3 The Coase Theorem 
The previous section has demonstrated that in various instances of international 
environmental affairs, in particular in situations involving asymmetric preferences and/or 
capacities, victim states are likely to employ positive incentives in order to induce and/or 
enable perpetrator states to alter their externality-generating behavior. Put in other words: The 
victims of pollution often pay polluters to stop polluting. This widespread practice in 
international environmental affairs may be considered to be inappropriate or unfair from a 
legal or moral point of view because it violates the longstanding “Polluters Pay Principle”, i.e. 
the internationally recognized principle that each state is responsible for controlling the 
transboundary effects of pollution generated within the borders of its national jurisdiction.5 
Nevertheless, given the absence of a supranational authority capable of enforcing the 
“Polluters Pay Principle”, this practice should not be surprising. The fact that victim states 
often transfer resources to perpetrator states in order to promote international environmental 
cooperation gives rise to a crucial question: Are transfers of positively valued resources from 
one actor to another an effective and efficient means to solve international externality 
problems, and if so, under which conditions? Over four decades ago the economist Ronald 
Coase laid the theoretical foundations for addressing this question. Thus, in the following 
section I discuss his theoretical findings and highlight their relevance for the study of 
international environmental cooperation. 
The idea that victims of pollution transfer resources to polluters is not new, nor is it a 
discovery of International Relations theory. In his seminal article “The Problem of Social 
Cost“ (1960), Ronald Coase contested the conventional notion that governmental regulation 
was needed to resolve domestic disputes over negative externalities—i.e. pollution and other 
undesirable side effects of economic activity—and refuted the claim that the producer of a 
negative externality should automatically be made liable. Coase argued that under conditions 
of clearly defined property rights and a well-working market system the producer and the 
victim of an externality can engage in market transactions which will ultimately reduce the 
                                                 
5  The “Polluters Pay Principle” is enshrined in the United Nations 1972 Stockholm Declaration and in many 
other international environmental agreements concluded thereafter. Principle 21 of the Declaration of the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration) stipulates that “states have, 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign 
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
states or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.“ 
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externality to the same, socially optimal level, irrespective of the initial distribution of 
property rights, i.e. regardless of which party has a right to create or prevent the externality. If 
the victim of pollution holds the right to a clean environment, then the polluter will pay the 
victim to accept that level of pollution at which the marginal benefit accruing to the polluter 
from an additional unit of production equals the marginal cost to the victim of an additional 
unit of pollution. In case the polluter has the property right to pollute, i.e. to create an 
externality, then the victim will pay the polluter to reduce emissions to the identical point at 
which the marginal benefit of an additional unit of a clean environment equals the marginal 
cost the polluter incurs from the foregone production. In short, when transactions costs, i.e. 
the costs of negotiating and implementing the exchange, are zero, the ultimate allocation of 
resources of such an exchange is the same and socially optimal, irrespective of the initial 
distribution of property rights. Subsequent commentators called this the “Coase Theorem“ 
(Darst 1997: 45). 
It may be helpful to illustrate the rather abstract arguments outlined above on the basis 
of a simple example. Consider a situation in which the sulfur dioxide emissions of a steel mill 
negatively affect a landowner located down wind. Suppose that the pollution produced by the 
steel mill causes damages to the landowner in the order of $50'000 and that pollution can be 
eliminated by the installation of pollution control devices at a cost of $30'000. Assume further 
that the costs accruing to the landowner of shifting his land to a new use unaffected by the 
pollution amount to $20'000. Is it efficient or socially optimal for the government to intervene 
in this dispute and make the polluter—i.e. the steel producer—liable for the damages he 
causes? Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is not. If the government forces the steel 
producer to internalize all external costs of steel production, the steel producer will install 
pollution control devices and the dispute will be resolved at a cost of $30'000. If the 
government does not intervene in this dispute, the steel producer will continue to pollute and 
the landowner will change the use of his land, thereby solving the dispute at a cost of $20'000. 
Thus, in this specific case direct government intervention in favor of the landowner would 
have led to a socially sub-optimal solution to the externality problem. 
This example can also be used to illustrate Coase’s argument that in the absence of 
transaction costs market exchanges between parties will result in the same and socially 
optimal solution of negative externality problems, irrespective of the initial distribution of 
property rights. Suppose that the steel producer has the legal right to pollute, which—as 
shown above—happens to be the most efficient solution. In this case the landowner will offer 
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the steel producer up to $20'000—i.e. an amount lower than the costs for changing the use of 
his land—to stop polluting. The steel producer, however, will turn down this offer since the 
installment of pollution control devices costs $30'000. The outcome will thus be that the steel 
producer continues to pollute and the landowner changes the use of his land. Now consider 
the opposite situation in which the landowner has the legal right to clean air. The outcome in 
this situation will be exactly the same—continued pollution and change in the use of the 
landowner’s land—and also socially optimal. If the landowner insisted on pollution 
elimination, the steel producer would have to spend $30'000 on pollution control devices. 
However, the steel producer may offer the landowner an amount of, say, $25'000 for 
permission to pollute. Since this amount is higher than the costs of changing the use of his 
land, the landowner will be better off by accepting the offer and waiving his right to clean air. 
And the steel producer will also be better off since this amount is less than the costs of 
installing pollution control devices.6
Since Coase’s reflections apply to negotiation and exchange situations without direct 
government intervention, his arguments are relevant also for transactions in the international 
realm whose fundamental feature is the absence of a supranational authority above the 
individual nation-states. Indeed, since the absence of a supranational authority in the 
international realm precludes vertical solutions to externality problems—with the partial 
exception of the EU—, states are effectively forced to seek horizontal solutions to such 
problems. With respect to international environmental affairs, the Coasian model applies to 
situations in which a state or a group of states may consider paying another state to restrict or 
forego its sovereign right to produce an externality. The exchange of money for 
environmental measures on the part of the recipient results in a reassignment of (property) 
rights: While the donor states provide resources, the recipient country waives its sovereign 
right to pollute and commits itself to a course of action otherwise costly to itself, but 
beneficial to the donors. Under conditions of zero transaction costs, such a voluntary 
exchange leads to an optimal allocation of resources, or in other words, to a pareto-efficient 
                                                 
6 The logic of Coase’s argument also holds when the costs of pollution elimination involved in this example 
are lowered—say to $10'000. In this situation the steel producer will stop polluting, regardless of the initial 
distribution of property rights, and the outcomes will be socially optimal. If the steel producer has the legal 
right to pollute, the landowner will offer an amount of, say, $15'000 for a guarantee that pollution will be 
eliminated. The steel producer will accept this deal since the amount of money offered is larger than the costs 
of installing pollution control devices. If the landowner has the legal right to clean air, the steel producer will 
also stop polluting. Indeed, the largest amount the steel producer will be willing to offer for the permission to 
pollute is $10'000, i.e. an offer the landowner will decline. 
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reduction of the externality whereby at least one country is made better off and no country is 
made worse off by the exchange. 
The pareto-efficient nature of such market exchanges under conditions of zero 
transaction costs may be best exemplified by contrasting a situation in which a downstream 
state pays an upstream state to stop polluting a river they both share with a situation in which 
the downstream state coerces an upstream state—for example with economic sanctions—into 
doing so. In the former situation involving resource transfers the downstream state benefits 
from reduced pollution levels but also compensates the upstream state for the losses it incurs 
from changing its behavior. If the amount of resources the downstream state provides is less 
than it gains in terms of reduced pollution levels and exceeds the abatement costs incurred by 
the upstream state, both states are better off. In the latter situation involving economic 
sanctions the downstream state will likely benefit at the expense of the upstream state that is 
not compensated for the costs it incurs from changing its behavior. Hence, in this situation the 
upstream state will be made worse off, or, if the sanctions employed by the downstream state 
prove to be overly costly, both states may be worse off. 
The assumption of zero transaction costs, however, does not have much in common 
with the real world. Coase was aware of this and extended his analysis to include those real-
world cases in which transaction costs were positive and in which disputes over the 
assignment of property rights existed. Coase demonstrated that even under such conditions 
the social value of production could be maximized if courts assigned property rights to the 
party with the higher transaction costs. Although transposing this argument from domestic 
settings to the international level is certainly possible, two important caveats must be taken 
into account when doing so. First, Coase’s argument is based on the implicit assumption that 
there are courts that can assign and reassign property rights. This in turn presumes the 
existence of some sort of authoritative legal system with sufficient powers of enforcement. 
Second, even in those cases in which the initial assignment of property rights is not contested, 
his argument assumes that the costs of negotiating and implementing exchanges are not 
prohibitively high. This again presumes that an authoritative legal system is in place that 
parties can call upon in case contracts are breached. By contrast, at the international level 
there is neither an overarching government nor an authoritative legal system. As a result, 
transaction costs at the international level are often significantly higher than in domestic 
settings. Monitoring and enforcing international agreements are often more costly, and the 
risks that the parties to such an agreement will prove unable or unwilling to comply with 
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treaty obligations are higher. Finally, the very task of reassigning property rights in the 
international system and determining which party has the higher transaction costs is unlikely 
to be an easy undertaking (Darst 1997). Nevertheless, these qualifications do not call into 
question the general proposition that voluntary exchanges between victim and perpetrator 
states can lead to effective and efficient solutions to international externality problems. They 
rather suggest that for exchanges to be effective and efficient at the international level, 
interacting states must find means and ways to reduce or overcome transaction costs. 
2.4 Basic Analytical Framework 
The previous section has shown that a systematic analysis of transaction costs is key to 
answering the research question of this study: When and how can positive incentives foster 
international environmental cooperation in an effective and efficient way, and what are the 
problems that arise in employing positive incentives. Building upon recent theoretical work 
on positive incentives, in particular on the theoretical insights by Bernauer and Ruloff (1999), 
I develop in this section an analytical framework that provides for theoretically deduced 
propositions about which types of transaction costs are critical to the effective and efficient 
employment of positive incentives and how these transaction costs can be reduced or 
overcome. 
The analytical framework developed in this section builds upon the following 
concepts. Positive incentives are conceptualized in terms of transactions, i.e. exchanges of 
money, technology, know-how for externality-reducing behavioral changes. The outcomes to 
be explained are the effectiveness and efficiency of a transaction. As shown in figure 1, the 
explanation operates at several levels of analysis and involves two groups of explanatory 
concepts: a) Properties and Processes of Interaction between Donor and Recipient Countries, 
and b) Processes of Interaction in Donor and Recipient Countries. The explanatory concepts 
are operationalized in terms of problems that arise when designing and implementing positive 
incentives and that may have an impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of a transaction. 
FIGURE 2.1: BASIC ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
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The theoretical propositions of the analytical framework boil down to the following basic 
hypothesis: The more the designated problems crop up in a transaction both in terms of their 
occurrence and intensity, or conversely, the less successful the provider states are in coping 
with these problems, the lower the effectiveness and/or efficiency of the transaction. That 
said, it must be emphasized that the analytical framework is not so much designed to allow 
for rigorous hypothesis testing but rather aims to provide a checklist of problems that 
typically arise when designing and implementing positive incentives. Indeed, this caveat 
should not be surprising with a view to the fact that it is next to impossible to precisely gauge 
the exact influence of each problem on the outcomes to be explained. Hence, the analytical 
framework is best viewed as a useful analytical tool to evaluate and explain in empirical cases 
whether and how the theoretically predicted problems individually or collectively affected the 
effectiveness and/or efficiency of a transaction. 
This section is structured as follows. In a first step I elaborate on the outcomes to be 
explained, i.e. the effectiveness and efficiency of transactions, and discuss how these concepts 
are measured in this study. In a second step I specify the explanatory variables of the 
analytical framework, i.e. the problems in designing and implementing positive incentives. 
Measuring the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Transactions 
The effectiveness of a transaction denotes the extent to which positive incentives drove the 
recipient country’s behavior in a direction desired by the provider state. In other words, the 
degree to which the employment of positive incentives—and this cooperation strategy 
exclusively—altered the behavior of the recipient and hence reduced the negative externality 
at hand determines the effectiveness of a transaction. The efficiency of a transaction denotes 
the cost-effectiveness of positive incentives in driving the recipient country’s behavior in a 
direction desired by the provider state. The concept of efficiency used in this study 
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encompasses two related, nevertheless distinct dimensions. The first dimension of efficiency 
relates to the question of whether the employment of cooperation strategies other than 
positive incentives could have led to comparable or superior externality-reducing behavioral 
changes on the part of the recipient country at a lower or comparable cost. If no other 
alternative cooperation strategy could have generated larger net-benefits (benefits minus 
costs) arising from the behavioral changes on the part of the recipient, then the employment of 
positive incentives can be considered to have been efficient. The second dimension of 
efficiency relates to the question of whether alternative ways of employing positive 
incentives—i.e. the funding and implementation of alternative capacity-building measures—
could have led to comparable or superior externality-reducing behavioral changes on the part 
of the recipient country at a lower or comparable cost. If this question can be answered in the 
negative, then the specific way the provider countries employed positive incentives can be 
considered to have been efficient. 
It should be noted that the concepts of effectiveness and efficiency used in this study 
are not mutually dependent in the sense that when a transaction is found to be (in)effective, it 
necessarily has to be (in)efficient, or vice versa. For example, a transaction may be 
simultaneously effective and inefficient if the employment of positive incentives succeeded in 
reducing the negative externality at hand, but alternative cooperation strategies and/or ways of 
employing positive incentives could have led to comparable or superior externality-reducing 
behavioral changes on the part of the recipient country at a lower or comparable cost. 
Conversely, an ineffective but efficient transaction implies that the provision of positive 
incentives failed to alter the externality-generating behavior of the recipient country, but also 
that no other cooperation strategy and/or way of employing positive incentives could have led 
to a more favorable outcome from the point of view of the provider countries. 
From the discussion above it follows that it is necessary to specify a set of alternative 
cooperation strategies as analytical benchmarks for assessing the effectiveness and efficiency 
(first dimension) of transactions. Indeed, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of a 
transaction, we need to control for the possible effects of other cooperation strategies that the 
provider countries may have employed in combination with positive incentives. Moreover, in 
order to evaluate the efficiency (first dimension) of a transaction, we need to determine 
whether the employment of other cooperation strategies could have generated larger net-
benefits for the provider countries. Furthermore, it should be noted that in order to assess the 
second dimension of efficiency, it is necessary to specify the possible ways by which provider 
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countries can employ positive incentives to reduce or eliminate negative externalities. 
However, since the potentially available capacity-building measures to solve a transnational 
environmental problem are generally linked to the nature of the transnational environmental 
problem at hand, I have found it more practical to elaborate on these measures in a section of 
the subsequent chapter which provides an introduction to the physical and political basics of 
the nuclear safety problem in CEE and the FSU. Hence in the following I focus on 
establishing the analytical benchmarks for assessing the effectiveness and efficiency (first 
dimension) of transactions by specifying a set of alternative cooperation strategies. 
So far I have discussed two cooperation strategies which states may adopt as 
alternative strategies to positive incentives: Issue-specific reciprocity and negative incentives. 
However, using these two cooperation strategies in this study as analytical benchmarks for 
assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of transactions would be inadequate for the 
following reasons. On the one hand, an analysis of the cost-effectiveness of issue-specific 
reciprocity would not produce any relevant results because issue-specific reciprocity could 
not have been usefully employed in the examined empirical cases. As already pointed out, 
issue-specific reciprocity is only then usefully employed when the issue-specific behavior of 
the victim state can influence the preferences of the perpetrator state. This condition is, 
however, not always given in international environmental affairs, and it certainly was not 
given in the context of the nuclear safety problem in CEE and the FSU. Indeed, it made no 
sense for the Western (victim) states to threaten to reduce the safety levels at their own 
nuclear power plants in order to entice the Eastern (perpetrator) states to improve safety levels 
at their nuclear power plants. Thus, for practical reasons I exclude issue-specific reciprocity 
from analysis. On the other hand, focusing exclusively on negative incentives to assess the 
effectiveness and efficiency of transactions would be inappropriate because I would thereby 
fail to take into account other available strategies that may be employed to foster international 
environmental cooperation. 
As such it is clear that I must expand on the selection of alternative cooperation 
strategies in order to adequately assess the effectiveness and efficiency of transactions. 
Specifically, I include three additional alternative cooperation strategies for analysis. On the 
one hand, states may provide a different type of positive incentives, i.e. they may employ 
positive issue-linkage strategies. On the other hand, states may seek to foster international 
cooperation by providing new information or by altering existing norms and values, i.e. they 
may adopt what Mitchell (1997, 1999) has termed cognitive or normative strategies. In the 
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following I briefly outline the five cooperation strategies analyzed in this study. One word on 
terminology: What is referred to below as the sender state is the state employing a 
cooperation strategy. The state whose behavior the sender state attempts to alter by employing 
a cooperation strategy is referred to as the target state. 
Positive incentive strategies involve transfers of positively valued resources, such as 
money, technology, or know-how, from a sender (provider) state to a target (recipient) state. 
The logic underlying positive incentive strategies is twofold: On the one hand, such strategies 
seek to alter the incentive structure of a target state by increasing the latter’s perceived net-
benefits of changing its behavior. On the other hand, such strategies seek to generate new 
opportunities for a target state to alter its externality-generating behavior if it lacks the 
capacities to do so. As such positive incentive strategies are based on the assumption that 
target states are reluctant and/or incapable of altering undesirable behaviors. Although 
dependent on reliable information regarding the target state’s behavior, positive incentive 
strategies have the advantage of inducing target states to provide rather than hide information. 
Moreover, such strategies are generally regarded by target states to be less coercive and less 
of an infringement on sovereignty and free will. In recent years positive incentive strategies 
have been increasingly employed in international environmental affairs, in particular vis-à-vis 
capacity-poor countries of the developing world and the former socialist bloc. 
Notwithstanding their attractiveness and behavior-altering potential, positive incentive 
strategies may suffer from a number of problems. The problems involved in designing and 
implementing positive incentives are discussed in detail below. 
Positive issue-linkage strategies constitute a related, nevertheless distinct category of 
positive incentive strategies. Indeed, while the latter involve the provision of material 
incentives within the issue-area currently under negotiation between the sender and target 
states, the former generate (positive) incentives by linking various non-related issues with 
each other. Positive issue-linkage strategies seek to make desirable behavior on the part of the 
target state more attractive by increasing the target state’s perceived net-benefits of changing 
its behavior. For example, a sender state may hold out the prospect of improved market access 
or other economic benefits to a target state if it changes its undesirable behavior in the 
environmental realm. Such strategies are based on the assumption that target states are 
unwilling, but basically capable of altering their undesirable behaviors. Positive issue-linkage 
strategies tend to share most of the advantages and implementation problems of positive 
incentive strategies. 
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Negative incentive strategies involve sanctions, threats, coercion and other efforts 
designed to discourage undesirable behavior by increasing its costs (Mitchell 1999). Although 
negative incentive strategies are not often used in international environmental politics, they 
have been employed in some cases. Indeed, various powerful states, such as the United States, 
have on various occasions threatened violators of international environmental agreements 
with economic sanctions in order to induce these states to comply. For example, it is widely 
assumed that the blanket moratorium adopted by the International Whaling Commission in 
1982 has been effective because the United States threatened to punish violators of the 
moratorium, in particular Japan, with economic sanctions (DeSombre 1994, 2000). Negative 
incentive strategies are based on the assumption that the target state prefers to engage in the 
undesirable behavior because it values that behavior more than available alternative behaviors 
and that the target state has adequate capacity to engage in desirable behaviors. Such 
strategies can suffer from a host of problems (see Pape 1997). While negative incentive 
strategies are dependent on reliable information regarding the target state’s behavior, they 
tend to induce the target state to conceal or misrepresent information of its own behavior. 
Moreover, sanctions need to be credible and/or potent to be effective. However, the costs of 
sanctions and problems of collective action on the part of the sender states can prevent these 
conditions from being met. Furthermore, in some cases sanctions can lead to a so-called “rally 
around the flag” effect in the target state, thereby strengthening the target state’s resolve to 
continue its undesirable behavior. It must also be taken into account that the benefits the 
target state perceives to gain from its undesirable behavior may be larger than the costs the 
target state reckons it would incur by enduring threatened sanctions. Finally, even if a 
negative incentive strategy succeeds in inducing a behavioral change on the part of the target 
state, in some cases sanctions will only lead to a short-term change of preferences and not to a 
genuine change of interest. When sanctions are lifted, the target state’s preferences often 
revert to the status quo ante (Bernauer and Ruloff 1999). 
In various real-world cases confusion may arise as to the precise distinction between 
negative incentive and positive issue-linkage strategies. Indeed, depending on the 
circumstances, a target state may consider an attempt by a sender state to link various issues 
to be a negative incentive or a positive issue-linkage strategy. Hence, in order to precisely 
differentiate between these two cooperation strategies in empirical cases, we need to pay 
careful attention to the status quo and existing expectations on the part of the target state 
(Mitchell and Keilbach 1999). Consider once again the example discussed above of two states 
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(A and B) sharing a lake both for drinking water and waste disposal purposes. Assume also 
that both states are engaged in a certain level of trade. State A is employing a negative 
incentive strategy if it attempts to increase B’s level of pollution abatement by threatening to 
reduce levels of trade that B had previously expected would continue or to block increases in 
trade that B had previously expected would occur and promises to maintain previously 
expected trade levels or improvements only if B increases its level of pollution abatement. 
State A is employing a positive issue-linkage strategy if it attempts to increase B’s level of 
pollution abatement by offering to increase trade with B beyond the level that B had 
previously expected only if B increases its level of pollution abatement. 
Cognitive strategies attempt to furnish target states with new, more complete, or more 
accurate information with the aim of allowing target states to make more intelligent decisions 
which favor the behaviors sought by the sender states (Mitchell 1997). By informing target 
states of the costs and risks of their current behavior, cognitive strategies essentially attempt 
to convince target states that they are unwitting victims of their own behavior. For example, 
sender states can provide in-depth assessments of environmental problems in a target state in 
an attempt to convince the latter that remedial action would be in its own interest. Indeed, in 
one real-world case the countries participating in the LRTAP regime of the ECE provided the 
British government with compelling information on the full costs of its own externality-
generating behavior, i.e. the costs not only accruing to other countries, but also to the United 
Kingdom. This measure was successful in persuading the British government to initiate a 
broad range of environmental measures that ultimately led to significantly reduced levels of 
acid rain in the whole region (Levy 1995). The underlying assumption of cognitive strategies 
is that the target state is basically both willing and capable of changing its behavior. In 
addition, cognitive strategies assume that the target state engages in undesirable behavior 
because it mistakenly believes it to be desirable or beneficial and that changes to the target 
state’s perceived benefits and costs of existing alternatives through information will 
encourage it to adopt a desirable behavior. Providing information on the consequences and 
opportunities of various behavioral options represents a cost-effective strategy to induce 
behavioral change. However, it should be noted that these strategies will be ineffective when 
sender states adhere to them as a cheap way “to do something” rather than because inadequate 
information on the part of the target state is known to be the source of the undesirable 
behavior (Mitchell 1999). 
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Normative strategies are designed to influence the behavior of target states by altering 
deep-seated values and norms. In contrast to cognitive strategies, normative strategies do not 
merely seek to induce target states to adopt new means to pre-existing goals, but rather 
attempt to persuade target states to embrace new goals. For example, during negotiations and 
recurring meetings, sender states may try to convince target states to accept their norms of 
behavior, or both sender and target states may collaborate to focus attention on a particular 
problem, create new norms, and increase their respective commitment to such norms 
(Mitchell 1997). Normative strategies assume that target states are principally capable of 
adopting desirable behaviors and that they will do so once their norms and values have been 
altered through normative dialogue and education. International efforts aimed at altering 
norms are, however, often regarded by target states as presumptuous or even imperialist, and 
may thus provoke strong resistance on the part of target states. In addition, rhetorical attempts 
aimed at persuading target states to alter deeply held norms often take considerable time, and 
hence may be an unsuitable strategy for addressing urgent transnational environmental 
problems. On the other hand, if successfully employed, normative strategies are likely to 
induce wider ranging, deeper, and more stable behavioral changes at a relatively low cost than 
most alternative cooperation strategies (Mitchell 1999). 
In sum, the four alternative cooperation strategies outlined above—positive issue 
linkage, negative incentive, normative and cognitive strategies—provide the analytical 
benchmarks for assessing the effectiveness and efficiency (first dimension) of transactions. 
The effectiveness of a transaction can be more appropriately evaluated by controlling for the 
effect the parallel employment of one or more of these alternative cooperation strategies may 
have had on the behavioral changes of the target state. In addition, the efficiency of a 
transaction (first dimension) is assessed by comparing the relative costs and benefits of 
positive incentives with those of the four alternative cooperation strategies. The five 
cooperation strategies analyzed in this study are summarized in the table below. 
TABLE 2.1: SET OF COOPERATION STRATEGIES 
Cooperation Strategies Main Elements of Strategies 
Positive Incentive Strategies Such strategies involve the transfer of positively valued resources within 
an issue-area and attempt to increase both the target state’s incentives 
and capacities to cooperate. The target state’s incentives to cooperate are 
enhanced by increasing its perceived net-benefits of cooperation. 
Positive Issue-Linkage Strategies Such strategies seek to generate (positive) incentives by linking various 
non-related issues with each other. The target state’s incentives to 
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cooperate are enhanced by increasing its perceived net-benefits of 
cooperation. 
Negative Incentive Strategies Such strategies encompass all kinds of sanctions and threats. The target 
state’s incentives to cooperate are enhanced by increasing its perceived 
costs of non-cooperation. 
Cognitive Strategies 
 
Such strategies attempt to induce target states to cooperate by providing 
them with information on the full costs and risks of their own behavior 
which not only other states, but they themselves bear. 
Normative Strategies 
 
Such strategies seek to induce target states to cooperate by altering the 
values, and hence, the policy goals of target states. They rely on 
persuasion and operate by means of dialogue and education. 
 
Problems in Designing and Implementing Positive Incentives 
As pointed out above, the explanatory concepts of the basic analytical framework are 
operationalized in terms of problems that arise when designing and implementing positive 
incentives and that may affect the effectiveness and/or efficiency of a transaction. These 
problems, which are derived from game theory, negotiation analysis, economic theories and 
International Relations theory in general and build upon the results of empirical research on 
incentives in various areas of international relations, are specified below. 
Properties and Processes of Interaction between Donor and Recipient Countries 
Extortion: Both the effectiveness and efficiency of transactions can suffer from problems of 
“extortion“. Extortion is defined in this study as a behavioral strategy by which one actor 
misleads other actors into paying it to refrain from adopting some externality-generating or 
externality-enhancing behavior which it would not have adopted regardless of whether such a 
payment materialized or not. Extortion can thus arise when information on the (future) 
preferences and behavior of actors is unevenly distributed. For example: State A threatens to 
enhance a negative externality (for example increasing the production of ozone-depleting 
chemicals) unless other countries provide a specific amount of resources. The other countries 
are uncertain whether state A will carry out its threat if they refuse to comply with state A’s 
payment demand, i.e. state A can capitalize on private information which the other countries 
do not have. Even if state A was aware that enhancing the negative externality would be 
costly to itself as well and therefore would have not delivered on its threat regardless of the 
outcome of its payment demand, but the other countries did not know this for sure, the other 
countries might still have complied with state A’s payment demand. If successful, extortion 
50 Analytical Framework 
misleads donors into offering “money for nothing”: The donor countries paid state A to 
refrain from adopting a harmful behavior although state A would have refrained from doing 
so even in the event of no payment. Hence, in this specific case the resource transfer was 
inefficient in driving the behavior of state A in a direction desired by the other countries. 
Moral Hazard: A further problem that can hamper both the effectiveness and 
efficiency of transactions aimed at solving transnational environmental problems is moral 
hazard behavior on the part of the recipient country. Moral hazard has been coined in the 
literature on insurance economics and refers to the phenomenon that actors tend to engage in 
risky activities when they have reason to believe that others will bail them out if they run into 
serious troubles. With respect to international environmental politics, the prospect of 
environmental assistance may induce a potential recipient country to behave in similar ways. 
For example: The prospect of international environmental assistance may induce a country to 
postpone already earmarked domestic investments in environmental protection measures and 
to generally accept higher levels of environmental risk than it would otherwise be willing to 
live with precisely because it hopes or expects that other countries will provide the necessary 
resources to reduce the risks associated with its behavior to an acceptable level. Thus, in this 
specific case the donors paid too much for what they received in terms of environmental 
benefits: If the recipient country could not have expected that other countries would intervene 
and provide environmental assistance, it would have been less willing to engage in risky 
activities in the first place or it may have invested its own resources to reduce the 
environmental risk. 
So far I have outlined the potential impact of extortion and moral hazard on the 
efficiency (first dimension) of transactions. However, also the effectiveness of transactions 
can suffer from these two problems. This relates in particular to the risk that fear of extortion 
and moral hazard problems may deter donor states from engaging in otherwise mutually 
beneficial transactions. Indeed, the risks of extortion and moral hazard have been frequently 
cited in public debates as the most important arguments against the provision of positive 
incentives as a means to foster international cooperation. In fact, donor states may become so 
concerned about the problems of extortion and moral hazard that a “hazard of moral hazard” 
(Bernauer and Ruloff 1999: 30) may arise, thereby precluding transactions aimed at solving 
international externality problems. However, the occurrence of such risks in real-world cases 
may be far less pronounced than widely assumed. In addition, it should be noted that there are 
clear limits to extortion and moral hazard that may serve to reassure donor states that such 
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risks are low. To begin with, both extortion and moral hazard will occur only under certain 
conditions. In order for a country to extort resources from other countries, its threat to engage 
in some externality-generating or externality-enhancing behavior that it itself is not genuinely 
interested in has to be credible. If the potential costs to the extorting country obviously exceed 
any gains it could hope to achieve, then its threat will not be perceived as credible. Its threat 
will also be dismissed as incredible when the extorting country is perceived as lacking the 
capacity to generate or enhance a negative externality. Hence, economic conditions, technical 
constraints, domestic political exigencies, or organizational inertia can render many 
externality-generating behaviors unattractive or even unattainable for those countries 
threatening to engage in them. Moreover, both extortion and moral hazard are unlikely to 
occur when the externality threatened or generated by a country hoping to obtain positive 
incentives from others does not harm any country that has the capacity to provide positive 
incentives. 
Furthermore, states also have various means at their disposal to reduce the risks of 
extortion and moral hazard behavior. For example, donor states can prevent the most obvious 
extortion attempts by using positive incentives exclusively in order to compel recipients to 
engage in desirable behavior rather than to deter recipients from engaging in undesirable 
behavior. This argument is based on the following reasoning. Extortion risks emanate from 
two types of states: From those states currently engaged in a desirable behavior which 
threaten to adopt some new undesirable behavior unless rewarded, and from those states 
currently engaged in an undesirable behavior which threaten to continue or intensify that 
behavior unless rewarded for not doing so. Extortion attempts by the former type of state can 
be prevented by strictly restricting resource transfers to those states engaged in the 
undesirable behavior at or prior to the time the donor states adopted a strategy of positive 
incentives (Mitchell 1998). Donor states can also safeguard against such risks by 
implementing measures that increase their information of the recipients’ preferences 
(extortion being dependent on incomplete information). A strategy of cooperation in steps 
involving intensive monitoring allows donor states to withdraw from an exchange if they 
suspect extortion or moral hazard. Finally, donor states can reduce the likelihood of extortion 
and moral hazard by insisting that recipient states contribute financially or in-kind to the 
common purpose. Such joint-financing of activities creates burdens also for the recipients, 
thereby reducing their incentives to engage in extortion and moral hazard. In short, although 
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extortion and moral hazard may pose serious problems in transactions, they can—at least in 
principle—be managed. 
Information and distribution problems: Two problems that typically arise when 
negotiating exchanges and that may negatively affect the effectiveness of transactions pertain 
to information and distributional issues. Both problems are related. Information problems 
derive from the fact that actors have incomplete information about each other’s future 
preferences and behavior. Distribution problems arise because each actor—assuming that 
actors behave as utility maximizers—has an interest in contributing as little as possible to the 
common purpose and securing the greatest possible benefit. In other words, those countries 
providing resources will seek to obtain the maximum amount of environmental protection 
measures from the recipient countries for as few resources as possible. The recipient 
countries, on the other hand, will attempt to gain the maximum amount of resources from the 
donors and deliver as few environmental protection measures as possible. In such situations, 
actors often seek to manipulate information they provide to others in order to maximize their 
net-benefits from a joint effort, for example by exaggerating the costs and understating the 
benefits of solutions proposed by other actors. Strategic manipulation of information on the 
costs and benefits of solutions under negotiation may lead to a “stingy” bargaining behavior 
of the parties and to protracted negotiations in which each side is holding out for more 
(Bernauer and Ruloff 1999). 
Information problems also arise because actors often have incomplete scientific 
information on the exact price and value of the specific object under negotiation. For 
example, in some instances it is virtually impossible to determine in advance how much 
specific environmental protection measures will cost. Furthermore, those countries providing 
resources have to determine how much they are both individually and collectively willing to 
pay for an improved environment. For example, it can be assumed that—ceteris paribus—
individual contributions to a solution of a transnational environmental problem will 
correspond to the specific degree of exposure of the individual countries to the environmental 
problem. However, in many instances it is simply not possible to evaluate in monetary terms 
the costs or risks of a negative externality affecting a country. Nor will it be easy for donor 
states to put a collective price tag on an improved environment since there are no reference 
prices for such a good. Consequently, negotiating parties will often experience great 
difficulties in determining which country should provide which amount of resources in what 
time frame in exchange for what kind of environmental protection measures. 
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Enforcement problems: When providing resources in exchange for externality-
reducing behavioral changes on the part of the recipient countries, donor states tend to hope 
that the recipients’ concerns for their reputations will provide sufficiently large incentives to 
comply with agreed upon environmental protection measures or other commitments. 
However, in many cases vague concerns about reputation costs will not suffice to secure 
compliance. Moreover, specific mechanisms aimed at protecting donors against reneging or 
non-compliance by recipients, such as cooperation step-by-step or the use of hostages, may 
not be available under certain circumstances (Keohane 1984). Thus donor states may have to 
adopt stronger enforcement mechanisms. However, enforcing international agreements 
beyond the specific measures mentioned above—such as cooperation in steps or the use of 
hostages—is often hampered by problems that arise in employing negative incentives such as 
economic sanctions. 
Various analysts have pointed to a host of factors that may undermine the 
effectiveness of sanctions in driving the recipient’s behavior in a direction desired by the 
sanctioning states (Hufbauer and Schott 1990; Pape 1997). I limit the discussion of these 
factors to two major problems involved in employing negative incentives in international 
environmental politics. First, it must be taken into account that the most serious transnational 
environmental problems originate in capacity-poor countries. Punishing a capacity-poor 
recipient country with sanctions in order to enforce compliance with an international 
environmental agreement may be opposed both on normative grounds and because this 
country may simply be unable to change its behavior in the direction requested by the 
sanctioning side. Indeed, in most cases of international environmental politics the rationale 
behind the provision of positive incentives is to help capacity-poor states to comply with 
international agreements. Punishing such states for non-compliance is therefore likely to be 
perceived as both unfair and ineffective and may even drive such states over the brink. 
Second, sanctions often impose considerable costs—both in economic and political terms—
on the sanctioning states as well. Indeed, economic sanctions usually impose concentrated 
costs on some groups of the sender state’s domestic constituency to provide diffuse social 
benefits should the sanctions work. Those domestic groups bearing the costs of the sanctions 
are likely to oppose the sanctions and lobby against their implementation (Olson 1965). 
Moreover, sanctions imposed to enforce compliance with an international environment 
agreement may also hurt broader economic or political interests of sender states, thereby 
reducing the likelihood that this policy tool will be used. For example, if sender states have a 
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strong strategic interest in the economic and political stability of a potential target state, and if 
sanctions against this state run the risk of undermining this strategic interest, then sanctions 
are unlikely to be imposed. In short, the effectiveness of transactions can be seriously 
undermined by enforcement problems. 
Processes of Interaction in Donor and Recipient Countries 
Problem-Definition: It has been argued above that insufficient capacities are often a major 
reason why countries engage in externality-generating behavior and that resource transfers are 
an important means to solve transnational environmental problems that result from 
insufficient capacities. Moreover, it has been suggested that donor countries can employ their 
resources in different ways to address insufficient capacities on the part of recipient countries. 
In other words, donor countries often have a choice to fund and implement different capacity-
building measures in recipient countries. However, not all capacity-building measures are 
equally cost-effective in driving the behavior of the recipient in a direction desired by the 
donor countries. For example, the funding and implementation of one particular measure may 
enable the recipient to change its externality-generating behavior at lower cost, or more 
durably at comparable cost, than other available measures. Which capacity-building measures 
donors chose to fund and implement is determined by what is referred to here as problem-
definition, i.e. the specific way donors define an environmental problem (Keohane and Levy 
1996). As such it is evident that problem-definition has important implications for the 
efficiency (second dimension) of a transaction. 
The specific interests of donor governments and domestic producer groups often 
determine how an environmental problem is defined and consequently which specific 
solutions to a transnational environmental problem are selected for implementation. 
Especially then when the public benefits to be gained from addressing a transnational 
environmental problem are not substantial, donor governments—provided that they are 
willing to transfer resources—will tend to prefer solutions that also provide private benefits. 
Indeed, the widespread practice of donor states tying environmental and other aid programs to 
the purchase of technology and services from domestic firms testifies to this general 
preference. Nevertheless, even when considering that resource transfers are often designed to 
generate private benefits for donor countries, donor governments may still have a choice 
among different ways to employ their resources. Thus, to understand why and when donor 
governments may favor some solutions over others, we must also take into account the 
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interests and political clout of domestic producer groups. When domestic producer groups 
believe that they can derive concentrated benefits from particular solutions to a transnational 
environmental problem, they will seek to lobby the government into adopting their preferred 
solutions and providing the necessary resources. The outcome of the interest group process is 
of course difficult to predict, but we can hypothesize that the government will tend to favor 
those solutions which are consistent with its own policy goals and which are preferred by the 
domestic producer group with the largest political clout (Meier 1988). Needless to say, the 
solutions that serve the interests of a specific domestic producer group need not represent the 
most cost-effective way to address a transnational environmental problem. 
“Slippery slope effect“: A problem that may seriously hamper the effectiveness of a 
transaction relates to what Connolly and List (1996) have dubbed the “slippery slope effect”. 
As noted above, states often engage in undesirable, externality-generating behavior because 
they have insufficient capacities to adopt new, desirable behaviors. Capacity-building 
measures funded by donor states are designed to enable the recipient to renounce its previous 
undesirable behavior and engage in new desirable behavior. However, the effectiveness of 
such resource transfers often depends on how easily the recipient can simultaneously engage 
in both the previous undesirable and new desirable behavior. Unless the two behaviors are 
mutually exclusive, recipient states may adopt new desirable behaviors but continue 
undesirable ones, thereby reducing the overall effectiveness of the resource transfer. Under 
such circumstances, the resource transfer will only be effective if the donor states can make 
the resource transfer contingent on the recipient both adopting a desirable behavior and 
refraining from engaging in undesirable behavior (Mitchell 1998). 
The following example serves to illuminate what the “slippery slope effect” implies. 
Transnational environmental problems are often caused by the operation of “dirty“ or unsafe 
industries, for example power plants that use inefficient and antiquated technologies. In some 
cases, capacity-poor countries are economically highly dependent on the output of these 
power plants and therefore cannot afford to close them down immediately. Donor countries 
may thus agree to provide financial and technical assistance to modernize these power plants 
to allow them to operate at higher efficiency or safety levels for a specified period of time 
until they are definitively closed. However, once these power plants are modernized, the 
recipient country will have even less incentive to shut them down. What’s more, while a 
modernized power plant may be cleaner or safer than it was before, it will certainly not be as 
clean or safe as it would be if it were closed altogether (Darst 1997). Thus in the example 
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above the “slippery slope effect” relates to the risk that the provision of resources may 
unintentionally result in prolonging the lifetime of a dirty or unsafe power plant, or put in 
other words, in encouraging and enabling the recipient to continue its previous undesirable 
behavior. 
Coordination problems: If more than two countries are involved in a transaction, 
cooperation problems may arise on the donor and recipient side, respectively. An important 
factor that can give rise to cooperation problems on the donor side pertains to the specific 
nature of the benefits donors expect to gain from addressing an environmental problem. In the 
case of public benefits, the donor countries may have to cope with burden-sharing problems, 
i.e. disputes over which donor should provide which amount of resources and why. Burden-
sharing problems can seriously hamper the effectiveness of a transaction since such problems 
may lead to a sub-optimal provision of resources needed for the common purpose. Thus in 
order to secure both an adequate provision of resources and the cohesion of the donor group, 
donors may have to take safeguard-measures against “free-riders“. Making the potential 
beneficiaries pay their share for the provision of a public good, however, involves 
enforcement problems, not between donor and recipient countries, but within the donor group. 
If the benefits to be gained from addressing an environmental problem are 
predominantly of a private nature, then a competition for these private benefits may break out 
in the donor group. Such a competition for private benefits within the donor group can have 
the effect of undermining any attempt to establish a united donor front vis-à-vis a recipient 
country. As a result, the recipient country can play donors against each other and effectively 
circumvent the conditions donors may try to impose on their environmental aid programs. 
One possible strategy to secure a united donor front in the face of donor competition for 
private benefits is to persuade the various donor countries to pool their resources under the 
custody of an international funding agency. By distributing private benefits in relation to the 
resources provided by the individual donor countries, such an agency may be able to defuse 
donor competition for private benefits and hence may be better placed than individual donors 
to pursue conditionality policies. 
When there is more than one recipient involved in a transaction, similar problems can 
also arise on the recipient side. A potential cooperation problem on the part of the recipients 
relates to the situation in which recipients have to compete for the resources provided by the 
donors. From the donors’ perspective, such a situation is advantageous since it may induce the 
recipients to deliver the maximum amount of environmental protection measures at the lowest 
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price. Whether or not donors can place various recipient countries into competition with each 
other depends upon the possibilities to substitute environmental measures by one recipient 
country for environmental measures by another. In case the cooperation of all potential 
recipient countries is vital for the desired outcome, i.e. in so-called weakest-link situations 
(Sandler 1994), then placing recipients into direct competition will fail to be effective. 
Theoretically, recipients can avoid such a competitive situation by coordinating their 
bargaining positions vis-à-vis donor countries, i.e. they could attempt to collude in order to 
coordinate positions on which amount of environmental measures recipients are willing to 
offer for what price. However, experience shows that such action is rare. 
In sum, the basic analytical framework outlined above focuses our attention on eight 
distinct problems that can arise when designing and implementing positive incentives. 
Whether they in fact arise in specific empirical cases and the extent to which they can be 
resolved through the mechanisms discussed, influences the effectiveness and/or efficiency of 
transactions. The principal problems in bringing positive incentives to bear and the specific 
outcomes they affect are summarized in the table below. 
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TABLE 2.2: PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS OF POSITIVE INCENTIVES 
Problem Affected Outcome(s) 
Extortion Efficiency (first dimension) 
Effectiveness 
Moral Hazard Efficiency (first dimension) 
Effectiveness 
Information Problems Effectiveness 
 
Distribution Problems Effectiveness 
 
Enforcement Problems Effectiveness 
 
Problem-Definition Efficiency (second dimension) 
 
“Slippery Slope Effect” Effectiveness 
 
Coordination Problems Effectiveness 
 
 
 
 “It’s impossible to deliver [our nuclear] 
power stations by missile to some other 
country, but in reality, they are no less 
dangerous than nuclear weapons.“ 
 
- Alexei Yablokov, environmental adviser 
to the former Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin, 1992 (Halverson 1993: 43). 
 
 
3 THE NUCLEAR SAFETY PROBLEM IN CEE AND THE FSU 
Although it may be far-fetched to equate the dangers posed by nuclear weapons with the 
threat emanating from the continued operation of Soviet-built nuclear power plants (NPPs), 
the introductory quotation above certainly serves to illustrate the potentially grave 
transboundary consequences of a serious accident at one of the 58 operational nuclear reactors 
in CEE and the FSU. This alarming judgment was underscored by the dramatic and still fresh 
memories of the worst accident in the history of the civilian use of nuclear power: On 26 
April 1986, block 4 of the Chernobyl NPP in Ukraine exploded due to sudden and 
uncontrollable increases in power which led to catastrophic releases of radioactive material 
into the environment.1 The number of casualties directly related to the accident is officially 
put at 31, with an unknown number of Chernobyl victims in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia 
currently still suffering from long-term health problems.2 Within weeks after the nuclear 
accident around 116'000 people had to be evacuated from the towns and villages within a 
radius of 30 kilometers of the plant, and since then more than 200'000 have been removed 
from their homes due to long-term radiation exposure. In total some 28'000 square kilometers 
of land in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia were contaminated with caesium-137 and an area of 
around 3'000 square kilometers is considered to be so seriously contaminated that it will 
                                                 
1 The Chernobyl accident occurred after plant operators conducted a series of maneuvers as part of a test to see 
how the reactor would respond to freak power surges, a phenomenon to which this particular reactor type is 
known to be susceptible. Although inherent design deficiencies of the Chernobyl reactor were certainly a 
determining factor of the catastrophe, the Soviet authorities blamed the accident exclusively on operator error 
in an attempt to shield their nuclear technology against any criticism and to allay fears that such an accident 
could ever occur again (Connolly 1997: 78; Foss 1999: 25). 
2 There have been wild speculations regarding the death toll of the Chernobyl catastrophe. On the eve of the 9th 
anniversary of the accident international media reports claimed that 125'000 people had died in Ukraine as a 
result of long-term radioactive contamination. In 1996 the Ukrainian Deputy Health Minister put the number 
of Chernobyl casualties at 1'800, especially among the 600'000 “liquidators” which had been involved in 
clean-up operations immediately after the accident. However, there is presently no international consensus on 
the exact death toll, and the only confirmed health effects of the accident are the well-known epidemic of 
childhood leukemia and a pronounced increase in suicides among the liquidators (NucNet, 21 February 1996; 
NW, 29 April 1999: 1, 12). 
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remain inhabitable for decades (Herttrich et al. 1994: 89; Perera 1997b). The damage was, 
furthermore, not confined to the plant’s immediate vicinity: As a consequence of then 
prevailing meteorological conditions, the radioactive fallout was dispersed over large regions 
of Scandinavia and Western Europe. The radioactive cloud contaminated agriculture, exposed 
the populations of various Western countries to sharply elevated levels of radiation and 
caused millions of dollars of damage. The nuclear disaster at Chernobyl thus clearly 
demonstrated that the risks connected with the production of nuclear power were a 
transnational problem, and as such a matter for international politics. 
Although the 1986 Chernobyl disaster had raised international concern about nuclear 
safety in CEE and the then existing Soviet Union, knowledge of Soviet-designed reactors was 
rather limited at the time. Moreover, the international community could not do much about 
the problem due to Soviet intransigence to cooperate on such a sensible issue during the Cold 
War. Four years later, however, the revolutions that swept across Eastern Europe in 1989/90 
and the demise of the Soviet Union in late 1991 created new opportunities for concerned 
Western countries to address the nuclear safety problem in the East. Starting in September 
1990, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) launched a series of fact-finding 
missions to various Eastern NPPs. These missions revealed that the nuclear safety problem in 
CEE and the FSU was far worse than anticipated and that another Chernobyl-type nuclear 
disaster could occur unless urgent action was taken. 
The following chapter describes the physical and political basics of the nuclear safety 
problem in CEE and the FSU with the aim of providing relevant background information to 
the individual case studies. This chapter is structured along the following lines. The first 
section elaborates on the concept of nuclear safety and provides a basic understanding of the 
factors that account for the serious safety shortcomings of Soviet-built NPPs. The second 
section discusses the interests of the principal actors involved in the international attempt to 
improve nuclear safety in CEE and the FSU, i.e. the interests of both Western and Eastern 
governments and the Western nuclear industry. This section shows that there were competing 
interests not only between Western and Eastern governments, but also among the Western 
donors. The third section explores the various cooperation strategies and capacity-building 
measures by which the Western countries could address the nuclear safety problem. This 
section explains why the Western donors sought to solicit nuclear safety cooperation from the 
Eastern governments by predominantly pursuing positive incentive strategies and elaborates 
on a range of ways by which the Western donors could employ positive incentives. In doing 
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so, this section also provides a set of analytical benchmarks against which the efficiency of 
positive incentives (second dimension) may be assessed in the individual case studies. The 
fourth and final section of this chapter elaborates on the West’s initial response to the nuclear 
safety problem. This section includes a brief description of the international institutional 
context in which the West began to address the nuclear safety problem in CEE and the FSU 
and presents a rough outline of the West’s major nuclear safety assistance programs. 
3.1 Safety Deficiencies at Eastern NPPs 
International experts have defined nuclear safety since the 1980s as “the achievement of 
proper operating conditions, prevention of accidents or mitigation of accident consequences, 
resulting in the protection of site personnel, the public and the environment from undue 
radiation hazards” (Foss 1999: 33). During the past two decades an international consensus on 
nuclear safety has evolved according to which the level of nuclear safety is determined by 
three basic features: 
• The design of nuclear reactors and other technological aspects at nuclear facilities 
• The quality of their manufacture, maintenance and manning, i.e. operational safety aspects 
or a so-called “safety culture“ 
• A proper regulatory framework and licensing procedure 
 
This concept of nuclear safety took several decades to develop in Western countries, and was 
until recently largely absent in the countries of the former socialist bloc. In the early days of 
the commercial use of nuclear energy, nuclear safety was geared not to the prevention of 
nuclear accidents, but rather to the protection of workers and the public from the exposure to 
ionizing radiation. Only in the late 1970s did nuclear safety concepts in the West begin to 
shift towards accident mitigation and containment (Connolly 1997: 158). The approach 
initially taken by Western countries was a technical one that largely applied to design aspects 
of nuclear facilities. This approach resulted in the adoption of the concept of defense-in-
depth, whereby nuclear facilities are constructed with a high degree of redundancy and with 
layers of back-up measures capable of compensating for the potential failure of any given 
safety response such as shutdown systems and containment structures (Foss 1999: 33). 
Following the 1979 accident at the Three Miles Island NPP in the United States, this 
technical approach to nuclear safety was regarded as insufficient to guarantee the safe 
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operation of nuclear plants. As a result, increased attention was devoted to operational aspects 
of nuclear power generation, especially to those related to human behavior. These efforts have 
not only led to improvements in training, maintenance and quality assurance, but have 
cumulated in the understanding that a general attitude of caution is required to avoid 
accidents. Thus, when both managers and workers of a nuclear facility display an instinctive 
attitude of conservatism with regard to safety and assign priority to safety over all other 
operational goals, a so-called “safety culture” is considered to be in place. Finally, over the 
past decades there has grown an appreciation that an independent regulatory agency is an 
important prerequisite for the safe and responsible use of nuclear power. The primary function 
of such agencies is to regulate NPPs in the public interest and to ensure high safety standards 
by means of a legally-based licensing process. Essentially, regulatory agencies aim to protect 
the interests of the population against the organs of the state or powerful vested interests. 
Their independent status is designed to allow the regulatory agencies to be objective both in 
their judgments and in the execution of their duties. 
A number of the technical and operational safety standards originally developed in 
Western countries were gradually adopted by the IAEA. Indeed, although the IAEA has 
primarily been concerned with non-proliferation issues, the agency has established a 
considerable body of safety norms and technical guidance for the civilian use of nuclear 
power, however without the authority to enforce safety standards. Beginning in the mid 
1970s, the IAEA developed a series of codes and guidelines—known as the Nuclear Safety 
Standards Program (NUSS)—for the design and operation of NPPs. Furthermore, in 1988 the 
IAEA’s International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) published a report which sets 
specific safety targets for nuclear reactors to achieve (Frogatt 1999). The NUSS standards and 
related IAEA documents such as the INSAG report have served as de facto international 
safety standards by which Western nuclear safety experts have judged the safety of Soviet-
designed nuclear reactors. However, it should be noted that these international standards 
represent little more than the least common denominator of pre-existing nuclear safety 
standards in the West, and no country has a legal obligation to apply them to their nuclear 
facilities. The NPPs operating in the countries of CEE and the FSU have been found by 
Western nuclear safety experts to be deficient in all three safety-relevant aspects outlined 
above. In the following the major safety deficiencies of Eastern NPPs are briefly discussed. 
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Soviet-built nuclear reactors are essentially variations on two basic designs: The 
RBMK (graphite moderated channel reactor) and the VVER (pressurized water reactor).3 
Both reactor types were developed by the Soviets in multiple generations and vary 
considerably in safety levels. The RBMK reactor, a design that has never been used in the 
West, was developed by the Soviet Union not least for military purposes because it produces 
weapons-grade fissile material. Due to the possibility of military use, RBMK reactors were 
not exported beyond the borders of the then existing Soviet Union (Herttrich et al. 1994: 89; 
Launer and Young 1997: 54). However, following the breakup of the Soviet Union in late 
1991 three new independent states inherited the 15 former Soviet RBMK reactors—Russia 
(11 operational reactors at the Leningrad, Smolensk and Kursk NPPs), Ukraine (two 
operational reactors at the Chernobyl NPP) and Lithuania (two operational reactors at the 
Ignalina NPP). The basic design flaws of RBMK reactors are outlined below (EBRD 1996: 
6): 
• Positive void reactivity coefficient (i.e. a potential for rapid and uncontrollable power 
surges) 
• Complicated information and control system 
• Insufficient diversity of neutron flux instrumentation and shutdown systems 
• Lack of containment 
• Limited capacity and poor redundancy of emergency core cooling systems 
• Risk of single or even multiple channel rupture in case of insufficient coolant flow 
• Insufficient fire protection 
• Poor redundancy and shortcomings in emergency power supply 
 
Although the Soviet authorities had introduced a number of technical safety improvements at 
various RBMKs in the wake of the 1986 Chernobyl accident, Western nuclear safety experts 
concluded in the early 1990s that these reactors were inherently unstable and could not be 
improved, even through extensive upgrading, to safety levels acceptable for long-term 
operation. Western nuclear safety experts therefore strongly recommended that the RMBK 
reactors be shut down as soon as possible. 
                                                 
3 RBMK stands for Reaktor Bolschoi Moshnosti Kipyashchiy. VVER stands for Vodo Vodyanoy 
Energeticheskiy Reaktor (Scott et. al. 1995: 703). 
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The VVERs are pressurized water reactors (PWRs), similar in their basic design to 
Western PWR reactors. The Soviet Union developed three generations of VVERs. The first 
generation of VVER reactors—built prior to 1970—is the VVER-440/230. At the time the 
West began to address the nuclear safety problem in the East, there were ten VVER-230s 
operating in the region: Two in the Slovak Republic (at the Bohunice NPP), four in Bulgaria 
(at the Kozloduy NPP) and four in Russia (two each at the Kola and Novovoronezh NPPs).4 
The safety of VVER-230s is hampered by the following design flaws (EBRD 1996: 6): 
• Insufficient quality of equipment 
• Insufficient containment 
• Poor instrumentation and control 
• Limited capacity of the emergency core cooling systems and of the emergency power 
supply 
• Insufficient redundancy of safety systems 
• Insufficient fire protection 
 
Western nuclear safety experts concluded in the early 1990s that the VVER-230s were not 
upgradeable to internationally accepted safety standards, either for reasons inherent in their 
design or because the required upgrading could not be justified on economic grounds. They 
thus recommended that the VVER-230 reactors be shut down as soon as feasible. The second 
generation of Soviet-built PWRs, the VVER-440/213, was developed between 1970 and 1980 
and incorporated several safety improvements on the earlier model, in particular a kind of 
containment structure. Although there are still legitimate concerns about the safety of the 14 
operational VVER-213s, the IAEA concluded that they could be upgraded to fit international 
safety standards (Halverson 1993: 44). The most modern generation of the Soviet-built 
VVERs is the VVER-1000. The IAEA has stated that the VVER-1000 design “is similar to 
that of non-Soviet plants in operation worldwide and includes a full containment structure. 
However, some concerns related to design and operational problems remain, even for the 
more advanced 1000 MW units, mainly about core safety and instrumentation and control“ 
(IAEA 1992: 6). Most Western nuclear safety experts opined that the 20 operational VVER-
                                                 
4 In 1995 the Armenian government decided to reopen a VVER-230 reactor at the Medzamor NPP that had 
been closed in 1989 due to concerns about seismic risks. 
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1000s had a design safety basis sufficiently comparable to that used in the West to justify 
safety upgrades on both safety and economic grounds. 
FIGURE 3.1: GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF THE 58 OPERATIONAL SOVIET-DESIGNED NUCLEAR 
REACTORS IN CEE AND THE FSU 
 
Source: EBRD 1996: 5. 
66 Nuclear Safety Problem 
Besides the design flaws, a number of operational safety deficiencies that carry across all 
reactor types exacerbated the nuclear safety problem. Considering that in the past the 
operation of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors had been geared towards the achievement of 
maximum power output, with safety considerations far from being a top priority, it was not 
surprising that both staff and management of these plants lacked a proper “safety culture“. 
Authoritarian and compartmentalized management styles were firmly entrenched at Eastern 
NPPs, with decisions frequently made at the national level. Operating staff were not 
encouraged to question or criticize, and therefore exhibited little curiosity about anything 
outside their immediate responsibilities. Moreover, areas such as staff training, in-service 
inspection and periodical testing, quality assurance, waste management, radioactive release 
and environmental monitoring, emergency planning for handling potential accidents, as well 
as documentation management and reporting procedures, were often poorly or inadequately 
developed (EBRD 1996: 4). 
Although the operational safety problems outlined above existed well before Western 
nuclear safety experts had gained access to Eastern NPPs, the profound and far-reaching 
social, political and economic changes following the revolutions of 1989/90 in CEE and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991 aggravated the safety situation. Serious safety 
problems were created as Russian nuclear experts left the former socialist countries of CEE 
and the newly independent republics. Indeed, due to varying degrees of dependence on the 
Soviet Union for the supply of nuclear technology, nuclear fuel and the handling of spent fuel, 
nuclear safety in almost all countries of the region was negatively affected by the pullout of 
Russian technicians. At one extreme, Bulgaria and Lithuania were left to continue the 
operation of their NPPs without adequate operating manuals and experience (Connolly and 
List 1996: 237-238). In addition, the subsequent economic crisis related to these countries’ 
transformation process added to the operational safety problems by demoralizing plant 
personnel—wages were cut or not even paid—and by leading to poor maintenance and repair 
work at Eastern NPPs (FT, 3 July 1992). 
Finally, all CEE and FSU countries lacked a strong and independent nuclear safety 
authority capable of implementing and enforcing acceptable safety standards. Historically, 
nuclear regulation had always been weak in the former communist countries, although some 
differences existed. While various CEE countries had introduced a certain degree of nuclear 
regulation during the late 1970s and 1980s, the regulatory situation in the Soviet Union was 
far worse, where the industry and its colossal bureaucracy operated beyond the control of any 
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legal framework (Foss 1999: 58). The fact that prior to the Chernobyl catastrophe the Soviet 
authorities had been able to conceal from the public at least five other severe nuclear 
accidents involving fatalities and significant radioactive releases testifies to this deplorable 
state of affairs. The collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991 did not necessarily improve the 
situation. All successor states of the FSU had to cope with the formidable task of developing 
from scratch their own organizations for the regulation of NPPs and other nuclear facilities 
that they had inherited. In addition, once these regulatory agencies were established, their 
influence and independence remained limited: In the early 1990s the nuclear regulatory 
agencies in nearly all CEE and FSU countries were understaffed and overworked, and most 
were clearly powerless vis-à-vis the richer and more influential facility operators (NW, 9 
December 1993: 7). 
In sum, due to a combination of various design deficiencies, an inadequate “safety 
culture“, and the absence of a strong and independent regulatory framework, the risk of a 
serious accident at a Soviet-built NPP was found to be many times higher than at a Western 
NPP. The safety risk posed by the continued operation of these Soviet-designed nuclear 
reactors in the early 1990s is best illustrated by the judgment of William Martin, former head 
of the U.S. Department of Energy, who has argued that a nuclear accident could happen on 
average once every 180 reactor years for Soviet-designed reactors, unlike older Western 
reactors at which a serious mishap could occur once every 40'000 to 50'000 reactor years 
(Martin 1995: 74). 
3.2 Interests of the Principal Actors 
The shocking revelations of the IAEA fact-finding missions in the early 1990s and an 
alarming string of near disasters at Eastern NPPs had raised public concern in a number of 
Western European countries to the extent that several Western governments were forced to do 
something about the nuclear safety problem.5 The memories of the Chernobyl tragedy were 
still vivid, and the public awareness that various nuclear reactors in CEE and the FSU—
commonly referred to as “ticking time-bombs” in the Western media—were operating even 
closer to Western Europe than the ill-fated Chernobyl NPP made remedial action all the more 
                                                 
5 The most serious incidents that occurred at Eastern NPPs in the early 1990s were a fire in the turbine hall at 
Chernobyl unit 2 in October 1991, the rupture of a pressure channel at the Leningrad NPP in March 1992, 
and an extended loss of electric power and near-meltdown at the Kola NPP in February 1993 (Darst 1997: 
62). 
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urgent. To be sure, Western concern about the threat of transboundary radioactive 
contamination tended to vary with geographical proximity to the Eastern trouble spots: 
Western countries bordering CEE and FSU countries were more concerned about the nuclear 
safety problem than those which were somewhat removed. Nevertheless, widespread concern 
about the transboundary environmental risks posed by the continued operation of Soviet-
designed nuclear reactors no doubt constituted a major driving force behind the subsequent 
actions of a number of Western countries to improve nuclear safety in CEE and the FSU. 
The interests of various Western countries in addressing the nuclear safety problem 
were not confined to environmental concerns. Those Western countries that relied heavily on 
nuclear power for their domestic energy supply were deeply concerned about the negative 
implications of another nuclear accident in the East for the political viability of nuclear power 
in their own countries. Indeed, as a consequence of the 1986 Chernobyl accident, public 
acceptance of nuclear power in the West had suffered seriously, and it was widely assumed 
that another accident would finish it off altogether (Flavin and Lenssen 1996: 52-55; 
Economist, 24 July 1993: 19). As the then President of the French state utility Electricité de 
France (EdF) put it: “Another Chernobyl would be the death knell of nuclear power” 
(European Energy Report, April 1991: 3). An immediate abandonment of nuclear power, in 
turn, threatened to have unforeseeable and dire economic consequences for various Western 
countries. Reducing the risk of another nuclear accident in the East was thus in the interest of 
both the governments of those Western countries where nuclear power constituted an 
important part of the national energy supply, on the one hand, and the Western nuclear 
industry, on the other. While the former—in particular the governments of France, the United 
States, Belgium, the United Kingdom and also Germany—were greatly concerned with 
protecting the enormous investments in their domestic nuclear energy programs and 
preserving the nuclear option in their future energy policies6, the latter had to fear for their 
commercial existence. 
                                                 
6  Preserving the nuclear option was certainly important for reasons of security of energy supply. Although 
nuclear power provided only around 17 percent of the world’s electricity supply in 1992, various Western 
countries relied strongly on this source of power (see Appendix). Moreover, in the early 1990s a new factor 
entered into the energy policies of Western governments: Widespread concern about climate change. Various 
Western governments regarded the nuclear option as a potential solution to this global environmental 
problem due to the fact that the production of nuclear power does not release any CO2 into the atmosphere. 
For example, it has been estimated that Germany would produce 20 percent more CO2 if it were to opt out of 
its nuclear energy program (ATW, August/September 1991: 371). 
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The nuclear safety problem in CEE and the FSU did not only represent a serious threat 
to the political viability of nuclear power in the West, but also created tremendous 
commercial opportunities for Western nuclear firms and their governmental supporters. 
Indeed, the prospect of gaining access to the new and potentially expanding nuclear markets 
in CEE and the FSU had enticed various Western nuclear firms to lobby their respective 
national governments into providing extensive nuclear safety assistance to the East. The 
Eastern nuclear markets were attractive to the Western nuclear industry for two related 
reasons. First, scattered across CEE and FSU countries were 16 partly built nuclear reactors of 
both the VVER-440/213 and VVER-1000 design, i.e. reactors which had been deemed fit for 
long-term operation by Western nuclear safety experts. The construction of these reactors had 
been halted in the late 1980s and early 1990s either due to public opposition to nuclear power 
in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident (especially in Russia and Ukraine) or due to 
financial and technical constraints on the part of the Eastern countries. Western nuclear firms 
were for commercial reasons eager to win contracts to complete one of these unfinished 
nuclear reactors. Moreover, Western nuclear firms could also secure commercial benefits by 
participating in government-funded nuclear safety upgrade programs. Although financially 
less attractive than completing partly built VVER-213s and VVER-1000s, the upgrading of 
various unsafe Soviet-designed nuclear reactors promised to furnish Western nuclear firms 
with the knowledge of Soviet nuclear technology considered indispensable for a future 
commercial conquest of the Eastern nuclear markets. 
Second, Western nuclear firms were all the more desperate to capitalize on these 
business opportunities in the East as they faced moribund nuclear markets at home. Indeed, in 
the United States no new NPP has been ordered, without subsequently being canceled, since 
1974. In Western Europe, every nuclear country with the exception of France has a 
moratorium on the construction of new NPPs, either officially, as in the United Kingdom or 
Switzerland, or de facto, as in Spain and Germany. And even the French nuclear program has 
slowed down dramatically since the late 1980s (Connolly 1997: 105; Economist, 21 
November 1992: 25). 
The decline of nuclear power in the West can be largely attributed to the growing 
public opposition to this technology. The nuclear accidents at Three Miles Island (1979) and 
Chernobyl (1986) and the hitherto unresolved issue of how to deal with radioactive waste 
have conspired to erode public support for nuclear power. Economic factors also account for 
the growing problems of nuclear power in the West. Since the late 1980s nuclear power has 
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been facing increasing competition from electricity generated by fossil fuels, especially 
natural gas, which are plentiful and inexpensive. High interest rates during the 1980s and 
early 1990s have served to increase the already high capital costs of nuclear power. The other 
cost components of nuclear power—operation and maintenance, fuel and decommissioning—
have also risen due to the growing stringency of nuclear safety standards imposed by Western 
governments. Finally, a general trend towards economic liberalization and deregulation in the 
West—with concomitant cuts in government subsidies—has served to further undermine the 
economic case for nuclear power. These economic and political developments have given rise 
in the West to what is commonly referred to as the “dash for gas”. Combined-cycle gas 
turbine plants have economic advantages over NPPs and other power generation facilities due 
to their short construction times and low capital costs.7 The resulting decline in orders for new 
NPPs in the West has left the Western nuclear industry to be primarily concerned with 
maintaining the safe and reliable operation of existing NPPs and, where appropriate, seeking 
to extend their operating life. However, such activities alone were unlikely to sustain the 
industry’s commercial survival in the long term (Frogatt 1999). 
In short, many Western nuclear firms regarded the Eastern nuclear market as a kind of 
lifeline that could help secure their commercial survival until new business opportunities 
emerged in the West. Pro-nuclear Western governments, on the other hand, perceived the 
provision of nuclear safety assistance to the East as a politically convenient means to 
subsidize their suffering domestic nuclear industries and to help them gain a foothold in the 
potentially lucrative Eastern nuclear market (NW, 6 February 1992: 3-4; Economist, 1 March 
1997: 18-19). 
The interests of those CEE and FSU countries operating Soviet-designed nuclear 
reactors contrasted sharply with the interests of Western countries. Although there had been 
widespread anti-nuclear sentiment in a number of Eastern countries following the 1986 
Chernobyl accident, public concern about the safety of the operational Soviet-designed 
nuclear reactors began to disappear in the East as it was growing in the West. In light of the 
harsh realities of newly gained national independence and the hardships of the subsequent 
                                                 
7  As a rule of thumb, capital costs amount to over 50 percent of the lifetime costs of a NPP, as compared to 
only 25-35 percent of the lifetime costs for a comparable coal-fired station and even less for a gas-fired 
station (Economist, 21 November 1992: 26). According to one energy expert, it would cost about £3 billion 
(nearly $5 billion) and take up to seven years to build a 1'000 MW nuclear power station in the United 
Kingdom while a gas-fired power station with similar capacity would cost about £400 million (about $650 
million) and take less than two years to complete (FT, 2 December 1996). 
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economic transformation process, citizens of Eastern countries lost whatever interest they 
previously had in environmental activism (Darst 1997: 61-62). In addition, Eastern 
governments which faced new and considerable economic and political constraints following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union increasingly perceived their Soviet-designed nuclear reactors 
as valuable economic and political assets and were thus reluctant to prematurely close nuclear 
reactors considered by Western nuclear safety experts to pose unacceptable safety risks. Since 
the specific interests of the Eastern governments will be dealt with in detail in the following 
case studies, it suffices here to present a short summary of the factors determining the position 
of Eastern governments. 
To begin with, nuclear power represents for all CEE and FSU countries the cheapest 
source of energy. This is largely due to the fact that the capital costs of NPPs—the largest 
single cost component of nuclear power—have long since been paid off. Moreover, following 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia demanded ever increasing prices for fossil fuel 
deliveries to its former sister republics and Eastern European allies. Given the economic 
advantage of nuclear power over alternative sources of energy, almost all Eastern countries 
increased in the early 1990s their reliance on electricity generated at existing NPPs. The 
growing relative importance of nuclear power for the energy supply of most Eastern 
countries, in turn, made an early retirement of operational nuclear reactors an extremely 
costly venture (Economist, 24 July 1993: 19-21). In addition, the closure of various NPPs 
threatened to result in social dislocation—nuclear facilities in the East employ huge 
workforces—, and most Eastern government were concerned about incurring the significant 
costs of decommissioning closed nuclear units. Moreover, for some Eastern countries the 
existing NPPs provided a welcome opportunity to export electricity in exchange for much 
needed hard currency. Finally, it was a strategic policy objective of several Eastern 
governments to reduce their traditionally high energy dependence on Russia. This policy goal 
called for a greater reliance on the available domestic energy supplies, in particular nuclear 
power (Connolly and List 1996: 240-242). In short, while most Eastern governments were in 
principle aware of the risks posed by the continued operation of Soviet-designed nuclear 
reactors, they lacked both the means and the incentives to unilaterally solve the nuclear safety 
problem and were generally bent on keeping their unsafe nuclear reactors in operation as long 
as possible. 
72 Nuclear Safety Problem 
3.3 Potential Strategies and Measures to Solve the Nuclear Safety Problem 
Having realized that the CEE and FSU countries were unwilling and/or unable to unilaterally 
reduce or eliminate the safety risk posed by the continued operation of unsafe Soviet-designed 
nuclear reactors, the Western countries had to determine the cooperation strategies by which 
the Eastern countries could be induced or enabled to alter their externality-generating 
behavior. Various strategies, or combinations of strategies, were considered. The Western 
countries could transfer money, technology and know-how to entice or enable the Eastern 
recipient countries to reduce or even eliminate the risk of a nuclear accident (positive 
incentive strategies). They could also try to make the provision of economic aid and other 
benefits dependent on the willingness of Eastern governments to comply with Western 
nuclear safety demands (positive issue-linkage strategies). Conversely, the Western countries 
could attempt to force Eastern countries to reduce or eliminate the risk of a nuclear accident 
by coercive means such as economic sanctions or the suspension of economic aid (negative 
incentive strategies). A further possible strategy would be to furnish Eastern officials with 
new and more accurate information so as to make them fully aware of the costs and risks 
involved in the continued operation of these unsafe reactors (cognitive strategies). Finally, 
Western officials could try to persuade Eastern authorities by means of dialogue and 
education to assign top policy priority to high levels of nuclear safety (normative strategies). 
With a view to the theoretical propositions outlined in section 2.2, it should not be 
surprising that the cooperation strategies predominantly employed by Western countries 
involved positive incentives. Indeed, that section has shown that states seeking to achieve and 
sustain cooperative outcomes in situations involving asymmetric preferences and capacities 
are likely to employ positive incentives. And the situation in which Western and Eastern 
countries interacted to address the nuclear safety problem was in fact determined by severe 
asymmetric preferences and capacities: While the former were for various reasons strongly 
interested in reducing or eliminating the risk of another nuclear accident in the East, the latter 
neither had the financial and technical capacities nor the immediate incentives to solve the 
nuclear safety problem. 
The Western donor countries were subsequently confronted with the question how, i.e. 
in which specific ways, to employ positive incentives. This question is not only of practical 
interest, but also relevant for assessing what has been referred to in the analytical framework 
as the second dimension of efficiency. Indeed, it has been argued above that alternative ways 
of employing positive incentives, i.e. the funding and implementation of different capacity-
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building measures, vary in terms of their cost-effectiveness in reducing negative externalities. 
Before the various ways by which the Western donors could employ positive incentives to 
solve the nuclear safety problem are explored, it is first necessary to briefly elaborate on what 
a solution to the nuclear safety problem implied for the Western donors. 
Basically the Western countries wanted to reduce as far as possible the risk of a 
nuclear accident at one of the operational Soviet-designed nuclear reactors in CEE and the 
FSU. In other words, the more risk reduction, the better. However, a satisfactory solution to 
the nuclear safety problem from the viewpoint of the Western donors could only be achieved 
if the risk of a nuclear accident in CEE and the FSU was reduced to what Western nuclear 
safety experts regarded as “acceptable” risk levels. While a certain level of risk is inherent in 
the production of nuclear power, it was the high or unacceptable safety risk posed by the 
continued operation of certain Soviet-designed nuclear reactors that prompted the Western 
countries into action. For the purposes of this study it is not necessary to specify what 
“acceptable” risk levels imply, which in any case would be rather difficult to do. However, 
what is indeed relevant is the fact that Western nuclear safety experts had concluded in the 
early 1990s that the VVER-230s and RBMKs—so-called high-risk nuclear reactors—could 
not be upgraded to reach international safety standards. This conclusion implied that while the 
implementation of various safety-enhancing measures could reduce the risk of a nuclear 
accident at one of these reactors to a certain degree, this reduced degree of risk would still not 
be acceptable from the viewpoint of Western countries and could not be further decreased by 
additional safety improvements. In abstract terms, risk reduction at VVER-230s and RBMKs 
is best viewed as a discontinuum: The marginal utility of each additional unit of safety-
enhancing measures implemented at a high-risk nuclear reactor decreases up to a certain point 
where no additional unit of safety-enhancing measures, but only the closure of the nuclear 
reactor, can generate further safety benefits. It was for these reasons that Western nuclear 
safety experts recommended that VVER-230s and RBMKs be shut down as soon as feasible. 
In short, while the Western donors could secure certain safety benefits by financing and 
implementing measures designed to reduce risk levels at VVER-230s and RBMKs, a 
satisfactory and lasting solution to the nuclear safety problem in CEE and the FSU could only 
be achieved by inducing or enabling the Eastern recipient countries to shut down these 
nuclear reactors as soon as possible. 
As outlined above, the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors, in particular of 
VVER-230s and RBMKs, was hampered by a combination of various design flaws, 
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operational deficiencies and weak regulatory regimes. Hence, the Western donors could 
reduce to a certain extent the risk of a nuclear accident at one of these reactors by financing 
and implementing the following safety-enhancing measures: 
• Technical safety upgrades to VVER-230s and RBMKs 
• Improving the material conditions for operation and promoting a “safety culture” among 
the small, but critical group of NPP operators 
• Increasing the technical and financial resources of nuclear safety authorities and 
enhancing their independence and organizational clout 
 
While perhaps necessary to address immediate nuclear safety concerns, these safety-
enhancing measures were unlikely to lead to a lasting solution to the nuclear safety problem 
in CEE and the FSU. Indeed, the Western donors could gain major safety benefits only by 
securing the premature closure of high-risk nuclear reactors. However, Eastern governments 
were reluctant and/or incapable to comply with Western closure demands. One important—
though not the only—factor determining the reluctance of Eastern governments to comply 
with Western closure demands was the fact that these countries depended to varying degrees 
on the power generated by unsafe nuclear reactors. It was hence evident that the Western 
donors would have to employ positive incentives so as to compensate Eastern countries for 
the power foregone by the premature closure of unsafe nuclear reactors. This goal could be 
achieved by the implementation of either supply-side or demand-side measures. Supply-side 
measures are basically designed to provide new or additional electricity generating capacity. 
The Western donors could thus seek to enhance the electricity generating capacity of Eastern 
recipient countries by providing resources for one or a combination of the following supply-
side measures: 
• Completion of unfinished and upgradeable VVER-213 and VVER-1000 reactors 
• Construction of new Western-type nuclear reactors 
• Construction of new conventional power plants (hydroelectric and thermal power plants) 
• Modernization and upgrading of existing conventional power plants 
 
Providing various Eastern countries with the financial and technical means to complete and 
upgrade unfinished VVER-213 and VVER-1000 reactors was at first sight an obvious course 
of action for the West. The Eastern countries had sunk enormous investments in these projects 
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and were therefore strongly interested in completing these partly built reactors to recoup 
otherwise lost investments. The possibility of constructing new Western-type reactors in the 
East, on the other hand, was an option that—although being briefly floated in 1990/1991—
never really made it on the agenda due to its enormous financial costs and risks both for the 
Western donors and the Eastern recipients. In contrast, constructing new and less capital-
intensive hydroelectric or thermal power plants tended to be a more cost-effective supply-side 
measure. However, many Eastern governments were somewhat reluctant to construct new 
fossil-fired generation capacity due to their concern of thereby increasing energy dependence 
on Russia and/or exacerbating balance of payments problems. Modernizing and upgrading 
existing conventional power plants also promised to be a cost-effective measure. Indeed, since 
many of these power plants were using outdated technology and were hampered by poor 
maintenance records, the conventional energy sector in the East as a whole operated at rather 
low productivity levels. Modernizing these plants would allow them to operate more 
efficiently, i.e. produce more power with the same input. 
On the other hand, the Western donors could also finance and support the 
implementation of demand-side measures in an effort to make the Eastern countries more 
energy-efficient. The rationale behind such measures was that a more efficient use of the 
available energy supplies was likely to reduce these countries’ reliance on unsafe nuclear 
power and thereby facilitate the near-term closure of high-risk nuclear reactors. Promoting the 
efficient use of energy in the East promised to be a very cost-effective way of employing 
positive incentives because there was such a huge energy savings potential in the region.8 
Indeed, in the early 1990s it was estimated that around 30 percent of the energy used in the 
former Eastern bloc could be easily saved (EEE Report, September 1993: 7). It was thus 
apparent that only a small increase in energy-efficiency would significantly reduce these 
countries’ energy demands, and consequently also their reliance on nuclear power generated 
by high-risk nuclear reactors. Hence, by transferring fuel-efficient technology and equipment 
                                                 
8 The fact that enormous amounts of energy were and still are wasted in CEE and FSU countries can be traced 
back both to the policies by which the Soviet Union had sought to secure its domination over the former 
Eastern bloc and to the distorted incentive structure of the socialist command economy. During the Cold War 
the Soviet Union had sponsored various energy projects in Eastern European countries and had supplied 
highly subsidized energy resources. The strategic aim of this policy had been to deepen the dependence of 
these countries on Soviet technology and energy transfers. Not surprisingly, the very availability of these 
presumably inexhaustible and cheap energy resources—energy prices bore little relation to economic cost—
enticed the Eastern European command economies to develop highly inefficient and energy-hungry industrial 
and housing structures. Under this system of low energy prices, it was only rational for the population to 
perceive energy not as a scarce resource, but as an entitlement. There was thus little incentive to measure and 
conserve energy or to invest in more fuel-efficient technology and equipment (Balabanov 1998: 71-73). 
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and by assisting the Eastern countries to completely overhaul and reform their energy sectors, 
including the pricing, billing and collection systems, the Western donors had an opportunity 
to help secure the premature closure of high-risk nuclear reactors at comparatively low cost. 
However, it must be noted that the effectiveness of demand-side measures depended on the 
willingness of Eastern governments to introduce market reforms in the energy sector because 
as long as energy prices did not reflect true production costs, there would be no incentive for 
energy saving. 
In sum, this section has elaborated on the reasons why the Western donors addressed 
the nuclear safety problem predominantly by positive incentive strategies and has explored 
various ways by which the Western donors could employ positive incentives. Furthermore, 
this section has also provided analytical benchmarks against which the efficiency of positive 
incentives (second dimension) may be assessed in the individual case studies. However, it 
must be emphasized that the set of capacity-building measures outlined in this section is 
neither exhaustive, nor does it imply that all these measures are necessarily applicable in each 
“case”—and hence that the relative cost-effectiveness of all these measures are assessed in 
each individual case study. Rather, the range of potentially applicable and applied capacity-
building measures is determined by the specific nature of each individual “case”. As such 
each case study will examine the relative cost-effectiveness of only a limited selection of the 
capacity-building measures outlined above. 
3.4 The West’s Initial Response to the Nuclear Safety Problem 
The analysis of the political basics of the nuclear safety problem in CEE and the FSU has so 
far demonstrated that there were competing interests both between Western and Eastern 
countries, and among the Western donor states themselves. First, the strong asymmetries of 
preferences and capacities between Western and Eastern countries were likely to make 
successful cooperation, in particular on the closure front, a very difficult undertaking. Second, 
the specific nature of the benefits to be gained by Western countries from addressing the 
safety threat was bound to give rise to divisions among Western donor countries and 
consequently have serious implications for the West’s overall approach to the nuclear safety 
problem. Indeed, those Western countries located geographically nearer to the various trouble 
spots in the East were enticed to act due to the predominantly public benefits flowing from the 
reduced environmental risk of a nuclear disaster and hence called for the earliest possible 
closure of unsafe reactors. The major Western nuclear countries, on the other hand, perceived 
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predominantly private benefits resulting from the opportunity of both protecting their own 
nuclear power programs and domestic nuclear industries from yet another debilitating 
accident and helping their ailing nuclear industries to gain a foothold in the Eastern nuclear 
market. These countries thus tended to adhere to a more pragmatic approach and generally 
accepted that most high-risk nuclear reactors in the East would continue to operate for years 
to come. 
Against this backdrop, the following section describes the West’s initial response to 
the nuclear safety problem in the East. This description is introduced with a brief discussion 
of the international institutional context in which the Western countries had started to address 
the nuclear safety problem in CEE and the FSU and their ensuing efforts to create an 
international regime for the safe use of nuclear power. Thereafter a brief overview of the 
major Western nuclear safety assistance programs is presented. 
International Institutional Framework Regulating Nuclear Safety  
As the West began to perceive the operation of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors as a serious 
transnational safety threat, the international institutional framework regulating nuclear safety 
issues was rather underdeveloped. Indeed, although a few international regimes existed in the 
field of nuclear safety, for example the Paris (1960) and Vienna (1963) Conventions on 
Nuclear Liability and the two IAEA Notification and Assistance Conventions (1986), these 
regimes neither had the mandate, nor the clout to guarantee a sufficient level of nuclear safety 
in states operating nuclear reactors. The same conclusion applies to the IAEA that lacks the 
authority to enforce international safety standards. The absence of strong international 
regimes and institutions in the field of nuclear safety can be mainly attributed to the fact that 
nuclear power has always been regarded as a prerogative of sovereign states. This in turn has 
much to do with reasons of national security, in particular with the close connections between 
nuclear power and the development of nuclear weapons (Foss 1999: 65). 
The nuclear safety problem in CEE and the FSU provided a fresh impetus to 
intergovernmental efforts aimed at strengthening the international institutional framework 
regulating nuclear safety issues. In September 1991 the IAEA General Conference officially 
launched the idea of a binding nuclear safety convention. A number of Western governments 
considered such a convention as a useful means to secure the premature shutdown of unsafe 
nuclear reactors, strengthen public acceptance of nuclear power, and to increase the level of 
nuclear safety worldwide by promoting exchanges of technology, experience and know-how 
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among engineers and NPP operators. And even the Eastern countries—whose unsafe nuclear 
reactors was the ultimate target of the proposed convention—were initially not reluctant to 
consider the idea because they hoped that it would generate larger amounts of international 
assistance (NW, 5 September 1991: 1, 10-12). Despite the strong support the idea initially 
enjoyed among many governments, negotiations on a binding nuclear safety convention were 
hopelessly bogged down by mid-1993. Apart from the contentious issues regarding the scope 
and content of such a convention, disagreement prevailed especially over how far any set of 
safety standards should trespass on national sovereignty and whether the proposed convention 
should be coercive in nature (NW, 16 April 1992: 6-7; NW, 8 July 1993: 14-15). Only after 
the original proposals had been significantly watered down was a first draft agreed upon in 
early 1994. After the minimum number of signatories had been finally secured three years 
later the so-called International Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) entered into force in 
October 1996.9
The principal aim of the CNS is to enhance levels of nuclear safety worldwide via a 
process of self-assessment augmented by formal reporting at periodic peer reviews. The 
convention neither sets binding technical standards, nor demands costly actions such as the 
shutdown of unsafe nuclear power plants.10 Instead, it commits parties to promote nuclear 
safety through better regulatory organization, legislation, financial and human resources, 
safety assessment and research, and safety upgrading. In addition, the CNS neither provides 
for means to verify whether parties meet the convention’s rather vaguely defined obligations, 
nor for sanctions against parties with poor compliance records. The convention essentially 
relies on peer review pressure to induce parties to comply with their formal obligations (NW, 
29 April 1999: 7-9). 
In short, despite ongoing efforts since 1991 to establish a more stringent international 
regime regulating national nuclear power programs, the international institutional framework 
in the field of nuclear safety remained weak and underdeveloped. As a result, the Western 
                                                 
9 As of January 2000, the CNS has been acceded to or ratified by 53 countries, including 30 of the total 32 
countries with operating NPPs. The remaining two nuclear countries that have so far not acceded to or 
ratified the convention are Kazakhstan and India (see website of the IAEA at: 
http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Documents/Legal/nukesafety.shtml). 
10 The CNS calls on parties to upgrade unsafe NPPs and, if not practicable, to shut them down as soon as 
possible. However, the convention contains an “escape-clause” for the shutdown of plants, conceding that the 
timing of any shutdown may be determined by the whole energy context and the estimated socio-economic 
impact (NN, June 1999: 56-57). 
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response to the threat posed by the continued operation of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors 
had to be initiated and managed on a more or less ad hoc basis. 
Major Nuclear Safety Assistance Programs 
In late 1990 and early 1991 both the EU and various other Western countries launched a 
number of assistance programs to address the nuclear safety problem in the East. The EU, 
which is by far the most important donor in terms of financial contributions, channeled its 
nuclear safety assistance through its PHARE program for CEE countries (including the Baltic 
states) and its TACIS program for the states of the FSU.11 The PHARE and TACIS programs 
are designed to provide grant assistance to Eastern countries with the overall aim to help them 
restructure their economies and build stable democratic institutions (Herttrich et al. 1994: 95). 
Nuclear safety projects funded under PHARE and TACIS focused on the following 
activities: Strengthening nuclear regulatory bodies, implementing operational safety 
improvements, conducting safety studies and providing basic safety equipment for NPPs 
(Nuclear Energy Institute 1997: 35-37). Funds committed under the EU’s nuclear safety 
programs overwhelmingly took the form of technical or “software-related“ assistance and did 
not directly address problems of hardware design. The EU’s technical assistance was widely 
criticized as being extremely bureaucratic and slow and as representing blatant subsidies to 
consultants from EU Member States’ nuclear industries. In addition, the EU’s nuclear safety 
programs suffered from internal coordination problems. Indeed, by 1993 the EU had proven 
unable to establish an efficient framework for cooperation between the five Director-
Generalships (DG) involved in the field of nuclear safety, and even within the DG for Foreign 
Affairs there was virtually no coordination between officials responsible for PHARE and 
TACIS (NW, 23 December 1993: 6). A further characteristic of the EU’s nuclear safety 
programs was the absence of explicit conditionality. Arguing that it was the sovereign 
responsibility of each recipient government to determine its national energy policies, the EU 
initially made no explicit attempt to condition its grant aid on commitments by Eastern 
governments to prematurely close unsafe nuclear reactors (Connolly and List 1996: 248-249). 
The EU’s nuclear safety assistance was not restricted to grants from the PHARE and 
TACIS programs, but also included funds from the Euratom loan facility. Euratom—an 
                                                 
11 In the first three years of Western nuclear safety aid programs to CEE and FSU countries, the EU had 
provided nearly two thirds of the total amount of Western assistance (Connolly and List 1996: 248). For the 
historical development of Western nuclear safety assistance, see Appendix. 
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acronym for the European Atomic Energy Community—was established in 1957 with a 
mandate to promote the safe and peaceful use of atomic energy. Its loan facility was designed 
to contribute to the financing of NPPs in the Community’s Member States. In late 1992 the 
European Commission proposed to extend Euratom’s lending mandate to include CEE and 
FSU countries. The Commission’s proposal to extend Euratom’s lending mandate was based 
on the reasoning that due to the falling demand for Euratom loans among EU Member States 
and the dim prospects that this demand would recover in the near-term, the remaining loans in 
the fund—around ECU 1 billion (then about $1.2 billion)—could be used to improve nuclear 
safety in the East, in particular for the completion of partly built Soviet-designed nuclear 
reactors. In March 1994 the European Council agreed to change Euratom’s lending mandate 
on the condition that Euratom loans would be used only for projects in which the majority of 
the financed capital goods or services were provided by a company from a EU Member State 
(Frogatt 1999). 
Various bilateral aid programs provided the second largest source of Western nuclear 
safety assistance. Bilateral aid programs initially focused on funding safety studies and 
measures aimed at improving the inadequate “safety culture“ at various Eastern NPPs, but 
gradually also addressed hardware problems. Although bilateral nuclear safety assistance has 
proven to be advantageous in terms of speed of disbursement, its major drawback was that it 
was uncoordinated by design, despite early efforts by the G-24 to coordinate aid strategies 
among Western donors.12 This lack of coordination has allowed donors to pursue quite 
different approaches to the nuclear safety problem. Indeed, while certain Western countries—
in particular Germany and Austria—pressed for the earliest possible closure of unsafe reactors 
and wanted Western aid to be firmly tied to shutdown commitments by Eastern governments, 
other Western donors adhered to a more pragmatic approach and were basically willing to 
provide nuclear safety assistance without insisting on rigorous conditions (Connolly and List 
1996: 243-245). 
The initial failure of the Western donor governments to coordinate policies and attach 
conditions to their aid programs was largely determined by the tremendous business 
                                                 
12 In an attempt to impose more order on the dissemination of aid to the East, the G-24 had created a Nuclear 
Safety Working Group in mid-1991 and subsequently set up a database to monitor all technical assistance 
programs and projects being implemented in the East. Since its initial efforts proved to be ineffective, the G-
24 established a 10-country executive steering committee in July 1992 and requested its secretariat, the 
Nuclear Safety Assistance Coordination Center (NUSAC), to improve the coordination of assistance 
programs (Nuclear Energy Institute 1997: 32). 
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opportunities involved in improving nuclear safety in the East. Indeed, various Western 
nuclear firms had immediately engaged in an intense commercial battle for lucrative safety 
upgrade contracts. Commercial competition was particularly intense in the early stages of the 
West’s safety upgrade efforts since Western nuclear firms were eager to develop their 
expertise of Soviet nuclear technology and acquaint themselves with the prevailing conditions 
in the Eastern nuclear markets in order to be well positioned for future nuclear upgrade and 
construction contracts. This fierce commercial competition among nuclear firms, in turn, had 
led several Western governments—torn between the desire to solve the nuclear safety 
problem in the East and to support their own crisis-ridden nuclear industries—to provide 
unconditional assistance and to abstain from tightly coordinating their aid programs with 
other donors. Since Eastern governments were generally reluctant to accept tough conditions 
imposed on nuclear safety assistance programs, a number of Western donor governments 
shrank from attaching strings to their aid out of fear of losing commercial benefits. The desire 
to secure commercial benefits also accounts for the initial lack of policy-coordination among 
the Western donors. In contrast to a coordinated or multilateral approach to the problem, in 
which private benefits would be more equally distributed among donor states, bilateral aid 
programs secured individual donors both more control over how financial resources were 
allotted and better opportunities to win business contracts. An uncoordinated approach among 
the donor states, however, allowed recipient governments to play donors against each other 
and, consequently, to avoid any costly aid conditions (MacLachlan 1996b: 1). 
Given the strong incentives of Eastern governments to keep their unsafe nuclear 
reactors in operation as long as possible, it was evident that a satisfactory and lasting solution 
to the nuclear safety problem depended to a large extent on the willingness and ability of the 
Western donor countries to pool their resources and stick to common policies of 
conditionality. Realizing these constraints, those Western countries most interested in 
reducing or eliminating the risk posed by the continued operation of high-risk nuclear 
reactors—in particular Germany due to its close proximity to Eastern NPPs, but also France 
which was concerned about the consequences of another nuclear accident in the East for the 
future of its nuclear power program—pressed for a more coherent and comprehensive 
approach to the nuclear safety problem (NW, 12 March 1992: 1, 10-11; NW, 16 April 1992: 
13-14). By mid-1992, their combined efforts had succeeded at least in the sense of mobilizing 
additional Western assistance and achieving agreement on the broad principles of a new 
action plan. At the July 1992 economic summit of the G-7 in Munich, the seven leading 
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economic powers of the West agreed to provide $700 million in grants over a period of five 
years for a five-point action program. Short-term safety measures were identified in the 
following three areas (NucNet, 27 July 1992): 
• Operational safety improvements (estimated costs: $360 million). 
• Short-term technical improvements to RBMKs and VVER-230s, which would allow these 
reactors to operate at lower risk until they were shut down (estimated costs: $320 million). 
• Enhancing regulatory regimes. This measure sought to improve the ability of Eastern 
regulatory authorities to implement and maintain higher levels of safety at operational 
NPPs and to refuse licensing of NPPs if required on safety grounds (estimated costs: $20 
million). 
 
In addition, the following long-term measures were envisaged by the G-7 action plan: 
• The investigation of energy efficiency measures and alternative energy sources for 
Eastern countries, so that the need for power from unsafe reactors could be reduced. 
• The examination of the potential for upgrading nuclear reactors considered to have a 
higher level of safety, i.e. VVER-1000s and VVER-440/213s. 
 
Although the G-7 countries were able to agree in Munich on the total amount of funds to be 
appropriated for the action program, disagreement prevailed over how to manage financing 
for the planned short-term safety measures. The European G-7 members wanted to create a 
multilateral assistance fund for this purpose. They reckoned that such a funding mechanism 
would minimize cut-throat commercial competition among Western nuclear firms and the 
danger that the most dangerous plants would be left aside while each Western donor picked 
out those plants it was most interested in. Moreover, they argued that a multilateral fund 
would enhance the Western donors’ leverage in bargaining shutdown commitments with 
Eastern governments. However, the non-European G-7 members, in particular the United 
States and Japan, favored organizing aid on a bilateral basis, with nothing more international 
than a forum to prevent duplication or neglect (Economist, 15 August 1992: 18). While the 
Bush administration officially cited the creation of a new and unwieldy bureaucracy as its 
motive to reject a multilateral fund, the Japanese government pointed to the unresolved 
territorial dispute with Russia over the Kuril Islands. In both cases, however, the deeper 
reasons for opposing the idea of a multilateral fund were the advantages provided by bilateral 
aid programs to gain commercial benefits (List 1993: 350). Indeed, since the United States 
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and Japan were not directly threatened by a nuclear accident in CEE and the FSU due to their 
geographical location, the main impulsion for these countries to provide nuclear safety 
assistance was the opportunity to bring home upgrade contracts. The prospective safety-
benefits of a multilateral approach were thus significantly lower for these countries than for 
Western European states. Moreover, since the European G-7 members wanted the newly 
established EBRD to administer the proposed multilateral fund, the United States and Japan 
were concerned that their domestic nuclear industries might be disadvantaged on the hardware 
backfit market through the awarding of contracts by a predominantly European financial 
institution. This is why the United States subsequently insisted that if at all a multilateral 
funding mechanism, the Washington-based World Bank should be assigned the task of 
managing the fund. 
The protracted political debate over whether to create a multilateral fund was finally 
resolved in February 1993 as Germany and France threatened to proceed with the fund even 
without the participation of the non-European G-7 members. Acknowledging that the fund 
would be created in any case, and thus fearing the possibility of being left out of bidding 
entirely, both the United States and Japan finally acquiesced to the creation of the Nuclear 
Safety Account (NSA) (NW, 28 January 1993: 1, 12-13). Not surprisingly, however, their 
initial contributions were marginal, just enough to make them eligible for the commercial 
opportunities created by the fund.13
The NSA became effective in April 1993 with initial pledges of ECU 115 million 
(then about $138 million) from 13 donor countries.14 The principal objective of the NSA is to 
finance, through grants, operational and near-term technical safety improvements for unsafe 
Soviet-designed reactors in the countries of CEE and the FSU and to secure the premature 
closure of these nuclear units after a specified time period. NSA funds are specifically 
targeted at those reactors that present the highest level of risk, i.e. VVER-230 and RBMK 
reactors (EBRD 1996: 2). The EBRD acts as the secretariat of the NSA and provides 
technical, project management, financial, legal and administrative services. The EBRD 
reports to NSA donors through an Assembly of Contributors that exercises overall supervision 
                                                 
13 While the United States and Japan initially pledged ECU 1.5 million and 9 million, respectively, Germany 
and France were willing to contribute ECU 40 million each over the period 1993-1995 (List 1993: 350; 
NucNet, 10 March 1993). 
84 Nuclear Safety Problem 
of the management of the NSA, approves six-month work programs and decides on the 
financing of individual projects. Based on mandates given by the Assembly of Contributors, 
the EBRD negotiates grant agreements with the recipient countries on timetables for the 
shutdown of unsafe reactors as part of agreed strategies for their power sub-sectors. To secure 
the material conditions for the premature closure of unsafe nuclear reactors, the NSA works in 
tandem with the investment arm of the EBRD that through lending from its ordinary resources 
can finance the investments needed to upgrade the energy infrastructure and other forms of 
energy generation in recipient countries (Démarcq 1994: 13). 
Following the conclusion of a NSA grant agreement, the utility operating the NPP in 
question is responsible for implementing the NSA upgrade projects. For this purpose the 
utility is required to set up a Project Management Unit (PMU) that is in charge of the day-to-
day project implementation. Consultants from Western firms are usually hired to support the 
PMU. The EBRD assists the utility in setting up the PMU and monitors project-
implementation. Procurement for all equipment and services required for NSA-funded safety 
upgrade projects is restricted to firms from NSA donor countries and the EBRD’s countries of 
operations. In general, equipment procurement follows open tendering. Consulting and 
engineering services are procured through selective tendering among qualified firms. The 
NSA’s procurement rules thus basically assure that awarded contracts are roughly balanced 
against relative contributions from donor states. In retrospect, this is the most probable reason 
why those Western donors not directly affected by the nuclear threat in the East increased 
their contributions to the fund in later years. 
Although it took considerable time and infighting to establish the NSA, and even 
though the amount of money initially allocated to the multilateral fund was far from 
sufficient—not least due to the limited financial contributions of important G-7 donors such 
as the United States and Japan—, the creation of the NSA represented an improvement on the 
existing nuclear safety assistance programs in two respects. First, the NSA represented the 
only international forum that drew all Western donors, both European and non-European 
countries, into a common assistance framework. This institutional innovation put the NSA in 
a better position than other forums to resolve collective action problems among donors by 
allowing it to apply political pressure on individual donors to give priority to safety benefits 
                                                 
14 The original donor countries were Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Belgium joined the 
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over commercial gains. Second, the NSA’s institutionalized links with the EBRD promised to 
improve the prospects of successfully enforcing conditionality policies. Indeed, in case a 
recipient government decided to renege on a closure agreement, it was bound to suffer 
considerable reputation costs, which in turn would possibly preclude further access to EBRD 
loans. Maintaining a good reputation was important to Eastern recipient governments since 
the EBRD was likely to play a leading role in capital lending to the cash-strapped region. As 
such it could be expected that the NSA’s specific position within the EBRD would increase 
its bargaining leverage (Connolly and List 1996: 266-267). 
However, before any Western donor could begin to effectively address the “hardware“ 
side of the nuclear safety problem, one important legal obstacle had to be overcome: The 
thorny question of nuclear third-party liability. Western nuclear firms tended to shy away 
from hands-on work at Soviet-designed nuclear reactors out of fear of being found liable for 
damages if an accident occurred at an Eastern NPP where they provided or installed safety 
equipment (NEI, January 1995: 32-34). Western donors therefore insisted that recipient 
countries adhere to the principles of the Vienna and Paris Conventions that provide for an 
international nuclear liability regime.15 Under both conventions, the operator of a nuclear 
installation is exclusively liable for accidents at and in relation to that installation, including 
accidents in the course of transport of nuclear substances. This “channeling“ of liability 
means that no legal action can be brought by victims against suppliers, carriers etc., even if 
the incident was attributable to the fault of one of them. The liability of the operator is 
therefore strict, i.e. the operator is held liable irrespective of fault. Since adequately 
compensating victims of a nuclear accident would doubtless exceed the financial means of 
any nuclear operator, both conventions call upon parties to provide a minimum amount of 
state guarantees. 
                                                 
NSA’s Assembly of Contributors in 1994 and the EU also made a significant contribution to the fund (ECU 
20 million). By late 1996, the aforementioned 15 donors had allocated ECU 257.2 million (EBRD 1996: 3). 
15 While the 1960 Paris Convention is limited to Western European states, the 1963 Vienna Convention is 
worldwide in scope, albeit without enjoying universal membership. In 1988, the parties to both conventions 
adopted a Joint Protocol linking the two (Darst 1997: 63). 
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These financial obligations, however, served to deter the financially strapped Eastern 
countries from adhering to the international nuclear liability regime.16 An additional reason 
for the difficulties in bringing Eastern countries in line with the international liability regime 
was the necessity of convention parties to enact national nuclear legislation and hence 
implement the liability principles. Indeed, since Eastern countries were unfamiliar with legal 
concepts such as nuclear liability insurance, it took them considerable time and effort to 
formulate and implement national nuclear laws (Krzyak 1995: 116). 
 
 
                                                 
16 Both the Paris and the Vienna conventions provide for clear financial limitations on the amount of liability to 
be assumed by parties—the 1960 Paris Convention for example sets a maximum liability of 15 million SDRs 
(Special Drawing Rights of the IMF; 1 SDR is worth roughly $1.20). Since the early 1990s, Western parties 
have been demanding that compensation in the form of state guarantees should amount to at least 150 million 
SDRs, which is in fact still very little when compared to the potential damages (NEI, January 1995: 33; 
MacLachlan 1996b: 4). 
 4 CASE STUDY I: THE NSA’S CLOSURE DEAL WITH BULGARIA 
Ever since a 1991 IAEA-mission to Bulgaria had concluded that safety conditions at the four 
VVER-230 reactors of the Kozloduy NPP were critical and demanded immediate action, 
Western countries and organizations had been trying to improve the safety of Kozloduy units 
1-4 and to persuade the Bulgarian authorities to prematurely close these four units. In June 
1993 the NSA concluded a grant agreement with the Bulgarian government in which it agreed 
to provide ECU 24 million for near-term safety upgrades at the Kozloduy NPP. In exchange, 
the Bulgarian government promised to close Kozloduy units 1-4 in 1997/1998 provided that a 
number of energy projects financed by IFIs had been completed by that time. While the NSA-
funded safety upgrade program was successfully implemented, the Bulgarian government 
refused in 1998 to comply with its closure commitments, allegedly because the set of 
investments in the country’s energy sector had not sufficiently materialized, and announced 
plans to further upgrade Kozloduy units 1-4 for prolonged operation. 
The outcomes to be explained can be summarized as follows. Effectiveness: The 
provision of positive incentives enabled the Bulgarian authorities to reduce the risk of a 
nuclear accident at the Kozloduy NPP to a certain extent, but ultimately failed to secure the 
premature closure of Kozloduy units 1-4. As such the effectiveness of the transaction was 
rather low. Efficiency: The transaction was efficient in the sense that the employment of no 
other cooperation strategy could have secured a comparable or superior behavioral change on 
the part of Bulgaria at a lower or comparable cost (first dimension of efficiency). On the other 
hand, the efficiency of the transaction was rather low in terms of the second dimension of 
efficiency: It is not impossible that other ways of employing positive incentives could have 
led to a more favorable result. These outcomes were shaped by the following problems. The 
effectiveness of the transaction was seriously hampered by the “slippery slope effect”. 
Moreover, enforcement and coordination problems among the donors also negatively affected 
the effectiveness of the transaction. The efficiency of the transaction (second dimension) was 
hampered by the rather pro-nuclear problem-definition adhered to by the Western donors. 
The case study on the NSA’s closure deal with Bulgaria is structured along the 
following lines. The first section provides a brief introduction to the energy situation in 
Bulgaria and discusses why a domestic solution to the nuclear safety problem in Bulgaria was 
difficult if not impossible. The second section elaborates on the provisions of the 1993 NSA 
agreement and explains why a closure agreement was concluded despite reservations on both 
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sides. The third section, which is structured into two parts, analyzes the implementation of the 
NSA agreement. Whereas the first part of this section describes the problems involved in 
implementing the NSA-funded safety upgrade program at the Kozloduy NPP, the second part 
examines the troublesome implementation of the various energy projects envisaged by the 
NSA agreement and explains why the Bulgarian government ultimately refused to comply 
with its closure commitments. The results of the case study are summarized in the fourth and 
final section. 
4.1 The Energy Situation in Bulgaria 
During the early 1990s, Bulgaria’s total installed electricity capacity amounted to about 
11'360 MW and was based on a troubled mix of the unsafe Kozloduy NPP and a number of 
aging thermal and hydroelectric power plants. The country’s six nuclear reactors at the 
Kozloduy NPP—four VVER-230s and two VVER-1000s—have an installed net capacity of 
3'420 MW, thus accounting for around 30 percent of Bulgaria’s total generation capacity. 
Bulgaria’s thermal power plants (including combined heat and power plants) accounted for 54 
percent and its hydroelectric facilities for 16 percent of total generation capacity (EEE Report 
Profiles, 1995a: 12-14; IEA 1994: 56-57). In the 1980s, the Bulgarian authorities had planned 
to increase the country’s nuclear generating capacity with the construction of two VVER-
1000 units at the Belene NPP. However, due to local protests and the country’s economic 
slowdown, the Bulgarian government decided in mid-1991 to cancel the construction project 
(Nuclear Energy Institute 1997: 310). 
TABLE 4.1: OPERATING NUCLEAR REACTORS IN BULGARIA 
Power Unit Reactor Type Capacity (Net, MW) Commercial Start 
Kozloduy 1 VVER-440/230 400 1974 
Kozloduy 2 VVER-440/230 400 1975 
Kozloduy 3 VVER-440/230 400 1981 
Kozloduy 4 VVER-440/230 400 1982 
Kozloduy 5 VVER-1000 910 1988 
Kozloduy 6 VVER-1000 910 1993 
Note: Kozloduy units 3 and 4 are a more modern version of the VVER-440/230 design. Kozloduy-6 was 
connected to the grid in 1991, but it took until 1993 to start commercial operations. Source: Kurtz 1996: 122. 
In the early 1990s, Bulgaria experienced serious difficulties in meeting its energy needs—
despite the fact that domestic energy demand had dropped drastically due to the sharp decline 
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in industrial production since 1989. As a result, the Bulgarian government had been forced to 
ration electricity supply during periods of heavy demand, i.e. in particular during the cold 
winter months. Bulgaria’s critical energy situation during the early 1990s was to a large 
extent determined by the poor performance of the country’s existing power plants (EEE 
Report Profiles 1995a).1 Not only had it proved difficult to maintain previous power output 
levels at the Kozloduy NPP due to frequent forced shutdowns, but also the country’s thermal 
power plants failed to reach their true potential due to their deteriorating condition: Around 60 
percent of Bulgaria’s thermal power generation capacity had been at the time in operation for 
over 20 years and had not undergone major modernization work since. 
Further exacerbating the country’s critical energy situation was the fact that Bulgaria 
had to pay increasing prices for fossil fuel imports from Russia and Ukraine. While Bulgaria 
was endowed with large supplies of low quality lignite coal, it had to import over 90 percent 
of its oil and gas (Kurtz 1996: 121). Previously, the Soviet Union had supplied Bulgaria with 
ever growing quantities of cheap energy—which was in effect the major reason why Bulgaria 
had developed highly energy intensive and inefficient industries in the first place.2 However, 
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 the Russian government was no longer 
willing to support its former socialist Eastern European ally with subsidized energy supplies, 
and Bulgaria eventually had to pay world-market prices for its fossil fuel imports.3 Bulgaria’s 
energy situation during the early 1990s was not only characterized by an acute energy 
shortage, but also by a rising relative importance of nuclear power. While the Kozloduy NPP 
accounted for less than 30 percent of total electricity production in the late 1980s, this figure 
had gradually risen to around 37 percent by 1993, almost entirely at the expense of electricity 
generated at the country’s thermal power plants (IEA 1994: 55). This development reflected 
the enhanced economic advantage of nuclear power: Although nuclear fuel imported from 
Russia was also subject to price hikes, its costs remained substantially below those for 
imported fossil fuels and even domestically produced coal.4
                                                 
1  The country’s distribution network was also highly inefficient, with electricity losses amounting to nearly 40 
percent in some areas (NEI, November 1992: 61). 
2 It has been estimated that electricity intensity as a whole in Bulgaria was about three times higher per unit of 
GDP than the OECD average, a ratio that had increased in the early 1990s because the decline in Bulgarian 
GDP had been greater than the decline in power demand (EEE Report Profiles, 1995a: 10). 
3  The Soviet Union also cut off electricity exports to Bulgaria in October 1991, precipitating an instant crisis in 
electricity supply in the country (NN, December 1991: 49). 
4 Production costs at the Kozloduy NPP have been estimated to be over 50 percent lower than the production 
costs at the country’s thermal power plants (EEE Report, May 1997: 25). 
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Struggling to meet the country’s energy needs and coping with a wide array of other 
formidable socio-economic problems connected with the country’s transformation process, 
the Bulgarian government was reluctant to comply with Western demands to immediately 
shut down the four VVER-230s of the Kozloduy NPP. Indeed, closing Kozloduy units 1-4 
would result in the loss of over a fourth of the country’s electricity supply, a sacrifice which 
the Bulgarian government believed it could not afford to make in face of the country’s dire 
economic and energy situation. The preferred course of action from Sofia’s point of view was 
thus to upgrade Kozloduy units 1-4 and allow them to operate as long as possible, at least 
until sufficient replacement power generation capacity was in place. However, since the 
Bulgarian authorities lacked both the technical expertise and the financial resources for such a 
complex and costly undertaking, they were dependent upon external assistance to help 
improve the near-term safety of Kozloduy units 1-4. 
4.2 The NSA Agreement with Bulgaria 
Deeply concerned that the critical safety situation at the Kozloduy NPP could result in yet 
another Chernobyl-style nuclear disaster, the EU reacted promptly by approving in July 1991 
an ECU 11.5 million emergency grant from its PHARE program to address the plant’s most 
urgent safety problems. With some delay both the EU emergency program and additional 
measures worth around $10 million had been implemented at the troubled facility by early 
1993 (Nuclear Energy Institute 1997: 322). Nevertheless, safety conditions at the Kozloduy 
NPP remained precarious. In particular, no or only little new safety-enhancing equipment had 
been installed at the Kozloduy NPP—Western nuclear safety assistance had so far focused on 
improving safety culture, strengthening the country’s nuclear regulatory authority and 
conducting safety studies of the plant. Bulgarian pleas for additional Western safety upgrade 
assistance had come at a favorable time: By April 1993 the NSA had become operational, and 
it had previously announced that the first grant agreement it would seek to conclude would 
concern the Kozloduy NPP (NW, 13 May 1993: 1-3). 
The work previously undertaken in the framework of the EU emergency program 
proved to be conducive to the ensuing negotiations between NSA/EBRD officials and the 
Bulgarian government on the conclusion of an agreement because there was a broad 
consensus about the required safety upgrade work. In early May 1993, the management of the 
Kozloduy NPP presented to the EBRD a list of safety-related equipment it wanted to purchase 
with NSA grants. However, the amount of money the Bulgarian authorities requested was so 
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large that if fully allotted, comparatively little money would have been left for other nuclear 
safety projects the NSA was considering to fund. By early June 1993, the EBRD had worked 
out a number of safety priorities worth ECU 24 million (then about $29 million) that the NSA 
was prepared to fund. This first round of talks on a NSA grant agreement ended without 
results because the Bulgarian officials were reluctant to agree to a grant condition whereby 
they would have had to close Kozloduy units 1-2 by 1996 and units 3-4 by 1998. Having 
carried out some upgrade work on Kozloduy units 1-2 in the preceding years, the Bulgarian 
authorities were less than keen to see these units closed in three years time. As far as 
Kozloduy units 3-4 were concerned, the Bulgarian authorities argued that their more modern 
design did not justify their closure by 1998.5 Nevertheless, two weeks later the Bulgarian 
government finally agreed to revised NSA-conditions and on 16 June 1993 the closure deal 
was sealed (NW, 10 June 1993: 10-11; NW, 24 June 1993: 13-14). 
The ECU 24 million grant agreement was designed to improve near-term safety levels 
at the four VVER-230 units of the Kozloduy NPP and to secure these units’ premature closure 
as soon as the country’s energy situation allowed. The installation of safety equipment funded 
by the NSA aimed to enhance safety levels during the final operating years of these four 
units.6 The Bulgarian state-owned electricity utility (NEK) was put in charge of project 
implementation and was requested to set up a special PMU at the plant. It was expected that 
the NSA-funded safety upgrade program at Kozloduy units 1-4 would be completed within 
about 18 months, i.e. by early 1995. In exchange for the NSA grant, the Bulgarian 
government pledged to shut down Kozloduy units 1-2 as soon as modernization work was 
completed on either of the two VVER-1000s of the Kozloduy NPP (units 5-6) or on the Varna 
thermal power plant, and when the Chaira hydroelectric power plant was operational. These 
energy projects were scheduled for completion by April 1997. Furthermore, Kozloduy units 
3-4 were slated to operate until both unit 5 and unit 6 of the Kozloduy NPP were modernized 
and the conversion of the Sofia, Kostov and Republika district heating plants to combined 
cycle co-generation heat and power plants had been completed. These energy projects were 
then expected to be completed by 1998 (NW, 24 June 1993: 13-14; Nuclear Energy Institute 
                                                 
5  Since the useful service life of a VVER-230 unit is about 25 to 30 years, the Bulgarian authorities had 
originally expected to operate Kozloduy units 1-2 until 2004/2005, and Kozloduy units 3-4 until 2010-2012 
(NW, 11 December 1997: 13). 
6 The safety equipment financed by the ECU 24 million NSA grant included fire protection devices, vessel 
inspection equipment, safety valves, electrical components and new emergency feedwater systems for reactor 
coolant (NucNet, 17 June 1993). 
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1997: 323; Frogatt 1999). The NSA agreement was based on the premise that IFIs such as the 
EBRD or the World Bank would provide favorable loans to realize the designated energy 
projects and hence facilitate or “trigger” the closure of Kozloduy units 1-4 in 1997/1998. 
To gain a Bulgarian closure commitment, the NSA had been obliged to phrase the 
terms of the grant agreement in such a way so as to allow the Bulgarian authorities room for 
maneuver. This had been achieved by including into the agreement indicative closure dates 
rather than firm deadlines for the four units’ closure. Furthermore, the premature closure of 
Kozloduy units 1-4 had been made contingent upon the rehabilitation of the Bulgarian energy 
sector, including investments in new or the rehabilitation of existing electricity sources and 
the necessity to modernize Kozloduy units 5-6. It was thus clear from the outset that sufficient 
funding by IFIs for the designated energy projects would be key to meet the agreement’s 
closure schedule. The NSA, on the other hand, was aware that in light of Bulgaria’s reliance 
on the power produced by the Kozloduy NPP it would probably be difficult to secure future 
Bulgarian compliance with the terms of the agreement. Not only would the Bulgarian 
authorities have strong incentives to keep the upgraded Kozloduy units 1-4 in operation 
beyond 1997/1998, but also enforcing the agreement’s closure guidelines was bound to pose 
serious difficulties since the NSA grant would be disbursed well before the Bulgarian 
authorities were expected to comply with their closure commitments. Chances for the NSA to 
intervene in case of Bulgarian non-compliance with the terms of the agreement were, 
therefore, slight. The then director of the NSA, François Démarcq, expressed his awareness of 
these contractual problems by terming the agreement a “pact of trust” between NSA donors 
and the Bulgarian authorities (NW, 24 June 1993: 14). 
The following reasons account for the NSA’s willingness to finance safety upgrades at 
Kozloduy units 1-4 despite the potential risk that Bulgaria might use the NSA-funded safety 
upgrades to allow these four units to operate beyond the stipulated closure dates. First, 
improving the dismal safety levels at Kozloduy units 1-4 was a top priority of the NSA. 
Second, Bulgarian pleas for Western nuclear safety assistance tended to indicate that the 
Bulgarian government was also deeply concerned about the poor safety conditions at the 
Kozloduy NPP. Thus, the NSA may have reckoned that once the country had sufficient 
supply capacity, the Bulgarian authorities would be willing to shut down Kozloduy units 1-4 
on safety grounds. Finally, the NSA probably reasoned that a full-fledged breach of the 
agreement on the part of the Bulgarian government would lead Western countries and IFIs to 
freeze their assistance and loan financing programs. Given Bulgaria’s dire economic situation, 
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Sofia was believed to be ill prepared to afford such sanctions. Thus, the potentially high 
reputation costs of non-compliance for Bulgaria tended to soothe Western concerns that Sofia 
might find it profitable to prolong the service lives of Kozloduy units 1-4 once these units had 
been upgraded. 
4.3 Implementation of the NSA Agreement 
The following section elaborates on the implementation of the NSA agreement. It first 
analyzes the problems involved in implementing the NSA-funded safety upgrade program at 
Kozloduy units 1-4. It then examines the troublesome implementation of the various energy 
projects envisaged by the NSA agreement and examines the reasons why the Bulgarian 
government ultimately refused to comply with the terms of the NSA agreement. 
Implementation of the Safety Upgrade Program at the Kozloduy NPP 
Implementing the NSA-funded safety upgrade projects at units 1-4 of the Kozloduy NPP 
turned out to be a problem-ridden and protracted process. Originally scheduled for completion 
in early 1995, it took until late 1997 to implement all safety upgrade projects. The following 
reasons account for the delay in the upgrade program’s schedule. First, the nuclear liability 
issue seriously delayed the procurement and installation of safety-related equipment funded 
by the NSA grant (NEI, January 1995: 12-13). It took the Bulgarian government over a year 
to take initial steps towards the resolution of the nuclear liability problem: Only in February 
1994 had it approved the text of a standard annex guaranteeing a disclaimer of liability to all 
contracts for the delivery of equipment or the provision of services to the plant, and it took 
until July 1994 for Sofia to finally sign the Vienna Convention. However, a number of 
Western nuclear engineering firms remained reluctant to sign NSA-contracts and see their 
equipment installed at Kozloduy units 1-4 until the Bulgarian Parliament had ratified the 
Vienna Convention and enacted national legislation based on the Convention. This was 
achieved only in September 1995, two years after the NSA agreement had been signed. 
Second, the Bulgarian authorities—fearful of the potential loses in electricity 
production, especially during the cold winter months—had repeatedly proven reluctant to 
temporarily shut down Kozloduy units 1-4 for maintenance outages, which was in effect 
necessary to install the NSA-funded safety equipment. As a matter of fact, in the fall of 1995 
the NSA had grown so incensed about the delays in implementing the safety upgrade program 
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that it threatened to freeze the further disbursement of grant money in case the Bulgarian 
authorities refused to temporarily shut down Kozloduy unit 4 in the following spring (NW, 5 
October 1995: 4-5). 
The Bulgarian authorities’ reluctance to extend maintenance outages out of fear of 
jeopardizing the country’s electricity supply was particularly exemplified in the serious 
conflict between the Bulgarian government and various Western countries and organizations 
over the restart of Kozloduy unit 1 in late 1995 (Nuclear Energy Institute 1997: 326-327). 
Unit 1 had been shut down in February 1995 for a five-month examination of its safety 
systems. During the maintenance outage, two Western European nuclear safety authorities 
(IPSN and GRS) had found that the resistance of unit 1’s pressure vessel to large thermal 
shocks was insufficient, and recommended in September 1995 that the Bulgarian regulatory 
authority take samples from the vessel for analysis before the unit was restarted. In late 
September 1995 G-7 representatives met with officials of the Bulgarian government and 
requested that Kozloduy unit 1 not be restarted unless the condition of its pressure vessel 
could be ascertained to the satisfaction of Western nuclear safety experts. Arguing that it 
desperately needed all Kozloduy units in operation during the subsequent winter months to 
ensure normal power supplies, the Bulgarian government rejected the G-7’s request. The 
French government responded to Sofia’s uncooperative behavior by pulling out most EdF 
engineers who had been working at the Kozloduy NPP under a cooperation agreement signed 
in 1993. Furthermore, in late October the EU offered to provide emergency coal supplies so 
that the reactor could remain closed throughout the winter. However, all these efforts failed to 
prevent the Bulgarian authorities from restarting Kozloduy unit 1 in late 1995. In January 
1996, the Bulgarian regulatory authority promised to shut down Kozloduy unit 1 in May 1996 
for an examination of its pressure vessel, but only after the EU had agreed to provide over 
ECU 10 million in compensation for the temporary shutdown of unit 1 (EEE Report, October 
1996: 32). 
Finally, technical and management problems contributed to the delays in 
implementing the safety upgrade program at Kozloduy units 1-4 (NW, 6 February 1997: 1, 
12). While the Bulgarian authorities experienced problems in setting up a functional PMU and 
in mobilizing local forces to implement the aid already provided—problems which generally 
resulted from the lack of preparation on the part of NEK and the Kozloduy NPP 
management—, the NSA declined to renew the contract for the project management in 1995 
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and had to recruit a new project manager, which consequently resulted in further delaying the 
implementation of the safety upgrade program. 
Implementation of Energy Projects under the NSA Agreement 
Although the Bulgarian government had announced its intention to set up a decommissioning 
fund for Kozloduy units 1-4 in April 1995 (EEE Report, April 1995: 8), it became 
increasingly evident in the following months that the Bulgarian authorities were not willing to 
abide by the closure dates stipulated in the NSA agreement. In fact, by the time the Bulgarian 
authorities should have had completed preparations for the closure of Kozloduy units 1-2 in 
1997, the Bulgarian government declared that it would not shut down these reactors in the 
near future. Moreover, in early 1998 Sofia announced plans to continue operating Kozloduy 
units 1-2 until 2005-2006, and Kozloduy units 3-4 until 2010-2012 (NEI, April 1998: 4). The 
Bulgarian government justified its plans to keep these units in operation beyond the scheduled 
closure dates on the grounds that IFIs had failed to live up to their commitments stipulated in 
the NSA agreement, i.e. it argued that the planned investments in the Bulgarian energy sector 
had not materialized to the extent which would allow the early closure of these four reactors. 
Indeed, both the implementation of various conventional energy projects and the 
modernization of Kozloduy units 5-6 had gotten far behind the schedule outlined in the 1993 
NSA agreement. As such Sofia’s decision to continue operating Kozloduy units 1-4 beyond 
1997/1998 did not strictly amount to a clear-cut violation of the terms of the NSA agreement. 
Although the NSA and other Western countries and institutions protested vehemently against 
Sofia’s decision, they reluctantly accepted the fact that the Bulgarian government would not 
close Kozloduy units 1-4 in line with the agreement’s original schedule. 
Why were the conditions laid down in the NSA agreement not met? According to the 
Bulgarian government, this outcome was due to the reluctance of IFIs to timely provide a 
sufficient amount of funds for the rehabilitation of Bulgaria’s energy sector. In the following 
it is argued that this assessment is only partly correct, and that the deeper reason why the 
terms of the NSA agreement were not met was the Bulgarian government’s desire to keep 
Kozloduy units 1-4 in operation as long as possible. 
To begin with, it must be emphasized that the failure to meet the terms of the NSA 
grant agreement cannot be attributed to a principal lack of willingness on the part of IFIs to 
extend loans for the rehabilitation of Bulgaria’s energy sector, at least not with respect to the 
conventional power projects envisaged by the NSA agreement. Indeed, both the EBRD and 
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the World Bank were prepared to facilitate the premature closure of Kozloduy units 1-4 by 
preparing and approving loans for a number of conventional power projects that were 
expected to improve Bulgaria’s overall energy situation. Whereas the EBRD had provided 
loans in the order of ECU 39.5 million for upgrade work at the Maritza East II thermal power 
plant, the World Bank had approved an Energy-I loan worth $93 million for the construction 
of the Chaira pumped-storage hydroelectric power plant.7 In addition, various IFIs had 
prepared a number of energy investment projects and considered to provide the necessary 
financial resources. The EBRD prepared together with the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
the so-called Power Sector Refurbishment Project which was slated to provide around ECU 
60 million in financing for the refurbishment of the Maritza East III thermal power plant, the 
upgrading of Bulgaria’s inefficient transmission and distribution network, and the initiation of 
a demand-side management program in the National Electric Company (NEK). Furthermore, 
the EBRD and the EIB also considered to jointly finance the so-called Power Transmission 
Project whose purpose was to support the restructuring and commercialization of the 
Bulgarian power sector, and to assist in preparations to link Bulgaria’s transmission system to 
Western Europe’s electricity grid. In addition, the World Bank and the EBRD considered 
jointly providing around $270 million in financing for the refurbishment and conversion of 
the Sofia and the Pernik district heating plants. Finally, the World Bank also reportedly 
considered extending an Energy-II loan in the order of $220 million for the refurbishment of 
the Varna thermal power plant.8  
In contrast to the conventional power projects, finding an international lending facility 
willing to fund the then estimated $300 million modernization work at Kozloduy units 5-6 
proved to be far more troublesome. After much wavering the EBRD eventually declined to 
finance the modernization project. As a result, it took until August 1995 for the Bulgarian 
authorities to approach Euratom—one of the few remaining lending facilities in principle 
willing to finance the modernization of Kozloduy units 5-6—with a loan application (Frogatt 
1999). Following a protracted tendering process throughout 1997, the Bulgarian government 
announced in January 1998 that an international consortium called “Euroconsortium”, 
comprising the German nuclear engineering firm Siemens, France’s Framatome and several 
Russian nuclear organizations, had been selected to modernize Kozloduy units 5-6 (EEE 
                                                 
7  The last stage of the upgrade work at Maritsa Istok II was reportedly completed in late 1999. The Chaira 
pumped-storage hydroelectric power plant was finally operational in June 1999, i.e. two years behind 
schedule (PEE, 5 August 1999: 14; EEE Report, September 1999: 20-21). 
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Report, January 1998: 19-20). Euroconsortium’s comprehensive modernization project was 
then expected to take about 4-5 years and to cost around ECU 230 million. Loan financing 
was due to come from consortium member countries, with a major contribution from Russia 
(around $150 million). Almost all of the upgrade work to be conducted by Siemens and 
Framatome was expected to be funded by Euratom loans under eased conditions. As part of 
the overall modernization project, the U.S. firm Westinghouse was chosen by the Bulgarian 
government to upgrade the computer systems at Kozloduy units 5-6. Westinghouse’s upgrade 
project was slated to cost around $63 million, and was expected to be financed with loans 
from the U.S. Eximbank. 
As pointed out above, the various energy projects envisaged by the NSA agreement 
were not completed on schedule partly because the various IFIs involved in the rehabilitation 
of Bulgaria’s energy sector had failed to provide the necessary financial resources on time. 
What accounts for the delays on the part of IFIs to approve loans for the restructuring of 
Bulgaria’s energy sector? Part of the answer is that although the IFIs were in principle willing 
to help Bulgaria refurbish its energy sector, they were not willing to do so at any price. In 
exchange for loans slated for the rehabilitation of Bulgaria’s conventional power plants, both 
the EBRD and the World Bank insisted on a number of far-reaching conditions the Bulgarian 
government was expected to comply with. These conditions, ranging from the achievement of 
significant progress in the privatization of the Bulgarian energy sector, the abolishment of 
subsidies and elimination of loss-making state firms, to the lifting of price controls for energy, 
were basically designed to promote Bulgaria’s problematic transition to a market-oriented 
economy, on the one hand, and to secure the future repayment of disbursed loans, on the 
other. In the course of the 1990s, the IFIs involved in Bulgaria became increasingly adamant 
in their demands that Sofia meet such conditions before new energy projects were approved 
for financing, and even threatened to withhold already contracted loans if the Bulgarian 
government failed to make progress in its reform program. 
The lack of movement on electricity prices proved to be the most irksome issue in this 
respect. Despite sharp price increases in 1991 and every six months thereafter, the rates paid 
by Bulgarian electricity consumers failed to meet production costs in subsequent years. In 
1995 the issue came to a head as both the World Bank and the EBRD demanded that the 
Bulgarian government immediately increase electricity prices (EEE Report Profiles, 1995a: 
                                                 
8  For a detailed description of these energy projects, see websites of the EBRD and the World Bank. 
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16). The Bulgarian government was initially reluctant to comply with these demands because 
of the possible social and political consequences of such measures.9 But faced with the 
threatened suspension of loans for its energy sector, Sofia eventually gave in and agreed to 
comply with such requirements. Although electricity prices nearly reached production-cost 
levels by late 1996, Bulgaria’s plunging currency during the subsequent months of political 
chaos and social unrest essentially meant that in dollar terms electricity prices had once again 
dropped far below the rates demanded by IFIs. IFIs subsequently maintained that further loans 
for Bulgaria’s energy sector would remain conditional upon Sofia reforming the country’s 
energy sector and increasing electricity prices. As a result, by the time the various power 
replacement projects should have been completed according to the NSA agreement neither the 
EBRD nor the World Bank had taken a positive funding decision on those conventional 
power energy projects then under consideration. 
Similar reasons account for the problems in securing a source of finance for the 
modernization of Kozloduy units 5-6. It was originally expected that the EBRD would finance 
the project (EEE Report, July 1993: 12-13). However, the slow progress achieved by the 
Bulgarian government in restructuring the country’s energy sector and increasing electricity 
prices no doubt deterred the bank from allotting substantial sums for the modernization of the 
two VVER-1000 units. Moreover, as a result of its evolving fiasco in the Mochovce nuclear 
completion project in the Slovak Republic (see case study III), the EBRD had become deeply 
critical of financing completion and modernization work at Eastern NPPs. With two major 
IFIs either reluctant (the EBRD) or not able (the World Bank)10 to finance the modernization 
work at Kozloduy units 5-6, it was obvious that the project would run into financing 
difficulties and, consequently, be delayed. Indeed, only in August 1995 had Euratom been 
approached to consider funding the modernization project, i.e. only a few months before the 
upgrade work at Kozloduy units 5-6 had been scheduled to begin. And since it had become 
increasingly evident in the following months that the various power replacement projects 
envisaged by the NSA agreement would not be completed on schedule, which in turn was 
                                                 
9 The Bulgarian government was reportedly concerned that energy price increases would contribute to inflation 
and effectively push the country’s metallurgical and chemical industries towards collapse (EEE Report, July 
1995: 24). However, a study carried out by the World Bank in 1995 claimed that the Bulgarian authorities 
were exaggerating the implications of power price increases for inflation. Since the electricity expense 
accounted for only 2.6 percent of the average total household expenses, it was estimated that even a 50 
percent increase in power prices would raise the consumer price index only by 1.25 percent (World Bank 
1999: 34). 
10 Since the 1980s, the World Bank’s official lending policy is not to finance nuclear power projects, both on 
environmental and economic grounds (Friends of the Earth 1992: 18-19). 
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likely to jeopardize the closure of Kozloduy units 1-4 in 1997/98, the European Commission 
was reluctant to commit Euratom loans without a definitive closure schedule on the table. 
In short, the reluctance of IFIs to attach less harsh conditions to their loans and, 
consequently, to jeopardize their own interests, i.e. in particular their desire to secure the 
repayment of disbursed loans, for the sake of meeting the terms of the NSA agreement, may 
have resulted in the proposed investments in the Bulgarian energy sector being delayed. On 
the other hand, and in defense of the uncompromising stance of the IFIs, it must be 
emphasized that the Bulgarian government needed to be encouraged to introduce market 
reforms into the country’s ailing power sector. Although socially painful and thus politically 
dangerous to the Bulgarian government, market reforms were the only practicable way to 
correct distorted economic incentives, improve the cash flow of the energy sector, and to 
ultimately secure an efficient energy supply in Bulgaria. Hence the lack of political will on 
the part of the Bulgarian leadership to follow through with admittedly painful, nevertheless 
inevitable market reforms of the country’s power sector certainly contributed to the slow 
disbursement of loans from IFIs for the designated energy projects in Bulgaria. 
As mentioned above, a deeper reason why the terms of the NSA agreement were not 
met on schedule was the Bulgarian government’s desire to keep Kozloduy units 1-4 in 
operation as long as possible. As a matter of fact, it is not unreasonable to assume that the 
Bulgarian officials deliberately dragged their feet in negotiations with the NSA and other IFIs 
in order to prevent the NSA closure schedule from being met. The following observations 
lend support to the assumption that the Bulgarian government was reluctant to take the 
necessary steps towards the premature closure of Kozloduy units 1-4. To begin with, already 
in 1995, i.e. less than two years after the conclusion of the NSA agreement and two to three 
years prior to the anticipated closure of Kozloduy units 1-4, the Bulgarian government had 
begun to signal that it would not be able to abide by its closure commitments. Moreover, the 
grounds on which Yanko Yanev, chairman of the Bulgarian nuclear safety authority, was 
dismissed from his post in August 1996 further suggest that the Bulgarian government was 
unwilling to consider closing Kozloduy units 1-4 in the near future. Yanev, who had led the 
Bulgarian delegation in negotiations with the NSA/EBRD in 1993, was fired because he had 
agreed both to the early closure of Kozloduy units 1-4 as a condition of the NSA grant 
agreement and to the temporary shutdown of Kozloduy unit 1 in May 1996 to test its pressure 
vessel (Nuclear Energy Institute 1997: 313). 
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Furthermore, the Bulgarian government proved to be strikingly slow in approving a 
long-term energy investment plan that was designed to specify the investments by which the 
planned shutdown of Kozloduy units 1-4 could be facilitated. Indeed, over two years after the 
NSA agreement had been concluded, the EBRD was reportedly still engaged in negotiations 
with Sofia over the introduction of a least-cost plan for the country’s energy sector (NW, 23 
December 1993: 5; NW, 6 April 1995: 11-12; NW, 5 October 1995: 4-5). This had been a 
matter of serious concern to the NSA since the Bulgarian government’s uncooperative 
behavior on the issue had served to dim the prospects that the planned energy projects would 
be in place by the time Kozloduy units 1-4 were expected to be shut down.11 Finally, the 
irritated reaction of the Bulgarian government to the conclusions of a Western-led study of the 
operating records of the Kozloduy NPP in 1996 also indicates that Sofia had no intention to 
prematurely close Kozloduy units 1-4. The Western-led study revealed that Kozloduy units 5-
6 had been operating in the past far below full capacity and hence concluded that Bulgaria 
could absorb the closure of one or possibly even two older Kozloduy units simply by running 
the more modern VVER-1000 units of the Kozloduy NPP nearer their full capacity (EEE 
Report, March 1998: 1-3). The study effectively refuted the often-repeated claim by Bulgarian 
officials that the power from all six Kozloduy units was desperately needed to meet domestic 
power needs. However, the Bulgarian government firmly rejected the conclusions of the study 
on the grounds that Western officials had cooked up the data in order to coerce Bulgaria into 
shutting down the older reactors of the Kozloduy NPP. In short, it is not impossible that the 
Bulgarian government deliberately hindered the scheduled implementation of the designated 
energy projects in order to be free to prolong the operation of Kozloduy units 1-4 beyond the 
closure dates stipulated by the NSA agreement. 
What accounts for the Bulgarian government’s resolve to disregard its obligations 
under the NSA agreement and to prolong the service lives of Kozloduy units 1-4? To begin 
with, Sofia’s stance was strongly determined by the fact that the economic imperative to keep 
Kozloduy units 1-4 in operation had grown significantly since the time the NSA agreement 
had been concluded. As a consequence of the relatively high costs of domestically produced 
coal and imported fossil fuels, Bulgaria had gradually increased its reliance on nuclear power 
from 37 percent in 1993 to around 45 percent in 1997. The growing relative importance of 
                                                 
11 The option to coerce the Bulgarian government into agreeing on an energy investment plan by withholding 
further grants for the safety upgrade program was, however, dismissed by NSA officials on the grounds that 
the NSA’s main objective remained the near-term improvement of these four units’ safety (NW, 5 October 
1995: 5). 
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nuclear power for the country’s electricity supply certainly increased the perceived costs of 
prematurely closing Kozloduy units 1-4. Moreover, the Bulgarian authorities had predicted 
that domestic electricity demand would soon recover after a long period of decline, a 
prediction that further strengthened the economic case of keeping Kozloduy units 1-4 in 
operation (EEE Report, March 1998: 1-3). Furthermore, by 1996 a number of energy-poor 
countries in the region such as Greece, Turkey and the former Yugoslavia had expressed their 
interest in purchasing cheap electricity from Bulgaria, which in turn added to the economic 
value of the Kozloduy NPP (Nuclear Energy Institute 1997: 311-312; NW, 11 December 
1997: 13-14). Indeed, due to the past years of steadily decreasing domestic electricity 
demand, Bulgaria had enjoyed a dramatic reduction in power imports and a concomitant rise 
in exports: Whereas in 1992 Bulgaria had imported 3'270 GWh of electricity and exported 
only 566 GWh, this negative trade balance had been completely reversed by 1997, with 
electricity imports totaling 785 GWh and annual exports amounting to 4'335 GWh (EEE 
Report, April 1999: 8). 
In addition, the provision of Western nuclear safety assistance, in particular the grants 
provided by the NSA for the installation of safety-enhancing equipment at the Kozloduy NPP, 
no doubt enhanced the incentives and capacities of the Bulgarian government to keep 
Kozloduy units 1-4 in operation beyond the anticipated closure dates. Indeed, the successful 
implementation of various safety upgrade projects did not only allow the Bulgarian 
government to argue that there were no longer any reasons to prematurely close Kozloduy 
units 1-4 on safety grounds, but also made the prolonged operation of Kozloduy units 1-4 
both technically and financially more feasible (NEI, May 1998: 3). Furthermore, Bulgarian 
officials claimed that after safety upgrade work worth around $100 million had been 
conducted at the Kozloduy NPP, it made no economic sense to prematurely shut down 
Kozloduy units 1-4. Indeed, Sofia maintained that it would be significantly cheaper to invest 
in further safety upgrades at Kozloduy units 1-4 and to allow them to operate until the end of 
their service lives than to spend millions of dollars on the provision of conventional power 
replacement capacity (EEE Report, November 1997: 9-10).12 Furthermore, the Bulgarian 
government argued that the continued operation of the four upgraded VVER-230 units was 
                                                 
12  This argument lends support to the assumption that the Bulgarian authorities were not especially interested in 
the timely implementation of the various energy projects envisaged by the NSA agreement. Indeed, although 
Bulgaria’s aging thermal power plants needed to be revamped, the Bulgarian authorities probably reckoned 
that it made more (narrow) economic sense to postpone the expensive task of restructuring the country’s 
energy sector for some time in order to be free to continue operating Kozloduy units 1-4 which provided 
cheap electricity. 
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needed to generate the funds for the eventual decommissioning of Kozloduy units 1-4, then 
estimated by the Bulgarian authorities to cost about $800 million (EEE Report, December 
1997: 9-10). 
Finally, repeated bids by the Russian nuclear industry and government to modernize 
Kozloduy units 1-4 for extended operations most likely encouraged the Bulgarian government 
to develop plans to prolong the service lives of these units. Already in November 1995 the 
Russian nuclear industry, which was eager to keep Bulgaria as an important export market for 
its nuclear fuel and technology and to secure upgrade contracts, had offered to help the 
Bulgarian authorities to further modernize Kozloduy units 1-4. In late 1996, the Russian 
government offered to extend a “commodity credit“ worth around $250 million to fund 
modernization work at these four units (EEE Report, November 1995: 6; NucNet, 2 
December 1996; NN, January 1997: 35). In addition, Russia’s aggressive bidding practices 
had the effect of prompting other Western nuclear firms to consider getting involved in any 
modernization work at Kozloduy units 1-4, thereby undermining the previous restraint on the 
part of various Western nuclear firms to conduct life extending safety upgrades on these units. 
Indeed, by late 1997 the German nuclear engineering firm Siemens was working on the 
development of a long-term safety improvement program for Kozloduy units 1-4 and was 
reportedly also involved in talks with NEK to discuss the possibility of life extension 
measures (NW, 11 December 1997: 12). 
With various energy investment projects far behind schedule and the Bulgarian 
authorities apparently reluctant to close Kozloduy units 1-4 in the near future, the whole NSA 
closure deal was on the verge of collapse by early 1998. Indeed, the Bulgarian government 
was at the time preparing an extensive upgrade program for Kozloduy units 1-4 which would 
allow these units to operate until the end of their useful design lives or even beyond. The 
NSA/EBRD, on the other hand, reluctantly accepted the fact that Bulgaria would continue to 
operate these upgraded, nevertheless still unsafe nuclear reactors, at least until additional 
replacement power was in place, which at the time was expected to take years. Although 
EBRD officials continued to negotiate with the Bulgarian authorities throughout 1998, it had 
become increasingly clear that they would not be able to induce the Bulgarian government to 
establish revised closure schedules. Aware of the risk that Bulgaria was likely to further 
upgrade Kozloduy units 1-4 for extended operations, the European Commission effectively 
took over closure negotiations from the NSA/EBRD in September 1998 and made it clear to 
Sofia that Bulgaria’s EU membership prospects depended on the premature closure of these 
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four units. Since the efforts by the European Commission to secure the premature closure of 
Kozloduy units 1-4 are analyzed in Case Study IV, the following assessment of the NSA’s 
closure deal with Bulgaria is limited to early 1998. 
4.4 Assessment 
To which extent did Bulgaria change its externality-generating behavior in a direction desired 
by the Western donors? On the basis of the 1993 NSA grant agreement, the Western donors 
sought to induce and enable the Bulgarian authorities to both improve safety levels at the four 
VVER-230 units of the Kozloduy NPP and to definitively close Kozloduy units 1-4 in 
1997/1998. The Western donors’ goal of reducing and—after a specified time period—of 
eliminating the risk of a nuclear accident at the Kozloduy NPP was only partly achieved. On 
the positive side, the somewhat delayed implementation of the NSA-funded safety upgrade 
program had reduced to a certain extent the risk of a nuclear accident at the Kozloduy NPP. 
On the negative side, the Bulgarian government ultimately refused in 1998 to comply with its 
NSA closure commitments and announced plans to extend the service lives of Kozloduy units 
1-4. In short, the behavioral changes on the part of Bulgaria encompassed a risk-reduction 
through the implementation of the safety upgrade program, but no risk-elimination due to the 
Bulgarian government’s refusal to prematurely close Kozloduy units 1-4. 
Which cooperation strategies and what kind of measures were employed by the 
Western donors to influence Bulgaria’s behavior? The Western donors sought to secure risk-
reducing and ultimately risk-eliminating behavioral changes on the part of Bulgaria by a 
combination of the following two cooperation strategies. To begin with, the Western donors 
employed normative strategies. At various rounds of negotiations and talks, NSA/EBRD 
officials and other Western nuclear safety experts had tried to persuade the Bulgarian 
authorities to adopt higher nuclear safety standards and to prematurely close Kozloduy units 
1-4 on safety grounds. The provision of positive incentives was the Western donors’ 
predominant cooperation strategy. Positive incentives were employed for the following 
measures. The NSA provided ECU 24 million in grants for near-term technical safety 
upgrades at Kozloduy units 1-4. In addition, it was foreseen by the NSA agreement that IFIs 
such as the EBRD and the World Bank would provide an unspecified amount of favorable 
loans to rehabilitate Bulgaria’s energy sector and to provide sufficient power replacement 
capacity in order to facilitate the premature closure of Kozloduy units 1-4. 
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To which extent was the observed behavioral change on the part of Bulgaria 
influenced by the provision of positive incentives and how high was the effectiveness of the 
transaction? The observed behavioral change on the part of Bulgaria was almost exclusively 
attributable to the provision of positive incentives. Indeed, the employment of normative 
strategies, while possibly enhancing the Bulgarian government’s willingness to carry out 
safety upgrades, affected the final outcome at most only slightly. Since the transfer of positive 
incentives resulted in reduced risk-levels at the Kozloduy NPP, but ultimately failed to secure 
the premature closure of Kozloduy units 1-4, the effectiveness of the examined transaction 
was rather low. 
How high was the efficiency of the transaction? First dimension of efficiency: The 
provision of positive incentives was certainly efficient in the sense that no alternative 
cooperation strategy could have led to comparable or superior behavioral changes on the part 
of Bulgaria at a lower or comparable cost. Positive issue-linkage strategies were unlikely to 
be more cost-effective than positive incentive strategies for two reasons. To begin with, 
positive issue-linkage strategies do not directly address incapacities on the part of the 
recipient country, but rather seek to enhance the recipient’s incentives to cooperate. Hence 
while such strategies could have been used to increase the Bulgarian government’s incentives 
to prematurely close Kozloduy units 1-4, they could not have been usefully employed to 
enable the Bulgarian authorities to enhance safety levels at the plant or to develop power 
replacement capacity. Second, it is rather doubtful whether the Western donors could have at 
the time identified or agreed on a specific issue-linkage capable of generating large enough 
incentives to induce the Bulgarian government to comply with Western closure demands. For 
example, the option of linking Bulgaria’s EU membership prospects to a cooperative stance 
on the closure issue was not possible due to the fact that at the time Bulgaria had not yet 
formally applied for EU membership and in any event could not count on having a 
prospective membership application accepted in the near future. 
Similar reasons explain why negative incentives were unlikely to be more cost-
effective than positive incentives. Economic sanctions were unlikely to entice the Bulgarian 
government to develop the technical and financial means to improve the safety of the 
Kozloduy NPP or to construct additional electricity generation capacity needed to compensate 
for the power lost by the plant’s premature closure. Moreover, while the threat or imposition 
of economic sanctions would have enhanced Bulgaria’s perceived costs of not complying 
with Western closure demands, it is doubtful whether such measures would have been 
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sufficient to induce the Bulgarian government to cooperate. As a matter of fact, the imposition 
of economic sanctions risked being counterproductive by exacerbating Bulgaria’s problem-
ridden transformation process and thereby possibly forcing the hard-pressed country to rely 
even more heavily on the cheap power produced at the Kozloduy NPP. In addition, it is 
doubtful whether the Western countries would have been prepared to bear the potential costs 
involved in coercing Bulgaria into complying with Western nuclear safety demands. Indeed, 
the West was unlikely to put at risk its economic and political interests in a smooth 
transformation process for the sake of securing the premature closure of Kozloduy units 1-4. 
Finally, under the given circumstances it was highly unlikely that the employment of 
cognitive or normative strategies would have resulted in a more favorable outcome from the 
Western donors’ point of view. 
Second dimension of efficiency: The transaction involved potentially serious 
inefficiencies in the sense that alternative ways of employing positive incentives may have 
resulted in superior behavioral changes on the part of Bulgaria at a comparable cost. The 
Western funding strategy encompassed the provision of NSA grants for near-term technical 
safety upgrades at Kozloduy units 1-4 and the disbursement of an unspecified amount of loans 
by IFIs for the rehabilitation of Bulgaria’s energy sector. The analysis of the transaction has 
shown that the implementation of near-term safety upgrades at the four VVER-230 units of 
the Kozloduy NPP did not only discourage the Bulgarian authorities from making rapid 
progress in the restructuring of the country’s ailing energy sector, but also ultimately 
enhanced the incentives and capacities of the Bulgarian government to keep the four 
upgraded, nevertheless still unsafe units in operation beyond the scheduled closure dates. As 
such the specific way the Western donors chose to employ positive incentives effectively 
resulted in prolonging the transboundary threat posed by the Kozloduy NPP, albeit at 
somewhat lower levels of risk. It is hence not impossible that the Western donors could have 
secured larger and more lasting safety benefits by refraining from funding technical safety 
upgrades at Kozloduy units 1-4 and instead channeling all available financial and technical 
assistance towards the rehabilitation of Bulgaria’s energy sector and the promotion of energy 
efficiency schemes. Such an alternative funding strategy would have probably been more 
successful in creating the material conditions for the premature closure of Kozloduy units 1-4, 
and would have certainly also avoided the risk of encouraging and enabling the Bulgarian 
government to prolong theses units’ service lives. True, in pursing such an alternative funding 
strategy the Western donors would have probably had to endure higher levels of risk in the 
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short-term. However, in the mid- to long-term the funding of such alternative capacity-
building measures promised to be the most cost-effective way to secure the premature closure 
of Kozloduy units 1-4 and thus a satisfactory and lasting solution to the nuclear safety 
problem in Bulgaria. In short, the efficiency of the transaction (second dimension) was rather 
low. 
To which extent did the theoretically predicted problems in designing and 
implementing positive incentives shape the effectiveness and efficiency of the transaction? 
Extortion and moral hazard problems did not negatively affect the outcomes to be explained. 
Indeed, the Bulgarian government did not engage in extortion in the sense that it threatened to 
enhance or prolong the risk of a nuclear accident at the Kozloduy NPP unless the Western 
donors provided a specific amount of resources. Rather, Sofia simply signaled to the Western 
donors, and rather credibly so, that it lacked the financial and technical capacities to reduce 
and/or eliminate the risk of a nuclear accident at the Kozloduy NPP. As such there are no 
reasons to assume that the Bulgarian government bluffed the Western donors into providing 
the resources for a behavioral change—reducing and/or eliminating the risk of a nuclear 
accident at Kozloduy units 1-4—it would have undertaken even without having received any 
resources. Nor did the analysis uncover any compelling evidence that the Bulgarian 
government engaged in moral hazard behavior. Indeed, it is rather unlikely that the prospect 
of gaining Western nuclear safety assistance induced the Bulgarian authorities to accept 
higher levels of nuclear risk at the Kozloduy NPP and to refrain from investing their own 
resources to alleviate the nuclear safety problem. In addition, these two potential problems in 
designing and implementing positive incentives did not discourage the Western donors from 
engaging in a transaction with the Bulgarian government. 
Information and distribution problems did not negatively affect the effectiveness of 
the transaction. Two reasons explain why negotiations between the NSA/EBRD and the 
Bulgarian government on a closure deal were concluded after a relatively short period of time 
and without much haggling over the costs and benefits of cooperation. First, it did not make 
sense for the Bulgarian government to bargain for extensive compensation since the financial 
resources of the NSA were in any case limited. Moreover, the NSA closure agreement had 
been phrased in ways—in particular the clause foreseeing closure of Kozloduy units 1-4 only 
after sufficient power replacement capacity had been provided—so as to allow the Bulgarian 
authorities room for maneuver in complying with future closure commitments. 
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The effectiveness of the transaction was to a certain extent hampered by enforcement 
problems. To begin with, the dismal safety situation at the Kozloduy NPP deterred the NSA 
from withholding grants for the safety upgrade program to induce the Bulgarian authorities to 
cooperate regarding the implementation of those provisions of the grant agreement designed 
to secure the premature closure of Kozloduy units 1-4. Moreover, once the grants earmarked 
for the implementation of the near-term safety upgrades at Kozloduy units 1-4 had been 
disbursed, the NSA had no leverage left to ensure that the Bulgarian government complied 
with its commitments under the NSA grant agreement. Finally, the NSA had no control over 
the long-term investment activities of the EBRD and the World Bank, both of which proved 
unwilling to suspend or withhold loan financing and assistance programs to induce the 
Bulgarian government to comply with its commitments. 
The efficiency of the transaction was seriously affected by the specific problem-
definition adopted by the Western donors. In determining potential measures to address the 
safety threat posed by the continued operation of Kozloduy units 1-4, the Western donors 
adhered to a rather pro-nuclear problem-definition. Indeed, even though the NSA closure 
agreement foresaw the provision of an unspecified amount of loans for the rehabilitation of 
Bulgaria’s energy sector—which promised to be the most cost-effective funding strategy to 
secure a lasting solution to the nuclear safety problem in Bulgaria—, the main thrust of the 
Western response to the nuclear safety problem in Bulgaria involved the funding and 
implementation of near-term technical safety upgrades at Kozloduy units 1-4. This pro-
nuclear bias in the Western donors’ funding strategy, although to a certain degree justifiable 
due to the urgency “to do something” about the dismal safety situation at Kozloduy units 1-4, 
was strongly determined by the commercial and political interests of the Western nuclear 
industry and their governmental supporters. Indeed, since Western nuclear engineering firms 
hoped to benefit commercially from subsidized safety upgrade work at Eastern NPPs, they 
used their considerable political weight—nuclear utilities and suppliers are generally very 
large, well-organized, often state-owned, and thus politically influential—to lobby their 
respective governments into providing assistance for quick, technical solutions to the nuclear 
safety problem in Bulgaria. Various Western governments, on the other hand, perceived the 
provision of financial assistance for such technical measures as a politically convenient way 
to subsidize and support their ailing nuclear industries. Hence, due to the specific interests of 
the Western nuclear industry and various pro-nuclear Western governments, the Western 
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donors adopted a problem-definition that in effect thwarted the employment of a potentially 
more cost-effective funding strategy. 
The effectiveness of the transaction was seriously hampered by the “slippery slope 
effect”. Indeed, the successful implementation of the NSA-funded safety upgrade program 
had the effect of both encouraging and enabling the Bulgarian government to keep Kozloduy 
units 1-4 in operation beyond the scheduled closure dates. The externally financed installation 
of various safety-enhancing equipment at the four VVER-230 units did not only make the 
continued operation of Kozloduy units 1-4 technically more feasible and economically more 
profitable, but also allowed the Bulgarian authorities to argue that the achieved safety 
improvements had removed all cause for concern about prolonging the service lives of these 
units. 
The effectiveness of the transaction was also negatively affected by coordination 
problems among the donors. One coordination problem took place between the NSA, on the 
one hand, and the IFIs expected to provide loan financing for the various energy projects 
designated by the NSA agreement, on the other. In the course of the 1990s, these IFIs proved 
to be increasingly adamant in their demands that loans earmarked for these energy projects be 
attached to far-reaching market reforms in the Bulgarian energy sector, not least in order to 
ensure the repayment of disbursed loans. The Bulgarian authorities, however, were often 
unwilling for political and economic reasons to implement the requested market reforms, 
which in turn prompted the IFIs to withhold already approved loans and to delay 
consideration of other energy investment projects. In addition, the growing reluctance of the 
EBRD to fund nuclear upgrade and completion projects—at least in part a consequence of the 
bank’s dismal experiences with its Mochovce nuclear completion project in the Slovak 
Republic—seriously delayed the scheduled modernization work at Kozloduy units 5-6. More 
flexibility and an easing of loan conditions on the part of the IFIs may have resulted in the 
designated energy projects being implemented on schedule. As such, the failure to secure the 
premature closure of Kozloduy units 1-4 may be partly attributed to the fact that IFIs were 
entrusted with fulfilling a major part of the conditions stipulated by the NSA agreement, and 
that these IFIs proved to be reluctant to subordinate their own interests to the NSA goal of 
securing the premature closure of Kozloduy units 1-4. However, it should be noted that 
market reforms were in effect necessary to restructure Bulgaria’s ailing energy sector and to 
improve energy efficiency. In addition, the Bulgarian authorities proved to be rather 
uncooperative in loan negotiations with IFIs. 
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Another coordination problem took place among those potential donor countries and 
firms capable of financing and conducting modernization work at Kozloduy units 1-4. Indeed, 
although Kozloduy units 1-4 were scheduled for closure in 1997/1998, the Russian nuclear 
industry, backed by loans from the Russian government, repeatedly offered to upgrade these 
units for prolonged operation. These aggressive Russian bids did not only strengthen the 
Bulgarian government’s resolve to keep these units in operation as long as possible, but also 
eroded the previous restraint on the part of Western nuclear firms to consider conducting life-
extending modernization work at Kozloduy units 1-4. 
 

 5 CASE STUDY II: THE NSA’S CLOSURE DEAL WITH LITHUANIA 
Following Lithuania’s independence from the Soviet Union in September 1991, various 
Western countries had sought to reduce the risk of a nuclear accident at the two inherently 
unsafe RBMK units of the Ignalina NPP and to persuade the Lithuanian authorities to 
prematurely close the plant. In February 1994 the NSA concluded a grant agreement with the 
Lithuanian government. According to the terms of the 1994 agreement, the NSA agreed to 
provide around ECU 40 million in grants for near-term technical safety upgrades at the 
Ignalina NPP and an in-depth safety assessment and IFIs would extend an unspecified amount 
of loans for the rehabilitation of Lithuania’s energy sector in exchange for a commitment on 
the part of the Lithuanian government to prematurely close the Ignalina NPP. Specifically, the 
Lithuanian government pledged to close the two RBMK units by the time they required 
rechanneling, then estimated to be around 1999-2002 for Ignalina unit 1 and before 2010 for 
Ignalina unit 2. In addition, the Lithuanian government agreed to close Ignalina unit 1 by mid-
1998 provided that the continued operation of this unit was not economically justified and the 
Lithuanian Nuclear Safety Authority refused to re-license the unit on safety grounds. While 
the NSA-funded safety upgrade program was successfully implemented, it had become 
evident by early 1998 that the Lithuanian government was unwilling to comply with the terms 
of the NSA agreement and was planning to rechannel the two RBMK units for prolonged 
operation. 
The outcomes to be explained can be summarized as follows. Effectiveness: Since the 
transfer of positive incentives reduced to a certain extent the risk of a nuclear accident at the 
Ignalina NPP, but was unlikely to secure the premature closure of the plant, the effectiveness 
of the transaction was rather low. Efficiency: Whereas the employment of no other 
cooperation strategy could have secured a comparable or superior behavioral change on the 
part of Lithuania at a lower or comparable cost, it is not impossible that other ways of 
employing positive incentives could have done so. As such the efficiency of the transaction 
(second dimension) was rather low. These outcomes were shaped by the following problems. 
While the effectiveness of the transaction was seriously hampered by the “slippery slope 
effect” and by enforcement problems, the rather pro-nuclear problem-definition adhered to by 
the Western donors impinged on the efficiency of the transaction (second dimension). 
The case study on the NSA’s closure deal with Lithuania is structured along the 
following lines. The first section explores the energy situation in Lithuania and discusses why 
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it was difficult, if not impossible, for the Lithuanian government to unilaterally alleviate the 
nuclear safety threat posed by the continued operation of the Ignalina NPP. The second 
section describes the provisions of the 1994 NSA grant agreement and explains why a closure 
agreement was concluded despite reservations on both sides. The third section examines the 
implementation of the agreement and elaborates on the reasons why the Lithuanian 
government was unwilling to comply with the terms of the NSA agreement. The fourth and 
final section summarizes the results of the case study. 
5.1 The Energy Situation in Lithuania 
Prior to gaining national independence in September 1991, Lithuania had been part of the 
Soviet North-Western power system. During the 1980s the Soviet authorities had installed 
considerable electricity generation capacity in Lithuania, in particular the two RBMK units of 
the Ignalina NPP, to cover regional electricity demand, i.e. for the region now encompassing 
the independent states Lithuania, Latvia, Belarus and the Kaliningrad area.1 Due to the 
decision by Soviet energy planners to concentrate regional power supply in the Lithuanian 
Soviet Republic, Lithuania had far more power generating capacity than it required to satisfy 
domestic electricity demand after it had become an independent state (Ebel 1997: 213). The 
two RBMK units of the Ignalina NPP (2'500 MW, net), along with the Elektrenai thermal 
power plant (1'800 MW, net) make up the core of Lithuania’s power generating capacity, with 
the rest coming from various central heating plants (CHP) and small hydroelectric facilities. 
TABLE 5.1: LITHUANIAN POWER GENERATING CAPACITY 
Source Capacity (MW, Net) Percent of Total Power 
Generating Capacity 
Thermal 2'609 45 
Nuclear 2'500 43 
Hydroelectric 711 12 
Total 5'820 100 
Note: For safety reasons, the totally installed capacity of 3'000 MW at the Ignalina NPP was reduced in April 
1991 to 2'500 MW. Source: Ebel 1997: 213. 
                                                 
1  The Soviet authorities had originally planned to construct four RBMK units at the Ignalina NPP, but only 
two were completed—Ignalina unit 1 was commissioned in December 1983 and Ignalina unit 2 in August 
1987. Construction of the third and fourth reactor was halted in 1989 due to the widespread public opposition 
to nuclear power in the wake of the Chernobyl accident (Frogatt 1999). 
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Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Lithuania and the other newly independent 
states in the region entered a period of sustained economic contraction, accompanied by a 
sharp fall in industrial output. The resulting decline in both domestic and regional electricity 
demand led to a significant reduction in power production in Lithuania, from a total 29.4 
billion KWh in 1991 to 10 billion KWh in 1994. In tandem with the reduced regional power 
demand, Lithuanian electricity exports dropped dramatically from 12 billion KWh in 1990 to 
about 1 billion KWh in 1994. 
TABLE 5.2: LITHUANIAN ELECTRICITY GENERATION AND EXPORTS (SELECTED YEARS) 
Year Generation (in 
billion KWh) 
Exports (in billion 
KWh) 
Exports as a percentage of total 
power generation 
1990 28.4 12.0 42.3 
1993 14.7 2.7 18.4 
1994 10.0 1.1 11 
Source: Ebel 1997: 214. 
The demise of the Soviet Union had far-reaching implications for the role of nuclear power in 
Lithuania. Since Lithuania has little or no domestic coal, crude oil, or natural gas reserves, 
Moscow had supplied the Lithuanian Soviet Republic with energy sources at highly 
subsidized rates (IEA 1994: 128). Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, however, 
Russia was no longer willing to provide cheap energy supplies to the newly independent 
republic and demanded ever-increasing prices for its energy exports. Lithuania responded to 
the price hikes for fossil fuels imported from Russia and to the decline in domestic electricity 
demand by idling thermal power capacity, which in turn led to an increased relative 
importance of nuclear power. This policy response was certainly rational in economic terms: 
Since the most expensive component of nuclear power, i.e. the capital costs, could be written 
off by virtue of Lithuania having effectively inherited the Ignalina NPP, the costs of 
producing nuclear power were estimated to be around 50 percent lower than the costs of 
generating electricity at the country’s thermal power plants. The relative economic advantage 
of nuclear power induced Lithuania to increase the amount of electricity generated at the 
Ignalina NPP as a percentage of total power production from 57.9 percent in 1991 to around 
88 percent in 1993, thus making Lithuania the world’s most dependent country on nuclear 
energy (Ebel 1997: 215-216). 
In short, in the course of the early 1990s nuclear power had assumed a unique role in 
Lithuania: The Ignalina NPP did not only satisfy an overwhelming part of the country’s 
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power demand, but also had a considerable export potential, even though power exports had 
collapsed following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In addition, the Ignalina NPP 
secured a certain degree of energy independence from Russia that in the past had not hesitated 
to suspend fossil fuel deliveries to apply political pressure. Indeed, Moscow had responded to 
Lithuania’s March 1990 unilateral declaration of independence from the Soviet Union by 
cutting off fuel supplies for ten weeks (Ebel 1997: 202). Moreover, in February 1991 the 
Soviet leadership had canceled oil shipments as a means to counter the growing national 
separatism in the Lithuanian Soviet Republic. As a result of these efforts by Moscow to 
exploit Lithuania’s energy dependence, the former large-scale public opposition in Lithuania 
to the continued operation of the Ignalina NPP—once despised as a symbol of Moscow’s 
domination of the republic and its disregard for local sensitivities and safety—disappeared for 
good (Launer and Young 1997: 50). Although the Ignalina NPP was of considerable 
economic and political value to the newly independent country, the Lithuanian authorities 
were most likely aware of the safety risks posed by the continued operation of the two RBMK 
units. However, they were reluctant to immediately close the plant for the reasons outlined 
above, and also lacked the financial and technical means to alleviate the plant’s safety 
deficiencies. 
5.2 The NSA Agreement with Lithuania 
The inherent safety deficiencies of the two operational RBMK reactors of the Ignalina NPP 
and their geographical proximity to Scandinavia and Western Europe had made the Ignalina 
NPP a priority item on the West’s nuclear safety agenda. Various concerned countries, in 
particular Sweden, had been involved in improving the safety of the Ignalina NPP ever since 
Lithuania had become an independent state in September 1991. The work conducted under 
these early bilateral nuclear safety assistance programs was mainly “software-related“ and 
focused on conducting studies of the plant’s safety. By mid-1993, Lithuanian officials had 
drawn up in cooperation with Western nuclear safety experts a comprehensive plan to 
improve the safety of the Ignalina NPP, the so-called Safety Improvement Program (SIP) 
(NEI, June 1997: 26-28). After the Lithuanian nuclear safety authority (Vatesi) had approved 
the SIP, the Lithuanian government approached the NSA with a formal request for financing 
the safety upgrade program. To accelerate international funding for the SIP, the Lithuanian 
authorities made a significant effort to solve the pending nuclear liability issue which had 
previously hindered any hands-on work at the plant: In late 1993, the Lithuanian parliament 
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(Seimas) ratified the Vienna Convention and passed a nuclear law based on the wording of 
the convention. On 17 December 1993, the NSA’s Assembly of Contributors tentatively 
approved an ECU 33 million (then about $40 million) grant for near-term safety upgrades at 
the plant. After the Lithuanian government had given its consent to the terms of the NSA 
grant, the agreement was signed on 10 February 1994. 
As part of the overall safety improvement program, the appropriated NSA funds of 
ECU 33 million—later increased to ECU 34.8 million—were earmarked to support 20 safety 
projects in three areas (NEI, June 1997: 26-28): Operational safety, technical improvements, 
and services.2 Completion of the NSA-funded safety upgrade projects was scheduled for 
1998. The NSA also agreed to provide around ECU 7 million for an in-depth safety 
assessment of the Ignalina NPP.3 In addition, the NSA agreement foresaw the provision of an 
unspecified amount of favorable loans by IFIs to rehabilitate Lithuania’s energy sector. In 
exchange for the NSA grant, the Lithuanian government agreed to the following conditions 
(Nuclear Energy Institute 1997: 236): 
• The operation of both RBMK units of the Ignalina NPP would not be prolonged beyond 
the time these units required rechanneling. Due to the deformation of the graphite 
moderator, RBMK reactors require rechanneling after 15-20 years of operation, i.e. about 
halfway through their useful service lives. At the time the NSA agreement was concluded, 
it was expected that Ignalina unit 1 would need to be rechanneled between 1999 and 2002, 
and the deadline for rechanneling Ignalina unit 2 was then estimated to be before 2010. 
• An in-depth safety assessment of the Ignalina NPP under the supervision of a panel of 
international experts and partly funded by the NSA would be completed by the end of 
1995. 
• The continued operation of Ignalina unit 1 beyond mid-1998 would depend on Lithuania’s 
energy situation and on the cost of further safety upgrades. If the continued operation of 
Ignalina unit 1 beyond mid-1998 was found to be economically justified, Vatesi, the 
Lithuanian nuclear safety authority, would determine whether the unit’s continued 
operation could be justified on safety grounds and decide on a new Western-style 
                                                 
2 Operational safety improvements encompassed non-destructive examinations, seals for pressure tubes, 
routine maintenance equipment, radiation monitors and a simulator. Near-term technical improvements 
covered seismic, fire and explosion prevention. Services included project management as well as design and 
engineering work (Nuclear Energy Institute 1997: 237). 
3  Beyond the NSA grants, additional aid for the overall safety improvement program was expected to be 
provided by other Western donors, especially by Sweden ($8-10 million), as well as by Canada, the United 
States and Japan. Lithuania pledged to contribute $5 million annually to the safety improvement program 
(NucNet, 15 August 1995; Nuclear Energy Institute 1997: 237). 
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operating license for the unit by mid-1998. Vatesi’s decision would be based on the 
results of the Western-funded in-depth safety assessment. 
• The Lithuanian government would prepare a detailed investment program for the 
rehabilitation of the country’s power sector. The NSA agreement with Lithuania stipulated 
that the premature closure of the two RBMK units was dependent on Lithuania having 
sufficient domestic electricity supply—excluding power export capacity (NW, 17 
February 1994: 1). Least-cost loan investments by IFIs in Lithuania’s energy sector were 
expected to enhance efficiency in both electricity production and consumption and 
thereby guarantee a sufficient electricity supply following the anticipated closure of the 
Ignalina NPP. 
 
The NSA agreement with Lithuania was designed to provide for near-term safety 
improvements at the Ignalina NPP and ultimately sought to secure the early closure of the 
plant’s two RBMK units. Taking into account that the terms of the agreement obliged the 
Lithuanian authorities to prematurely close the Ignalina NPP, the successful conclusion of the 
NSA agreement may be puzzling. Indeed, the NSA closure deal essentially consisted of a 
commitment on the part of the Lithuanian government to give up a both an economically and 
politically valuable asset in exchange for a grant of around ECU 42 million for near-term 
safety improvements and an in-depth safety assessment and an unspecified amount of loans 
for the rehabilitation of the country’s power sector. It was thus not only surprising that the 
Lithuanian government agreed to the terms of the agreement. Equally interesting is the 
question why the NSA assumed that the Lithuanian government would actually comply with 
its future closure commitments: Given the non-simultaneous nature of the stipulated 
commitments—the NSA-sponsored upgrade work would be completed long before the 
Lithuanian government was expected to comply with its closure pledge—the NSA had to 
reckon that the incentives for the Lithuanian government to renege on its closure 
commitments were bound to be enormous. 
The following considerations proved to be conducive to the successful conclusion of 
an agreement under the terms stipulated by the NSA. At the time the NSA grant agreement 
was finalized, the prevailing energy and economic situation in Lithuania as well as predicted 
electricity demand scenarios had given rise to hopes that the early closure of the Ignalina NPP 
could be secured without seriously affecting Lithuania’s electricity supply and economic 
development. The ongoing economic recession following the break-up of the Soviet Union 
had led to a sharp reduction in industrial production in Lithuania (around 70 percent between 
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1991 and 1994), and consequently to an ongoing fall in domestic electricity demand 
(averaging around 50 percent). Energy experts had thus predicted that even without the 
Ignalina NPP, Lithuania would have sufficient electricity generation capacity to meet 
domestic power needs.4 This prediction was supported by the results of an energy study 
jointly conducted by the World Bank, the IEA and the EBRD in 1992/1993 that concluded 
that the early retirement of both Ignalina units would be technically and economically 
feasible. According to demand scenarios developed by the joint study, little or no new 
generating capacity would be needed were the two RBMK reactors of the Ignalina NPP to be 
shut down anytime between 1995 and 2010. Even under a “high demand scenario“ in which 
electricity demand would stabilize in the near-term, and then increase rapidly, capacity 
additions would not be required until 2002 or later. 
Various other energy studies supported this conclusion by suggesting that Lithuania’s 
potential for energy savings was at the time between 30 and 50 percent (NW, 1 December 
1994: 15). It was anticipated that the rehabilitation of Lithuania’s power sector—funded by 
loans from IFIs—would reduce the country’s high reliance on nuclear power and thereby 
facilitate the early closure of the Ignalina NPP. To be sure, the joint study by the World Bank, 
the IEA and the EBRD did acknowledge a potentially serious obstacle to the early closure of 
the Ignalina NPP, namely the high costs of increased fossil fuel imports and lost power export 
revenues (IEA 1994: 130). However, energy experts argued that it was not clear at the time 
how future prices for fossil fuels would develop. Moreover, they pointed to the fact that by 
1994 Lithuania had all but lost its traditional electricity export markets. Indeed, regional 
power demand had dropped sharply, Lithuania’s neighbor states faced difficulties in paying 
for electricity imports, and the Ignalina NPP now had to compete with Russia’s Smolensk 
NPP, which had the economic advantage of being able to purchase nuclear fuel and spare 
parts from the Russian nuclear industry at lower prices (NW, 1 December 1994: 15). Thus, 
with the bleak economic situation in the East, and with no possibilities to sell electricity to the 
West—grid connections to Western Europe did not yet exist—, the economic value of the 
Ignalina NPP as a source of export revenues was limited at the time the NSA agreement was 
concluded. 
                                                 
4  With a peak demand of about 2'100 MW and a total installed generation capacity of 5'820 MW, Lithuania 
could forego the generation capacity at Ignalina (2'500 MW) and still enjoy a surplus generating capacity 
even during periods of high power demand (EU Enlargement Watch 1998: 10). 
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A number of additional reasons explain why the Lithuanian government was willing to 
accept the terms of the NSA agreement. To begin with, the Lithuanian authorities were 
certainly interested in reducing the risk of a nuclear accident at the Ignalina NPP. And since 
they were dependent on Western financial and technical assistance to improve safety levels at 
the plant, they probably had no other choice than to accept the agreement’s conditions. The 
Lithuanian government’s desire to secure a responsible reputation and good will in the West 
may have further contributed to its willingness to agree to the NSA conditions. Finally, the 
NSA agreement had been based on rather vague and long-term conditions. The Lithuanian 
government had pledged to close the Ignalina NPP by the time the plant’s two RBMK 
reactors needed rechanneling. According to the then available information, rechanneling 
would be required anytime between 1999 and 2002 for Ignalina unit 1 and sometime before 
2010 for Ignalina unit 2. This was a rather large time frame, and future closure costs could 
thus be discounted at rather high rates. Furthermore, closing the two Ignalina units prior to 
these deadlines was dependent on the results of both the in-depth safety assessment and least-
cost energy studies, and on the Western donors providing sufficient financial and technical 
assistance—i.e. conditions which were all subject to a high degree of uncertainty. In sum, all 
the considerations outlined above combined to prevent the Lithuanian government from a 
priori refusing to accept the rather unfavorable terms of the NSA agreement. 
Having likely gained the maximum it could expect in negotiations with the Lithuanian 
government, the major concern on the part of the NSA was to secure Lithuania’s future 
compliance with the terms of the agreement. The NSA’s long-term closure strategy appears to 
have been based on the following elements. First, the NSA no doubt hoped that economic 
developments and the anticipated rehabilitation of Lithuania’s power sector would reduce the 
economic case for nuclear power and thus the incentives on the part of the Lithuanian 
government to keep the units in operation. Second, the NSA probably assumed that the in-
depth safety assessment of Ignalina unit 1 would uncover so many safety deficiencies that 
either the costs to further upgrade the unit could not be justified on economic grounds or the 
Lithuanian nuclear safety authority would have no other choice than to refuse the re-licensing 
of the unit on safety grounds. Finally, the NSA most likely reckoned that the Lithuanian 
government was particularly vulnerable to political pressure from the West. Indeed, Lithuania 
had for both political and economic reasons a strong interest to deepen relations with Western 
Europe. It was thus widely assumed that the Lithuanian government would not be willing to 
jeopardize this interest by uncooperative behavior in the nuclear safety field. In short, the 
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potentially high reputation costs of Lithuanian non-compliance with the terms of the NSA 
agreement tended to soothe Western concerns about the risk of a prolonged operation of the 
Ignalina NPP. 
5.3 Implementation of the NSA Agreement 
The initial implementation phase of the NSA agreement was rather successful. On the one 
hand, the NSA-funded safety upgrade work at the Ignalina NPP proceeded rather smoothly, 
with 17 of the total 20 projects completed by spring 1997, and the three remaining NSA-
funded safety projects finished by 1999. On the other hand, the Lithuanian government had 
taken a first major step towards adhering to its closure commitments by establishing a special 
decommissioning fund in mid-1995 that initially received 16 percent of the profits from the 
sale of electricity5. In addition, in 1995 the Lithuanian government officially confirmed its 
intention to close Ignalina unit 1 by 2005 and Ignalina unit 2 before 2010 (EEE Report, 
October 1995: 34). 
However, various developments and events in 1997 and 1998 conspired to dim the 
prospects of securing the early retirement of the Ignalina NPP. First, there was a considerable 
delay in carrying out the in-depth safety assessment of Ignalina unit 1. Originally scheduled 
for completion by the end of 1995, it took until late 1996 for the safety assessment to be 
completed and the safety analysis report (SAR) to be released.6 This delay made it next to 
impossible for Vatesi to meet the mid-1998 deadline to decide on whether or not to issue a 
new operating license for Ignalina unit 1.7 Throughout 1997, the Lithuanian authorities 
struggled with EBRD officials to extend the licensing deadline to late 1999 (NW, 10 July 
1997: 4). In this effort, the Lithuanian authorities were supported by an international group of 
nuclear safety organizations (the so-called “Licensing Assistance Project”) that argued that a 
sufficient amount of time was required for a proper licensing process. In early 1998 the NSA 
                                                 
5  However, in 1996 the Lithuanian authorities decided to reduce the payment rate from 16 to 4 percent. This 
decision drew considerable criticism from Western donor states and nuclear experts since it threatened to 
reduce the amount of funds available for the future decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP (Frogatt 1999; EEE 
Report, August 1998: 26). 
6 There had reportedly been serious difficulties in obtaining technical information from the Russian plant-
designers and in tracking down relevant information at the plant (NW, 20 February 1997: 15). 
7 The safety analysis report was designed to provide a technical basis for Vatesi’s decision to issue a new 
license for Ignalina unit 1. However, in late 1996 the report had yet to be translated into Russian, the 
language used by Lithuanian regulators and plant personnel for technical matters (Nuclear Energy Institute 
1997: 238-239). 
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reluctantly compromised and agreed to extend the licensing-deadline for Ignalina unit 1 to 
May 1999. 
Second, although the Lithuanian authorities complied with the NSA condition to draw 
up a loan investment program for the rehabilitation of the country’s power sector (Nuclear 
Energy Institute 1997: 239), implementation of the power sector development program 
subsequently stalled, despite the apparent willingness of various IFIs to provide loans for this 
purpose.8 The failure of the Lithuanian authorities to make progress in the rehabilitation of the 
country’s power sector had much to do with the overproduction of electricity in Lithuania: 
Since the country was abundant in electricity, i.e. in particular in cheap nuclear power 
produced at the Ignalina NPP, the Lithuanian government had only little incentive to increase 
its debt burden by investing scarce resources in energy efficiency projects and in the 
rehabilitation of thermal generation capacity. However, this was a tremendous lost 
opportunity to significantly ease the impact of Ignalina’s closure. Indeed, as the World Bank 
had concluded in an August 1998 report: “If only half of the estimated potential annual 
energy saving from conservation were realized, the country would have no need for nuclear 
power” (FT, 25 November 1998). 
Finally, from 1997 on it had become increasingly evident that the Lithuanian 
government was determined to keep the two RBMK units of the Ignalina NPP in operation as 
long as possible. This determination was first signaled at a spring 1997 meeting between 
Lithuanian authorities and EBRD officials that had been convened to discuss the 
recommendations of the international panel. In accordance with the NSA agreement, a panel 
of seven international experts had assessed both the safety analysis report (SAR) and its 
subsequent independent review by Eastern and Western nuclear safety organizations (RSR). 
In March 1997, the international panel published its recommendations: Apart from being 
                                                 
8 Both the EBRD and the World Bank had proven willing to financially support alternative power generation 
and energy efficiency projects related to the future closure of the Ignalina NPP. In December 1992 the EBRD 
had approved an ECU 32 million loan to address urgent problems in energy supply and to improve energy 
efficiency. In addition, the EBRD considered to extend an ECU 28 million loan for the Kaunas energy sector 
and modernization project and examined its possible involvement in the development of private sector 
energy service companies (ESCOs) to support the energy efficiency improvement efforts launched under the 
1992 Energy Sector Emergency Investment Loan. The World Bank approved in May 1994 a $26.4 million 
Power Rehabilitation Loan aimed at improving energy efficiency and the safety and reliability of the 
electricity system. Furthermore, in May 1996 the World Bank agreed to provide a $5.9 million loan—with an 
additional $6.9 million from the Global Environment Facility—for the Klaipeda Geothermal Demonstration 
Project. Finally, in July 1996 the World Bank approved a $10 million loan for the Lithuanian Energy 
Efficiency/Housing Pilot Project aimed at supporting private and public initiatives to improve energy 
efficiency in homes and schools. For a detailed description of these energy projects, see websites of the 
EBRD and the World Bank. 
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critical of the safety culture at the Ignalina NPP and of Vatesi’s independence, the panel 
concluded that the continued operation of the Ignalina NPP for some years could only be 
justified if additional safety upgrade work in the order of $120 million was carried out 
immediately (Nuclear Energy Institute 1997: 238). This was a considerable amount of money 
for the hard-pressed country to spend on safety upgrades. Nevertheless, the Lithuanian 
government readily accepted the international panel’s recommended safety improvements. 
Although it took some political pressure by the EBRD and the EU to induce the Lithuanian 
authorities to keep the Ignalina units down for an extended period of time in order to carry out 
some of the urgent safety upgrade work requested by the international panel (EEE Report, 
May 1997: 19-20), the Lithuanian government promptly agreed in June 1997 to implement a 
new safety improvement program, known as SIP-2. The Lithuanian government further 
announced that it would provide 80 percent of the $25 million needed for immediate safety 
upgrade work in 1997, while the remaining 20 percent was expected to come from a 
combination of EBRD loans and bilateral assistance from Sweden, the United States and 
Japan (EEE Report, June 1997: 2-3). 
The Lithuanian government’s willingness to invest a considerable amount of scarce 
financial resources in further safety improvements testifies to its determination to keep the 
two RBMK reactors of the Ignalina NPP in operation as long as possible. What accounts for 
the Lithuanian government’s resolve in this respect? To begin with, research conducted at the 
Ignalina NPP in mid-1997 indicated that the life of the reactors’ fuel channels could be longer 
than previously expected due to limited operations and extended outages at the plant. In other 
words, the research suggested that the scheduled closure deadlines for the two Ignalina 
units—i.e. as soon as rechanneling was required—could possibly be postponed. The 
possibility of being able to operate both Ignalina units longer than previously anticipated 
certainly strengthened the Lithuanian government’s resolve to upgrade the Ignalina NPP for 
prolonged operation (EEE Report, February 1998: 34-35). 
Second, Lithuania had increased its electricity exports since the time the NSA 
agreement had been concluded. Indeed, while total power exports amounted to only around 1 
billion KWh in 1994, they had subsequently climbed up to 5.2 billion KWh in 1996.9 
Moreover, the mid-term prospects of exporting electricity to Western Europe—a 
commercially much more attractive option than exporting to the country’s traditional markets 
                                                 
9 In 1996, the Ignalina NPP sold 16 percent of its output to Belarus, 12 percent to Latvia and 4 percent to the 
Russian Kaliningrad region in an electricity-for-fuel swap (Nuclear Energy Institute 1997: 235). 
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in the East—had improved in the interim. Since mid-1995 the Lithuanian authorities had been 
involved in talks with Western engineering firms to construct a power line from Lithuania to 
Poland (Nuclear Energy Institute 1997: 235). It was then estimated that this project would 
effectively allow Lithuania to sell electricity worth around $100 million a year to Western 
Europe (EEE Report, June 1996: 8-9). The rising power exports to the country’s neighbor 
states and the improved prospects of exporting power to Western Europe certainly enhanced 
the incentives on the part of the Lithuanian government to keep the Ignalina NPP in operation 
as long as possible. Finally, the successful implementation of the NSA-funded safety upgrade 
program no doubt strengthened the Lithuanian government’s resolve to keep the Ignalina 
units running for as long as possible and hence to renege on its NSA commitment not to 
rechannel the two RBMK reactors. Indeed, after the externally financed safety upgrade 
programs had eliminated the most egregious safety shortcomings at the Ignalina NPP, the 
Lithuanian authorities began to argue that the premature closure of the plant could no longer 
be justified on safety grounds. In addition, the installation of a substantial amount of safety 
equipment at the plant had the effect of lowering the technical and financial barriers to the 
prolonged operation of the Ignalina NPP (RFE/RL Newsline, 18 March 1998, 23 October 
1998; NN, May 1998: 47). 
In late 1997 and early 1998, the NSA experienced a further round of setbacks in its 
efforts to secure the early retirement of the Ignalina NPP. First, throughout the second half of 
1997 Lithuanian authorities struggled with NSA officials over the question of whether the 
replacement of ten defective fuel channels represented normal maintenance work or a life-
extension measure (NW, 4 September 1997: 12). While initially arguing that such work 
violated the terms of the grant agreement, the NSA eventually gave in and accepted that the 
ten defective fuel channels could be replaced. Second, in an effort to determine whether 
further safety upgrades at the Ignalina NPP were economically justified, the EBRD had 
commissioned the British consulting firm ERM Energy to conduct a least-cost study of 
Lithuania’s energy needs. This study, which was presented to the EBRD in January 1998, 
concluded that closing the Ignalina NPP before 2004 would not be warranted economically, 
and that investments to further improve safety and thus allow the plant to operate beyond 
2004 could be justified on economic grounds. The study’s conclusions represented a serious 
setback for the NSA-led attempt to secure the premature closure of the Ignalina NPP since 
they allowed the Lithuanian authorities to argue on economic grounds that the units’ fuel 
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channels should be replaced to allow the Ignalina NPP to operate for another 15-20 years 
(NW, 29 January 1998: 6-7). 
In sum, by early 1998 the widespread hopes of securing the premature closure of the 
Ignalina NPP in line with the NSA agreement had faded. Although the Lithuanian 
government was not yet obliged to deliver on its part of the NSA agreement—the licensing-
deadline for Ignalina unit 1 had been postponed to May 1999, and it could not be determined 
with certainty when the two RBMK units required rechanneling—during the past months the 
Western donors had gained the impression that the Lithuanian authorities were unlikely to 
comply with their future commitments. This impression was reinforced not only by 
widespread doubts that Vatesi would be able to take an independent and objective licensing-
decision for Ignalina unit 1, but also by an official statement of the Lithuanian economy 
minister in April 1998 that the Ignalina NPP would stay in operation as long as the plant was 
safe and cost-effective, i.e. not until the two RBMK units needed rechanneling as stipulated 
by the NSA agreement (NEI, May 1998: 4). Moreover, various Lithuanian officials had 
during the past months openly contemplated the idea of replacing the fuel channels of the two 
RBMKs to allow the Ignalina NPP to operate for another 15-20 years (NW, 29 January 1998: 
6-7; NW, 9 April 1998: 7). It was at this stage of the deadlocked negotiations between the 
NSA/EBRD and the Lithuanian government that the European Commission intervened into 
the ongoing closure dispute and sought to link Lithuania’s EU membership prospects to a firm 
commitment by the Lithuanian government to comply with the terms of the NSA agreement. 
Since the European Commission’s attempt to secure the premature closure of the Ignalina 
NPP is analyzed in Case Study IV, the following assessment of the NSA’s closure deal with 
Lithuania is limited to early 1998. 
5.4 Assessment 
To which extent did Lithuania change its externality-generating behavior in a direction 
desired by the Western donors? On the basis of the 1994 NSA grant agreement, the Western 
donors sought to induce and enable the Lithuanian authorities to both improve safety levels at 
the two inherently unsafe RBMK units of the Ignalina NPP and to prematurely close these 
two units. The two RBMK units of the Ignalina NPP were slated for closure at latest by the 
time they required rechanneling, which was then expected to occur between 1999-2002 for 
Ignalina unit 1, and before 2010 for Ignalina unit 2. In addition, Ignalina unit 1 would be 
closed by mid-1998 if the unit’s continued operation could not be justified on economic 
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grounds and if the Lithuanian nuclear safety authority (Vatesi) could not issue a new Western-
style operating-license for the unit on the basis of the results of an in-depth safety assessment. 
The Western donors’ goal of reducing and ultimately eliminating the risk of a nuclear 
accident at the Ignalina NPP was only partly achieved. On the one hand, the successful 
implementation of the NSA-funded safety upgrade program reduced to a certain extent the 
risk of a nuclear accident at the Ignalina NPP. On the other hand, it was highly unlikely in 
early 1998 that the Lithuanian authorities would comply with those provisions of the NSA 
agreement that ultimately sought to secure the premature closure of the Ignalina NPP. First, it 
was doubtful whether Vatesi would be free enough from political pressure by the Lithuanian 
government to take an objective licensing-decision for Ignalina unit 1 in May 1999. Second, 
the Lithuanian government had indicated that it did not intend to comply with the NSA 
condition to close the two RBMKs once they required rechanneling and that it was 
considering replacing the units’ fuel channels to allow the Ignalina NPP to operate for another 
15-20 years. In short, the behavioral changes on the part of Lithuania encompassed a risk-
reduction through the successful implementation of the NSA-funded safety upgrade program, 
but no risk-elimination due to the Lithuanian government’s likely refusal to comply with its 
closure commitments. 
Which cooperation strategies and what kind of measures were employed by the 
Western donors to influence Lithuania’s behavior? The Western donors sought to secure risk-
reducing and ultimately risk-eliminating behavioral changes on the part of Lithuania by a 
combination of the following cooperation strategies. Normative strategies were employed in 
the sense that NSA/EBRD officials and other Western nuclear safety experts had repeatedly 
tried to persuade the Lithuanian authorities to adopt higher nuclear safety standards and to 
prematurely close the Ignalina NPP on safety grounds. The employment of cognitive 
strategies was explicitly foreseen by the NSA agreement. By conducting an in-depth safety 
assessment of the Ignalina NPP, the Western donors sought to provide Vatesi with the 
necessary technical information to decide on whether the continued operation of Ignalina unit 
1 beyond mid-1998 could be justified on safety grounds. Moreover, the Western donors also 
sought to provide the Lithuanian authorities with more reliable information on the full 
economic costs of operating the Ignalina NPP by commissioning least-cost studies of 
Lithuania’s energy needs. The Western donors hoped that the results of the in-depth safety 
assessment and least-cost studies would induce the Lithuanian authorities to prematurely 
close at least Ignalina unit 1 on safety and/or economic grounds. The Western donors’ 
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predominant cooperation strategy included the provision of positive incentives. Positive 
incentives were employed for the following measures. The NSA provided around ECU 40 
million in grants for near-term technical safety upgrades at the Ignalina NPP and an in-depth 
safety assessment. In addition, the 1994 NSA grant agreement foresaw the provision of an 
unspecified amount of favorable loans by IFIs to rehabilitate Lithuania’s power sector and 
improve energy efficiency. 
To which extent was the observed behavioral change on the part of Lithuania 
influenced by the provision of positive incentives and how high was the effectiveness of the 
transaction? The observed behavioral change on the part of Lithuania was almost exclusively 
attributable to the provision of positive incentives. Indeed, the cognitive strategies employed 
by the Western donors failed or were unlikely to have any positive effect on Lithuania’s 
behavior. First, the 1998 least-cost study on Lithuania’s energy needs concluded—in contrast 
to earlier hopes—that further safety upgrades and the continued operation of the Ignalina NPP 
could be justified on economic grounds. Second, it was unlikely that the results of the in-
depth safety assessment could be objectively used by Vatesi to refuse the licensing permit for 
Ignalina unit 1 on safety grounds. Moreover, the employment of normative strategies, while 
possibly raising the Lithuanian authorities’ sensibility for nuclear safety matters, contributed 
only slightly to the final outcome. Since the provision of positive incentives resulted in 
improved safety levels at the Ignalina NPP, but was unlikely to secure the premature closure 
of the plant’s two RBMK units, the effectiveness of the transaction was rather low. 
How high was the efficiency of the transaction? First dimension of efficiency: The 
transaction was efficient in the sense that no alternative cooperation strategy could have led to 
comparable or superior behavioral changes on the part of Lithuania at a lower or comparable 
cost. The employment of positive issue-linkage strategies was unlikely to be more cost-
effective than the provision of positive incentives for two reasons. First, positive issue-linkage 
strategies would have not provided the Lithuanian authorities with the financial and technical 
means to improve safety levels at the Ignalina NPP and—even more important—to 
prematurely close the plant’s two RBMK reactors. Second, during the early 1990s there were 
no easily identifiable positive issue-linkages which the Western donors could have readily 
agreed upon and which promised to generate sufficient incentives for the Lithuanian to 
comply with Western closure demands. The relative cost-effectiveness of employing negative 
incentives suffered from similar problems. First, the employment of negative incentives was 
unlikely to lead to safety improvements at the Ignalina NPP. Second, it is debatable whether 
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economic sanctions or other threats would have enticed the Lithuanian government to comply 
with Western closure demands. In fact, it is not impossible that such measures would have 
only worsened Lithuania’s economic situation and hence prompted the hard-pressed country 
to sustain its high reliance on the cheap power produced at the Ignalina NPP. Moreover, it is 
rather unlikely that the Western countries would have been willing to isolate Lithuania 
economically and politically at a time when the newly independent republic was struggling to 
break out of Moscow’s orbit and anchor itself within the community of Western democratic 
states. Finally, and as already discussed above, the employment of cognitive or normative 
strategies was highly unlikely to produce a more favorable outcome from the Western donors’ 
point of view. 
Second dimension of efficiency: The transaction involved potentially serious 
inefficiencies because alternative ways of employing positive incentives may have possibly 
led to superior behavioral changes on the part of Lithuania at a comparable cost. The funding 
strategy pursued by the Western donors included the provision of around ECU 40 million in 
grants for near-term technical safety upgrades at the Ignalina NPP and an in-depth safety 
assessment as well as the disbursement of an unspecified amount of favorable loans by IFIs 
for rehabilitation and energy efficiency projects in Lithuania. This funding strategy, i.e. in 
particular the provision of grants for the implementation of near-term technical safety 
upgrades, was likely to have the unintentional effect of prolonging the somewhat improved, 
nevertheless still inadequate safety situation at the Ignalina NPP. Indeed, once the NSA-
funded safety upgrade program had eradicated various safety shortcomings at the Ignalina 
NPP, the Lithuanian government had even less incentive than before to prematurely close the 
two RBMK units. In addition, by improving the prospects that it may be technically and 
financially feasible to rechannel the two RBMK units for another 15-20 years of operation, 
the NSA-funded safety upgrade program most likely discouraged the Lithuanian authorities 
from investing in projects designed to restructure the country’s power sector and improve 
energy efficiency. As such it is rather likely that the prospects of securing the premature 
closure of the Ignalina NPP, and hence a satisfactory and lasting solution to the nuclear safety 
problem in Lithuania, would have been much better if the Western donors had refrained from 
funding near-term technical safety upgrades at the Ignalina NPP and employed positive 
incentives exclusively for measures aimed at easing the impact of the plant’s closure on the 
country’s energy and economic situation. Of course, the drawback of such an alternative 
funding strategy was that the Western donors would have had to accept higher levels of 
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nuclear risk in the short-term. However, in the mid- to long-term the Western donors would 
have probably secured larger and more lasting safety benefits by pursuing such an alternative 
funding strategy. In short, the efficiency of the transaction (second dimension) was rather low. 
To which extent did the theoretically predicted problems in designing and 
implementing positive incentives shape the effectiveness and efficiency of the transaction? 
Neither extortion, nor moral hazard problems negatively affected the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the transaction between the Western donors and Lithuania. The Lithuanian 
government’s behavior cannot be described as extortion in the sense that it threatened to 
enhance or prolong the transboundary risk posed by the continued operation of the Ignalina 
NPP unless it was paid for to refrain from doing so. Rather, the Lithuanian government 
simply gave the Western donors to understand that it did not have sufficient financial and 
technical resources to improve safety levels at the two RBMK units and/or to prematurely 
close the Ignalina NPP, and in doing so it probably did not overstate its case. Thus, the 
Lithuanian government did not mislead the Western donors into paying it for a behavioral 
change—reducing and/or eliminating the risk of a nuclear accident at the Ignalina NPP—it 
would have undertaken even in the absence of resource transfers. Furthermore, it is rather 
unlikely that the Lithuanian government engaged in moral hazard behavior in the sense that 
the prospect of gaining Western nuclear safety assistance induced the Lithuanian government 
to engage in overly risky activities and to refrain from investing its own resources to alleviate 
the dangerous safety situation at the Ignalina NPP. Finally, these two potential problems in 
designing and implementing positive incentives did not discourage the Western donors from 
engaging in a transaction with Lithuania. 
Information and distribution problems did not negatively affect the effectiveness of 
the transaction. Two reasons explain why negotiations between the NSA/EBRD and the 
Lithuanian government on a closure deal were concluded rather quickly, i.e. without being 
protracted by “stingy” bargaining behavior on the part of the negotiating parties. To begin 
with, since the amount of grants to be gained from the NSA was limited, it made no sense for 
the Lithuanian government to bargain for extensive compensation. Moreover, the negotiating 
parties had agreed to base the NSA closure agreement on rather vague and long-term 
conditions, thereby allowing the Lithuanian government to discount future closure costs and 
granting it sufficient room for maneuver in complying with future commitments. 
Enforcement problems certainly hampered the effectiveness of the transaction. Indeed, 
once a significant part of the funds earmarked for the safety upgrade program at the Ignalina 
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NPP had been disbursed, the NSA could no longer threaten to freeze the further disbursement 
of grant money to ensure that the Lithuanian government stuck to its commitment not to 
rechannel the two RBMK units for prolonged operation. Moreover, the NSA did not have any 
influence over the long-term investment activities of the EBRD and the World Bank, both of 
which proved unwilling to increase Lithuania’s perceived costs of non-compliance with the 
NSA agreement by threatening to suspend loan financing and assistance programs. 
The specific problem-definition adopted by the Western donors did have a negative 
impact on the efficiency of the transaction. The selection of potentially available measures to 
address the nuclear safety problem in Lithuania suggests that the Western donors adhered to a 
rather pro-nuclear problem-definition. Indeed, although the NSA’s closure deal was based on 
the understanding that IFIs would provide an unspecified amount of loans for the 
rehabilitation of Lithuania’s power sector—which, as argued above, promised to be the most 
cost-effective way to secure a lasting solution to the nuclear safety problem in Lithuania—, 
the Western donors resolved to direct a significant part of their financial and technical 
assistance towards the implementation of near-term technical safety upgrades at the Ignalina 
NPP. To a certain extent, this pro-nuclear bias in the Western donors’ funding strategy can be 
explained by the perceived need to undertake immediate action against the risk of a nuclear 
accident at the Ignalina NPP. On the other hand, the propensity on the part of the Western 
donors to define the nuclear safety problem in Lithuania in a pro-nuclear way was no doubt 
strongly influenced by the commercial and political interests of the Western nuclear industry 
and their governmental supporters. Western nuclear engineering firms had been quick to 
realize that the nuclear safety problem in the East did not only represent a threat to their 
commercial survival, but also a tremendous commercial opportunity to secure much needed 
business contracts. The influential Western nuclear industry thus lobbied their respective 
national governments into defining the nuclear safety problem in ways that served their 
commercial interests, i.e. as a problem that could be solved by quick, technical solutions. 
Various Western governments, on the other hand, proved to be susceptible to such lobbying 
efforts. Indeed, by granting funds for near-term technical safety upgrades, pro-nuclear 
Western governments had the politically convenient opportunity to subsidize their own 
nuclear industries and to help them gain a foothold in the potentially lucrative Eastern nuclear 
market. In short, due to the specific interests of the Western nuclear industry and various pro-
nuclear Western governments, the Western donors adopted a problem-definition that in effect 
thwarted the funding and implementation of more cost-effective capacity-building measures. 
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The effectiveness of the transaction was seriously hampered by the “slippery slope 
effect”. The analysis has shown that both the incentives and capacities of the Lithuanian 
government to rechannel the two RBMK reactors of the Ignalina NPP for another 15-20 years 
of operation were enhanced by the successful implementation of the NSA-funded safety 
upgrade program. Indeed, the externally financed modernization of the Ignalina NPP did not 
only make the long-term operation of the plant technically more feasible and economically 
more profitable, but also provided the Lithuanian authorities with the much-welcome 
argument that there were no longer any major safety reasons to object against the 
rechanneling of the two RBMK units and their prolonged operation. 
Coordination problems among the donors did not negatively affect the effectiveness of 
the transaction. In contrast to the coordination problems observed in the previous case study 
on the NSA’s closure deal with Bulgaria, the NSA-led attempt to secure the premature closure 
of the Ignalina NPP was not hampered by bids from Russian or Western nuclear firms to 
unilaterally upgrade the two RBMK units of the Ignalina NPP for prolonged operation. In 
addition, the rehabilitation of Lithuania’s power sector was not delayed because the IFIs 
lacked the flexibility and/or willingness to extend loans for this purpose, but rather because 
Lithuania continued to enjoy enormous surpluses of cheap electricity generated by the 
Ignalina NPP, and hence had practically no incentive to invest scarce resources in a more 
efficient use and production of power. 
 

 6 CASE STUDY III: THE EBRD’S ATTEMPT TO SECURE THE PREMATURE 
CLOSURE OF BOHUNICE UNITS 1-2 IN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
Throughout 1994 and 1995, the EBRD sought to conclude with the Slovak government a deal 
designed to eliminate the safety threat posed by the continued operation of two VVER-230 
reactors at the Bohunice NPP (units 1-2). Specifically, the EBRD offered to provide a 
substantial amount of low-interest loans for the completion and upgrading of two partly built 
VVER-213 units at the Mochovce NPP in exchange for a firm international commitment on 
the part of the Slovak government to prematurely close the two unsafe VVER-230 reactors at 
the Bohunice NPP by the year 2000 or once the two Mochovce units were completed. 
However, in late 1995, after several rounds of negotiations, the Slovak government rejected 
the EBRD’s closure deal in favor of a Czech-Russian counter-offer to complete Mochovce 
units 1-2 without substantial loan conditions, and by early 1998 it had become evident that 
Bratislava was planning to prolong the operation of the two VVER-230 units at the Bohunice 
NPP. 
The outcomes to be explained can be summarized as follows. Effectiveness: Since the 
EBRD failed to conclude a closure deal and to extract a firm closure commitment from the 
Slovak government, the effectiveness of the attempted transaction was low. Efficiency: The 
attempted transaction was efficient in the sense that the employment of no other cooperation 
strategy could have secured a comparable or superior behavioral change on the part of the 
Slovak Republic at a lower or comparable cost. However, it is not impossible that an 
alternative way of employing positive incentives could have led to a more favorable result. 
Hence, the efficiency of the attempted transaction (second dimension) was rather low. These 
outcomes were shaped by the following problems. The effectiveness of the attempted 
transaction was seriously hampered by coordination problems among the potential donors and 
to a certain extent also by information and distribution problems. The efficiency of the 
attempted transaction (second dimension) was negatively affected by the specific problem-
definition adhered to by the Western donors. 
The case study on the EBRD’s ultimately unsuccessful attempt to secure the premature 
closure of Bohunice units 1-2 is structured along the following lines. The first section 
provides a brief introduction to the energy situation in the Slovak Republic. The second 
section elaborates on the genesis of the deal proposed by the EBRD to secure the premature 
closure of the two VVER-230 units at the Bohunice NPP. The third section examines the 
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developments that led to the collapse of the EBRD’s closure deal. The results of the case 
study are summarized in the fourth and final section. 
6.1 The Energy Situation in the Slovak Republic 
At the time it seceded from Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and became a sovereign state on 1 
January 1993, the Slovak Republic possessed a total installed electricity generation capacity 
of around 6'500 MW. Nearly half of this total generation capacity was installed at the 
country’s numerous thermal power plants, roughly one quarter at various hydroelectric 
facilities, and around one quarter at the four-block Bohunice NPP. Bohunice units 1-2—
collectively known as Bohunice V1—are both VVER-440/230 reactors, while the two newer 
units 3 and 4 of the Bohunice NPP are VVER-440/213s. 
TABLE 6.1: OPERATING NUCLEAR REACTORS IN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
Power Unit Reactor Type Capacity (Net, MW) Commercial Start 
Bohunice 1 VVER-440/230 408 1979 
Bohunice 2 VVER-440/230 408 1981 
Bohunice 3 VVER-440/213 408 1985 
Bohunice 4 VVER-440/213 408 1986 
Source: Kurtz 1996: 139. 
Besides the four-block Bohunice NPP, the Slovak Republic also had four Soviet-designed 
nuclear reactors at various stages of completion at the Mochovce NPP. The decision to build 
these four VVER-213s at the Mochovce NPP had been taken in the late 1970s under 
Czechoslovakia’s ambitious nuclear power expansion program. Construction of the 
Mochovce NPP had begun in the mid 1980s, but was halted in early 1991 due to a lack of 
funding (Wedmore 1995: 47). 
TABLE 6.2: UNCOMPLETED NUCLEAR REACTORS IN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
Power Unit Reactor Type Capacity (Net, MW) Completion Status, in 
percent (as of 1995) 
Mochovce 1 VVER-440/213 388 85 
Mochovce 2 VVER-440/213 388 65 
Mochovce 3 VVER-440/213 388 45 
Mochovce 4 VVER-440/213 388 20 
Source: Kurtz 1996: 139. 
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Although the Bohunice NPP accounted for only around one quarter of the Slovak Republic’s 
total installed generation capacity, by 1993 over half of the country’s total annual electricity 
output was generated by the four nuclear reactors of this plant. The Slovak Republic’s 
enhanced relative reliance on nuclear power was a result of the Slovak authorities’ decision to 
respond to the overall drop in electricity demand during the early 1990s by reducing 
electricity production at the country’s hydroelectric and thermal power plants. This decision, 
in turn, had been prompted by the deplorable state of the country’s conventional power plants, 
rising prices for fossil fuel imports and a desire to alleviate the country’s severe 
environmental problems by idling thermal power plants burning low quality coal (IEA 1994: 
227). 
TABLE 6.3: SLOVAK ELECTRIC POWER BY SOURCE (1992) 
Source Percent of Total Electricity 
Production 
Nuclear 53 
Thermal 38 
Hydroelectric 9 
Source: IEA 1994: 229. 
The increased relative attractiveness of nuclear power, coupled with predictions by Slovak 
energy experts that the country desperately needed additional electricity generation capacity 
by the end of the 1990s, had a distinctive impact on the evolving energy policies of the newly 
independent Slovak Republic. On the one hand, Bratislava began to consider the possibility of 
further upgrading Bohunice units 1-2 (Bohunice V1) for continued operation until the end of 
their design lives, i.e. until around 2010. Due to the inherent safety deficiencies of the VVER-
230 design, the two oldest units of the Bohunice NPP had previously undergone a “small 
reconstruction“ involving 89 separate upgrade projects at a total cost of around $67 million. 
However, the then Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission had licensed these units to 
operate only until 1995 (NW, 11 November 1993: 1). The Slovak government’s plan to 
further upgrade these two units received indirect support by the IAEA which—impressed by 
the recently realized safety improvements—agreed with the Slovak nuclear safety authorities 
in mid-1993 that the implementation of an additional modernization program in the order of 
$200 million would justify the continued operation of Bohunice V1. The IAEA’s optimistic 
conclusions regarding the continued operation of Bohunice V1 came somewhat as a surprise 
since Western nuclear safety experts had so far argued that VVER-230s could not be 
134 Case Study III 
upgraded to reach international safety standards—at least not at reasonable cost—and 
therefore should be shut down in the near-term. The IAEA’s conclusions were also deeply 
disturbing to those Western governments and organizations which wanted to see these two 
unsafe nuclear reactors shut down as soon as possible. 
On the other hand, the Slovak government began to show a growing interest in 
completing the partly built Mochovce NPP. Although the restrained financial resources of 
both the Slovak state and its national power company, Slovensky Elektrarne Podnik (SEP), 
ruled out the near-term resumption of the costly construction work, the fate of the Mochovce 
NPP was far from sealed. Western nuclear firms and suppliers, struggling with stagnant 
nuclear markets at home and therefore desperate to gain a foothold in the potentially lucrative 
Eastern nuclear market, had been quick to indicate their interest in re-launching the nuclear 
completion project. Already in late 1991, Electricité de France (EdF) had concluded with SEP 
a tentative agreement on the completion and upgrading to Western safety standards of 
Mochovce units 1-2, and in the following year EdF had conducted an extensive audit of the 
existing plant infrastructure and equipment (ATW, August/September 1992: 437). 
From the viewpoint of those Western parties interested in completing and upgrading 
these two VVER-213 units, the Mochovce completion project did not only promise lucrative 
completion and upgrade contracts, but also held out the prospect of eliminating the safety 
threat posed by the continued operation of Bohunice V1. Such optimism was not unfounded. 
Indeed, the Slovak government had so far rejected Western demands to prematurely close 
Bohunice V1 on the grounds that the continued operation of these two VVER-230 units was 
required to meet domestic power needs. Western project sponsors thus reckoned that the 
completion of the two more modern VVER-213 units at the Mochovce NPP would provide 
sufficient power replacement capacity to enable the Slovak authorities to prematurely close 
Bohunice V1. Securing a source of finance, however, was key to the prospective realization 
of the nuclear completion project, and the interested parties hoped that the EBRD would 
provide the loans needed for the multi-million project. 
6.2 The Genesis of the EBRD’s Closure Deal 
After having been tentatively approached for funding in 1992, the EBRD began in early 1993 
to consider financing the completion and upgrading of Mochovce units 1-2 and subsequently 
entered loan negotiations with the government of the now independent Slovak Republic. 
From the outset of loan negotiations, the EBRD was aware that the Western-led completion of 
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the Mochovce NPP would be a historic and momentous project: Not only would it be the first 
nuclear power project to be ever funded by an IFI, but it would also represent the first project 
wherein Western nuclear technology and money would be used to complete and upgrade a 
partly built Soviet-designed NPP. Hence, an approval of loans for the Mochovce completion 
project was likely to set a precedent both for international funding of nuclear power projects 
in general, and in CEE and FSU countries in particular, where a number of similar NPPs 
awaited completion (NW, 8 December 1994: 4; NZZ, 7 February 1995). 
Given the significance of the Mochovce completion project, the EBRD had to reckon 
that its prospective involvement in the project would trigger strong resistance by the 
governments and publics of those Western countries committed to non-nuclear energy 
policies. Fierce opposition to the Mochovce completion project was expected in particular 
from Austria which primarily due to its geographical proximity to Soviet-designed reactors in 
the Slovak and Czech Republics, but also in conformity with its long-term goal of 
establishing a NPP-free zone in CEE, had since 1990 been pressing for a premature retirement 
of NPPs in its two Eastern European neighbor republics (NW, 11 November 1993: 11).1 
Moreover, the anticipated opposition from Austria and other non-nuclear Western countries 
was likely to be reinforced by protest activities on the part of various Western environmental 
interest groups that opposed the construction of new NPPs in CEE and FSU countries on the 
grounds that they did not represent sustainable development and only served to stifle 
alternative energy investments. Western environmental pressure groups argued that the near-
term closure of all unsafe Soviet-designed NPPs in CEE and the FSU could be secured by 
helping the respective countries to exploit the enormous energy-efficiency potential of their 
highly wasteful economies and to adopt alternative ways of meeting their energy needs (FAZ, 
7 November 1994). 
In anticipation of the likely difficulties in garnering sufficient international support for 
the Mochovce completion project, but also in conformity with its commitment to help 
improve nuclear safety in the region, the EBRD was determined to insist on loan conditions 
that promised to significantly reduce the risk of a nuclear accident in the Slovak Republic. 
Hence, in late 1993 the EBRD announced that its main condition for extending low-interest 
loans for the completion and upgrading of Mochovce units 1-2 was a firm commitment on the 
                                                 
1 For example, in 1991 the Austrian government had unsuccessfully sought to induce the Czechoslovak 
government to close the Bohunice NPP by holding out the prospect of free electricity supplies (NW, 7 
February 1991: 12). 
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part of the Slovak government to prematurely close—preferably by 1995—Bohunice V1, 
whose two VVER-230 units were considered to pose a serious nuclear safety threat to both 
Western and Eastern Europe. The EBRD stipulated its main loan condition for the Mochovce 
completion project at a critical time since Bratislava had been working on a plan to further 
upgrade Bohunice V1 for continued operation until around 2010. Although the EBRD’s 
strategy of linking loan financing for the Mochovce completion project to the premature 
closure of Bohunice V1 effectively aimed to induce the Slovak government to cancel the 
extensive modernization program at Bohunice V1, Bratislava still faced strong incentives to 
consider the option of upgrading the two VVER-230s for prolonged operation. To begin with, 
Slovak energy planners had deemed the two VVER-230 units of the Bohunice NPP, which 
together provided around 25 percent of the country’s electricity supply at comparatively low 
cost, essential to meet the country’s power needs. Moreover, a continued operation of 
Bohunice V1 would allow the Slovak authorities to accumulate the necessary funds for the 
eventual decommissioning of the two units. Finally, domestic doubts about the risks and the 
technical feasibility of upgrading Bohunice V1 for long-term operation had waned as a 
consequence of the generally good safety grades attested to the plant in mid-1993 by the 
IAEA. Under such circumstances, Bratislava was far from keen to close Bohunice V1 in the 
near future, at least not until additional power generating capacity had been brought on line, 
and therefore sought to separate the two issues in loan negotiations with the EBRD (NW, 11 
November 1993: 11). 
While negotiations between the EBRD and the Slovak government on the terms of the 
Mochovce loan stalled throughout late 1993 and early 1994, project preparations initiated by 
interested firms and utilities proceeded rather smoothly and reached a first breakthrough in 
January 1994 as EdF and SEP established the joint venture Elektrarne Mochovce (EMO). 
EMO, owned 51 percent by EdF and 49 percent by SEP, would operate the Mochovce NPP 
and export part of the electricity produced at the plant’s two completed units to Western 
Europe to help pay back the loans. Since EdF and other interested Western partners such as 
the German utilities Bayernwerk and Preussenelektra had previously made their involvement 
in the proposed Mochovce completion project dependent upon the earliest possible closure of 
Bohunice V1, the formation of EMO indicated that SEP had accepted an explicit link between 
international loan financing to complete Mochovce units 1-2 and the premature closure of 
Bohunice V1 (NW, 27 January 1994: 11). 
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Despite these tentative steps towards an agreement, the Slovak government under 
Prime Minister Meciar continued to adhere to an ambivalent position vis-à-vis the EBRD’s 
main condition for loan financing. On the one hand, in early May 1994 Bratislava allotted 
$190 million for an extensive modernization project at Bohunice V1 and subsequently 
awarded the German firm Siemens the basic engineering contract for most of the proposed 
upgrade work (FAZ, 25 October 1994; NEI, October 1994: 54-56). This decision by the 
Slovak government provoked fierce outrage at the EBRD since it threatened to undermine the 
bank’s efforts to link funding for the Mochovce NPP to the premature closure of Bohunice 
V1. Indeed, if the Slovak government was to invest so much money in the modernization of 
Bohunice V1, it would certainly have even less reason to close these two units in the near 
future. On the other hand, the Slovak government surprised Western governments by issuing 
a resolution on 14 May 1994 which committed the Slovak Republic to close Bohunice V1 by 
the year 2000, or as soon as the two new Mochovce units were completed. This move left 
Western governments wondering whether or not the Slovak government’s unilateral closure 
resolution was simply a bargaining tactic to soothe Western suspicions of Bratislava’s 
intentions and thereby pave the way for international financing of the Mochovce completion 
project. 
Notwithstanding widespread doubts about the sincerity of the Slovak government’s 
May 1994 closure resolution, this unilateral commitment apparently convinced various 
Western governments and financial institutions that a closure deal along the lines proposed by 
the EBRD was within reach. By mid-1994 both the European Commission and the French and 
German governments had officially announced their intention to support the EBRD in 
financing the nuclear completion project. The EBRD, on the other hand, proceeded with its 
project preparations by assessing whether the completion and upgrading of Mochovce units 1-
2 could be justified on safety, environmental and economic grounds. After a nuclear safety 
review and an environmental assessment had given green light to the project, a least-cost 
study prepared by the consulting firm Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett concluded in late 1994 that 
completing Mochovce units 1-2 would be the most economic option to meet Slovak energy 
needs, even assuming an enhanced energy-efficiency rate of Slovak industry (NW, 8 
December 1994: 3-5). On the basis of varying assumptions concerning the Slovak Republic’s 
economic development, fossil fuel prices, and discount rates, the least-cost analysis argued 
that completing Mochovce units 1-2, estimated to cost DM 1.452 billion (then about $945 
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million), would save between DM 87 million and DM 739 million compared to alternative 
energy projects. 
After the proposed nuclear completion project had taken these hurdles, the EBRD 
published the official Mochovce financing plan in mid-December 1994. According to the 
plan, the EBRD would provide the largest single financial contribution to the estimated DM 
1.452 billion completion project, i.e. DM 412.5 million (then about $270 million), or roughly 
28 percent of the total project costs. The second major source of finance was the EU, which 
agreed to contribute DM 366.3 million in Euratom loans, i.e. around 25 percent of the total 
project costs. The remaining funds were expected to come from French and German 
government export credits (around 20 percent) and from the three Western European firms 
and utilities expected to be heavily involved in the project, i.e. besides EdF as prime 
contractor and co-owner of the Mochovce NPP, also Bayernwerk and Preussenelektra which 
were interested in importing electricity from the completed plant. However, since both the 
European Commission and the French and German governments had stated their intention to 
proceed with project financing only if the EBRD took the lead, the whole project hinged upon 
a loan approval by the EBRD, a decision that was then scheduled for March 1995. 
The EBRD insisted on five conditions for financing the completion and upgrading of 
Mochovce units 1-2. First, it insisted that Bratislava firmly commit itself to the closure of 
Bohunice V1 by the year 2000 or once the two Mochovce units were completed. The EBRD 
had originally wanted to see the two unsafe reactors at the Bohunice NPP shut down in 1995. 
However, the bank was effectively forced to compromise on the closure deadline because 
Bratislava was determined to upgrade the two units for continued operation beyond 1995. 
Nevertheless, the EBRD’s main loan condition still promised to secure considerable safety 
benefits because the implementation of the extensive modernization program at Bohunice V1 
held out the alarming prospect of these two units being operated until 2010. Second, the 
EBRD insisted that the Slovak government increase electricity prices sharply—between 20 
and 30 percent—to ensure that the loan recipient would be able to repay the loans. Third, the 
bank demanded that the Slovak Republic adhere to the Vienna Convention to shield Western 
nuclear suppliers from potential liability claims (Wedmore 1995: 46). Finally, two additional 
conditions stipulated by the EBRD, i.e. that the two Soviet-designed reactors of the Mochovce 
NPP must be completed and upgraded to Western safety standards and that the project must 
constitute the least-cost investment option for the Slovak Republic’s energy needs, had 
allegedly been met by the conclusions of the then recently submitted nuclear safety review 
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and the results of the least-cost study conducted by Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett. In light of the 
great significance of the nuclear completion project, the EBRD decided to launch a public 
participation process to avoid any charges of lack of consultation (EEE Report, January 1995: 
25). The EBRD even agreed to go beyond normal bank procedures by releasing the full least-
cost study of the project, a decision that reflected the bank management’s willingness to meet 
non-governmental environmental organizations at least halfway in the Mochovce project 
assessment process. 
6.3 The Collapse of the EBRD’s Closure Deal 
In early 1995 the controversy surrounding the Mochovce completion project came to a head 
as the Austrian government, supported by other non-nuclear Western European countries and 
various environmental groups, energetically contested the project in an attempt to both 
prevent the EBRD from approving the Mochovce loans and to persuade the bank to consider 
alternative investment options.2 Project opponents focused their criticism on the EBRD’s 
least-cost study (NW, 19 January 1995: 12-15). Specifically, the study was criticized for 
having based its final conclusions on assumptions that were clearly biased in favor of 
completing Mochovce units 1-2, i.e. on increasing fossil fuel prices (around 60 percent over 
the following four years) and low discount rates for the capital invested in the Mochovce 
NPP. Moreover, critics pointed out that even in the most favorable scenario assumed by the 
least-cost study, completing Mochovce units 1-2 had been found to be only 5 percent cheaper 
than the construction of a new combined-cycle gas turbine plant, and that with only slight 
modifications to the assumptions, construction of a gas-fired power plant would turn out to be 
the most economic option.3
The fact that the alternative investment option of constructing a gas-fired power plant 
had been defeated by a small margin gave rise to widespread suspicions that the EBRD had 
manipulated the input of the least-cost study to ensure that the nuclear completion project 
passed the assessment process as the least-cost investment option. Project opponents saw such 
suspicions corroborated by the following circumstances. First, Austrian officials had claimed 
                                                 
2  The controversy surrounding the Mochovce completion project was highlighted by following protest 
activities during the public consultation process: A petition signed by 1.3 million people opposing the 
project, 200 technical critiques, and 105 pressure groups from 14 countries registering their opposition 
(Frogatt 1999). 
3  For an in-depth critique of the least-cost study on the Mochovce completion project, see Energy Economist, 
January 1995: 5-12. 
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in early 1995 that between the first and second stage of the least-cost analysis, the consultants 
of Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett had lowered the discount rate used in their cost calculations from 
12 percent to 10 percent, thus favoring the nuclear option (NW, 19 January 1995: 15). 
Second, project opponents could point to a recent precedent in which the completion of 
VVER-213 reactors had not been considered to be an economic course of action: After 
Germany had inherited VVER-213 reactors at the Greifswald NPP from the former German 
Democratic Republic in 1990, the German authorities faced a similar decision as the EBRD 
was now confronted with in the Slovak Republic. Although the German authorities had 
considered the task of completing the reactors to Western safety standards to be technically 
possible, they decided to decommission the Greifswald NPP because the costs to complete 
and upgrade the VVER-213 units could not be justified on economic grounds (Wedmore 
1995: 48). 
The third, and probably most important circumstance which served to deepen 
suspicions that the EBRD was bent on squeezing the nuclear completion project through the 
assessment process was the fact that EBRD’s management—led by the bank’s then French 
President de Larosière—had staffed the Mochovce project team exclusively with French 
nationals. Such a move was not insignificant when taking into account that the French state-
owned utility EdF stood to benefit considerably from the realization of the Mochovce 
completion project, especially with a view to the competitive advantage the utility was 
expected to thereby gain over other Western nuclear firms in the potentially lucrative Eastern 
nuclear market.4 Given the French commercial interests involved in completing the two 
Mochovce units, suspicions abounded that the French project team had manipulated the least-
cost study to ensure that the Mochovce completion project would come through as the most 
economic option (FT, 12 March 1995). Not surprisingly, EBRD’s management repudiated 
such accusations and sought to check the rising tide of protests against the project with the 
argument that without the provision of loans for the Mochovce completion project, the West 
would have no leverage to secure the early closure of Bohunice V1. This argument, however, 
had been losing credibility due to the continued failure of the Slovak government to convince 
Western governments and publics of its firm intention to close the two older Bohunice units 
by the year 2000 or once the Mochovce units were completed. As a matter of fact, 
                                                 
4  One project opponent put it this way: “EdF wants to expand into new markets on the back of European 
taxpayers. If they get this project [the Mochovce completion project], they will get them all” (FT, 12 March 
1995). 
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inconsistent statements by Slovak officials regarding the closure deadline for Bohunice V1 
most likely deepened Western suspicions of Bratislava’s dubious policy stance on the closure 
issue.5
The persisting controversy over and the concomitant rise in opposition to the 
Mochovce completion project, which was no longer limited to environmental groups, but also 
included EBRD managers and various member governments (Wedmore 1995: 46), triggered a 
process of crumbling support for the EBRD’s closure deal. In early February 1995, the 
Austrian Parliament passed a resolution calling for the country’s withdrawal from the EBRD 
if the bank approved loans for the Mochovce NPP (NW, 16 February 1995: 9-10). In the same 
week, the German utility Preussenelektra announced that it was canceling its participation in 
the nuclear completion project because it was not convinced of the Slovak government’s 
resolve to shut down Bohunice V1 as envisaged in the EBRD closure deal. Bayernwerk 
followed suit with a statement that although it was still interested in importing cheap 
electricity from the Mochovce NPP, it would not officially join EMO. On 15 February, the 
European Parliament intensified the dispute by adopting a non-binding resolution opposing 
the completion of the Mochovce NPP on the grounds that the project lacked sufficient safety 
guarantees. The resolution called on the EBRD and the European Commission to undertake 
further in-depth investigations before acting on the proposed Mochovce loans (NW, 23 
February 1995: 3). 
While the lack of agreement in the West called into question the fate of the Western-
led Mochovce completion project, a potentially even more serious threat to the EBRD’s 
closure deal arose from the East: On 13 February Slovak and Russian Prime Ministers, 
Meciar and Chernomyrdin, signed a letter of intent in Bratislava in which Moscow agreed to 
grant the Slovak Republic a $150 million credit towards the completion of the Mochovce NPP 
(NW, 16 February 1995: 9). Chernomyrdin’s proposed Russian-led project was substantially 
cheaper than the one proposed by the EBRD, not least because it did not include the safety 
upgrades envisaged in the Western-led nuclear completion project. The Russian counter-offer 
was certainly attractive to the Slovak government: Besides being considerably cheaper, it 
neither contained the condition to raise electricity prices nor the obligation to prematurely 
close Bohunice V1. Whereas the Western project sponsors portrayed the Russian counter-
                                                 
5 Indeed, whereas a top Slovak official stated in February 1995 that Bohunice V1 would be closed a year after 
the Mochovce NPP was commissioned, Prime Minister Meciar announced during a visit to Vienna in early 
March 1995 that the Slovak Republic would shut down Bohunice V1 by 2005 (NW, 16 March 1995: 6). 
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offer as a serious threat both to the EBRD’s closure deal and Western nuclear safety efforts in 
general, Austria and other Western project opponents downplayed the prospects of Russia 
taking over the project. They doubted that the Slovak government had the political clout to 
complete the two Mochovce units without upgrading them to Western safety standards since 
EU-newcomer Austria could threaten to block the Slovak Republic’s proposed entry into the 
EU over such an issue (NW, 30 March 1995: 17). 
Notwithstanding the potential implications of the Russian counter-offer for the 
EBRD’s closure deal, the battle over the Western-led completion project continued to rage in 
the West during the run-up to the crucial financing decision by the EBRD board, then 
scheduled to be taken on 27 March 1995. The European Parliament intervened once again 
into the dispute on 15 March by stating its doubts about the safety and cost-effectiveness of 
the Mochovce completion project and insisting on various conditions to be met before the 
EBRD and the European Commission approved any loans. By this time, EBRD-internal 
support of the project had crumbled to the extent that a positive board decision was far from 
clear. While France in particular, but also Germany were strongly in favor of the project, the 
governments of Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Hungary and 
Greece had officially or unofficially stated their opposition. Moreover, the U.S. government, 
whose vote was considered to be key to the EBRD’s decision, had so far wavered on the 
issue. In the end, however, the EBRD did not have to take a decision: On 22 March 1995 the 
Slovak government requested that the EBRD board postpone its vote on financing the 
Mochovce completion project (NW, 23 March 1995: 1, 12-13). 
The Slovak government had officially based its postponement request on the March 15 
European Parliament resolution which had set a broad list of prerequisites to be met before 
the EBRD and the European financing institutions acted on any loans. This official statement 
was widely regarded in the West as to have disguised Bratislava’s deeper reasons for 
requesting the postponement of the financing decision. Various Western officials claimed that 
Bratislava had already decided to ditch the Western-led nuclear completion project in favor of 
new counter-offer, said to be 30 percent cheaper, to finish the plant with Skoda Prague and 
Russian Minatom. Other observers argued that the Slovak government was still interested in 
pursuing the Western-led project, but had used the postponement request as a bargaining 
tactic to extract more favorable terms from the EBRD. On balance, the latter interpretation 
appears to be more credible. Indeed, by acceding to the Vienna Convention on 7 March 1995, 
the Slovak government had complied with at least one important condition of the EBRD. 
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Moreover, Prime Minister Meciar was said to have balked not only at the total costs of the 
Western-led project, but also at certain conditions laid down by the Western financing 
institutions (NW, 30 March 1995: 17). In particular the EBRD’s insistence on substantial 
electricity price increases had reportedly irritated the Slovak government since Bratislava was 
concerned that such price hikes would force many Slovak enterprises into bankruptcy and add 
to the country’s already high unemployment rate (EEE Report, April 1995: 2-3). 
After days of silence, Bratislava announced that its request to postpone the vote on 
financing the completion of Mochovce units 1-2 did not mean that it had ditched the Western-
led project, but rather that it wanted to evaluate alternative offers, such as a recent proposal 
involving Czech bank financing and construction work by Skoda Prague6, and an earlier bid 
from Russian industry, with corresponding credits.7 Austria, now facing the even more dire 
prospect of having to live with a Slovak NPP operating at conventional Eastern European 
safety standards near its borders, sought to increase the costs of a possible Slovak choice in 
favor of one of the counter-offers. At a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg in 
early April 1995, Austria’s then foreign minister Alois Mock warned aspiring members of the 
EU in CEE that they could not expect to join the EU without adequate safety standards for 
their nuclear power plants (Wedmore 1995: 50). Austria’s threatened issue-linkage, however, 
was overshadowed by the dimming prospects that funding for the Western-led nuclear 
completion project would be approved by IFIs: In mid-April 1995 the European Investment 
Bank (EIB), which had been previously asked by the European Commission to give its 
opinion on the provision of an Euratom loan for the nuclear completion project, issued a 
report stating that it was not convinced that completing Mochovce units 1-2 represented the 
least-cost investment option and that under certain circumstances a phased investment in a 
gas-fired power plant would be economically more adapted to the Slovak Republic’s energy 
situation (NW, 20 April 1995: 4). 
Apparently speculating that the EBRD would eventually soften its stance, during the 
subsequent months Bratislava repeatedly asked the Western parties involved in the nuclear 
completion project to reconsider their bids and conditions. However, apart from suggesting to 
                                                 
6 Skoda’s interest in completing the project can be at least partly explained by the fact that the Czech 
engineering firm was hoping to retrieve some of the $30 million it had already invested in the aborted 
original Mochovce project (NW, 26 October 1995: 1, 11). 
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slightly modify the Western-led project in order to provide for a minimum input of Russian 
firms, the EBRD was unwilling to climb down on its original conditions (NW, 1 June 1995: 
4). Moreover, with the Slovak nuclear safety authority apparently convinced that the 
implementation of the extensive modernization program at Bohunice V1 would allow these 
two VVER-230 units to operate safely until the end of their design lives, the prospects that the 
Slovak government would give its consent to a deal involving the early closure of Bohunice 
V1 looked increasingly bleak (NW, 24 August 1995: 13-14). It was therefore no great surprise 
that on 5 September 1995 the Slovak government formally rejected the deal proposed by the 
EBRD on the grounds that it involved unacceptable conditions, and announced that it would 
pursue an alternative offer from Skoda Prague, with financing from Czech and Slovak banks, 
the Russian government, and other sources. Not only was the Skoda-led project then 
estimated to be almost 30 percent cheaper than the Western-led project, i.e. total estimated 
project costs amounted to DM 1 billion instead of DM 1.452 billion, but the alternative offer 
also did not link project funding to substantial electricity price increases and to the premature 
closure of Bohunice V1. 
In an effort to alleviate Western concerns about the safety of the Skoda-led project and 
to muffle Western disenchantment with its decision to reject the EBRD’s closure deal, the 
Slovak government offered EdF and its partners a technical role in the new project. Although 
EdF had originally predicated its participation in the nuclear completion project on the 
conditions that the Mochovce NPP be built to Western safety standards and that the plant’s 
completion be linked to the early closure of Bohunice V1—two conditions that were no 
longer met by the new completion deal—the French utility eagerly signed up to the new 
project. Not surprisingly, EdF was reluctant to see the money and time it had invested so far 
in the Western-led project wasted and to turn down potentially lucrative contracts, and thus 
concluded an agreement with SEP in mid-December 1995 on the provision of technical and 
support services in project control, quality assurance and safety improvements (EEE Report, 
January 1996: 4). Moreover, in April 1996 SEP concluded a contract worth about $100 
million with Eucom, a European consortium consisting of Framatome and Siemens, to 
upgrade the two Mochovce units to levels consistent with IAEA safety recommendations. 
Following various modifications to the original project proposed by Skoda, the total costs of 
                                                 
7 In early April 1995, SEP director Kvetan confirmed that there was still a chance that the EBRD would 
finance the Mochovce completion project, but added that he hoped EdF would cut the project costs and that 
the EBRD would renounce its condition that Bratislava raise electricity prices by almost 30 percent, and 
instead accept the 10 percent suggested by the Slovak government (NW, 4 May 1995: 12). 
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the new Mochovce completion project were estimated to amount to DM 1.3 billion, i.e. a 
saving of around 10 percent on the initial scheme proposed by the EBRD. The bulk of the 
money required for the completion work was scheduled to come from both Czech and Slovak 
banks and from the Russian government. Financing for the safety upgrade work performed by 
Eucom was slated to come from France’s Société Générale and Germany’s Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau (NW, 23 May 1996: 8). 
Since the deal proposed by the EBRD failed to materialize, the Slovak government 
had no contractual obligation to prematurely close Bohunice V1. Hence, Western hopes to 
eventually eliminate the safety threat posed by the continued operation of these two VVER-
230 units clung to the Slovak government’s May 1994 unilateral commitment close Bohunice 
V1 by the year 2000 or once the two new Mochovce units were operational. However, during 
the subsequent years these hopes gradually faded. Indeed, although the Skoda-led Mochovce 
completion project had reached its final stages by early 1998—unit 1 was then scheduled to 
start in mid-1998, and unit 2 was expected to be completed in 1999—, the Slovak government 
had so far failed to credibly signal that it would honor its May 1994 closure commitment. 
Even more alarming, in late 1997 Slovak energy authorities had indicated that an early 
closure of Bohunice V1 might not be possible due to rising domestic electricity demand. 
Finally, the implementation of the expensive modernization program at Bohunice V1—unit 1 
was slated to be completed in 1999 and unit 2 in the first half of 2000—had exacerbated 
Western concerns that the Slovak government was planning to keep these two units on line 
well into the next century in order to recoup the considerable investment. Prompted by the 
growing risk that the Slovak government would refuse to honor its unilateral closure 
commitment, the European Commission stepped up the pressure on Bratislava in late 1998 by 
linking the country’s EU membership prospects to the establishment of a “realistic” closure 
schedule for the two VVER-230 units at the Bohunice NPP. These efforts by the European 
Commission to secure the premature closure of Bohunice units 1-2 are analyzed in Case 
Study IV. The following assessment is thus restricted to the EBRD’s ultimately unsuccessful 
attempt to condition the provision of low-interest loans for the Mochovce completion project 
on a firm commitment by the Slovak government to prematurely close Bohunice V1. 
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6.4 Assessment 
To which extent did the Slovak Republic change its externality-generating behavior in a 
direction desired by the Western donors? By offering favorable loans for the completion and 
upgrading to Western safety standards of Mochovce units 1-2, the EBRD had sought to 
induce and enable the Slovak government to prematurely close Bohunice V1 by 2000 or once 
Mochovce units 1-2 were operational. The Western donors’ goal of eliminating the safety risk 
posed by the continued operation of Bohunice V1 was not achieved: Due to the collapse of 
the EBRD’s closure deal in late 1995, Bratislava had no contractual obligation to prematurely 
close Bohunice V1. In addition, by early 1998 it had become evident that the Slovak 
government—in defiance of its May 1994 unilateral commitment to close Bohunice V1 by the 
year 2000 or once Mochovce units 1-2 went on line—was planning to keep these two unsafe 
units in operation for years to come. In short, by rejecting the EBRD’s closure deal and 
subsequently making preparations for the long-term operation of Bohunice V1, the Slovak 
Republic failed to alter its behavior in a direction desired by the Western donors. 
Which cooperation strategies and what kind of measures were employed by the 
Western donors to influence the Slovak Republic’s behavior? While the Western donors 
adhered in part to normative strategies—Western nuclear safety officials had repeatedly 
sought to convince the Slovak government of the necessity to close Bohunice V1 on safety 
grounds—, the dominant cooperation strategy employed by Western donors consisted of a 
deal involving the provision of positive incentives. It is certainly true that the nature of the 
EBRD’s closure deal was to a certain extent commercial in the sense that the Slovak Republic 
would have had to pay back, with interest, the loans extended by the IFIs to complete 
Mochovce units 1-2. Nevertheless, the EBRD’s closure deal did comprise a positive incentive 
strategy by virtue of the fact that it involved the attractive offer by IFIs to provide a 
considerable amount of low-interest loans under long-term repayment conditions. With a view 
to the fact that the Slovak government lacked the financial resources to complete units 1-2 of 
the Mochovce NPP without external financing, and taking into account the financial risk the 
IFIs were willing to shoulder with their prospective involvement in the multi-million nuclear 
completion project, this offer did indeed constitute a positive incentive. 
To which extent was the observed behavioral change on the part of the Slovak 
Republic influenced by the provision of positive incentives and how high was the 
effectiveness of the attempted transaction? Since the Slovak government rejected the EBRD’s 
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closure deal in favor of an unconditional Czech-Russian counter-offer and was hence unlikely 
to prematurely close Bohunice V1 in the near future, the effectiveness of the attempted 
transaction was low. In other words, the attempted transaction was ineffective in driving the 
Slovak Republic’s behavior in a direction desired by the Western donors. 
How high was the efficiency of the attempted transaction? First dimension of 
efficiency: The attempted transaction was efficient in the sense that the employment of no 
alternative cooperation strategy would have likely led to comparable or superior behavioral 
changes on the part of the Slovak Republic at a lower or comparable cost. This assessment is 
based on the following considerations. In contrast to the Bulgarian and Lithuanian cases, there 
was less need for the Western donors to provide the Slovak Republic with the financial and 
technical means to reduce the near-term risk of a nuclear accident at Bohunice V1. Indeed, the 
Slovak Republic disposed over the financial and technical resources to implement safety 
upgrades at the two VVER-230 units of the Bohunice NPP, and was apparently determined to 
do so. To achieve their nuclear safety goals, the Western donors had to induce the Slovak 
government to prematurely close Bohunice V1. However, Bratislava was unwilling to comply 
with Western closure demands primarily because it was concerned that the Slovak Republic 
could not afford to forgo the power supplied by Bohunice V1, at least not until additional 
power generation capacity had been brought on line. 
Against this backdrop, it becomes clear why alternative cooperation strategies were 
unlikely to be more cost-effective than positive incentives. While the employment of positive 
issue-linkage and negative incentive strategies would have arguably raised the stakes for the 
Slovak government to comply with Western closure demands, it is unlikely that these 
strategies would have been effective due to their incapacity to address the underlying 
cooperation problem, i.e. the Slovak government’s concern that the country lacked the power 
generation capacity to do without Bohunice V1. Indeed, it is difficult to see how some 
positive issue-linkage or, conversely, the imposition of economic sanctions, would have 
enabled the Slovak authorities to construct additional electricity generating capacity needed to 
replace the power of Bohunice V1. Moreover, it was unlikely that the Western donors would 
have been able to identify and agree upon a positive issue-linkage of sufficient value to the 
Slovak Republic. One possible issue-linkage, i.e. making the Slovak Republic’s prospects of 
joining the EU conditional on the premature closure of Bohunice V1, was at the time no 
option for the majority of EU Member States, with the notable exception of EU-newcomer 
Austria. Moreover, such an issue-linkage would have probably been ineffective in the near-
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term due to the fact that decision-makers in Bratislava were aware that it would take 
considerable time before the Slovak Republic’s membership bid would be seriously 
considered by the EU. It was also unlikely that Western donors would have been willing to 
bear the potential costs of employing a negative incentive strategy, which involved the risk of 
exacerbating the country’s transformation problems and hence provoking political instability 
both in the Slovak Republic and the region. Finally, the employment of normative or 
cognitive strategies was also highly unlikely to be more cost-effective than the provision of 
positive incentives. The Western donors in fact employed normative strategies, but to no 
apparent avail. The potential cost-effectiveness of cognitive strategies was also low. Indeed, 
under the given circumstances it is difficult to see how the provision of more complete 
information on the full costs and risks of keeping Bohunice units 1-2 in operation would have 
induced the Slovak government to comply with Western closure demands. 
Second dimension of efficiency: The attempted transaction may have involved serious 
inefficiencies because the possibility cannot be ruled out that an alternative way of employing 
positive incentives might have led to comparable or superior behavioral changes on the part of 
the Slovak Republic at a lower or comparable cost. Indeed, instead of proposing to fund the 
completion of Mochovce units 1-2, the EBRD could have offered to provide favorable loans 
for the potentially less expensive option of constructing a new gas-fired power plant in 
exchange for the premature closure of Bohunice V1. Non-nuclear Western countries such as 
Austria, but also various environmental interest groups had from the beginning of the 
anticipated closure deal lobbied the EBRD to pursue this alternative investment option on the 
grounds that the construction of a new gas-fired power plant would be both more economical 
and environmentally safe than the proposed nuclear completion project. In late 1994, the 
consulting firm Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett, which had been commissioned by the EBRD to 
assess the cost-effectiveness of various energy investment options for the Slovak Republic, 
had concluded that this alternative investment option was more expensive than the completion 
of Mochovce units 1-2. However, a closer examination of the consulting firm’s least-cost 
study in early 1995 revealed that the study’s baseline assumptions were strongly biased in 
favor of the nuclear option and that with only slight modifications to the assumed discount 
rates and projected fossil fuel prices, the construction of a gas-fired power plant would have 
constituted the least-cost investment option. 
While it is plausible to suggest that the option of funding the construction of a gas-
fired power plant would have been less expensive, evaluating whether this alternative way of 
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employing positive incentives would have been more effective is highly speculative. On the 
one hand, it is necessary to explore whether the Slovak government would have accepted a 
deal involving the funding of a gas-fired power plant in exchange for the early closure of 
Bohunice V1. The answer to this issue basically depends on two circumstances. First, it 
depends on the degree to which the Slovak government was determined to complete the 
Mochovce NPP. If the Slovak authorities were bent on completing the Mochovce NPP, then 
the alternative option would have likely been rejected. Conversely, if the Slovak leadership 
accepted that the planned additional power generation capacity could be non-nuclear, then the 
alternative option would have had good chances of being considered. With a view to the fact 
that Prime Minister Meciar had still been considering non-nuclear alternatives as late as mid-
1995 (NW, 13 July 1995: 1), the latter interpretation appears to be more credible. Second, it 
depends further on the precise reasons why the Slovak government turned down the Western-
led Mochovce completion project in favor of the Czech-Russian counter-offer. If the Slovak 
government’s main reasons were the relatively high costs of the Western-led nuclear 
completion project and the related condition to sharply increase electricity prices in order to 
secure the future repayment of the disbursed loans, then it would have probably accepted the 
potentially cheaper option of constructing a gas-fired power plant. However, if the main 
reason for the Slovak government’s rejection of the Western-led nuclear completion project 
was the EBRD’s condition to prematurely close Bohunice V1, then the alternative option to 
fund the construction of a gas-fired power plant—also linked to an early retirement of 
Bohunice V1—would have probably been rejected as well. Since little is known about the 
precise cost-benefit calculations the Slovak government made while considering the EBRD’s 
closure deal, any conclusions regarding the issue of whether the Slovak Republic would have 
accepted a closure deal involving the construction of a gas-fired power plant must remain 
tentative. 
On the other hand, we need to consider the possibility that the Western donors might 
have been in a more favorable position to entice the Slovak government to accept a closure 
deal if the alternative investment option had been pursued from the beginning. This 
hypothesis is based on the observation that the Western-led nuclear completion project was 
highly controversial in the West, not only due to the implications of the project for the future 
of nuclear power in the region, but also due to widespread allegations that the EBRD had 
manipulated its least-cost study to ensure that the nuclear completion project passed the 
assessment process. The controversy surrounding the EBRD’s closure deal, in turn, led to a 
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widening fissure among the Western donors. Against the backdrop of crumbling Western 
support for the Western-led completion project, the EBRD and other Western project 
proponents were in a weakened position to forcefully press the Slovak government to accept 
the proposed closure deal, especially after the Czech and Russian nuclear industry had made 
counter-offers. It is no doubt speculative whether in the absence of such controversy a united 
Western donor front could have deterred the Slovak government from rejecting a deal 
involving the premature closure of Bohunice V1. Nevertheless, it is plausible to suggest that 
the alternative option of constructing a gas-fired power plant would have been far less 
controversial than the Mochovce completion project, and would have hence provided the 
Western donors with a relatively stronger bargaining position. 
Finally, it is necessary to take into account the possibility that the controversy 
surrounding the Western-led nuclear completion project may have prompted the Slovak 
government to consider counter-offers to complete the Mochovce NPP in the first place. The 
Slovak government’s position on the Mochovce completion issue was strongly determined by 
its national energy plan, according to which a predicted rise in domestic energy demand 
would necessitate the introduction of additional power generation capacity by the end of the 
1990s. A timely completion of new power units—either nuclear or thermal—was therefore a 
high priority for Bratislava. The strong controversy surrounding the Mochovce completion 
project in the West had exacerbated fears on the part of Slovak decision-makers that the 
Western-led nuclear completion project might be delayed, or even worse, might fail to be 
approved by the EBRD board. Indeed, in spring 1995 both the European Parliament and the 
EIB had called upon the EBRD to reassess the project’s safety and cost-effectiveness, and 
internal EBRD support of the project had by this time crumbled to the extent that a positive 
board decision was far from certain. Faced with such uncertainty about the Western-led 
completion project, the Slovak government may have begun to seriously consider counter-
offers from Czech and Russian industry. It is hence possible that a Western offer to fund the 
construction of a less controversial, gas-fired power plant would have not driven the Slovak 
government to consider counter-offers. In sum, while the provision of positive incentives was 
probably the most cost-effective cooperation strategy to secure the premature closure of 
Bohunice V1, it is not impossible that an alternative way of employing positive incentives—
i.e. funding the construction of a gas-fired power plant instead of the completion of Mochovce 
units 1-2—might have been more cost-effective. Hence, the efficiency of the attempted 
transaction (second dimension) was rather low. 
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To which extent did the theoretically predicted problems in designing and 
implementing positive incentives shape the effectiveness and efficiency of the attempted 
transaction? The outcomes to be explained were unaffected by extortion and moral hazard 
problems. The Slovak government did not engage in extortion, i.e. it did not threaten to 
increase or prolong the safety threat posed by the continued operation of Bohunice V1 unless 
the Western donors paid it to refrain from doing so. Instead, Bratislava had signaled its 
willingness to consider prematurely closing Bohunice V1 provided that external financing for 
the construction of power replacement capacity was forthcoming. As such the Slovak 
government did not attempt to extract a payment from the Western donors for a behavioral 
change—prematurely closing Bohunice V1—it would have undertaken even in the absence of 
such a payment. Nor does the analysis suggest that the Slovak government engaged in moral 
hazard behavior. Indeed, the prospect of gaining loan financing for the Mochovce completion 
project did not induce the Slovak authorities to accept higher levels of nuclear risk at 
Bohunice V1 or reduce their willingness to unilaterally improve the safety situation at the 
plant. Moreover, these two potential problems in designing and implementing positive 
incentives did not deter the Western donors from seeking to engage in a transaction with the 
Slovak Republic. 
Information and distribution problems negatively affected the effectiveness of the 
attempted transaction. On the one hand, uncertainties regarding the long-term development of 
fossil fuel prices and the Slovak Republic’s future energy demand intensified the dispute over 
whether the completion of Mochovce units 1-2 represented the least-cost investment option 
for the country’s power needs. On the other hand, incomplete information regarding 
Bratislava’s “real“ intentions to comply with its commitment to close Bohunice V1 by 2000 
or once Mochovce units 1-2 were completed hampered the timely conclusion of a closure 
deal. Indeed, widespread doubts in the West about the Slovak government’s sincerity to shut 
down Bohunice V1 in the near future provoked rising opposition to the closure deal by 
various EBRD member countries and prompted Preussenelektra and later Bayernwerk to 
withdraw from the Western-led nuclear completion project. Distribution problems, which led 
to protracted negotiations on the conclusion of a deal, arose from the Slovak government’s 
repeated efforts to ease the conditions the EBRD had been seeking to impose on its loan 
financing program for the Mochovce completion project. Indeed, the Slovak government most 
likely used its March 1995 request to postpone the EBRD’s vote on the loans as a bargaining 
tactic to extract more favorable terms from the bank, in particular with respect to the project 
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costs and the related condition to sharply increase electricity prices, but probably also with 
respect to the demand to prematurely close Bohunice V1. However, against the backdrop of 
the growing Western opposition to the Western-led nuclear completion project, the EBRD 
was unwilling to comply with such requests: Cutting the costs would have implied reducing 
the scope of the planned safety upgrades at the Mochovce NPP, something various concerned 
EBRD member countries were loath to accept. Moreover, since it was impossible for the bank 
to reduce the project costs, the EBRD was reluctant to give in on its condition that electricity 
prices be sharply raised. Finally, the EBRD regarded the earliest possible closure of Bohunice 
V1 as a non-negotiable issue. 
The effectiveness of the attempted transaction was not hampered by enforcement 
problems. Indeed, since the EBRD failed to conclude a closure deal with the Slovak 
government, enforcement problems had no effect on the final outcome. 
The efficiency of the attempted transaction may have been seriously hampered by the 
specific problem-definition adhered to by the Western donors. Generally speaking, there were 
two ways by which the Western donors could have employed positive incentives to secure the 
premature closure of Bohunice V1, i.e. either by funding the completion of Mochovce units 1-
2 or by financing the construction of a new gas-fired power plant. Yet from the beginning of 
the negotiation process the Western donors adhered to a problem-definition that clearly 
favored pro-nuclear solutions to the nuclear safety problem in the Slovak Republic. Indeed, 
irrespective of widespread objections that the construction of a gas-fired power plant would 
be both more economical and environmentally safe, the EBRD appeared to be bent on 
funding the completion of Mochovce units 1-2. Not surprisingly, the fact that the completion 
of Mochovce units 1-2 had been found to prevail over the alternative investment option of 
constructing a gas-fired power plant by only a small margin provoked widespread accusations 
that EBRD project managers had manipulated the least-cost study to ensure that the nuclear 
completion project successfully passed the bank’s assessment process. 
Although the EBRD immediately repudiated such accusations, they received 
considerable backing in late 1995 as Martin Blaiclock, who was formerly in charge of the 
EBRD’s review of Mochovce proposals, claimed that French government pressures had been 
brought to bear on the EBRD and that within the bank the then French President, Jacques de 
Larosière, had actively become involved in the deal (EEE Report Profiles, 1995b: 13; 
MacLachlan 1996a: 23-24). According to Blaiclock, by mid-1994 widespread protests against 
the Mochovce completion project and the findings of an initial least-cost study, which favored 
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the construction of a combined-cycle gas power plant, had made EBRD directors and various 
member state governments nervous about the outcome. As a result, EBRD President De 
Larosière allegedly appointed over Blaiclock’s head a French EBRD executive as project 
leader, who was supported by another French national seconded to the project from the 
French finance ministry. Blaiclock and a senior German economist in the team resigned from 
the project because of the political interference and claims that the consulting firm Putnam, 
Hayes & Bartlett had been instructed to rewrite the least-cost study according to assumptions 
provided by the remaining French project team, which resulted in the nuclear completion 
project being seen in a more favorable light. In short, if Blaiclock’s allegations are true, it is 
possible to conclude that the commercial interests of a small number of EBRD member 
countries—in particular of France—prevented the Western donors from pursuing a potentially 
more cost-effective funding strategy. 
The effectiveness of the attempted transaction was not hampered by the “slippery 
slope effect”. Indeed, even if the proposed Western loans for the completion and upgrading of 
Mochovce units 1-2 had been disbursed, the funding of this specific capacity-building 
measure could not have had the unintentional effect of enhancing the incentives and/or 
capacities of the Slovak Republic to continue to engage in undesirable behavior, i.e. to 
prolong the service lives of Bohunice units 1-2. 
Coordination problems among the potential donors and providers of nuclear 
technology seriously affected the effectiveness of the attempted transaction. To begin with, 
the whole controversy surrounding the Mochovce completion project testifies to the problem 
of coordinating disparate national policies of potential donors. On one side of the debate were 
the French and German governments, which strongly supported the Mochovce completion 
project not least because French and German firms were bound to profit commercially from 
the project. Indeed, while EdF could use the Mochovce project as a springboard to similar 
completion projects in Russia, Bulgaria and Ukraine, the German utilities Bayernwerk and 
Preussenelektra stood to benefit from cheap electricity imports from the Slovak Republic. On 
the other side of the debate was a vigorous opposition movement spearheaded by the anti-
nuclear Austrian government and various Western environmental pressure groups. This 
opposition movement sought to prevent international funding for the project because financial 
support by the EBRD would have likely set a precedent for the completion of similar Soviet-
designed reactors elsewhere in CEE and the FSU, which in turn threatened to undermine all 
efforts to persuade CEE and FSU countries to follow an alternative-energy path. 
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Uncoordinated actions by Western nuclear firms also hampered the conclusion of a 
closure deal. As the EBRD was seeking to link loans for the Mochovce completion project to 
the early closure of Bohunice units 1-2, Siemens signed a $150 million contract to modernize 
Bohunice V1. Although Siemens argued that its upgrade work did not represent life-
extension, in the end its modernization program did have the effect to increase the incentives 
on the part of the Slovak government to keep the two Bohunice units in operation for as long 
as possible. 
The most serious coordination problem took place among those potential donor 
countries and firms capable of financing and completing Mochovce units 1-2. Indeed, the 
Czech-Russian counter-offer to complete the Mochovce NPP both at lower costs and without 
insisting on substantial loan conditions such as electricity price increases and the premature 
closure of Bohunice V1 was probably the most important reason why the EBRD’s closure 
deal failed to materialize. The Western donors certainly failed to take into account the 
potential of Eastern countries to undermine the proposed closure deal. Only a collaborative 
project with Russian and Czech nuclear engineering firms, under which a major part of the 
Mochovce completion work would have been awarded to these firms, may have precluded the 
Czech-Russian counter-offer. Such an option, however, was apparently never seriously 
considered by the EBRD, most likely because of concerns about the resulting safety standards 
of such an international project, but also possibly due to the commercial interests of those 
Western nuclear firms expected to assume a leading role in implementing the Mochovce 
completion project. In short, the effectiveness of the attempted transaction was seriously 
hampered by the inability or unwillingness of the Western donors to create a united donor 
front, comprising all interested countries and firms with the financial and technical means to 
complete Mochovce units 1-2. 
 
 7 CASE STUDY IV: THE ENFORCEMENT OF CLOSURE COMMITMENTS BY THE 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Due to the growing risk that the Slovak Republic, Lithuania and Bulgaria would renege on 
their unilateral or international closure commitments and prolong the service lives of their 
high-risk nuclear reactors, the European Commission intervened in the closure debate in late 
1998 and sought to enforce closure commitments by extracting “realistic” closure schedules 
from the three applicant countries. From the outset of closure negotiations, the Commission 
employed a negative incentive strategy by linking the applicant countries’ EU membership 
prospects to the establishment of “realistic” closure schedules. In addition, during the final 
stages of the bargaining process the Commission also employed a positive incentive strategy, 
offering each applicant country a substantial amount of decommissioning aid in exchange for 
the establishment of “realistic” closure commitments. In late 1999 the closure negotiations 
were concluded with the following results: The Slovak Republic promised to close Bohunice 
units 1-2 in 2006 and 2008. Lithuania agreed to abide by its NSA closure commitments, i.e. it 
pledged to close Ignalina unit 1 by 2005 and to decide on a definitive closure date for unit 2 in 
2004. Finally, Bulgaria pledged to shut down Kozloduy units 1-2 in 2003 and to fix a 
definitive closure date for units 3-4 in 2002. It is expected that Kozloduy units 3-4 will be 
closed in 2006-2008/10. Whereas Lithuania’s closure commitments were fully in line with the 
Commission’s original closure demands, the closure schedules conceded by the Slovak 
Republic and Bulgaria were somewhat delayed compared to what the Commission had 
originally demanded. 
The outcomes to be explained can be summarized as follows. Effectiveness: This 
outcome varied slightly across the three examined transactions. Whereas the effectiveness of 
the transaction between the Commission and Lithuania was high, the effectiveness of the 
other two transactions in which the Commission sought to extract “realistic” closure 
schedules from the Slovak Republic and Bulgaria was rather high. This assessment is based 
on the following considerations. On the one hand, it is plausible to suggest that the 
employment of positive incentives was effective in all three examined transactions. Indeed, 
although the Commission’s negative issue-linkage strategy exerted considerable pressure on 
the applicant countries to compromise, this strategy was ultimately insufficient to secure 
“realistic” closure commitments from the applicant countries. In other words, the provision of 
positive incentives in the form of decommissioning aid was in effect a necessary means to 
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extract closure commitments from the three applicant countries. On the other hand, the 
specific closure schedules conceded by the Slovak Republic and Bulgaria—in contrast to 
those conceded by Lithuania—were not fully in line with the Commission’s original closure 
demands. Efficiency: With a view to the fact that no other cooperation strategy and/or way of 
employing positive incentives could have secured comparable or superior behavioral changes 
on the part of the three applicant countries at a lower or comparable cost, it can be concluded 
that the efficiency of the three examined transactions was high, both in terms of the first and 
second dimension of efficiency. These outcomes were shaped by the following problems. The 
effectiveness of the two transactions aimed at securing “realistic” closure commitments from 
the Slovak Republic and Bulgaria was to a certain degree negatively affected by enforcement 
problems. Indeed, since the enforcement of closure commitments threatened the strategic and 
commercial interests of various EU Member States and the Western European nuclear 
industry, the Commission was in effect prompted to accept somewhat later—i.e. less 
favorable—closure schedules than it had originally demanded. 
It should be noted that this case study differs from the other case studies conducted in 
this book in the sense that it involves the empirical analysis of three distinct transactions 
between one donor and three different recipients. As already pointed out, I have decided to 
analyze these three distinct transactions within the framework of one case study because all 
three transactions materialized in the context of the EU accession process. The case study on 
the European Commission’s ultimately successful attempt to enforce the closure 
commitments of the three applicant countries is structured along the following lines. The first 
section provides important background information to the Commission’s attempt to enforce 
the applicant countries’ closure commitments. The following three sections analyze the 
individual bargaining processes between the Commission and each applicant country. The 
fifth and final section summarizes the results of the case study. 
7.1 Genesis and Determinants of the European Commission’s Closure Strategy 
In seeking to induce the Slovak Republic, Lithuania and Bulgaria to abide by their unilateral 
or international closure commitments and hence to prevent the prolonged operation of their 
high-risk nuclear reactors, the European Commission could capitalize on a source of leverage 
which was in effect only recently available: The possibility to condition these three countries’ 
EU membership prospects—i.e. their chances of beginning EU membership negotiations—on 
the establishment of “realistic” closure schedules. Indeed, all three countries had officially 
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applied for EU membership between mid and late 1995, and the EU enlargement process had 
been formally launched in March 1998. Since the three applicant countries were strongly 
interested in securing the economic and strategic benefits of EU membership as soon as 
possible, the Commission certainly reckoned that its proposed issue-linkage strategy would 
exert considerable pressure on the applicant countries to compromise on the closure issue. 
Nevertheless, the extent to which the Commission could successfully capitalize on this 
source of leverage and push for the earliest possible closure of high-risk nuclear reactors 
depended on a number of circumstances. To begin with, the Commission had to ensure that its 
proposed issue-linkage strategy was credible in the eyes of the applicant countries. In other 
words, this issue-linkage would only be effective if the applicant countries were convinced 
that there was a firm, non-negotiable nexus between their EU membership prospects and the 
establishment of “realistic” closure schedules. Second, the Commission faced competing 
interests within the EU regarding its closure strategy. Indeed, whereas some domestic 
producers and EU Member States were concerned that the enforcement of closure 
commitments would threaten their commercial and strategic interests and thus called for an 
abandonment or relaxation of closure requirements, other industrial and state actors within the 
EU had strong incentives to ensure that the Commission did not deviate from or soften its 
closure strategy. 
In the following section I elaborate on these circumstances, thereby describing the 
general background against which the Commission sought to enforce the applicant countries’ 
closure commitments. The first part of this section briefly outlines the EU enlargement 
process, with a special emphasis on the nexus between the accession process and the closure 
of high-risk nuclear reactors in applicant countries. The second part explores the various 
competing interests within the EU that shaped the Commission’s closure strategy and 
ultimately determined its bargaining position vis-à-vis the applicant countries. 
EU Enlargement and the Closure of High-Risk Nuclear Reactors 
After the revolutions of 1989 and 1991 had radically transformed the political landscape of 
the European continent and induced the majority of the former socialist states in CEE and the 
FSU to seek stronger political and economic ties with Western Europe, the EU had come 
under growing internal and external pressure to consider enlarging its membership towards 
the East. At the 1993 Copenhagen Council meeting EU heads of state formally welcomed 
new members from CEE and the FSU provided that they fulfilled a set of economic and 
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political conditions, the so-called “Copenhagen Criteria”. Plans to enlarge EU membership 
were further developed at the December 1994 Essen Council meeting which set into motion 
the process of defining the extensive body of EU legislation—the so-called “Acquis 
Communautaire”—which each prospective Member State was expected to conform with. 
After a vast majority of countries from CEE and the FSU had officially applied to join the EU 
in 1994/95, the December 1995 Madrid Council meeting called on the European Commission 
to submit an assessment of the candidate states’ applications for membership. 
In July 1997 the Commission presented its assessment in a document entitled “Agenda 
2000”. In this document the Commission proposed a so-called “two-wave EU enlargement 
strategy”. Based on the apparent capacity of each candidate country to meet the full range of 
EU accession criteria, the Commission divided the Eastern European applicant countries into 
two groups or “waves”. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia were 
assigned to the group of “first-wave” applicant countries. The Slovak Republic, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria, Latvia and Romania, on the other hand, were categorized as “second-wave” 
applicant countries. Whereas the Commission recommended to immediately begin EU 
membership negotiations with the more advanced “first-wave” applicant countries, it deemed 
the “second-wave” applicant countries to be in need of more advice and preparation. “Agenda 
2000” also emphasized the need to improve nuclear safety in CEE and called on applicant 
countries to respect agreed upon schedules for the closure of first-generation VVERs and 
RBMKs. Whereas the Slovak Republic was expected to honor its May 1994 resolution to 
close Bohunice V1 by 2000 or once Mochovce units 1-2 were operational, Lithuania was 
called on to comply with its commitments made under its 1994 grant agreement with the 
NSA. With respect to the closure commitments of Bulgaria, the Commission acknowledged 
that Kozloduy units 1-4 were unlikely to be closed as foreseen by the 1993 grant NSA 
agreement since certain conditions of the agreement—i.e. the provision of sufficient 
replacement power—had not yet been fully met. Nevertheless, it called on the Bulgarian 
government to close Kozloduy units 1-2 in 2001 and units 3-4 in 2001/2002. In short, in 
“Agenda 2000” the Commission had for the first time formally proposed to link the 
establishment of “realistic” closure schedules to the EU accession process. 
At the December 1997 Luxembourg Council meeting EU heads of state approved the 
“two-wave EU enlargement strategy” and endorsed a new proposal to reinforce the pre-
accession strategy. The aim of this proposal was to increase within the framework of the so-
called Accession Partnership Agreements the support for applicant countries in introducing 
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the reforms required by accession. While the Accession Partnership Agreements called on 
applicant countries to prepare timetables for adopting the Acquis Communautaire, the EU 
promised to provide—under the condition that the objectives set out in the timetables had 
been achieved—the resources and assistance needed to facilitate the accession process. In 
March 1998 the Commission submitted drafts of the Accession Partnerships for each of the 
applicant countries. The Commission’s demand that the applicant countries establish 
“realistic” closure schedules was confirmed in the Accession Partnerships with the Slovak 
Republic, Lithuania and Bulgaria. Moreover, on this occasion the Council requested that the 
Commission publish annual reports reviewing the progress of reform and the ability of each 
applicant country to comply with the agreed upon timetables and targets. It was expected that 
these so-called Accession Progress Reports would be used as the key publications for 
determining when applicant countries would be prepared to join the EU (Frogatt 1999). 
Following the formal launch of the EU enlargement process at a meeting of EU 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs in late March 1998, the issue of nuclear safety in applicant 
countries attracted enhanced attention. In August 1998 a seven-member panel of High-Level 
Advisors, which had been appointed by the Commission to review the EU’s nuclear safety 
assistance programs and to make recommendations regarding the EU’s future nuclear safety 
policies in the applicant countries and the FSU, submitted its final report. The panel’s most 
important findings and recommendations were the following (Panel of High-Level Advisors 
1998). First, the expert panel recommended to refrain from imposing conditionality 
requirements on nuclear safety assistance programs, in particular NPP closure agreements, on 
the grounds that this strategy had not only been ineffective, but also counterproductive. In 
addition, the panel voiced doubts about the practical feasibility of linking the accession 
process to the establishment of nuclear safety standards considered acceptable by EU Member 
States. These doubts were not unfounded: Due to the absence of a legal document enshrining 
unified EU nuclear safety standards, the applicant countries had no clear benchmark against 
which they could judge their own levels of nuclear safety. Despite these rather critical 
findings, the panel did recommend that the EU continue to insist on the premature closure of 
first-generation VVERs and RBMKs in the Slovak Republic, Lithuania and Bulgaria. 
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However, the panel appeared to accept later closure schedules than those originally proposed 
by the Commission in “Agenda 2000”, in particular with respect to Kozloduy units 1-4.1
Apparently concerned that the Commission might reconsider or relax its closure 
requirements, the Austrian government undertook strenuous efforts during its presidency of 
the European Council of Ministers in the second half of 1998 to ensure that a high level of 
nuclear safety was linked to the accession process. As a result of Vienna’s active lobbying 
efforts, in December 1998 the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution which endorsed the 
Commission’s demand that the applicant countries close their high-risk nuclear reactors in 
conformity with the requirements contained in the Accession Partnerships and the NSA grant 
agreements. Considering that the nexus between the accession process and closure 
requirements was not uncontested within the EU, this Council resolution represented an 
important endorsement of the Commission’s proposed strategy to link the establishment of 
“realistic” closure schedules to the applicant countries’ EU membership prospects (Frogatt 
1999). Finally, by March 1999 the European Parliament had also given its support to the 
Commission’s closure strategy. Indeed, in late February 1999 a special committee of the 
European Parliament voted in favor of keeping the EU’s nuclear safety policies in line with 
the closure guidelines originally established at the 1992 G-7 summit meeting in Munich, 
thereby backing the Commission’s efforts aimed at securing the premature closure of first-
generation VVERs and RBMKs (NW, 25 February 1999: 8-9). Moreover, in early March 
1999 the European Parliament endorsed the Commission’s requirement that Lithuania and 
Bulgaria establish “realistic” closure schedules (NW, 1 April 1999: 12-13). 
Competing Interests within the EU regarding the Commission’s Closure Strategy 
In pursuit of its goal to enforce the applicant countries’ closure commitments, the 
Commission was under considerable pressure to take into account competing interests within 
the EU. On the one hand, an important domestic producer group and various EU Member 
States were concerned that the enforcement of closure commitments would threaten their 
commercial and strategic interests and hence sought to induce the Commission to abandon or 
relax its closure requirements. On the other hand, there were other industrial and state actors 
                                                 
1 Indeed, whereas the Commission had originally insisted on the closure of Kozloduy units 1-4 by 2001-2002, 
the expert panel indicated that Kozloduy units 1-2 should be closed once the planned modernization program 
at Kozloduy units 5-6 was completed, i.e. by around 2004, and refrained from proposing any firm closure 
deadlines for Kozloduy units 3-4. 
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within the EU that had strong incentives to ensure that the Commission did not deviate from 
its original closure strategy. In the following I elaborate on the various competing interests 
within the EU that shaped the Commission’s closure strategy and ultimately determined its 
bargaining position vis-à-vis the applicant countries. 
The Western European nuclear industry represented the most important EU domestic 
producer group that opposed the Commission’s closure strategy. The influence of this 
industrial group on the nuclear safety policies of Western European governments and the EU 
cannot be underestimated. Indeed, during the early 1990s the Western European nuclear 
industry had successfully exploited its considerable organizational clout and the highly 
complex and technical nature of the nuclear safety problem in CEE and the FSU to define and 
shape the direction and scope of the Western nuclear safety assistance programs. It is 
interesting to note that in the early 1990s the Western European nuclear industry had refrained 
from openly opposing Western efforts aimed at securing the premature closure of first-
generation VVERs and RBMKs. In fact, the Western nuclear industry had a vital stake in 
securing the early closure of the most hazardous Soviet-designed nuclear reactors since 
another nuclear accident in the East threatened to destroy the commercial future of the 
Western nuclear industry. 
Nevertheless, from the mid 1990s on the Western nuclear industry increasingly 
opposed Western closure efforts and spoke up for the continued operation of the high-risk 
nuclear reactors in CEE and the FSU. Exponents of the nuclear industry justified this change 
of course on the grounds that the West’s early closure policy had not only proven to be 
unsuccessful, but had also become obsolete with a view to the fact that the safety situation at 
various Eastern European NPPs had improved since the early 1990s. However, the deeper 
reasons for this change of course were no doubt grounded in the nuclear industry’s ongoing 
commercial crisis. The past decline in orders for new NPPs and the bleak prospects for future 
construction contracts in the traditional nuclear markets of Western Europe and North 
America seriously threatened the commercial survival of the Western European nuclear 
industry. The industry had responded to this alarming situation by seeking business 
opportunities in the emerging nuclear markets of South-East Asia, China, the FSU and CEE. 
However, the 1997/1998 financial crises in South-East Asia and Russia and the Chinese 
government’s decision to scale back on its nuclear expansion plans drastically curtailed 
investment opportunities in these regions. These developments had left CEE as the one and 
only promising nuclear market for the foreseeable future, and the Western European nuclear 
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industry was consequently reluctant to see its business prospects in this important nuclear 
market undermined by Western closure demands. 
Specifically, the Commission’s closure strategy threatened the commercial interests of 
the Western European nuclear industry in three respects (Frogatt 1999). To begin with, the 
nuclear industry was aware that if the first-generation VVERs and RBMKs operating in CEE 
were to be closed in the near future, Western nuclear firms would lose a considerable share of 
the funding—critics would say subsidies—provided by the West’s nuclear safety assistance 
programs. Second, the Western European nuclear industry was concerned that the forced 
closure of a number of high-risk nuclear reactors would lead to a sustained reduction in the 
nuclear generation capacity of these countries and thus to significantly diminished long-term 
business opportunities in CEE. This concern was based on the assumption that the enormous 
capital costs which the applicant countries were likely to incur in the process of complying 
with the Acquis Communautaire would make it financially impossible for these countries to 
replace the decommissioned nuclear units with new, capital-intensive nuclear reactors. 
Finally, the Western European nuclear industry was worried that any strong pressure by the 
Commission to secure the premature closure of first-generation VVERs and RBMKs would 
reduce its chances of acquiring much welcomed contracts from Eastern operators, not only for 
upgrade and construction work, but also for commercial activities in other areas of the nuclear 
power sector. With a view to the fact that in the Eastern European applicant countries there 
was often just one state-owned company which operated all nuclear power plants, the nuclear 
industry’s concern that high-level Western pressure on these Eastern operators would 
undermine their willingness to award contracts to Western firms was not unfounded. In sum, 
the Western European nuclear industry had strong incentives to lobby the Commission—
either directly or via their national governments—into abandoning or at least relaxing its 
closure requirements. 
The Commission’s closure strategy also threatened the strategic and economic 
interests of various EU Member States. A number of EU Member States, in particular from 
the Nordic region, supported the near-term admittance of new members into the Union. From 
their perspective, eastward enlargement of the EU promised to generate various strategic and 
economic benefits, ranging from the promotion of the political and economic reform 
processes in the former socialist states to the unhindered access for Western European firms 
to new markets in the East. These EU Member States were thus in favor of a smooth EU 
accession process. However, the Commission’s strategy of tying the applicant countries’ EU 
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membership prospects to the establishment of “realistic” closure schedules threatened to 
protract and possibly undermine the EU accession process. Indeed, the forced near-term 
closure of a number of nuclear reactors was likely to create a severe financial burden for the 
applicant countries and hence compound their difficulties in complying with the EU’s 
economic accession criteria. This created a profound dilemma: While these EU Member 
States were certainly aware of the safety risks involved in the continued operation of first-
generation VVERs and RBMKs, they were also concerned that the Commission’s closure 
strategy would negatively affect their strategic and economic interests by protracting or 
undermining the EU accession process. As a result, these EU Member States were unwilling 
to push the issue of accession and reactor closures and sought to induce the Commission to 
relax its closure requirements. 
Whereas the Western European nuclear industry and certain EU Member States called 
for an abandonment or relaxation of closure requirements, other domestic producers and EU 
Member States pushed in the opposite direction. The most important industrial group that 
endorsed the Commission’s closure strategy was the Western European electricity producers. 
The Western European electricity producers had a strong commercial interest in securing the 
premature closure of various high-risk nuclear reactors because they were concerned that the 
current applicant countries in CEE would flood the EU with cheap power supplies once they 
became full-fledged EU Member States. Their concern about the prospect of massive power 
imports from CEE had been triggered by the combination of three key developments: The 
construction of links between the previously separated electricity networks of Western and 
Eastern Europe, the liberalization of the EU’s electricity markets and the planned eastward 
expansion of the EU. In the following I briefly outline these developments and explain why 
they together generated strong incentives for the Western European electricity producers to 
support the Commission’s closure strategy. 
Prior to 1989, there were no interconnections between the various Eastern and 
Western European electricity networks and hence virtually no electricity was traded between 
Eastern and Western Europe. However, in the course of the 1990s this situation had changed 
dramatically. By 1998 the electricity network for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
the Slovak Republic (CENTREL) had been fully integrated into the Western European grid 
(UCPTE), resulting in an interconnected electricity network known as the Trans European 
Synchronously Interconnected System (TESIS). Moreover, whereas the Bulgarian grid had 
been linked to the UCPTE on a trial basis, the planned construction of a transmission line 
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between Poland and Lithuania was expected to expand the TESIS network further eastwards 
(Nuclear Energy Institute 2000: 56). Finally, there were ambitious plans to link parts of the 
FSU’s UPS grid to the TESIS network. In short, the construction of links between the 
previously separated electricity networks of Europe promised to remove for the first time in 
European history all physical barriers to the free movement of electricity among Eastern and 
Western European countries (Frogatt 1999). 
Another key development related to the liberalization of the EU’s electricity markets. 
In February 1999, the Directive on Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity entered into 
force. The long-term goal of this directive was the creation of a single European electricity 
market in which electricity could be freely traded within the EU. Specifically, it required EU 
Member States to gradually open up their national electricity markets to competition and to 
allow consumers to purchase electricity from a variety of power producers, including 
electricity utilities from other EU Member States. Although certain EU Member States, in 
particular France, had succeeded in watering down the original liberalization plans and were 
likely to only reluctantly implement the new rules, the directive was nevertheless expected to 
unleash a strong competitive dynamic in the EU’s electricity markets and to gradually lead to 
the abolishment of all political trade barriers for electricity within the EU. 
Against the backdrop of these two developments, the planned eastward enlargement of 
the EU raised the specter of a massive influx of cheap power imports from CEE (EU Energy 
Policy, August 1999: 7-8). With a view to the massive investments required for 
environmental harmonization in the applicant countries—not least for restructuring and 
modernizing the energy sector in CEE—, the Commission had concluded in “Agenda 2000” 
that none of the applicant countries could be expected to fully comply with the Environmental 
Acquis in the near future (European Commission 1997: 65). It was thus widely assumed that 
the Eastern European applicant countries would be allowed to join the EU without entirely 
conforming to the Union’s environmental rules and standards. This assumption was alarming 
to the Western European electricity producers because it implied that by the time the applicant 
countries acceded to the EU and hence enjoyed unrestricted access to the single European 
electricity market, their power plants would still be operating at lower environmental 
standards, and consequently also at lower production costs, than the power plants in the 
existing EU Member States. In other words, the Western European electricity producers were 
concerned that the disparate environmental standards in an enlarged EU would provide the 
Eastern European power producers with an “unfair” cost advantage which in turn threatened 
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to lead to a massive influx of cheap power from CEE into the EU and distort the single 
European electricity market.2 What’s more, the cost advantage resulting from the disparate 
environmental standards was likely to accrue in particular to the Eastern European NPPs since 
in contrast to thermal power plants, for which detailed EU guidelines on air pollution existed, 
there were no unified EU nuclear safety standards for NPPs (Frogatt 1999). In short, against 
the background of the three developments outlined above, the Western European electricity 
producers had strong incentives to lobby for and support measures which mitigated against 
the distorting impact of EU enlargement on the single European electricity market and limited 
the “unfair” competition from Eastern European power producers. Not surprisingly, the 
Commission’s strategy to secure the premature closure of high-risk nuclear reactors in the 
context of the EU accession process represented one such measure. 
Finally, the fact that the EU accession process—including the opening of EU 
membership negotiations with the applicant countries—required the unanimous approval of 
all EU Member States had a distinct influence on the Commission’s closure strategy and 
bargaining position. Indeed, since each EU Member State could theoretically block the EU 
accession process on nuclear safety grounds, the Commission was under pressure to take into 
account the concerns and demands of those non-nuclear EU Member States which were in 
favor of the earliest possible closure of high-risk nuclear reactors (Frogatt 1999). The position 
of the anti-nuclear Austrian government was of particular importance in this respect. In 
pursuit of its policy objective to create a nuclear-free Central and Eastern Europe, the 
Austrian government had repeatedly insisted on the need for the Eastern European applicant 
countries to comply with their existing closure commitments in order to qualify for EU 
membership.3 Although it was rather unlikely that Austria or other non-nuclear EU Member 
States would lightly block the EU accession process on nuclear safety grounds, it was still a 
possibility to be reckoned with, and this possibility exerted strong pressure on the 
Commission to stick to its original closure strategy and adopt a tough bargaining position vis-
à-vis the applicant countries. 
                                                 
2 Whereas the average electricity tariff for industrial consumers in CEE was about 25-30 percent lower than in 
the EU in the late 1990s, residential rates in CEE were roughly three times lower than the EU average. 
Although these large price differences were expected to decrease in the long-term, in the interim they were 
bound to generate strong incentives for Eastern European power producers to flood the EU’s liberalized 
electricity markets with cheap power supplies (Frogatt 1999). 
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In sum, this section has described the general background against which the 
Commission sought to enforce the applicant countries’ closure commitments. On the one 
hand, this section has shown that by the time or shortly after closure negotiations with the 
applicant countries were initiated in late 1998 key EU institutions had endorsed the nexus 
between the EU enlargement process and closure requirements, thereby enhancing the 
credibility of the Commission’s issue-linkage strategy. On the other hand, this section has 
also shown that the Commission was under considerable pressure to accommodate its closure 
strategy to various competing interests within the EU, a circumstance which was likely to 
determine its bargaining position vis-à-vis the applicant countries. In the following three 
sections the closure negotiations between the Commission and the three applicant countries 
are examined. 
7.2 Closure Negotiations with the Slovak Republic 
Since the Slovak government had carried on with the extensive and costly upgrade program at 
Bohunice V1 regardless of its unilateral commitment to close these two units by 2000 or once 
the first two units at Mochovce NPP were operational, it had become increasingly clear by 
1998 that the Slovak authorities were planning to keep these two VVER-230 units in 
operation as long as possible. The Slovak government’s unofficial plan to postpone the 
scheduled closure of Bohunice V1 did not go unnoticed by the European Commission. In the 
November 1998 Accession Progress Report the Commission noted that “the Bohunice 
Nuclear Power Plant units 1 and 2 are expected to be licensed for long term operation in 1999 
after a major upgrading programme” and tartly reminded the Slovak government that “this 
plan is neither in line with the Accession Partnership nor with a Slovak Government Decree 
from 1994, which provides for the shutdown of the units 1 and 2 as soon as Mochovce comes 
into commercial operation” (Frogatt 1999). 
Despite the apparent risk that the Slovak authorities were planning to keep the 
controversial first-generation VVERs at the Bohunice NPP in operation beyond the scheduled 
closure date, political developments in the Slovak Republic in late 1998 had given rise to 
hopes that Bratislava would stick to its 1994 unilateral closure commitment. In September 
                                                 
3 In July 1999, as closure negotiations with the applicant countries were still under way, the Austrian Council 
of Ministers issued a position paper which stated that if the applicant countries did not submit comprehensive 
and convincing closure plans the Austrian government would demand discussions with other EU Member 
States on the consequences for the accession process (PEE, 8 July 1999: 7). 
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1998 a new coalition government under Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda had been elected 
which in contrast to its predecessor was determined to bring the Slovak Republic into the 
front line of the Eastern European applicant countries. In a significant departure from the 
erratic and authoritarian policies previously pursued under Vladimir Meciar, the new Slovak 
government immediately undertook strenuous efforts to make up for lost time in meeting EU 
accession criteria, in particular with regard to democratic practices and the protection of 
minority rights. Considering that the Commission had stated its disapproval of the unofficial 
Slovak plan to license Bohunice V1 for long-term operation in the November 1998 Accession 
Progress Report, it was widely hoped that the new Slovak government would not risk 
undermining its declared policy goal to begin EU membership negotiations as soon as 
possible by reneging on the 1994 closure resolution. Nevertheless, these hopes were dashed 
on 21 April 1999 as the Slovak government officially canceled the May 1994 closure 
resolution and declared that Bohunice units 1-2 would remain operational as long as they 
were safe. Since the Slovak nuclear safety authority was convinced that the extensive 
modernization program at Bohunice V1 would allow the two units to be safely operated for 
several years beyond their original design lives, the decision of the Slovak government 
implied that Bohunice units 1-2 would be kept in operation until around 2010-2015. 
Various reasons account for the Slovak government’s decision to rescind its 1994 
closure commitment and to postpone the closure of Bohunice V1. To begin with, the fact that 
the modernization program at Bohunice V1 had received much praise from international 
nuclear safety experts at an IAEA conference in Vienna in mid-April 1999 certainly prompted 
the Slovak government to postpone the scheduled closure of Bohunice V1 (NW, 22 April 
1999: 20-21). Moreover, the Slovak government had strong incentives to continue to operate 
these two units. On the one hand, the Slovak authorities were determined to recoup the 
considerable amount of money—around $200 million—they had invested over the past years 
in the extensive and costly upgrade program at Bohunice V1 (PEE, 29 April 1999: 12-13). 
The continued operation of Bohunice V1 was certainly lucrative from a commercial point of 
view, not least due to the prospect of exporting power to Western Europe once the Slovak 
Republic was admitted to the EU and enjoyed unrestricted access to the single European 
electricity market. On the other hand, the Slovak authorities were reportedly eager to keep 
Bohunice units 1-2 in operation due to predictions that domestic electricity demand would 
increase considerably in the near future. Finally, the Slovak government apparently doubted 
that its decision to postpone the closure of Bohunice would seriously affect its bid for EU 
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membership. Indeed, the Slovak authorities probably assumed that the successful 
implementation of the extensive safety upgrade program at Bohunice V1 would induce the 
Commission to reconsider or at least relax its closure requirements for these two units. 
In response to the Slovak government’s decision to postpone the scheduled closure of 
Bohunice V1, the Commission established a bilateral working group to address the Bohunice 
closure issue. During the following months Commission officials sought to convince the 
Slovak authorities of the need to establish a “realistic” closure commitment in line with the 
Accession Partnership Agreement. A first round of closure negotiations in June 1999 ended 
without any results. Citing the improved safety levels at the Bohunice NPP and the high costs 
of prematurely closing the two units—estimated at around 1 percent of the country’s GDP 
(FT, 15 September 1999)—the Slovak authorities initially refused to consider closing 
Bohunice units 1-2 before 2010-2015. During a second round of talks in July and August 
1999, the Slovak authorities continued to be intransigent. The only concession they were 
willing to make at this stage of the bargaining process was to propose closing the two units 
between 2008 and 2012 under the condition that adequate international funding was made 
available as compensation for prematurely closing Bohunice V1 (NEI, October 1999: 30). 
By early September 1999 the Commission had come under enhanced pressure to break 
the deadlock over the Bohunice closure issue. Indeed, in recent months various EU Member 
States had been calling on the Commission to reconsider its “two-wave EU enlargement 
strategy” and to begin EU membership negotiations with as many Eastern European applicant 
countries as possible, not least with the Slovak Republic which had made considerable 
progress in complying with EU accession criteria (RFE/RL Weekday Magazine, 23 
September 1999). Since the December 1999 Helsinki Council meeting was expected to decide 
which of the then current “second-wave” applicant countries would be invited to start EU 
membership negotiations, the Commission was urged to conclude as soon as possible a 
closure agreement with the Slovak Republic. Prompted by this internal pressure, the 
Commission demanded that the Slovak government submit a “realistic” closure plan by 30 
September 1999. Moreover, in an attempt to raise the stakes for the Slovak government to 
compromise, the Commission changed its bargaining strategy in two respects. First, while 
continuing to insist on the establishment of a “realistic” closure schedule as a precondition to 
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qualify for EU membership negotiations4, the Commission definitively abandoned the 
“Agenda 2000” requirement that Bohunice V1 be closed by 2000 and hinted that it was 
prepared to accept closure deadlines between 2003 and 2008 (NW, 16 September 1999: 13-
15; PEE, 17 September 1999: 13). Second, the Commission signaled its willingness to 
compensate the Slovak Republic for a positive decision on the Bohunice closure issue. 
Indeed, although the Commission declined to pay compensation for the economic losses 
resulting from the premature closure of Bohunice V1, it offered to provide a substantial 
amount of decommissioning aid from its PHARE program and possibly also from the 
Euratom loan facility in exchange for a “realistic” closure commitment (NW, 30 September 
1999: 10-11; PEE, 1 October 1999: 14). 
Within a few weeks the Slovak leadership debated the closure issue and took a final 
decision: On 27 September the Slovak government announced that it would close Bohunice 
units 1-2 in 2006 and 2008, i.e. two respectively four years earlier than it had previously 
proposed in negotiations with the Commission. The Slovak government also indicated that if 
the Slovak Republic were allowed to join the EU before 2006 and received additional 
compensation, it would be prepared to close the two units even earlier (NW, 30 September 
1999: 10). The latter proposal was certainly meant to be a concession to the Austrian 
government which unsurprisingly rejected the Slovak government’s closure pledge as 
inadequate and threatened to veto the begin of EU membership negotiations unless the closure 
dates were brought forward. 
Nevertheless, the Slovak government’s closure decision was positively received both 
by the majority of EU Member States and the European Commission, which in its mid-
October 1999 Accession Progress Report deemed the proposed closure dates to be in line with 
“Agenda 2000” and the Accession Partnership. Also in October the promised aid for 
decommissioning activities at Bohunice V1 was confirmed: The Commission firmly pledged 
to provide Euro 10 million in 2000 and Euro 20 million each year after that until 2006 from 
its PHARE program, bringing the total amount of decommissioning aid to Euro 110 million 
(then about $110 million) (Nuclear Energy Institute 2000: 62). Finally, at the December 1999 
Helsinki Council meeting EU heads of state formally invited the Slovak Republic to begin EU 
membership negotiations. 
                                                 
4  In early September 1999 the Commission’s chief negotiator in the accession talks, Francois Lamoureux, 
reminded the Slovak government that a “decision on the closure of these reactors would make the start of 
accession talks easier” (EEE Report, September 1999: 3). 
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7.3 Closure Negotiations with Lithuania 
By spring 1998 it had become evident that the Lithuanian government was planning to renege 
on its NSA commitments and to rechannel the two RBMK reactors at the Ignalina NPP for 
another 15-20 years of operation, i.e. until about 2020-2025. With a view to the economic 
significance of the Ignalina NPP, it was not surprising that the Lithuanian authorities were 
concerned that the premature closure of the plant according to the terms of the NSA 
agreement would be too costly for the hard-pressed country and therefore favored extending 
the service lives of the two units. Indeed, the Ignalina NPP provided roughly 80 percent of the 
country’s power needs, a contribution that could not easily or cheaply be replaced. In 
addition, Lithuania lacked the funds necessary for the early decommissioning of the plant. 
Whereas energy experts estimated that it would require at least $600 million to decommission 
the plant, the Lithuanian authorities had so far set aside only $25 million for future 
decommissioning activities (EEE Report, January 1999: 24). 
Moreover, the improved prospects of exporting cheap power to Western Europe had 
increased Lithuania’s incentives to keep the Ignalina NPP in operation as long as possible: In 
February 1998 the Lithuanian government had called an international tender for a strategic 
investor to construct and operate a transmission line between Lithuania and Poland. An 
international consortium called Power Bridge subsequently won the tender for the $450 
million construction project. Project heads suggested at the time that by 2001 Lithuania could 
be exporting 6 billion KWh annually to Western Europe, thereby earning up to $150 million a 
year (Energy Economist, April 1999: 3). Finally, there was continuing uncertainty about when 
exactly the fuel channels of the two Ignalina units would need to be replaced and the 
Lithuanian authorities were reportedly convinced that the previous and ongoing upgrade 
programs had eliminated all major safety problems at the plant. 
The major obstacle to the Lithuanian government’s unofficial plan to extend the 
service life of the Ignalina NPP was the opposition of the European Commission. Since early 
1998 Commission officials had repeatedly warned the Lithuanian government that Lithuania’s 
EU membership prospects depended on the premature closure of the Ignalina NPP (NW, 9 
April 1998: 7). This stance was confirmed in the November 1998 Accession Progress Report 
in which the Commission demanded that the Lithuanian government make a firm 
commitment not to rechannel unit 1 of the Ignalina NPP. After the Lithuanian government 
had unsuccessfully sought to persuade the Commission that it made no sense to tie 
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Lithuania’s EU membership prospects to the premature closure of the Ignalina NPP5, it 
adopted a bargaining strategy of demanding substantial compensation payments in exchange 
for closure commitments. 
This bargaining strategy was reflected in the final draft of Lithuania’s national energy 
strategy that the Lithuanian government had issued in December 1998. The draft outlined two 
so-called “extreme scenarios” for the shutdown of the Ignalina NPP, with one scenario 
assuming the “forced” closure of the two Ignalina units in 2005 and 2010, and the other 
scenario assuming fuel channel replacement and continued operation of the two Ignalina units 
until about 2020 and 2025. The draft also suggested that the government would be in a 
position to take a final decision on closure dates once the country’s nuclear safety authority, 
Vatesi, had completed the licensing review of unit 1. Although the draft energy strategy 
indicated that Lithuania was in principle willing to adopt the “forced” closure scenario and 
hence honor the NSA agreement, it unmistakably warned the Commission that “if the license 
[for unit 1] is granted and the combined Lithuania and European Commission funding of early 
closure of the Ignalina plant is not sufficient for all consequences, including the restructuring 
of the whole electricity supply in the country, it might be necessary to re-channel and 
continue operation...simply because that would be the only option Lithuania could afford” 
(NW, 10 December 1998: 15). 
Negotiations between the Lithuanian government and the European Commission on 
the closure of the Ignalina NPP heated up in the early months of 1999 after the government 
submitted its draft energy strategy to the Lithuanian parliament (Seimas) for debate. The 
Commission was apparently reluctant to offer compensation in exchange for a Lithuanian 
closure commitment and once again threatened that Lithuania’s EU membership prospects 
depended on the premature closure of the Ignalina NPP. In response, the Lithuanian Economy 
Minister, Vincas Babilius, warned the Commission that Lithuania would not be able to 
specify shutdown dates without international aid commitments,6 and claimed that Lithuania 
needed $2.5 billion in foreign aid to close Ignalina unit 1 by 2005 (NW, 25 February 1999: 8). 
Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorious made his government’s position clear by accusing the 
                                                 
5 Lithuanian Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius criticized the Commission’s issue-linkage on the grounds 
that the premature closure of NPPs was not included in the Copenhagen criteria, and argued that “an earlier 
start of the negotiations and accession to the European Union would give additional possibilities to ensure 
nuclear safety and an earlier shutdown of unit 1” (NW, 12 November 1998: 6). 
172 Case Study IV 
Commission of pushing the Ignalina closure issue solely for protectionist reasons and 
declaring that the Lithuanian leadership was not willing to “sacrifice the economy of 
Lithuania for political motives” (NW, 15 April 1999: 8). In the midst of this controversy, the 
Seimas decided in mid-April 1999 to postpone its decision on the draft national energy 
strategy and requested the government to provide more details on the two Ignalina closure 
scenarios. 
The Lithuanian government’s determination to resist the pressure exerted by the 
Commission’s issue-linkage strategy and to insist on compensation in exchange for a firm 
closure commitment was enhanced by two circumstances. To begin with, popular support in 
Lithuania for EU membership had decreased dramatically since the start of the heated 
negotiations over the closure of the Ignalina NPP. Indeed, according to an opinion poll 
conducted in April 1999 by the EC Information Centre, only 27 percent of respondents 
favored Lithuanian membership in the EU, down from 51 percent in October 1998. These 
figures clearly indicated that due to widespread concerns that the premature closure of the 
Ignalina NPP would devastate the country’s economy and reduce living standards a large 
proportion of the Lithuanian population was reluctant to sacrifice the Ignalina NPP to qualify 
for EU membership (EEE Report, June 1999: 16). The mounting domestic opposition to the 
forced closure of the Ignalina NPP no doubt strengthened the Lithuanian government’s 
resolve to resist the Commission’s closure demands, at least until the Commission offered to 
provide financial and technical assistance to cope with the costly implications of prematurely 
closing the two RBMK units. Second, during the past months top Finish and Swedish 
government officials had assured the Lithuanian leadership of their unconditional support for 
Lithuania’s bid to join the EU and had repeatedly argued that the Ignalina closure issue 
should not be a stumbling block for the start of EU membership negotiations with Lithuania 
(NEI, June 1999: 6; NW, 1 July 1999: 16). The diplomatic support granted by these two 
Nordic EU Member States most likely encouraged the Lithuanian government to stand firm 
on the closure issue. 
In an attempt to reach some compromise on the Ignalina closure issue, the Lithuanian 
government released in early June 1999 a revised draft of the country’s energy strategy. 
According to the revised energy strategy Lithuania would refrain from rechanneling Ignalina 
                                                 
6  Specifically, Babilius argued that “We [the Lithuanian government] can’t give an exact date until we know 
when and how much money will be available [to support closures] and for what specific purposes it must be 
used” (RFE/RL Weekday Magazine, 22 February 1999). 
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unit 1 and thus close this unit by 2005. However, by postponing the decision on replacing the 
fuel channels at Ignalina unit 2 until 2004, the revised energy strategy effectively aimed to 
keep the future of Ignalina unit 2 open and to avoid any firm commitment to close this unit in 
the near future (NW, 10 June 1999: 7). The Lithuanian authorities subsequently indicated that 
they were willing to consider the closure of Ignalina unit 1 according to the timetable set out 
in the revised energy strategy provided that international assistance was forthcoming. In 
response, the Commission—apparently concerned that the Lithuanian government would 
refuse to compromise without international aid commitments—signaled its willingness to 
discuss financial and technical aid for the shutdown of the Ignalina NPP (NW, 1 July 1999: 
16-17). 
During the following months closure negotiations focused on the amount of 
compensation the Commission would have to provide in exchange for a “realistic” closure 
commitment.7 In mid-August 1999 the Commission made its first concrete offer to help with 
the decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP as Francois Lamoureux of the Commission’s 
External Relations Directorate submitted a proposal offering Euro 100 million (then about 
$100 million) over a six-year period provided that firm closure dates were put forward. 
Although the Lithuanian government criticized the proposed decommissioning aid as 
inadequate and insisted on a guarantee that international aid would continue to flow after 
2006, the Commission subsequently pushed the Lithuanian leadership to accept this offer as a 
first step towards larger aid commitments which could be secured at an international pledging 
conference (PEE, 17 September 1999: 7-8; NW, 26 August 1999: 12-13). In addition, in early 
September 1999 the EU’s new Commissioner for Enlargement, Guenter Verheugen, made it 
clear to the Lithuanian government that an invitation to begin EU membership negotiations 
depended on the establishment of firm closure schedules by the end of the year (RFE/RL 
Weekday Magazine, 28 September 1999). 
The prospect of receiving both a substantial amount of decommissioning aid and an 
invitation to begin EU membership negotiations was apparently sufficient to induce the 
Lithuanian government to offer for the first time a concrete closure schedule: On 8 September 
1999 the Lithuanian government announced that Ignalina unit 1 would be closed by 2005 and 
that a final decision on a closure date for Ignalina unit 2 would be taken by 2004. The 
                                                 
7  The Lithuanian government’s bargaining position received a boost in late July 1999 as Vatesi, the Lithuanian 
nuclear safety authority, decided after much delay to re-license Ignalina unit 1 for another five-year operating 
period (NW, 5 August 1999: 8). 
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following day, the then new Lithuanian economy minister, Eugenijus Maldeikis, indicated 
during a visit to Brussels that Ignalina unit 2 would be closed by 2009 (EEE Report, 
September 1999: 2-3). The Seimas, which still had to approve the government’s revised 
energy strategy, was bitterly divided over the proposed closure schedules. Indeed, the 
parliamentary opposition had reportedly assailed the government for being overeager to bow 
to Brussels’ demands and for selling out the country’s national interests (RFE/RL Weekday 
Magazine, 28 September 1999). Nevertheless, on 5 October 1999 the Seimas passed the 
government’s energy strategy with 63 votes to 31, but declared that the closure of Ignalina 
unit 1 by 2005 depended on the provision of international assistance for decommissioning and 
for mitigating the social impact of early shutdown (Nuclear Energy Institute 2000: 49). In its 
mid-October 1999 Accession Progress Report the Commission praised Lithuania’s closure 
commitment as “farsighted and courageous” and stressed its expectation that Ignalina unit 2 
would be closed by 2009 (NW, 21 October 1999: 18-19). Finally, at the Helsinki Council 
meeting in mid-December 1999 EU heads of state confirmed that Lithuania had met the 
conditions to begin EU membership negotiations. 
7.4 Closure Negotiations with Bulgaria 
By early 1998 the NSA’s closure deal with Bulgaria was on the verge of collapse. On the one 
hand, it was evident that Bulgaria would not shut down Kozloduy units 1-4 as originally 
foreseen by the 1993 NSA agreement. Indeed, since the implementation of the various energy 
projects designed to “trigger” the closure of Kozloduy units 1-4 was far behind schedule, the 
Bulgarian government was reluctant to close these four first-generation VVERs according to 
the schedule outlined in the NSA agreement. On the other hand, and even more alarming to 
the Western donors, the Bulgarian government had signaled its intention to carry out an 
extensive upgrade program at Kozloduy units 1-4 which would allow these units to operate 
until the end of their design lives or even beyond. With a view to the fact that Bulgaria had 
committed itself to the premature closure of Kozloduy units 1-4, the Bulgarian government’s 
plan to upgrade these units for prolonged operation amounted to a clear-cut violation of the 
NSA agreement. 
The Bulgarian government no doubt faced strong incentives to renege on its NSA 
commitments. Indeed, not only were the costs of decommissioning these units considerable, 
but the premature closure of Kozloduy units 1-4 would also require investments to provide 
sufficient replacement power for these four first-generation VVERs—they produced well over 
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30 percent of Bulgaria’s power needs—and entail an increase in fossil fuel imports. An 
additional reason that enhanced the Bulgarian government’s resolve to keep Kozloduy units 
1-4 in operation as long as possible was the prospect of boosting the country’s power export 
potential. Indeed, during the past months the Bulgarian government had been seeking to 
conclude export agreements with Macedonia and Turkey.8 Finally, the Bulgarian authorities 
were reportedly convinced that the safety upgrade programs previously conducted at the 
Kozloduy NPP had removed all cause for concern about the continued operation of the four 
first-generation VVERs (NW, 23 April 1998: 7-8). 
During a series of high-level negotiations in April and June 1998, the EBRD—acting 
on behalf of the NSA—sought to induce the Bulgarian government to propose a “realistic” 
closure schedule for Kozloduy units 1-4. Whereas the EBRD rejected Sofia’s request to 
renegotiate the NSA agreement, the bank was reportedly willing to extend the agreement’s 
closure deadlines provided that the Bulgarian national electric company NEK could prove that 
the continued operation of Kozloduy units 1-4 was needed and represented the least-cost 
solution to meet Bulgaria’s energy needs (NW, 23 April 1999: 7-8). However, these talks 
foundered on the reluctance of NEK to negotiate in good faith—NEK officials had reportedly 
presented projections of exaggerated electricity demand increases to justify the long-term 
operation of Kozloduy units 1-4 (NW, 10 September 1998: 7). Negotiations between the 
NSA/EBRD and Bulgaria definitively collapsed in mid-September 1998 as the Bulgarian 
government adopted a new energy strategy which stipulated that Kozloduy units 1-2 would be 
closed in 2004/2005 and Kozloduy units 3-4 between 2010 and 2012 (EEE Report, September 
1998: 5). Realizing that Bulgaria’s desire to join the EU was the best leverage the West had to 
extract a “realistic” closure commitment from the Bulgarian government, the European 
Commission intervened in the closure debate and warned Sofia that Bulgaria’s EU 
membership prospects depended on the premature closure of Kozloduy units 1-4. This stance 
was confirmed in the November 1998 Accession Progress Report in which the Commission 
noted that “Bulgaria must respect its [NSA] commitments and close [Kozloduy] units 1-4 as 
soon as [Kozloduy] units 5 and 6 have been modernized” (Frogatt, 1999). 
                                                 
8 On 7 April 1999 Bulgaria achieved agreement with Macedonia on the construction of a transmission line that 
was expected to boost Bulgaria’s power exports to its Balkan neighbor. Moreover, the Bulgarian government 
subsequently finalized the terms of an agreement with Turkey under which Bulgaria would export a total of 
33.7 TWh between 2000 and 2008. The total value of this power export deal for Bulgaria was then estimated 
to amount to roughly $1 billion (EEE Report, April 1999: 7-8). 
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During the following months closure negotiations between the Commission and the 
Bulgarian government reached an impasse. Indeed, the Commission’s repeated warnings that 
Bulgaria would have to prematurely close Kozloduy units 1-4 to qualify for EU membership 
negotiations provoked strong resistance by the Bulgarian government. The general sentiment 
among the Bulgarian leadership was that the Commission’s closure demands were unjustified 
with a view to the fact that safety levels at the Kozloduy NPP had improved since the early 
1990s. Bulgarian Prime Minister Ivan Kostov underlined his government’s resolve to stand 
firm on the closure issue by calling the Commission’s insistence on the premature closure of 
Kozloduy units 1-4 “a meaningless diktat” and claiming that “the aggressive demand to close 
the [Kozloduy] nuclear power plant will destroy even what little competitiveness the country 
now has” (PEE, 19 March 1999: 4). The Bulgarian government subsequently sought to 
strengthen its bargaining position in negotiations with the Commission by requesting the 
parliament to endorse its energy strategy. On 12 March 1999 the Bulgarian parliament met 
this request by unanimously rejecting the option of closing Kozloduy units 1-4 before the end 
of their design lives (NW, 18 March 1999: 13). 
In an attempt to resuscitate the bogged down negotiations, the Commission sent a 
delegation to Sofia on 21 May 1999 to discuss various energy scenarios and to identify what 
alternative power sources were available on what timetable and with what financing (NW, 27 
May 1999: 9). Nevertheless, the Bulgarian government remained determined to move on with 
its plan to modernize Kozloduy units 1-4 for prolonged operation. In response, the 
Commission warned the Bulgarian government in June 1999 that its approval of a Euratom 
loan for the modernization program at Kozloduy units 5-6 depended on the establishment of 
“realistic” closure dates for Kozloduy units 1-4 (NW, 1 July 1999: 15). The Bulgarian 
government appeared to be unimpressed by this warning, claiming that NEK was both willing 
and able to finance the costly modernization project with funds from its own greatly improved 
cash flow if the Commission continued to insist on the establishment of early closure dates in 
exchange for a Euratom loan (NN, September 1999: 35). 
Yet in a significant departure from its previous uncompromising bargaining stance, 
from September 1999 on the Bulgarian leadership began to signal some flexibility on the 
closure issue. Indeed, during high-level negotiations on 17 September over Bulgaria’s 
application to join the EU, the Bulgarian government indicated that it would appoint a task 
force to reconsider electricity demand forecasts—a serious sticking point in negotiations so 
far. Moreover, during the following weeks Bulgarian negotiators indicated that they were 
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willing to consider earlier closure schedules for Kozloduy units 1-4 provided that sufficient 
compensation was forthcoming. Finally, on 4 November 1999 the Bulgarian parliament voted 
to extend the government’s mandate for negotiating with the Commission beyond the 
parameters laid down in the national energy strategy, thereby authorizing the government to 
reach an agreement on earlier closure deadlines than those fixed in the energy strategy (PEE, 
12 November 1999: 4). 
Bulgaria’s enhanced willingness to compromise on the closure issue was triggered by 
the following circumstances. First, from September 1999 on the Commission—under growing 
pressure by various EU Member States to accelerate Bulgaria’s accession into the EU as a 
means to promote stability in the war-torn Balkan region (RFE/RL Weekday Magazine, 21 
July 1999, 2 September 1999)—had begun to signal that it was willing to open EU 
membership negotiations with Bulgaria on the sole condition that Sofia established “realistic” 
closure schedules, i.e. irrespective of Bulgaria’s progress in meeting other EU accession 
criteria.9 This relaxation of the conditions to qualify for EU membership negotiations raised 
the stakes for the Bulgarian government to compromise on the closure issue. Indeed, the near-
term begin of EU membership negotiations had so far been a rather remote possibility for the 
Bulgarian government, dependent both on its willingness to prematurely close Kozloduy units 
1-4 and to make progress in complying with the EU’s formal accession criteria. In contrast, 
from September 1999 on the Bulgarian government could reckon that it would receive an 
invitation to begin EU membership negotiations at the upcoming Helsinki Council meeting if 
it complied with the Commission’s closure demands. Second, in early October 1999 the 
Commission had signaled its willingness to provide technical and financial aid to help cope 
with the decommissioning of Kozloduy units 1-4 (NEI, October 1999: 30). With a view to the 
fact that during the past weeks the Bulgarian government had made the premature closure of 
Kozloduy units 1-4 conditional upon adequate external assistance, the Commission’s offer to 
provide aid was no doubt instrumental in enhancing the Bulgarian government’s willingness 
to reach an agreement on the Kozloduy closure issue. 
During the remaining weeks of November 1999, the Commission and the Bulgarian 
government started a new round of negotiations that focused on the specific closure deadlines 
and on the amount of compensation the Commission would have to provide in exchange for a 
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Bulgarian closure commitment. The Bulgarian government reportedly offered to close 
Kozloduy units 1-2 in 2001/2002 under the condition that it received compensation for lost 
profits and replacement capacity in the order of $80 million per reactor per lost year of 
operation—i.e. a total of about $500 million—and proposed to postpone a decision on a 
definitive closure date for Kozloduy units 3-4 until 2004 (PEE, 12 November 1999: 4). The 
Commission dismissed this closure plan on the grounds that the Bulgarian government was 
seeking compensation for replacement capacity that Bulgaria did not require, but once again 
confirmed that it was willing to provide funding for decommissioning projects (EEE Report, 
November 1999: 7). 
Under pressure to reach an agreement before the opening of the Helsinki Council 
meeting in mid-December 1999, the two negotiating parties were apparently willing to make 
concessions regarding the closure deadlines and to settle for a compromise. On 29 November 
1999 an agreement on the premature closure of Kozloduy units 1-4 was finally concluded: 
The Bulgarian government pledged to close Kozloduy units 1-2 in 2003 and to fix a definitive 
closure date for Kozloduy units 3-4 in 2002. Prime Minister Kostov promised that Kozloduy 
units 3-4 would be closed by 2008/2010. The EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement, Guenther 
Verheugen, indicated that the Commission’s understanding was that these two units would be 
shut down by 2006 (NW, 2 December 1999: 5). In exchange for the new closure schedule, the 
Commission pledged to provide Euro 200 million (then about $200 million) of financial 
support between 2000 and 2006 from the PHARE program and agreed to disburse a Euratom 
loan of up to Euro 250 million for the modernization program at Kozloduy units 5-6.10 
Finally, after the Commission had confirmed that the new closure dates were consistent with 
the 1993 NSA agreement, the Bulgarian government received an invitation to begin EU 
membership negotiations at the Helsinki Council meeting. 
                                                 
9 On 13 October 1999 the Commission in effect abandoned its “two-wave EU enlargement strategy” as it 
proposed to begin EU membership negotiations with all current “second-wave” applicant countries. The 
Commission confirmed that the opening of EU membership negotiations with Bulgaria was conditional upon 
the establishment of a “realistic” closure date for Kozloduy units 1-4 (EEE Report, October 1999: 1). 
10 The agreement stipulated that the second half of the Euro 200 million grant from the PHARE program would 
be confirmed in 2002 once definitive closure dates for Kozloduy units 3 and 4 had been agreed upon (PEE, 
10 December 1999: 4). 
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7.5 Assessment 
To which extent did the Slovak Republic, Lithuania and Bulgaria change their behavior in a 
direction desired by the principal donor, i.e. the European Commission? In 1998 the three 
applicant countries had in effect threatened to renege on their unilateral or international 
closure commitments by signaling their intention to prolong the service lives of their high-risk 
nuclear reactors. In an attempt to prevent the long-term operation of Bohunice units 1-2 in the 
Slovak Republic, Ignalina units 1-2 in Lithuania, and Kozloduy units 1-4 in Bulgaria, the 
Commission intervened in the closure debate and sought to extract new “realistic” closure 
commitments from all three countries. In various documents—i.e. “Agenda 2000”, the 
Accession Partnership Agreements and the Accession Progress Reports—the Commission 
had outlined what it meant by “realistic” closure commitments. With respect to Bohunice 
units 1-2, the Commission expected the Slovak government to honor its unilateral 
commitment to close these two units by the year 2000 or once Mochovce units 1-2 were 
operational. Regarding Ignalina units 1-2, the Commission insisted that the Lithuanian 
government refrain from rechanneling these two units for prolonged operation and respect its 
commitments under the 1994 NSA agreement. Finally, with respect to Kozloduy units 1-4, the 
Commission demanded that the Bulgarian government firmly pledge to close all four units 
between 2001/2002 and 2004, i.e. by the time the modernization program at Kozloduy units 
5-6 was expected to be completed. 
After several rounds of intensive negotiations throughout 1999, the Commission 
succeeded in extracting new closure commitments from the three applicant countries. In late 
September 1999, the Slovak government agreed to close Bohunice units 1-2 in 2006 and 
2008. These closure schedules were delayed compared to what the Commission had originally 
demanded. In October 1999 Lithuania pledged to close Ignalina unit 1 by 2005 and to decide 
on a closure date for Ignalina unit 2 in 2004. It is expected that Ignalina unit 2 will be closed 
by 2009. The Lithuanian government’s closure commitments were fully in line with the 
Commission’s original closure demands. Finally, in late November 1999 the Bulgarian 
government agreed to shut down Kozloduy units 1-4 in 2003 and to fix a definitive closure 
date for units 3-4 in 2002. It is expected that Kozloduy units 3-4 will be shut down between 
2006 and 2008/2010. These closure commitments—in particular for Kozloduy units 3-4—
were somewhat delayed compared to what the Commission had originally demanded. 
Nevertheless, by firmly committing themselves to the premature closure of their high-risk 
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nuclear reactors, the three applicant countries more or less changed their externality-
generating behavior in a direction desired by the Commission. 
Which cooperation strategies and what kind of measures were employed by the 
European Commission to influence the applicant countries’ behavior? The principal 
cooperation strategy by which the Commission sought to induce the applicant countries to 
refrain from prolonging the service lives of their high-risk nuclear reactors and to close these 
units as soon as possible was an issue-linkage. Throughout the bargaining process, the 
Commission repeatedly warned the applicant countries that their EU membership prospects—
i.e. their chances of beginning EU membership negotiations—depended on their willingness 
to establish “realistic” closure schedules. It should be noted that during the initial stages of the 
bargaining process the Commission had made the applicant countries’ chances of beginning 
EU membership negotiations conditional not only on the establishment of “realistic” closure 
schedules, but also on their capacity to meet EU accession criteria. This issue-linkage was 
modified from September 1999 on as the Commission signaled its willingness to open EU 
membership negotiations with the applicant countries on the sole condition that they 
established “realistic” closure schedules, irrespective of their progress in meeting EU 
accession criteria. 
How can we classify the Commission’s strategy of tying the applicant countries’ EU 
membership prospects to the establishment of “realistic” closure schedules? In other words, 
did the Commission’s issue-linkage represent a positive issue-linkage strategy or a negative 
incentive strategy? This is a rather tricky question. Indeed, the answer to this question 
ultimately depends on the applicant countries’ expectations regarding their EU membership 
prospects prior to the time the Commission first employed the issue-linkage during the 
bargaining process. We may state the two possibilities as follows. The issue-linkage qualifies 
as a positive issue-linkage strategy if the Commission offered to improve the applicant 
countries’ EU membership prospects beyond the level that they had previously expected if 
they established “realistic” closure schedules. Conversely, the issue-linkage qualifies as a 
negative incentive strategy if the Commission both threatened to reduce the applicant 
countries’ EU membership prospects beyond the level that they had previously expected if 
they refused to establish “realistic” closure schedules and offered to maintain their previously 
expected EU membership prospects only if they established “realistic” closure schedules. 
What were the applicant countries’ expectations regarding their EU membership 
prospects prior to the time the Commission employed the issue-linkage? Although the 
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Commission had repeatedly indicated since July 1997 that the applicant countries would have 
to abide by their unilateral or international closure commitments to qualify for EU 
membership, in late 1998 the applicant countries most likely expected—or hoped—that their 
EU membership prospects depended exclusively on their capacity to meet the EU’s political 
and economic accession criteria. Formally speaking, this view of the EU accession process 
was not incorrect: Nuclear safety is not a prerogative of the EU and there is no legal 
document enshrining unified EU nuclear safety standards (EU Energy Policy, August 1999: 
7). Be that as it may, the applicant countries most likely perceived the Commission’s 
insistence on reactor closures as an imposition of a new and burdensome condition to qualify 
for EU membership negotiations. In other words, from the applicant countries’ perspective, 
the Commission’s issue-linkage amounted to a threat to reduce their EU membership 
prospects beyond the level that they had previously expected if they refused to establish 
“realistic” closure schedules. As such the Commission’s issue-linkage is best classified as a 
negative incentive strategy. 
Apart from adhering to a negative incentive strategy, the Commission also employed 
normative strategies in all three examined transactions. At various rounds of bilateral talks 
Commission officials sought to persuade representatives from the three applicant countries to 
give up their plans to prolong the service lives of their high-risk nuclear reactors and to 
comply with their international and unilateral closure commitments. Last but not least, during 
the final stages of the bargaining process the European Commission offered each applicant 
country a substantial package of positive incentives in the form of decommissioning aid in 
exchange for the establishment of “realistic” closure schedules. The Commission promised to 
grant the Slovak Republic Euro 110 million for decommissioning activities at Bohunice units 
1-2. Lithuania was expected to receive at least Euro 100 million for the decommissioning of 
Ignalina units 1-2 and an unspecified amount of additional decommissioning aid at a 
forthcoming pledging conference. Finally, the Commission promised to grant Bulgaria 
decommissioning aid in the order of Euro 200 million. In addition, the Commission also 
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firmly pledged to disburse a Euratom loan of up to Euro 250 million for the modernization of 
Kozloduy units 5-6.11
To which extent were the observed behavioral changes on the part of the three 
applicant countries influenced by the provision of positive incentives and how high was the 
effectiveness of the transactions? The empirical analysis of the three transactions suggests that 
the combined effects of the various cooperation strategies employed by the Commission 
induced the three applicant countries to establish “realistic” closure schedules. In this respect 
it must be emphasized that the Commission originally sought to extract “realistic” closure 
commitments from the applicant countries by employing cooperation strategies other than 
positive incentives. Only in the final stages of the bargaining process did the Commission 
provide positive incentives in combination with a negative issue-linkage strategy. Hence, in 
order to gauge the extent to which the provision of positive incentives influenced the 
behavioral changes of the applicant countries, it is necessary to first roughly assess the effects 
of the other two employed cooperation strategies. The employment of normative strategies 
most likely had no effect on the observed behavioral changes of the applicant countries. 
Indeed, all three applicant countries had strong incentives to prolong the service lives of their 
high-risk nuclear reactors: Not only did the continued operation of these reactors promise to 
generate considerable benefits, but their premature closure and decommissioning threatened 
to create a severe economic and social burden. With a view to the high opportunity and “real” 
costs of cooperation, it is plausible to suggest that the Commission’s repeated persuasion 
attempts did not enhance the applicant countries’ willingness to establish “realistic” closure 
schedules. The Commission’s negative issue-linkage strategy, on the other hand, did have a 
significant impact on the applicant countries willingness to cooperate. Since the three 
applicant countries were strongly interested in securing the economic and strategic benefits of 
EU membership as soon as possible, the Commission’s threat to link the EU accession 
process to the establishment of “realistic” closure schedules exerted considerable pressure on 
the applicant countries to compromise on the closure issue. 
                                                 
11 The Commission’s offer to disburse the Euratom loan does not strictly speaking qualify as a positive 
incentive because international funding for the modernization of Kozloduy units 5-6 was in effect an integral 
part of the 1993 NSA agreement. In other words, the Bulgarian government could have expected to receive 
such loans for the modernization project if it agreed to prematurely close Kozloduy units 1-4. Similarly, the 
Commission’s threat in June 1999 that it would not approve a Euratom loan if the Bulgarian government 
refused to establish “realistic” closure schedules does not qualify as a negative incentive. Rather, this threat 
merely sought to reconfirm the existing link between international funding for the modernization project and 
the closure of Kozloduy units 1-4 and to crush any hopes the Bulgarian government may have had to get 
around this link. 
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In order to fully account for the reasons why the Commission’s issue-linkage exerted 
considerable pressure for cooperation, we need to take into account two circumstances. First, 
the Commission’s issue-linkage exerted considerable pressure on the applicant countries to 
cooperate because it had gained in credibility over time. With a view to the fact that the 
Commission’s issue-linkage strategy was not uncontested within the EU and had attracted 
criticism from various EU Member States and the influential Western European nuclear 
industry, it is plausible to suggest that during the early stages of the bargaining process the 
applicant countries most likely doubted the credibility of the Commission’s threat to link 
these two issues. A lack of credibility would have seriously undermined the potential effects 
of the issue-linkage. However, the issue-linkage was ultimately credible because the 
Commission successfully defended its bargaining strategy against all internal and external 
attempts to de-link the EU accession process from the closure of high-risk nuclear reactors. 
The Commission’s success in rendering its issue-linkage credible can be attributed to a good 
degree to the internal support provided both by the Western European electricity producers 
and various non-nuclear EU Member States, in particular Austria, which for either 
commercial or political reasons insisted that the closure of high-risk nuclear reactors remained 
firmly linked to the EU accession process. 
Second, the issue-linkage exerted considerable pressure on the applicant countries to 
cooperate because the Commission eventually modified the conditions for EU membership 
negotiations. Indeed, from September 1999 on the Commission offered the applicant 
countries the opportunity to begin EU membership negotiations on the sole condition that 
they established “realistic” closure schedules, i.e. irrespective of their progress in meeting the 
EU’s formal accession criteria. This modification of the conditions for EU membership 
negotiations raised the stakes for the applicant countries to compromise on the closure issue. 
In particular for Bulgaria, but also for Lithuania, the near-term begin of EU membership 
negotiations had so far been a rather remote possibility, not least due to their lack of progress 
in complying with the EU’s formal accession criteria. By contrast, in autumn 1999 EU 
membership negotiations had become a distinct possibility for the applicant countries, 
provided that they established “realistic” closure schedules. The Commission’s decision to 
modify the conditions for EU membership negotiations had been triggered by a change in EU 
enlargement strategy. In the wake of the Kosovo war (March—June 1999) various EU 
Member States had adopted a more strategic view of EU enlargement, i.e. eastward 
enlargement of the EU was increasingly perceived as a strategic means to promote stability on 
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the EU’s borders. This strategic view of EU enlargement pertained in particular to Bulgaria 
due to its geographical location in the chronically unstable Balkan region, but was 
subsequently extended to other applicant countries. Hence, from mid-1999 on there was an 
enhanced sense of urgency on the part of various EU Member States to accelerate the 
accession process and provide the Eastern European applicant countries with a “European 
perspective”. This change in EU enlargement strategy exerted strong pressure on the 
Commission to abandon its “two-wave EU enlargement strategy” and to initiate EU 
membership negotiations with all applicant countries. The Commission thus agreed to 
suspend most of its conditions for EU membership negotiations, with the exception of its 
demand that the applicant countries establish “realistic” closure schedules. 
In short, the Commission’s negative issue-linkage strategy was no doubt instrumental 
in inducing the applicant countries to cooperate. On the other hand, this assessment does not 
imply that the observed behavioral changes of the applicant countries can be exclusively 
attributed to the effects of the issue-linkage. To begin with, it is doubtful whether the issue-
linkage was sufficient for inducing the applicant countries to establish “realistic” closure 
schedules. In other words, it is rather likely that the applicant countries would have refused to 
cooperate if the Commission had resorted exclusively to the issue-linkage. The empirical 
analysis of the closure negotiations with Lithuania suggests that this possibility was not far-
fetched. In early 1999 the Lithuanian government had indicated that it would refrain from 
rechanneling Ignalina units 1-2 and honor its NSA closure commitments provided that 
external assistance was forthcoming. The Commission initially ignored these compensation 
demands and reiterated its warning that Lithuania’s EU membership prospects depended on 
the premature closure of the Ignalina NPP. As a result of the Commission’s uncompromising 
bargaining stance, public support in Lithuania for EU membership dropped significantly. The 
crumbling public support for EU membership suggests that the Lithuanian government faced 
mounting domestic pressure not to give in to the Commission’s closure demands—at least not 
until the EU provided financial assistance to help cope with the costly implications of the 
plant’s closure. It is hence likely that the Lithuanian government would have refused to abide 
by its NSA closure commitments if the Commission had refrained from offering 
decommissioning aid and exclusively employed the issue-linkage. 
Moreover, even if we assume that the issue-linkage ultimately did induce the applicant 
countries to compromise on the closure issue, it is likely that the Commission would have had 
to settle for far less favorable closure commitments—i.e. later closure deadlines—if it had 
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resorted exclusively to the issue-linkage. This assessment pertains in particular to the closure 
negotiations with the Slovak Republic and Bulgaria. On the one hand, it is certainly true that 
the Commission’s issue-linkage was instrumental in inducing the Slovak and Bulgarian 
governments to negotiate over the premature closure of their high-risk nuclear reactors. On 
the other hand, it is far from clear whether or to which degree the specific closure deadlines 
the Slovak and Bulgarian governments conceded in late 1999 can be attributed to the pressure 
exerted by the issue-linkage. With a view to the fact that the Slovak and Bulgarian 
governments had insisted that the closure deadlines depended on the amount of compensation 
the Commission was willing to provide, it is rather unlikely that the issue-linkage was 
exclusively or even primarily responsible for securing these more or less satisfactory closure 
schedules. In sum, it is plausible to suggest that the Commission would have secured far less 
favorable closure schedules or perhaps none at all if it had refrained from offering 
compensation and only employed the issue-linkage. 
The arguments above suggest that the provision of positive incentives in the form of 
decommissioning aid made the difference between success and failure. The employment of 
positive incentives was thus necessary to induce the applicant countries to establish closure 
schedules more or less in line with the Commission’s original closure demands. Indeed, the 
three applicant countries had insisted on some sort of compensation in exchange for their 
willingness to incur the costs of cooperation. It is thus highly likely that the applicant 
countries would have established far less favorable closure schedules or would have even 
refused to cooperate if the Commission had refused to provide positive incentives. This 
finding suggests that the employment of positive incentives was effective in driving the 
applicant countries’ behavior in a direction desired by the Commission. Nevertheless, it must 
be taken into account that in contrast to the closure commitments conceded by the Lithuanian 
government, the closure commitments offered by the Slovak and Bulgarian governments were 
not fully in line with the Commission’s original closure demands. This leads us to the 
following conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the examined transactions. Whereas the 
effectiveness of the transaction between the Commission and Lithuania was high, the 
effectiveness of the two other transactions was rather high. 
How high was the efficiency of the three examined transactions? In assessing the first 
dimension of efficiency, we need to take into account that the Commission employed positive 
incentives in combination with a negative issue-linkage strategy. Hence, in order to assess the 
first dimension of efficiency, we need to address the following question: Could the 
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Commission have secured comparable or superior behavioral changes on the part of the three 
applicant countries—i.e. earlier closure deadlines—at a lower or comparable cost by 
employing another cooperation strategy in tandem with the negative issue-linkage strategy? 
On the basis of the evidence available, I would answer in the negative. To begin with, it is 
difficult to see how the Commission could have resorted to a positive issue-linkage strategy. 
Indeed, the Commission already employed an issue-linkage strategy, albeit one that was 
designed to increase the applicant countries’ costs of non-cooperation. Theoretically, the 
Commission could have converted its negative issue-linkage strategy into a positive issue-
linkage strategy by offering the applicant countries significantly enhanced EU membership 
prospects—i.e. in effect an invitation to join the EU—in exchange for the establishment of 
“realistic” closure commitments. However, such a positive issue-linkage was politically 
impractical because it would have undermined the foundations of EU enlargement that 
conditioned EU membership on the respective applicant country’s ability to comply with the 
Acquis Communautaire. 
Conversely, the Commission could have sought to further raise the costs of non-
cooperation by broadening its already employed negative issue-linkage strategy to include the 
threat of economic sanctions. However, with a view to the strategic interests of various EU 
Member States in promoting eastward enlargement of the EU, it is doubtful whether the 
Commission would have been able or willing to resort to such a measure that involved the 
serious risk of undermining the accession process. Moreover, it is rather unlikely that the 
threat of economic sanctions would have led to comparable or superior behavioral changes on 
the part of the applicant countries. On the contrary, with a view to the fact that the 
Commission’s negative issue-linkage strategy already exerted considerable pressure on the 
applicant countries, it is rather likely that the additional threat to impose economic sanctions 
in the event of non-cooperation would have stiffened the applicant countries’ resistance to 
closure demands and may have led them to opt out of closure negotiations. Finally, it is 
difficult to see how the employment of normative or cognitive strategies in combination with 
the Commission’s issue-linkage could have led to more favorable outcomes. Indeed, neither 
persuasion attempts nor the provision of more complete information on the full costs and risks 
of prolonging the operation of high-risk nuclear reactors would have enticed the applicant 
countries to establish “realistic” closure schedules. In short, the three examined transactions 
were efficient in the sense that the Commission could not have secured a more favorable 
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result by employing an alternative cooperation strategy in combination with its negative issue-
linkage strategy. 
As far as the second dimension of efficiency is concerned, the empirical analysis 
suggests that the efficiency of the three examined transactions was high. Indeed, it is unlikely 
that the Commission could have secured comparable or superior behavioral changes on the 
part of the applicant countries at a lower or comparable cost by employing positive incentives 
in different ways. The following reasons explain why the provision of decommissioning aid 
was the most cost-effective way of employing positive incentives. First, by pledging to defray 
a significant part of the decommissioning costs, the Commission addressed one of the main 
reasons why the applicant countries were reluctant to prematurely close their high-risk nuclear 
reactors. Indeed, the considerable financial costs and technical complexities of 
decommissioning nuclear reactors had seriously impinged on the applicant countries’ 
willingness to cooperate. In contrast, the provision of financial and technical aid to construct 
power replacement capacity—while certainly helpful in softening the impact of reactor 
closures on the applicant countries’ energy situation—would have not directly addressed this 
key cooperation problem. Second, the decommissioning aid pledged by the Commission was 
inextricably linked to the closure of high-risk nuclear reactors. This characteristic of the 
pledged aid enhanced the prospects of successful cooperation because the recipient countries 
had no opportunities to misuse the pledged decommissioning aid to continue to engage in 
undesirable behavior. 
To which extent did the theoretically predicted problems in designing and 
implementing positive incentives shape the effectiveness and efficiency of the transactions? 
Neither the effectiveness nor the efficiency of the three examined transactions was negatively 
affected by extortion problems. This conclusion may be surprising when taking into account 
that the applicant countries had implicitly threatened to prolong an already existing negative 
externality—i.e. to extend the service lives of their operational high-risk nuclear reactors—if 
not compensated for refraining from doing so. Nevertheless, the applicant countries’ behavior 
does not qualify as extortion. Indeed, the three applicant countries had a genuine interest in 
prolonging the service lives of their high-risk nuclear reactors. From their perspective, the 
benefits to be gained from prolonging the operation of these units clearly exceeded the 
involved environmental costs, not least due to the fact that the previous safety upgrade 
programs funded by the Western donors had reduced the risk of a nuclear accident at one of 
these units. It is thus highly likely that the applicant countries would have delivered on their 
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implicit threat to continue to operate these unsafe units if the Commission had not provided 
compensation in the form of decommissioning aid. In short, the applicant countries did not 
bluff the Commission into providing positively valued resources in exchange for risk-
eliminating behavioral changes that they would have undertaken even if the Commission had 
refused to provide such resources. In addition, this potential problem did not deter the 
Commission from engaging in transactions with the three applicant countries. 
Moral hazard problems also did not negatively affect the outcomes to be explained. 
True, it is plausible to suggest that by postponing the scheduled closure dates for Kozloduy 
units 1-4 and Bohunice units 1-2 the Bulgarian and Slovak governments in effect engaged in 
risky activities that exposed the West to elevated levels of nuclear risk. On the other hand, it 
is unlikely that the Bulgarian and Slovak governments postponed the scheduled closure dates 
because they expected or hoped that the Commission would provide the necessary resources 
to reduce to an acceptable level the risks resulting from the continued operation of their first-
generation VVERs. As a matter of fact, the Bulgarian and Slovak government’s willingness to 
invest a considerable amount of their own resources in the modernization of their high-risk 
nuclear reactors suggests that they did not expect to gain (additional) risk-reducing nuclear 
safety assistance from the West by postponing the scheduled closure schedules. In short, the 
behavior of the Bulgarian and Slovak governments does not qualify as moral hazard and did 
not have any impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the transactions. 
The effectiveness of the examined transactions was not seriously affected by 
information and distribution problems. It should be noted that this assessment does not imply 
that these problems were absent in the closure negotiations. Indeed, the Commission did 
encounter difficulties in determining the applicant countries’ “real” preferences regarding the 
near-term closure of high-risk nuclear reactors, not least due to the applicant countries’ 
apparent reluctance to comply with their existing closure commitments. Moreover, the 
applicant countries also sought to gain the maximum amount of compensation in exchange for 
the least costly environmental measures, i.e. the latest possible closure schedules. However, 
these information and distribution problems neither seriously delayed nor prevented the 
conclusion of closure negotiations. An important reason why these problems did not seriously 
affect the effectiveness of the transactions was the fact that the Commission had set a tight 
deadline for the establishment of “realistic” closure schedules, i.e. prior to the December 1999 
Helsinki Council meeting. This tight deadline served to limit the time to haggle over the size 
and composition of compensation payments as well as over specific closure schedules. 
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Enforcement problems negatively affected the effectiveness of at least two of the three 
examined transactions. As pointed out above, the closure schedules ultimately conceded by 
the Slovak and Bulgarian governments were somewhat delayed compared to what the 
Commission had originally demanded. Considering that the Commission disposed over 
considerable bargaining leverage, it is rather surprising that it did not succeed in extracting 
closure commitments from the Slovak Republic and Bulgaria that corresponded more closely 
with its original closure demands. Hence, what explains the fact that these two transactions 
were not fully effective? 
The principal reason why the Commission’s enforcement attempt was not completely 
successful in these two transactions relates to the fact that the Commission had faced steadily 
growing internal pressure to relax its closure requirements. This pressure emanated, on the 
one hand, from the commercial interests of the Western European nuclear industry. Since the 
forced closure of various nuclear reactors in CEE and the FSU threatened to have detrimental 
effects on the Western European nuclear industry’s near- and long-term business 
opportunities, this influential industrial group had strong incentives to lobby the 
Commission—either directly or indirectly via their respective national governments—into 
abandoning or at least into softening its early closure policy. It is hence plausible to suggest 
that the commercial interests of the Western European nuclear industry had a certain effect on 
the Commission’s willingness to relax its closure requirements and settle for compromises. 
On the other hand, the pressure exerted on the Commission to relax its closure requirements 
also derived from the strategic interests of various EU Member States in firmly tying the 
Eastern European applicant countries into the EU accession process. Since the Commission’s 
strategy of linking the applicant countries’ EU membership prospects to the establishment of 
“realistic” closure schedules had provoked strong resistance on the part of the applicant 
countries, various EU Member States had become concerned that the Commission’s 
uncompromising stance on the closure issue would protract or possibly derail the EU 
accession process. It is hence plausible to suggest that various EU Member States exerted 
pressure on the Commission to adopt a more flexible bargaining stance in order to minimize 
the strategic risks involved in enforcing closure commitments. In short, the efforts by the 
Western European nuclear industry and various EU Member States to safeguard their 
commercial and strategic interests gave rise to enforcement problems that impinged on the 
effectiveness of two examined transactions. 
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It should be noted that the Commission’s attempt to enforce Lithuania’s closure 
commitments posed similar threats to the commercial and strategic interests of the Western 
European nuclear industry and various EU Member States. However, enforcement problems 
did not negatively affect the effectiveness of this transaction. This finding has much to do 
with the fact that it was virtually impossible for the Commission to adopt a more flexible 
bargaining stance vis-à-vis the Lithuanian government. Indeed, the Commission either 
insisted that the Lithuanian government refrain from rechanneling Ignalina units 1-2 and close 
the plant in line with its NSA closure commitments, or it yielded to the Lithuanian 
government’s plans to rechannel these two units and accepted that the Ignalina NPP would 
continue to operate for another 15-20 years. Given the alarming prospects of the latter option, 
it is reasonable to suggest that in this specific transaction the Commission faced less internal 
pressure to relax its closure requirements. 
The specific problem-definition adopted by the Commission did not hamper the 
efficiency of the examined transactions. Indeed, the Commission’s decision to enhance the 
applicant countries’ capacities and incentives to prematurely close their high-risk nuclear 
reactors by employing positive incentives for decommissioning work was not dictated by the 
political or commercial interests of EU Member States or domestic producer groups. Rather, 
the Commission most likely decided to fund the implementation of this specific capacity-
building measure because it promised to be the most cost-effective way to secure the 
premature closure of high-risk nuclear reactors under the given circumstances. 
The „slippery slope effect” did not hamper the effectiveness of the examined 
transactions. This conclusion is evident: Since the aid pledged by the Commission was 
earmarked for decommissioning work and was as such inextricably linked to the closure of 
high-risk nuclear reactors, it did not enhance the incentives or capacities of the recipient 
countries to continue to engage in undesirable behavior, i.e. to prolong the operation of their 
high-risk nuclear reactors. 
Coordination problems did not negatively affect the effectiveness of the examined 
transactions. This finding has much to do with the fact that the European Commission was the 
sole donor in the examined transactions. Indeed, the fact that the Commission was authorized 
to negotiate over closure commitments on behalf of all EU Member States prevented both 
burden-sharing problems among the Western donors and the pursuit of conflicting national 
strategies aimed at securing “realistic” closure commitments from the applicant countries. 
 
 8 CASE STUDY V: THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO SECURE THE PREMATURE 
CLOSURE OF THE CHERNOBYL NPP IN UKRAINE 
Prior to the time Ukraine gained national independence from the Soviet Union in late 1991, 
the Ukrainian leadership had resolved to prematurely close the ill-fated Chernobyl NPP by the 
end of 1993. However, this proved to be a short-lived victory: In October 1993 the Ukrainian 
parliament rescinded its previous closure resolution and approved the government’s plans to 
extend the service lives of the two remaining operational nuclear reactors at the Chernobyl 
NPP (units 1 and 3). Moreover, in early 1994 the Ukrainian government signaled its intention 
to restart Chernobyl unit 2, which had been shut down in 1991 as a result of a major fire in the 
unit’s turbine hall. Deeply concerned about the prospect of the crippled Chernobyl NPP being 
modernized for long-term operation, the Western countries subsequently sought to induce the 
Ukrainian government to close Chernobyl units 1 and 3 as soon as possible and to refrain 
from restarting Chernobyl unit 2. In December 1995, after nearly two years of intensive 
negotiations, the G-7, the European Commission and the Ukrainian government signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in which the West agreed to provide $2.3 billion in 
assistance in exchange for the closure of the Chernobyl NPP by 2000. The MoU envisaged 
around $500 million in grants for various projects related to the plant’s early closure and $1.8 
billion in loans for the completion of the two partly built Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 reactors 
(K2/R4) and the modernization of existing hydroelectric and thermal power plants. 
Implementation of the December 1995 MoU proved to be a bumpy and protracted 
process. After having agreed to close Chernobyl unit 1 in November 1996, the Ukrainian 
government became increasingly irritated with the delays on the part of the Western donors to 
provide the promised loans for the K2/R4 project. As a result the Ukrainian government 
repeatedly threatened to restart the second unit of the Chernobyl NPP and to postpone the 
closure of unit 3 if the K2/R4 project was not completed on schedule. To render its latter 
threat more credible, the Ukrainian authorities undertook strenuous efforts to keep Chernobyl 
unit 3 operational, despite the fact that the reactor was in perpetual need of repairs and clearly 
unfit for continued operation. Not least due to the ongoing failure of the Western donors to 
approve loan financing for the nuclear completion project, the Ukrainian government decided 
in late 1999 to keep Chernobyl unit 3 in operation, which was certainly undesirable from the 
Western donors’ perspective. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian government subsequently realized 
that its threat to postpone the closure of the plant was unlikely to accelerate the approval of 
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loans for the K2/R4 project and might even jeopardize the provision of Western assistance for 
other Chernobyl-related projects. Hence, in June 2000 Ukrainian President Kuchma agreed to 
close the remaining operational reactor of the Chernobyl NPP by December 2000. The 
Chernobyl NPP was duly shut down on 15 December 2000, a few days after the Western 
donors had tentatively agreed to provide over $1.2 billion in loans for the completion of the 
Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 reactors. 
The outcomes to be explained can be summarized as follows. Effectiveness: Since the 
provision of a comprehensive package of positive incentives ultimately induced and enabled 
the Ukrainian government to close the Chernobyl NPP, albeit somewhat later than the 
Western donors had preferred to see, the effectiveness of the transaction was rather high. 
Efficiency: The transaction was efficient in the sense that the Western donors could not have 
attained a more favorable result by employing alternative cooperation strategies. On the other 
hand, it is likely that the Western donors could have secured at least a comparable behavioral 
change on the part of Ukraine at lower cost by employing positive incentives in different 
ways. As such the efficiency of the transaction (second dimension) was rather low. These 
outcomes were shaped by the following problems. Whereas the effectiveness of the 
transaction was to a certain extent hampered by information, distribution and coordination 
problems, the efficiency of the transaction (second dimension) was negatively affected by the 
pro-nuclear problem-definition adopted by the Western donors. 
The case study on the international effort to secure the premature closure of the 
Chernobyl NPP is structured along the following lines. The first section elaborates on the 
reasons why the Ukrainian leadership revoked its previous anti-nuclear policy and opted for 
the continued operation of the Chernobyl NPP. The second section examines the bargaining 
process that led to the conclusion of the December 1995 MoU in which the West pledged $2.3 
billion in assistance in exchange for the closure of the Chernobyl NPP by 2000. The third 
section explores the problem-ridden implementation of the MoU. The fourth and final section 
summarizes the results of the case study. 
8.1 The Rise and Fall of Ukraine’s Anti-Nuclear Policy 
The April 1986 nuclear disaster at the Chernobyl NPP and its subsequent handling by Soviet 
authorities—Moscow had initially sought to conceal the fact that a serious nuclear accident 
had occurred—had given rise to a powerful anti-nuclear power movement in various republics 
of the then existing Soviet Union. The anti-nuclear power movement subsequently took 
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advantage of the increased possibilities for political participation in the era of Perestroika and 
Glasnost in the late 1980s and pressed the Soviet government into revoking its ambitious 
nuclear power program. As a result, by 1990 the Soviet government had halted the completion 
of various reactors under construction and decided to close the Medzamor NPP in Armenia.1
The anti-nuclear power movement was particularly strong in Ukraine, which along 
with Belarus had suffered most from the radioactive fallout of the nuclear meltdown at the 
fourth unit of the Chernobyl NPP. Outright concern about the safety of the Soviet-designed 
nuclear reactors operating in Ukraine was certainly a motivating factor, but not the only one: 
Since many Ukrainians blamed the 1986 nuclear disaster on the Soviet government, 
opposition to nuclear power became a populist stance associated with anti-communism and 
the desire to throw off the Soviet yoke (Marples 1996a: 23). Proponents of Ukrainian 
statehood did not miss the opportunity to capitalize on such feelings to promote their political 
agenda. Shortly after its declaration of sovereignty in July 1990—Ukraine remained a 
republic of the Soviet Union until it gained full national independence on 1 December 1991—
, the newly elected Ukrainian parliament imposed a five-year moratorium on the construction 
of new nuclear units and voted in favor of closing the three remaining operational reactors at 
the Chernobyl NPP by the end of 1995. Following a major fire in the turbine hall of 
Chernobyl’s second unit in October 1991, which had raised the specter of another nuclear 
disaster, the Ukrainian parliament decided to shut down Chernobyl unit 2 immediately and to 
close Chernobyl units 1 and 3 by the end of 1993 (NEI, December 1991: 2; NN, December 
1991: 48).2
The Ukrainian parliament’s closure decrees had given rise to hopes in the West that 
one of Europe’s most serious nuclear safety threats would soon disappear. These far-flung 
Western hopes, however, gradually faded in the months following Ukraine’s independence as 
the Ukrainian leadership began to reconsider its anti-nuclear policy. Indeed, already by the 
end of 1992 Ukrainian officials had been warning that it would be impossible to meet the 
country’s energy needs if the nuclear moratorium was upheld and the Chernobyl NPP closed 
on schedule (NW, 31 December 1992: 11-12). Throughout 1993 the fate of the Chernobyl 
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive account of the rise and fall of the anti-nuclear power movement in the Former Soviet 
Union, see Dawson (1996). 
2 Even the then mayor of Slavutich, the town built near Chernobyl to house the station’s workforce, had 
expressed his understanding for the Ukrainian parliament’s decision to bring forward the closure date of the 
Chernobyl NPP, arguing that the continued operation of the ill-fated plant was a psychological burden that 
the average Ukrainian citizen found hard to bear (NW, 23 July 1992: 14). 
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NPP was fiercely contested among Ukrainian politicians and government agencies, leaving 
the West worried about the outcome of the domestic debate. Western concerns were 
definitively confirmed on 21 October 1993 as the Ukrainian parliament, completely ignoring 
the opinion of the country’s fledgling nuclear safety authority, rescinded the nuclear 
moratorium and Chernobyl closure resolution and approved the government’s plans to 
modernize and prolong the service lives of Chernobyl units 1 and 3. Moreover, in early 1994 
the Ukrainian government approved the nuclear industry’s plans to repair and restart 
Chernobyl unit 2 as well (NW, 28 October 1993: 1, 10-12; NW, 7 April 1994: 10-11; Nuclear 
Energy Institute 1997: 183). 
Why did the Ukrainian leadership revoke its previous anti-nuclear policy and opt for 
the continued operation of the troubled Chernobyl NPP? This policy change was in part 
triggered by Ukraine’s deepening economic crisis following the attainment of full national 
independence. Between 1991 and 1994 Ukraine’s economy had come close to collapsing 
under the collective weight of hyperinflation, a near-worthless currency, the disruption of 
former Soviet bloc trade links, and a huge decline in industrial production. Ukrainian GDP 
dropped by a dramatic 50 percent during this time period (Ebel 1997: 274-275; IEA 1996: 
39). Beleaguered by a major economic crisis, Ukraine could not easily afford to close the 
Chernobyl NPP. Indeed, the significant costs and technical complexities involved in 
decommissioning the Chernobyl NPP and cleaning up the severely contaminated site 
exceeded the destitute country’s financial and technical capacities by lengths. In addition, the 
Ukrainian leadership was also concerned about the social costs of closing the Chernobyl NPP. 
Since there were virtually no alternative employment opportunities for the approximately 
5'000 strong Chernobyl workforce and with no social safety net in place, the early closure of 
the plant threatened to create severe social problems among the 23'000 residents of the 
company town Slavutich. 
The Ukrainian leadership’s decision to keep the Chernobyl NPP in operation beyond 
the scheduled closure date was also closely connected with a fundamental reappraisal of 
nuclear power in Ukraine—a reappraisal that had been triggered by the country’s critical 
energy situation in the wake of independence. Ukraine lacked substantial indigenous energy 
supplies other than low quality coal and uranium deposits and was able to meet only around 
23 percent of its oil requirements and 19 percent of its natural gas needs through domestic 
production (Ebel 1997: 280). Ukraine therefore had to import roughly 80 percent of its oil and 
natural gas needs, a large part of which was supplied by the Russian Federation. Prior to 
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gaining independence in late 1991, Ukraine could count on vast amounts of cheap fossil fuel 
supplies from the Soviet Union to meet its energy needs. However, following the break-up of 
the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Russian Federation was no longer willing to deliver 
subsidized energy supplies and began to charge its former Soviet neighbors higher prices for 
energy. Russia’s new energy policy had serious implications for Ukraine’s energy situation. 
Indeed, not least due to its growing difficulties in paying for Russian fossil fuel imports, 
Ukraine had found itself in the midst of an acute energy shortage after gaining independence. 
The Ukrainian leadership hence soon realized that Ukraine could not easily dispense with 
nuclear power. In fact, the Ukrainian government opted to deepen the country’s reliance on 
nuclear power: Whereas Ukraine’s 14 operational nuclear reactors accounted for roughly 25 
percent of the country’s total electricity supply in 1991, this figure had risen to 34 percent in 
1994 (Ebel 1997: 301).3
Ukraine’s enhanced reliance on nuclear power was to large extent determined by 
economic factors. Indeed, nuclear power was estimated to cost about 20 percent less than the 
electricity produced at the country’s thermal power plants (NEI, April 1996: 13). The relative 
cost advantage of nuclear power derived not only from the comparatively high costs of 
imported fossil fuels, but also from the fact that the most expensive component of nuclear 
power, i.e. the capital costs for the construction of a nuclear facility, could be written off by 
virtue of Ukraine having inherited the plants from the Soviet Union. In this respect it made 
economic sense to squeeze out as much power from these Soviet “gifts” as possible 
(Economist, 24 July 1993: 20). Ukraine’s growing reliance on nuclear power was also 
determined by strategic considerations. By August 1993 Ukraine had accumulated debts for 
Russian natural gas deliveries in the order of $120 million (Markus 1995: 16). Ukraine’s 
growing gas debts did not only have critical implications for the security of its energy 
supply—Russia had decreased gas supplies for the first time in late August 1993—but was 
also perceived by the Ukrainian leadership as increasing the country’s political vulnerability 
vis-à-vis Moscow and jeopardizing its fragile independence at a time when relations between 
                                                 
3 The country’s 14 operational nuclear reactors (as of late 1993) were located at five NPP sites. Chernobyl 
NPP: Two RBMK-1000s (units 1 and 3; unit 4 was destroyed in 1986 and unit 2 was closed in 1991). 
Khmelnitsky NPP: One VVER-1000 (unit 1). Rovno NPP: Two VVER-213s (units 1-2) and one VVER-1000 
(unit 3). South Ukraine NPP: Three VVER-1000s (units 1-3). Zaporozhe NPP: Five VVER-1000s (units 1-5). 
Due to the surge of the anti-nuclear movement in the late 1980s, construction work on three almost finished 
VVER-1000s—Zaporozhe unit 6, Khmelnitsky unit 2, and Rovno unit 4—had been halted in 1990 (Ebel 
1995: 41). 
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Ukraine and the Russian Federation were seriously strained by various bilateral disputes.4 
Indeed, throughout 1993 Moscow had attempted to exploit the gas debt issue to gain political 
concessions from Kiev.5 Consequently, Ukraine had sought to reduce its dependence on 
Russian fossil fuel imports by relying more heavily on domestically produced nuclear power. 
In short, the Ukrainian leadership’s decision to keep the Chernobyl NPP in operation 
must be viewed in the context of a general revaluation of nuclear energy in Ukraine. In the 
wake of independence, which had confronted Ukraine with a host of new political and 
economic challenges, the hard-pressed country no longer denounced its nuclear reactors as 
ugly manifestations of Soviet imperialism, but increasingly regarded them as “valuable 
bulwarks of national independence in a world where Russia controlled most other sources of 
energy“ (Darst 1997: 61-62). This view pertained even to the ill-fated Chernobyl plant. 
Indeed, even though the amount of power generated by the Chernobyl NPP accounted for 
only about 6 percent of the country’s total electricity supply, this was still a considerable 
amount of energy to forego at a time when Ukraine was struggling to cope with an acute 
energy shortage and when Russia was eager to exploit Ukraine’s massive natural gas debts to 
gain political concessions in other outstanding bilateral issues (NW, 28 October 1993: 10-12; 
NW, 17 March 1994: 16-17). 
8.2 International Negotiations on a Closure Deal 
In response to Kiev’s plans to resuscitate the ill-fated Chernobyl plant, the IAEA carried out 
in March 1994 a two-week safety review mission at the Chernobyl NPP. The mission found a 
number of serious safety deficiencies and in an unusually alarming tone for the IAEA 
concluded that “international levels of safety were not being met“ at the Ukrainian plant (NW, 
7 April 1994: 1). The IAEA team also confirmed that the so-called sarcophagus—i.e. the 
shelter covering the destroyed fourth unit of the plant—was in a state of “accelerated 
deterioration” and represented an additional safety problem. The disturbing conclusions of the 
safety review mission prompted the IAEA to hold an emergency conference in late April 1994 
                                                 
4 Outstanding bilateral issues between Ukraine and Russia included the withdrawal of former Soviet nuclear 
weapons, the division of the Black Sea Fleet, the status of Sevastopol, the ownership of former Soviet assets, 
and various territorial disputes, especially over Crimea (Ebel 1997: 272). 
5 In February 1993, Russian officials proposed that Ukraine give up its share of the Soviet Union’s assets 
abroad in exchange for its energy debt. Moreover, at a September 1993 meeting in Massandra convened to 
resolve the dispute over the division of the Black Sea Fleet, Russian officials suggested that Ukraine trade its 
share of the fleet in exchange for gas debt relief (Markus 1995: 16). 
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to explore possible solutions both to the critical safety situation at the Chernobyl plant and to 
Ukraine’s energy dilemma (NW, 14 April 1994: 1, 10). 
Yet the IAEA emergency conference proved to be a failure: The Ukrainian delegation, 
led by Vice Prime Minister Shmarov and the chairman of the State Committee for Atomic 
Energy (Goskomatom), Mikhail Umanets, used the occasion to emphasize the central role of 
nuclear power for Ukraine’s energy needs and stunned Western officials with the blunt 
assertion that there was no prospect of the two operational reactors at the Chernobyl NPP 
being closed any time soon (EEE Report, May 1994: 7). Shmarov also indicated that the 
plant’s closure would cost around $4 billion: $1 billion to construct a second sarcophagus 
over the ruined fourth unit, $1.2 billion to complete various nuclear reactors under 
construction, $1 billion to decommission the plant, and $800 million to upgrade existing 
thermal generating capacity. In short, the IAEA emergency conference did not only end 
without any decision on what to do, but also left many Western officials wondering whether 
the Ukrainian delegation’s blunt assertion that the Chernobyl NPP would remain in operation 
had been a gambit to attract Western financial support for the country’s ailing power sector 
(NW, 28 April 1994: 11). 
Ever since early 1994 the European Commission, acknowledging that Ukraine’s 
reluctance to prematurely close the Chernobyl NPP was at least partly determined by the 
country’s critical energy situation, had been contemplating the idea of funding the completion 
of two to three partly built Ukrainian VVER-1000 reactors to facilitate the early closure of the 
troubled plant. This option was strongly backed by the governments of France and Germany 
whose domestic nuclear industries stood to benefit considerably from the completion work. 
On 16 May 1994 foreign ministers of the EU agreed in principle to help Ukraine close the 
Chernobyl NPP. However, EU Member States differed on the specific objectives of a closure 
package, with the United Kingdom and other EU Member States arguing against the 
completion of partly built nuclear reactors, as proposed and endorsed by the European 
Commission, France and Germany (NW, 19 May 1994: 14). 
In the following weeks, the French and German governments worked hard to garner 
support for a Chernobyl closure “action plan”, encompassing both an overhaul of the 
Ukrainian energy sector and the completion of existing nuclear reactors. By the end of June 
1994, their combined efforts had materialized: At their summit meeting in Corfu on 24-25 
June 1994, EU Member States agreed to allocate ECU 100 million (then about $120 million) 
in grants over three years from the Union’s TACIS program to help Ukraine develop energy 
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sector programs and pledged to raise ECU 400 million in Euratom loans to help fund the 
completion of three unfinished VVER-1000 units in Ukraine (Zaporozhe-6, Khmelnitsky-2, 
and Rovno-4). The EU made its financial assistance conditional upon Kiev closing the 
Chernobyl NPP as soon as possible, initiating structural reforms of the country’s energy 
sector, strengthening nuclear operation standards and signing the Vienna Convention. The 
amount of assistance pledged by the EU at the Corfu summit meeting was of course far from 
sufficient. Indeed, the European Commission had estimated that the total costs of closing the 
Chernobyl NPP would amount to ECU 1.8 billion (then about $2.16 billion). Commission 
officials indicated that EU assistance could be increased only through “detailed discussions 
with Ukraine on an action plan“, including the establishment of a firm schedule for meeting 
commitments (NW, 30 June 1994: 9). Furthermore, the EU was counting on the non-
European members of the G-7, in particular the United States, to endorse its action plan and 
pledge additional financial assistance at the upcoming G-7 summit meeting in Naples (IHT, 2 
July 1994). 
The Naples G-7 summit on 8-10 July 1994 proved to be a veritable disappointment for 
those countries expecting the provision of a large Western aid package. Indeed, although the 
G-7 countries formally endorsed the EU’s action plan—the G-7 countries reportedly agreed to 
seek the closure of Chernobyl units 1 and 3 by 1996 and 1997 (NW, 10 November 1994: 
14)—they approved only $200 million in grants, bringing up the total amount of committed 
Western assistance to $800 million. The G-7 also pledged to call upon IFIs, such as the World 
Bank, the EBRD and the EIB, to provide additional funds, but indicated that such money 
would be conditional upon far-reaching reforms in the Ukrainian energy sector (EEE Report, 
27 July 1994: 1). The rather disappointing amount of aid pledged at the G-7 Naples summit 
meeting can be traced back to a number of problems. To begin with, there was considerable 
disagreement among the G-7 countries about the preferred approach to compensate Ukraine 
for the power foregone by the closure of the Chernobyl NPP. Indeed, whereas the French and 
German governments—looking out for the commercial interests of their nuclear industries—
were pushing hard for the completion of Ukrainian VVER-1000 units, other G-7 countries 
were initially less enthusiastic about this approach and favored the implementation of demand 
management programs and the rehabilitation of existing hydroelectric and thermal power 
plants (NW, 16 June 1994: 6-7). In fact, the U.S. government was at the time evenly split on 
the issue over how best to offset the shortfall in Ukrainian electricity supply following the 
closure of the Chernobyl plant. While the State Department was in favor of funding the partly 
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built nuclear reactors, the Department of Energy (DoE) urged the U.S. and other Western 
governments to help Ukraine become more energy-efficient and develop alternative sources 
of power (NW, 16 June 1994: 7; NYT, 14 June 1994). 
Another key problem at the G-7’s Naples summit was working out how much it would 
cost to improve nuclear safety in Ukraine (EEE Report, July 1994: 2). Alone the estimated 
costs for the completion of the three unfinished VVER units varied considerably: While the 
European Commission had put the cost between $900 million and $1.2 billion, the EBRD had 
suggested that $1.5 billion would be necessary. In any case, estimates of the G-7 nuclear 
safety working group (NSWG) and the EU on the total costs of closing the Chernobyl NPP—
ranging between $2 and $3 billion—were substantially below the estimates of Ukrainian 
officials. Moreover, Western countries had become increasingly aware that Ukrainian 
officials had been deliberately manipulating Western concerns about the safety of the 
Chernobyl NPP and playing an increasingly ambitious stalling game in an effort to wring as 
much money out of the West as possible in exchange for the plant’s closure (EEE Report, 
June 1994: 4). Ukraine’s upping of the ante confirmed such suspicions: While Vice Prime 
Minister Shmarov had spoken of $4 billion at the IAEA’s emergency conference in late April 
1994, a few weeks later he insisted that the closure of the plant by 2004 would cost between 
$6 and $8 billion (NW, 19 May 1994: 14). Goskomatom chairman Umanets and the manager 
of the Chernobyl NPP, Sergei Parashin, pronounced similar figures. Ukrainian President 
Kravchuk had raised the stakes even higher by announcing in late May 1994 that closing the 
Chernobyl NPP would entail costs in the order of $14 billion (NW, 16 June 1994: 6). Finally, 
the fear of creating a costly precedent for ongoing international efforts to shut down other 
RBMK reactors operating in the Russian Federation and Lithuania may have contributed to 
the Western countries’ reluctance to commit a comprehensive aid package for the closure of 
just two operational RBMK units in Ukraine (FAZ, 8 July 1994). 
During the following months the fate of the Chernobyl NPP remained in limbo. 
Dismissing the Western action plan on the grounds that the amount of aid pledged by the EU 
and the G-7 was far from inadequate to justify the closure of a plant that allegedly still had an 
important energy potential, provided 5'000 jobs and indirectly supported some 23'000 people, 
various Ukrainian officials subsequently called for the long-term operation of the troubled 
facility (NW, 21 July 1994: 8; EEE Report, August 1994: 19). Further impeding the 
negotiation process was the fact that the incoming Ukrainian government under the newly 
elected President Leonid Kuchma had not yet formulated an official position on Chernobyl. 
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By the fall of 1994 the EU had grown so incensed about the ongoing failure of Kiev to 
commit to a closure schedule that it suspended an already approved ECU 85 million balance 
of payment loan to Ukraine (Lapychak 1995: 21). Most likely as a result of this economic 
pressure, the Ukrainian government returned to the negotiating table, but continued to hold 
out for more money and to insist on far-reaching conditions. At a meeting with U.S. President 
Clinton in November 1994, Ukrainian President Kuchma suggested that the West provide up 
to $4.5 billion for the early closure of the plant. This figure included $1.5 billion to 
decommission Chernobyl and to complete three unfinished nuclear reactors, and $3 billion to 
build two new nuclear reactors near Slavutich, a new demand that reflected Kiev’s concerns 
about the social consequences of closing the plant. Moreover, Kuchma insisted that 
Chernobyl closure would only be initiated after the new nuclear reactors had been completed 
and that in any case repair work on unit 2 would continue in the interim (Ebel 1997: 309). In 
an effort to narrow the options and estimates on both sides and to flesh out a detailed action 
plan, the G-7 established a special task force in late 1994, comprising energy experts from the 
G-7, the World Bank, the EBRD, the IEA, and the Ukrainian government. Nevertheless, 
negotiations once again came close to break-down since the Ukrainian negotiators proved 
unwilling to agree on any near-term closure date and continued to insist on receiving funds 
for the construction of a new nuclear power plant near Slavutich, although the G-7 had 
previously rejected this option (NW, 5 January 1995: 13-14).6
The deadlock in the negotiations was finally broken during the visit of a high-level 
political delegation of the EU to Kiev in mid-April 1995. On 13 April 1995 President Kuchma 
agreed in principle to close the Chernobyl NPP by 2000, thereby providing for the first 
Ukrainian closure commitment. The breakthrough in negotiations can be largely attributed to 
the fact that the Ukrainian government had realized that non-cooperation on the Chernobyl 
closure issue would hold up the release of much needed Western financial and economic aid. 
Indeed, in March 1995 the EU had promised to release the suspended ECU 85 million balance 
of payment loan if Kiev agreed to prematurely close the Chernobyl NPP and hinted that a 
closure commitment could pave the way for more economic aid (NW, 20 April 1995: 13). A 
further reason for the breakthrough in negotiations on the Chernobyl closure issue was that 
Western officials had become increasingly aware of the need to negotiate directly with 
                                                 
6 The Ukrainian government had also become rather wary about the credibility of Western aid commitments, 
arguing that Ukraine had so far received nothing but promises from the West in exchange for its willingness 
to transfer Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia (NW, 23 March 1995: 16). 
 Case Study V 201 
Ukrainian President Kuchma. Progress had stalled during the past months not least because 
the Ukrainian government had so far been represented in negotiations by Goskomatom, the 
state organization responsible for operating the Ukrainian NPPs, which by nature had a vested 
interest in keeping the Chernobyl NPP in operation (NW, 30 March 1995: 7). 
On 16-17 May 1995, representatives of the G-7 convened with Ukrainian officials in 
Kiev to confirm a schedule for closing the Chernobyl NPP by 2000. The timetable submitted 
by the Ukrainian government called for the closure of unit 1 in 1997, the decommissioning of 
unit 2 (not operational since 1991) in 1996, and the closure of unit 3 in 1999 (NW, 1 June 
1995: 7-8). Ukrainian experts had estimated that it would cost $4.5 billion to close the plant, 
and Kiev made it clear that implementation of the closure schedule was conditional upon the 
West footing the bill (NEI, June 1995: 6). The amount of assistance demanded by Ukraine did 
not only comprise the direct costs of closing the Chernobyl NPP, i.e. the costs of 
decommissioning the plant and constructing waste and fuel storage facilities. It also included 
international funding for the reconstruction of the ailing sarcophagus, the resettlement of the 
plant’s workforce, decontamination of the surrounding zone and—most important—the 
construction of replacement power generating capacity. Interesting enough, by proposing 
Western funding to build a new 3'000 MW gas-fired combined-cycle power plant near 
Slavutich, Ukraine had demanded for the first time in negotiations with the West a non-
nuclear alternative to replace the Chernobyl NPP (NW, 20 April 1996: 13-14). 
President Kuchma’s agreement in principle to close the Chernobyl NPP by 2000 was 
greeted with applause in the West and did not go unrewarded: On 1 June 1995, the EU signed 
an interim trade agreement with Ukraine which triggered the immediate release of the frozen 
ECU 85 million balance of payments loan. Furthermore, the EU agreed to provide additional 
economic assistance in the order of ECU 200 million (then about $240 million) provided that 
Kiev stuck to its closure commitment (NN, July 1995: 31; Economist, 22 July 1995: 18). 
Kiev’s April 1995 closure commitment also unleashed a fierce commercial battle among 
Western European engineering firms over how to replace the generating capacity of the 
Chernobyl NPP. A consortium of 12 Western companies led by the Swiss-Swedish 
engineering firm ABB was the first to act and proposed to build a 3'000 MW gas power plant 
near Slavutich for around $2-3 billion. On 27 May 1995 the Ukrainian government expressed 
its tentative approval of the gas plant option by signing a memorandum of understanding with 
ABB (NZZ, 29 May 1995). A consortium led by Germany’s Siemens subsequently criticized 
ABB’s proposal on the grounds that a gas-fired power plant would only aggravate Ukraine’s 
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balance of payments problems. Instead, Siemens proposed to create 2'000 MW of generating 
capacity in Ukraine by renovating and modernizing existing coal-fired power plants at a cost 
of $1.5 billion. Meanwhile, the European Commission—heavily lobbied by the Western 
European nuclear industry—continued to press for the completion of two to three unfinished 
VVER-1000 units (NW, 1 June 1995: 6-7). 
After the G-7 countries at their summit meeting in Halifax in June 1995 had failed to 
agree on any concrete replacement options and to commit the billions of dollars requested by 
Ukraine, it was only in late September when progress was made on the issue. At a meeting in 
Kiev on 26-27 September, representatives of the G-7 formally rejected the Ukrainian 
government’s proposal to replace the Chernobyl NPP with a gas-fired combined-cycle power 
plant on the grounds that this would increase the country’s reliance on Russian fuel deliveries 
and exacerbate its foreign debt. They argued that priority should be given to reconstructing 
the country’s hydroelectric facilities, modernizing thermal power plants, especially those 
using domestic coal, and completing two unfinished VVERs, i.e. the Khmelnitsky-2 and 
Rovno-4 reactors.7 G-7 representatives further addressed one of the main reasons for Ukraine 
insisting on a new power plant near Slavutich—to remedy the social consequences of 
Chernobyl closure—by proposing to create an international research and technology center on 
the problems of nuclear and radiation disasters in the Chernobyl zone, a proposal that 
promised to provide employment opportunities for the laid off Chernobyl-staff and thus help 
secure the social infrastructure of Slavutich. Finally, for the first time, proposed conversion 
work on the sarcophagus was included in the overall action plan. On the financial level, the 
G-7 indicated its willingness to allocate $1.2 billion for the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian 
energy sector, about $200 million for shutting down the Chernobyl units, a little more than $4 
million for preliminary work on the sarcophagus, and about $3 million for the creation of the 
international research and technology center (NW, 12 October 1995: 9; NucNet, 29 
September 1995). 
Although the Ukrainian leadership supported the proposed measures contained in the 
West’s action plan, it was far from content with the amount of assistance—roughly $1.4 
billion—offered by the Western countries. Ukrainian officials responded by exaggerating the 
economic value of the Chernobyl NPP and hinting that the closure of the plant may be 
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postponed.8 After such measures had failed to galvanize the West into providing the 
demanded $4 billion, Kiev scaled back on its compensation demands in mid-October and put 
the price tag at $3.2 billion (NW, 26 October 1995: 12-13). During talks in early November, 
the G-7 increased its aid package to $2.2 billion, but insisted that Ukraine contribute at least 
$900 million towards the closure costs. Not willing to agree to such a formula, Ukrainian 
Prime Minister Marchuk warned that the Chernobyl NPP would be upgraded for continued 
operation if agreement on the amount of Western assistance were not reached by the end of 
the year (NucNet, 30 November 1995; NW, 14 December 1995: 13). 
Frustrated with the lack of progress in reaching an agreement, several Western 
countries increased the pressure on the Ukrainian government in subsequent weeks by 
threatening to withhold desperately needed credits until Kiev compromised (NW, 11 January 
1996: 1, 8; Marples 1996a: 30). Responding to this pressure, President Kuchma, who was said 
to be personally in favor of shutting down the plant, sacked Goskomatom chairman Umanets 
in late November. Umanets was an influential exponent of the Ukrainian nuclear industry and 
had along with the management of the Chernobyl NPP endorsed plans to keep the troubled 
facility in operation until the end of its service life. G-7 representatives had hence regarded 
Umanets as a major obstacle to reaching a closure agreement (NEI, October 1995: 12; NW, 
14 December 1995: 13). These developments cleared the way for concluding on 1 December 
a draft agreement on the principles of a comprehensive Chernobyl closure deal. Less than 
three weeks later, on 20 December 1995, representatives of the G-7, the European 
Commission, and the Ukrainian government met in Ottawa, Canada, to sign the Memorandum 
of Understanding on the closure of the Chernobyl NPP. 
The December 1995 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the G-7, the 
European Commission and Ukraine was based on Ukrainian President Kuchma’s April 1995 
pledge to close the Chernobyl NPP by the year 2000 and incorporated the G-7’s commitment 
to support Chernobyl’s closure and the development of “long-term, sustainable, market-
oriented energy“, including the completion of the two partly built VVER-1000 units 
Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4. The MoU foresaw the provision of $498 million in grants and 
                                                 
7 Originally, the EU and the G-7 had envisaged completing three partly built VVER-1000 units to compensate 
Ukraine for the closure of Chernobyl units 1-3. However, Ukraine had completed the partly built Zaporozhe-
6 reactor with its own funds and connected the new reactor to the grid in October 1995 (NW, 19 October 
1995: 6). 
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$1.809 billion in international and Euratom loans at preferential rates, a large part of which 
related to projected investments by IFIs and was pending approval based on least-cost and 
feasibility studies. The MoU defined four separate areas of action: a) energy sector reform, b) 
least-cost power supply and efficiency investments to meet national power demand, c) nuclear 
safety issues associated with Chernobyl’s decommissioning, and d) the social impact of 
closing the Chernobyl NPP. Activities in each area were divided into unprofitable and 
profitable projects, the former being financed by grants, the latter by loans. Priority projects 
identified as unprofitable and thus to be funded by grants included power sector restructuring 
($43 million), energy investments ($102 million), safety improvements at Chernobyl unit 3 
and a 15-year decommissioning plan ($349 million), transformation of the sarcophagus into a 
safe structure (undetermined), and a social impact plan ($4 million). Projects considered in 
the MoU to generate revenue included the completion of the Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 
reactors along with the construction of high-voltage transmission lines, the reconstruction of 
hydroelectric and thermal power plants, and the promotion of energy efficiency and demand-
side management measures (NW, 11 January 1996: 9; MoU, December 1995). 
8.3 Implementation of the MoU 
The Western donors soon had to acknowledge that the conclusion of the MoU was only a first 
step towards securing the closure of the Chernobyl NPP and that the haggling over the size 
and composition of the Western funds was far from over as domestic opposition to the plant’s 
closure began to grow in Ukraine. In February 1996, a significant part of the Ukrainian 
parliament signaled its disapproval of the closure deal by sending an open letter to President 
Kuchma stating that there were no economic grounds for prematurely closing the Chernobyl 
NPP and that the plant should continue to operate until 2007, not least in order to avoid 
unemployment and social problems among the station’s workforce (NEI, April 1996: 7; NW, 
2 May 1996: 2). Furthermore, various members of the Ukrainian parliament began to voice 
increasingly strong criticisms of the amount of pledged aid and the slow disbursement of 
Western funds. In addition, a number of Ukrainian deputies demanded a larger portion of aid 
in the form of grants, a demand that reflected the parliament’s concern that the Western loans 
                                                 
8 For example, Ukrainian officials argued that the Chernobyl plant was the most reliable Ukrainian NPP, 
generating annual profits worth over $1.5 billion—a claim that was highly unrealistic due to the chronic non-
payment of bills by Ukrainian electricity consumers (Ebel 1997: 306; NW, 23 March 1995: 16). 
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for power replacement capacity would further aggravate the country’s foreign debt burden 
(NW, 11 January 1996: 9). 
Negotiations between Ukraine and the Western donors took a promising turn at the so-
called nuclear safety meeting of the G-7 and Russia in Moscow on 19-20 April 1996. 
Following the summit’s final statements, President Kuchma announced that Chernobyl unit 1 
would be permanently shut down by the end of the year, contrary to earlier plans which 
foresaw operation of the unit at least until 1997 (NW, 2 May 1996: 2). This decision, 
however, was not free of charge: It had been taken only after Kiev had received assurances 
from the G-7 that IFIs would earmark a total $3.1 billion—i.e. an increase of roughly $800 
million over previous commitments—in exchange for the plant’s closure, with the first 
installments expected before the end of the year. Moreover, the G-7 also agreed to fund 
reconstruction work on the ailing sarcophagus, with implementation following the completion 
of a feasibility study (EEE Report, May 1996: 20; NEI, June 1996: 6). The commitment by 
the G-7 to fund reconstruction work on the sarcophagus certainly helped to assuage Kiev’s 
concerns about creating a situation in which the Chernobyl NPP was shut down and the West 
lost all interest in the solution of this long-term problem that posed a clear and immediate 
threat to Ukraine.9
Despite these promising steps forward, implementation of the MoU continued to stall. 
Irritated by the slow disbursement of Western assistance, chief Ukrainian negotiator Yuriy 
Kostenko warned in mid-October 1996 that the Ukrainian government may reconsider its 
pledge to close Chernobyl unit 1 by the end of the year (OMRI, 16 October 1996). In the 
following weeks the Western donors stepped up their efforts to approve funding for various 
projects foreseen by the MoU. During the final months of 1996, various IFIs and bilateral 
donors agreed to approve loans for the first conventional energy projects following the 
conclusion of the MoU.10 Furthermore, on 12 November representatives of the EBRD and the 
Ukrainian government concluded an ECU 118 million (then about $142 million) NSA grant 
agreement and shortly thereafter, on 30 November 1996, the Ukrainian authorities ordered the 
closure of Chernobyl unit 1 (NW, 5 December 1996: 14). A large part of the NSA grant 
                                                 
9 There was widespread concern in Ukraine that the shelter could collapse due to seismic events, extreme 
weather conditions or continued degradation of the structure of unit 4, and hence give rise to a dispersion of 
radioactive dust. Moreover, experts feared that the continued ingress of rainwater into the shelter could lead 
to a contamination of groundwater in the Dnipro basin or possibly trigger a criticality excursion in the 
remaining fuel-containing materials (NEI, October 1997: 10). 
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package was earmarked for two major decommissioning projects—an interim spent fuel 
facility and a facility for treating the plant’s backlog of liquid radioactive waste—and ECU 
13.5 million was slated for near-term safety improvements at Chernobyl unit 3 (NW, 28 
November 1996: 11-12). Whereas the EBRD argued that the NSA grant agreement 
represented a “concrete step” towards the closure of the plant according to the timetable set 
out in the December 1995 MoU, the Ukrainian government warned that the closure of the 
remaining operational third unit of the Chernobyl NPP by the year 2000 would not be 
possible if the two planned units at the Khmelnitsky and Rovno NPPs were not commissioned 
by the same date. Moreover, Ukrainian officials indicated that the second unit of the 
Chernobyl NPP would be restarted unless the disbursement of Western assistance was 
speeded up (NucNet, 13 November 1996; OMRI, 15 November 1996). 
From late 1996 onward, negotiations between the Western donors and Ukraine on the 
closure of the Chernobyl NPP centered on two issues: The reconstruction of the ailing 
sarcophagus over the destroyed fourth unit of the Chernobyl NPP and the proposed 
completion of the two partly built nuclear reactors at the Khmelnitsky and Rovno NPPs. 
Progress on the sarcophagus issue had stalled so far partly because the negotiating parties had 
failed to agree on any of the many proposed solutions—these ranged from a Russian scheme 
to convert the sarcophagus into a solid concrete monolith to a proposal by a Western 
consortium to build a new shelter over both Chernobyl units 3 and 4. To determine which 
solution was the most cost-effective, the European Commission had commissioned a new 
feasibility study in early 1996. The study’s report was finally published in November 1996. It 
concluded that there was no clear preference among the evaluated options and proposed a 
stepwise approach. After the G-7 countries had adopted the recommendations of the 
feasibility study in December 1996, representatives of the G-7 and the Ukrainian government 
met in Washington in February 1997 and agreed on plans to stabilize the existing structure, 
thereby definitively shelving the idea of building a second shelter. At a meeting in Slavutich 
on 22 April 1997, the G-7 and the Ukrainian government approved the so-called “Shelter 
Implementation Plan“ (SIP). The overall objective of the SIP is to render the sarcophagus 
environmentally safe for a period of about 50 years, during which the means for the ultimate 
removal and disposal of the destroyed reactor and radioactive debris within the structure can 
                                                 
10 See Appendix for an overview of the conventional energy projects in Ukraine approved by IFIs and bilateral 
donors between 1995 and 2000. 
 Case Study V 207 
be devised.11 The reconstruction of the shelter was expected to take at least 8-9 years at an 
estimated cost of around $760 million. Defined as a non-revenue generating project, the SIP 
would be financed by grants (Nuclear Energy Institute 1997: 208-211; NEI, October 1997: 
11). 
At their Denver summit meeting in June 1997, G-7 leaders agreed to contribute $300 
million towards implementation of the SIP and endorsed the establishment of a new 
multilateral funding mechanism to be administered by the EBRD—the so-called “Chernobyl 
Shelter Fund”. Furthermore, the G-7 announced that it would hold a special pledging 
conference before the end of the year with the aim of meeting the balance of the required 
$760 million (NEI, July 1997: 2). However, this goal proved to be too ambitious: At the 
Chernobyl Sarcophagus Pledging Conference held on 20 November 1997 in New York, 
thirteen countries, including the EU, announced new funding pledges in the order of $37 
million and Ukraine agreed to contribute $50 million in-kind for the project. In addition, a 
number of countries made statements of support for the sarcophagus initiative, and the G-7 
promised to continue to solicit international and private sector support for the reconstruction 
project. Despite the apparent shortfall in funding, the Ukrainian government subsequently 
announced that the firmly pledged $387 million—roughly over half of the estimated project 
costs—was enough to start implementation of the SIP (NEI, December 1997: 2; NEI, January 
1998: 8; EEE Report, December 1997: 1-2). By mid-1998 the EBRD had awarded the first 
contracts for a project management unit and for licensing assistance and had allocated ECU 
103 million for a number of priority projects that were slated for implementation over a two 
year period (NW, 14 May 1998: 15; NW, 24 September 1998: 15-16; EBRD 2000: 9). 
These promising steps forward on the sarcophagus issue were clouded by the 
protracted negotiations over Western funding for the proposed completion of the 
Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 reactors, the so-called K2/R4 project. In early 1996 the G-7, 
which as a body has no direct fund raising ability, had instructed the EBRD to assume a 
leading role in financing the completion of the two partly built VVER-1000 units. The 
                                                 
11 The SIP consists of 22 primary tasks and 297 constituent activities within five major areas: 1) reducing the 
probability of sarcophagus collapse, 2) reducing the consequences of an accidental collapse, 3) increasing 
nuclear safety, 4) improving worker and environmental safety, and 5) developing a long-term strategy and 
study for conversion of the sarcophagus to an environmentally safe site (Nuclear Energy Institute 1997: 210). 
The SIP is not an explicitly technical solution to the problem but a logical approach to finding the optimal 
route through the various technical scenarios previously studied. As such the SIP is “decision-based”, 
involving the evaluation of data and technical studies undertaken as the project evolves (NEI, October 1997: 
11). 
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Western project sponsors had envisaged that the EBRD would provide around $375 million, 
i.e. roughly a third of the then estimated $1.2 billion project costs. The EU had already 
pledged a Euratom loan of ECU 400 million (then about $480 million), and the remaining 
funds were expected to be provided by various Western import-export banks and Ukraine. In 
September 1996 the EBRD appointed an independent panel of experts under the chairmanship 
of British professor John Surrey to assess whether the completion of the K2/R4 project was 
the least-cost option for meeting Ukraine’s electricity demands following the anticipated 
closure of the Chernobyl NPP. The EBRD’s decision to appoint an independent panel to 
assess the cost-effectiveness of the nuclear completion project was certainly consistent with 
the bank’s energy operations policy that carries stringent requirements on the use of bank 
loans for energy projects. On the other hand, this decision probably reflected the bank’s desire 
to avoid a repeat of its frustrating experiences with the abortive Mochovce completion project 
in the Slovak Republic. Indeed, in October 1995 the German consulting company Lahmeyer 
International had already completed a least-cost study for the EBRD. This study had 
concluded that completing the two unfinished VVER-1000 units was the overall least-cost 
investment option and it was on the basis of this assessment that the K2/R4 project had been 
included in the December 1995 MoU as the principal Chernobyl power replacement project. 
However, various environmental groups and independent energy experts had subsequently 
criticized Laymeyer’s least-cost study as being biased and inaccurate. It is hence likely that 
the EBRD appointed the independent panel in an attempt to avoid getting in the firing line 
again (NW, 19 September 1996: 1; Energy Economist, July 1998: 7-14; Surrey and Thomas 
1999: 326).12
Five months later, in February 1997, the EBRD published the final report of the 
independent panel, whose conclusions were devastating for the K2/R4 project: All but one of 
the panel members concluded that the plan to complete the Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 
reactors would not be the most cost-effective use of $1 billion or more of Western funds at 
this time. The independent panel argued that economic activity and electricity demand had 
fallen so sharply in the past few years that Ukraine currently enjoyed a large surplus of power 
generating capacity, and predicted that even with sustained economic recovery Ukraine would 
                                                 
12 The fact that the independent panel did not include any French members also points to the EBRD’s desire to 
avoid a second nuclear debacle: In 1995, the EBRD’s French President de Larosière had been severely 
criticized for loading the Mochovce project office with French nationals in what critics saw as a French 
attempt to take-over the project and promote the commercial interests of the French nuclear industry. Since 
EdF and Framatome stood to benefit from a Western-sponsored completion of the K2/R4 project, the EBRD 
deliberately appointed no French national to the panel (NW, 19 September 1996: 9; see also Case Study III). 
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not require additional generating capacity until 2010. The panel also argued that there was a 
more pressing need to implement safety upgrades at the country’s existing 11 VVER-1000 
nuclear reactors than to complete the Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 reactors. Indeed, if the 
implementation of safety upgrades increased operational reliability as well as nuclear safety, 
the extra output of the existing nuclear reactors would make the completion of the K2/R4 
project even less worthwhile. Finally, the panel felt that the vast potential for energy 
efficiency in Ukraine had not been sufficiently explored. As such the panel concluded that the 
least-cost approach to Ukraine’s energy problems was to enhance the operational reliability 
and efficiency of the country’s existing nuclear, thermal and hydroelectric power plants, to 
rehabilitate the deteriorating and highly inefficient transmission and distribution grid and to 
reduce excess demand by promoting energy efficiency schemes among industrial and 
residential energy consumers. As a matter of fact, the independent panel warned that the 
proposed K2/R4 project could possibly exacerbate Ukraine’s energy problems. Indeed, the 
installation of additional generating capacity threatened to use up the country’s scarce 
borrowing capacity for a purpose not needed and to undermine the efficiency objectives 
behind the Ukrainian government’s proposed market-based reforms throughout the energy 
sector (Surrey et al. 1997; Surrey 1997: 871-875). 
The independent panel’s report dealt a serious blow to the implementation of the 
December 1995 MoU that had designated the completion of the Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 
reactors as the principal Chernobyl power replacement project. The panel’s conclusion that 
the K2/R4 project was not the least-cost option for Ukraine’s energy needs implied that the 
EBRD could not fund the nuclear completion project. Yet the future of the K2/R4 project 
hinged on the approval of loans by the EBRD since the Euratom loan facility—the only other 
identified international source of finance for the project—was authorized to finance not more 
than 50 percent of the costs of any project it participated in and had announced that it would 
follow the EBRD’s lead (NW, 2 January 1997: 13-14). On the other hand, there was a 
growing perception in the West that Ukraine would soon close the Chernobyl NPP 
irrespective of whether or not the Western donors agreed to fund the K2/R4 project. Western 
officials had become increasingly aware that the restart of Chernobyl unit 2 was becoming 
more and more unlikely since Ukraine lacked the necessary funds and technical expertise to 
210 Case Study V 
refurbish the ailing reactor.13 Moreover, Chernobyl unit 3, the remaining operational reactor 
at the plant, had been shut down in July 1997 for a scheduled maintenance outage. During the 
maintenance outage, which was originally expected to last for about three months, 263 new 
cracks and defects in the unit’s coolant pipes were discovered which in turn meant that the 
unit’s repair would be seriously extended and the costs of restarting the reactor considerably 
increased. As a result various members of the Ukrainian nuclear community predicted that 
Chernobyl unit 3 would not be reconnected to the grid if the repair money were delayed (NN, 
September 1997: 26-27; NW, 6 November 1997: 2-3). 
Despite these developments, the fate of the K2/R4 project was far from sealed and the 
haggling over the required funds continued. Determined to avert the growing perception in the 
West that the Chernobyl problem might go away on its own and eager to preserve its 
remaining bargaining chip in negotiations with the Western donors, the Ukrainian government 
undertook strenuous efforts to mobilize the needed funds—estimated at around $55 million—
to repair the debilitated third unit of the Chernobyl NPP (NN, December 1997: 38, 59). In 
mid-May 1998, shortly after the EBRD had held its annual board meeting in Kiev, the 
Ukrainian authorities brought Chernobyl unit 3 back on line.14 Furthermore, between 
November 1997 and May 1998 various Ukrainian officials and government agencies 
repeatedly warned that the Chernobyl NPP would not be closed by 2000 unless the 
Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 reactors were completed by that time and even threatened to 
begin with preparations to upgrade Chernobyl units 2 and 3 for extended operation until 2010-
2015.15
Finally, the Ukrainian government began to discuss with Russian officials the 
possibility of completing the Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 reactors in collaboration with 
Russian nuclear engineering firms and with Russian financial assistance. Ukrainian officials 
were not only frustrated with the apparent reluctance of the EBRD to approve the required 
loans, but also objected to the high costs of the Western-led project. While Ukrainian officials 
                                                 
13 The Ukrainian parliament’s proposal to appropriate the necessary financial resources for the refurbishment of 
Chernobyl unit 2—estimated to cost about $200 million—from the national privatization fund failed to 
impress Western officials since it was apparent that due to Ukraine’s slow privatization process, there was 
virtually no money in that fund (NW, 24 April 1997: 15-16; NW, 31 July 1997: 5-6). 
14 The Ukrainian authorities had originally planned to bring Chernobyl unit 3 back on line on 5 May, i.e. three 
days before the opening of the EBRD’s annual meeting in Kiev, but agreed to comply with a request by the 
EBRD to postpone the unit’s startup (RFE/RL Newsline, 28 April 1998). 
15 For official pronouncements along these lines, see RFE/RL Newsline, 18 November 1997, 12 February 1998, 
6 May 1998, 12 May 1998; NW, 9 April 1998: 1; NW, 7 May 1998: 11. 
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argued that the two nuclear reactors could be completed at a cost of no more than $800 
million, the EBRD estimated the total project costs at over $1.2 billion, not least because the 
Western-led project included the installation of additional nuclear safety measures. Following 
a series of bilateral talks in late 1997 and early 1998, the Russian government agreed in 
February 1998 to grant Ukraine a technical loan in the order of $180 million towards joint 
completion of the K2/R4 project (EEE Report, February 1998: 35; RFE/RL Newsline, 23 
February 1998). The Ukrainian threat to turn the K2/R4 project over to the Russians was no 
doubt designed to increase the pressure on the Western donors to allocate the required loans. 
Indeed, a Russian take-over of the K2/R4 project would not only result in the loss of lucrative 
contracts for the Western nuclear industry, but also in the adoption of less strict safety 
standards than envisaged in the Western-led completion project. 
In the meantime, various Western donor states exerted strong political pressure on the 
EBRD with the aim of prompting the bank to find a formula that would allow for its 
participation in the K2/R4 project. Many Western donor governments argued that the political 
imperative to close the Chernobyl NPP remained above and beyond economic criteria: The 
completion of the Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 reactors had been defined as the principal 
Chernobyl power replacement project in the December 1995 MoU, and failure to meet this 
condition could possibly unravel the Chernobyl closure deal. Strategic considerations also 
contributed to the ongoing support by the major donor governments for the K2/R4 project. 
Various Western countries, in particular the United States, were eager to reinforce Ukrainian 
statehood in order to safeguard against the risk of a failing Ukrainian state seeking a political 
rapprochement with Russia.16 Completing the Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 reactors, which 
promised to reduce Ukraine’s dependence on Russian fossil fuel imports, was regarded as one 
possible means to prevent such an outcome.17 In addition, the West did not want to appear 
deserting Kiev at a time when Russia, irritated about NATO’s expansion plans, would likely 
be pressing hard on Ukraine (Economist, 1 March 1997: 18; FAZ, 3 March 1997; NW, 15 
May 1997: 11). 
                                                 
16 Zbigniew Brzezinksi, a former U.S. National Security adviser, has described the strong strategic interest of 
the United States in a viable and sovereign Ukraine with the following words: “It cannot be stressed strongly 
enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then 
subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire” (FT, 4 May 1998; see also NZZ, 27 May 1998). It is 
therefore not surprising that Ukraine has become the third largest recipient of U.S. aid after Israel and Egypt 
(Ebel 1997: 276). 
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Finally, several donor governments feared that if the West failed to finance the K2/R4 
project, Ukraine would still complete the two VVER-1000 units, however no longer to the 
rather strict safety standards envisaged in the Western-led completion project, but to the 
original Russian design specifications, and without Western nuclear engineering firms 
benefiting from the lucrative upgrade and completion work. The latter concern was 
pronounced in particular among the governments of France, Germany and the United States 
whose domestic nuclear industries were expected to assume a leading role in implementing 
the nuclear completion project (EEE Report, May 1997: 1-2; FAZ, 30 July 1997). 
At the instigation of various Western donor governments, the EBRD quietly dropped 
the conclusions of the independent panel and commissioned the American consulting firm 
Stone & Webster to re-assess the project’s cost-effectiveness. This second economic analysis, 
which was presented to the EBRD in May 1998, concluded that there was a 50 percent 
probability that the completion of the Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 reactors constituted the 
least-cost approach to Ukraine’s energy needs.18
Although Stone & Webster’s conclusions hardly represented a ringing endorsement of 
the K2/R4 project, they were apparently sufficient—along with ongoing pressure by the major 
Western donor governments—to induce the EBRD to consider getting involved in the 
controversial nuclear completion project. In mid-June 1998 the EBRD announced that the 
K2/R4 project had passed initial review, thereby triggering the launch of a four-month public 
consultation process before the project would be submitted for final review and then to the 
bank’s board for approval. However, the EBRD remained highly critical of the project’s 
financial viability. To begin with, the bank stated that it would contribute no more than $190 
million towards the now estimated $1.7 billion project costs—a financial contribution far 
below the $375 million the Western project-sponsors had originally envisaged. In addition, 
the EBRD specified that the Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 reactors would have to be built 
                                                 
17 The strategic interest of the G-7 countries in reducing Ukraine’s dependence on Russian fossil fuel supplies 
was expressed in their vetoing of the Ukrainian government’s proposal in early 1995 to replace the 
Chernobyl NPP with a gas-fired combined-cycle power plant (Surrey and Thomas 1999: 331). 
18 With a view to the fact that the assumptions used in Stone & Webster’s re-assessment of the K2/R4 project 
had been largely provided by Ukrainian, EU and U.S. officials, i.e. all interested parties, it was not surprising 
that the consultant’s report was generally optimistic about the project’s cost-effectiveness (Energy 
Economist, July 1998: 10). 
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sequentially, with loans for the second unit being granted only when the first unit was 
completed.19
Finally, it made the disbursement of any loans for the nuclear completion project 
contingent upon a host of far-reaching conditions. Concerned that the low level of cash 
payments for power in Ukraine could result in a non-performing loan and therefore impact on 
its AAA credit rating, the EBRD insisted that Ukraine make significant progress in reforming 
its energy sector. Specifically, the bank demanded that the Ukrainian government improve the 
poor cash-collection rates in the country’s power sector, reduce barter-deals and increase 
electricity tariffs. Moreover, the EBRD added a new condition which went far beyond the 
December 1995 MoU’s emphasis on energy sector reform: By indicating that it would only 
consider approving loans for the K2/R4 project once the Ukrainian government had signed 
the $2.2 billion Extended Fund Facility (EFF) then under negotiation with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the EBRD effectively linked the fate of the nuclear completion project 
to wider economic reform in Ukraine (NW, 18 June 1998: 20-21; Energy Economist, July 
1998: 10, 13). 
The stringent loan conditions spelled out by the EBRD did not go down well with the 
Ukrainian government. Indeed, Kiev feared that the onerous loan conditions imposed by the 
EBRD would seriously delay the disbursement of Western funds for the nuclear completion 
project. Consequently, in July 1998 the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers issued a statement in 
which it formally linked the closure schedule of the Chernobyl NPP to the starting up of the 
Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 reactors. The Cabinet statement declared quite frankly that this 
linkage aimed to make the Western donors more responsive to their obligations under the 
December 1995 MoU and hence to accelerate financing of the K2/R4 project (NW, 6 August 
1998: 11). 
In the following months progress on the K2/R4 funding issue inched forward. In 
December 1998 the four-month public consultation process was successfully concluded. 
Whereas various Western anti-nuclear governments and environmental groups protested 
vehemently against the EBRD’s decision to accept the results of the public consultation 
process, project proponents were reportedly optimistic that the EBRD would soon approve 
                                                 
19 According to the EBRD, the proposal to build the two reactors sequentially reflected “the need to mitigate 
the very substantial risk that the project will not be completed on time or on budget and that microeconomic 
discipline and the drive towards structural reforms will not be maintained, endangering the repayment of 
sovereign loans” (Energy Economist, July 1998: 11-12). 
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loans for the K2/R4 project, which in turn was expected to trigger the definitive closure of the 
remaining operational unit at the Chernobyl NPP by the end of 1999 (NW, 17 December 
1998: 13, 15). Decision-makers at the European Commission and the EBRD now appeared 
determined to press on with loan financing, even though the EIB had stated its reservations 
about the project’s financial viability in a January 1999 memorandum (EEE Report, February 
1999: 13-14). Indeed, a TACIS briefing issued on 12 April 1999 described the plan to 
complete the two Ukrainian reactors as “perfectly defined” and “economically justified” and 
confirmed that the contractors for the project had been selected and approved by the EBRD 
and Euratom (EEE Report, April 1999: 6-7). Furthermore, in May 1999 the EBRD’s 
Operations Committee formally approved the K2/R4 project, thereby making way for a final 
board decision on the matter (PEE, 10 June 1999: 12). In the meantime, the Ukrainian 
authorities had taken important decisions to settle the status of Chernobyl units 1 and 2. In 
December 1998 the Ukrainian nuclear utility Energoatom had received a license to begin the 
first phase of decommissioning at Chernobyl unit 1, and in March 1999 the Ukrainian 
government announced that it had abandoned earlier plans to repair and restart the second unit 
of the Chernobyl NPP (NW, 17 December 1998: 14; NW, 25 March 1999: 17). 
However, the growing momentum in favor of Western financing of the K2/R4 
project—and hence the improved prospects of securing the definitive closure of the 
Chernobyl NPP by the end of 1999—suffered a serious setback in mid-1999 due to a 
widening fissure among the Western donor governments. Indeed, just days before the G-7 
countries were expected to endorse the K2/R4 project at their June 1999 summit meeting in 
Cologne, which was expected to pave the way for a positive EBRD board decision in July, the 
Bundestag voted against German participation in the funding of the two nuclear reactors and 
called on the German government to support non-nuclear alternatives in Ukraine instead 
(PEE, 10 June 1999: 12-13; EEE Report, June 1999: 19; NW, 24 June 1999: 5-7). Henceforth 
the new administration under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, a fragile coalition government 
between the Social Democratic Party and the anti-nuclear Green Party, signaled its opposition 
to the nuclear completion project. Given the political weight of Germany within the EBRD 
and the large amount of export agency credits it had been expected to provide, the German 
government’s sudden change of course added a new uncertainty to the fate of the K2/R4 
project and consequently delayed formal discussions at the EBRD. 
In early July 1999 the Ukrainian government rejected Gerhard Schröder’s proposal to 
replace the Chernobyl NPP with modern thermal power facilities and subsequently warned 
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the West that the troubled Chernobyl facility would remain in operation until the 
Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 reactors were completed (RFE/RL Newsline, 12 July 1999; NW, 
15 July 1999: 6-7; NW, 5 August 1999: 8). Finally, after having been shut down for five 
months for additional repairs, the third unit of the Chernobyl NPP was reconnected to the grid 
in late November 1999, just weeks before the Western donors had hoped the plant would be 
definitively closed according to the December 1995 MoU.20 The Ukrainian government 
justified its decision to keep Chernobyl unit 3 in operation until an unspecified date in 2000 
on the grounds that Ukraine had not yet received the funds promised by the West to complete 
the Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 reactors (PEE, 26 November 1999: 10; RFE/RL Newsline, 
29 November 1999). Although the restart of the debilitated third unit of the Chernobyl NPP 
caused concern amongst the Western donors, they grudgingly accepted the Ukrainian 
government’s plans to keep the unit in operation for some time. However, G-7 representatives 
warned the Ukrainian government in December 1999 that additional funding for the 
reconstruction of the sarcophagus would depend on the unit’s definitive closure in 2000 (NW, 
23 December 1999: 13). Having received contributions in the order of $400 million so far, the 
SIP was still about $360 million short of the estimated $760 million needed. The Ukrainian 
government was no doubt hopeful that the outstanding funds for the SIP would be mobilized 
at a second pledging conference, scheduled to take place in mid-2000. 
In subsequent months the Western donors focused their efforts on securing a firm 
closure date for the remaining operational unit at the Chernobyl NPP. During a visit to 
Ukraine in early February 2000 U.S. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson promised that the 
United States would make the largest G-7 contribution to repair the sarcophagus at the 
upcoming pledging conference and agreed to provide $22.5 million to help complete a 
thermal power plant to power the Chernobyl site after decommissioning activities had started 
(NW, 10 February 2000: 5). In the wake of Richardson’s visit, Ukrainian President Kuchma 
ordered his government to set a definitive policy on the plant’s future. Although the Ukrainian 
Ministry of Fuel and Energy continued to lobby for the plant’s extended operation, the 
Ukrainian cabinet decreed on 29 March 2000 to permanently close the Chernobyl NPP in 
2000 (NW, 2 March 2000: 12-13; NW, April 2000: 9-10). Two months later, on 5 June, 
Ukrainian President Kuchma announced after talks with U.S. President Clinton in Kiev that 
                                                 
20 Chernobyl unit 3 was reconnected to the grid on 28 November 1999 only to be taken off-line on 3 December 
for further repairs following the detection of a leak in the plant’s emergency core cooling system. The reactor 
was restarted on 6 December (PEE, 10 December 1999: 14). 
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the third unit of the Chernobyl NPP would be definitively closed by 15 December 2000. 
President Clinton rewarded Kuchma’s closure commitment with a firm pledge to allocate $78 
million for the reconstruction of the sarcophagus and $2 million for safety improvement 
projects at other Ukrainian NPPs (RFE/RL Newsline, 6 June 2000; NW, 8 June 2000: 12). 
Kuchma’s decision to definitively close the ill-fated plant by the end of the year also led 
prospective SIP donors to drop their reservations about providing additional funding for the 
reconstruction of the sarcophagus: At a second pledging conference in Berlin on 5 July 2000, 
donors agreed to allocate an additional $322 million, thereby securing the continuation of the 
SIP (NW, 13 July 2000: 15-16). 
The commitment by President Kuchma to close the Chernobyl NPP by 15 December 
2000 also set a de-facto deadline for the EBRD to take a final decision on the contentious 
issue of financing the K2/R4 project. During the following months the Western project 
proponents—eager to prevent the nuclear completion project from falling into the hands of 
the Russians—worked hard to garner support for a positive board decision at the EBRD (NW, 
23 November 2000: 1; RFE/RL Weekday Magazine, 21 November 2000). In the meantime, 
various factions of the Ukrainian parliament sought to increase the pressure on the Western 
donors by signaling their intention to pass a bill that would keep the third unit of the 
Chernobyl NPP in operation past the scheduled closure date if the EBRD failed to approve 
loans for the project (NW, 9 November 2000: 9; RFE/RL Newsline, 6 November 2000). In 
mid-November EBRD President Jean Lemierre requested the bank’s board of directors to 
grant Ukraine a $215 million loan towards the completion of the Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 
reactors (NW, 23 November 2000: 1). Three weeks later, and only days before the scheduled 
closure of the Chernobyl NPP, this funding request was met: On 7 December 2000 the EBRD 
board approved the $215 million loan by a comfortable margin, not least owing to the 
decision of Germany to abstain rather than vote against the project.21
However, the EBRD board specified that the disbursement of the loan was contingent 
on a set of strict conditions. Among the board’s chief conditions were official confirmation of 
Chernobyl’s permanent closure, resumption by the IMF of its Extended Fund Facility (EFF) 
to Ukraine, assurances on the safety of the planned K2/R4 reactors and on the independence 
of Ukraine’s nuclear safety authority, and written confirmation by other lending institutions of 
                                                 
21 Although nine countries represented on the EBRD board voted against the project, their shareholdings in the 
EBRD were not large enough to overturn approval of a loan. Large EBRD shareholders, such as the United 
States, Canada, France and the United Kingdom, voted in favor of the project (NW, 14 December 2000: 1). 
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their expected participation in funding the project.22 In addition, the EBRD board insisted that 
the Ukrainian government make progress in reforming the country’s energy sector, in 
particular continued privatization of energy distribution companies and significant increases 
in both power tariffs and the proportion of cash collection on electricity deliveries (NW, 14 
December 2000: 1). Provided that these conditions are met, Ukraine will receive over $1.2 
billion in international financing for the completion of the Khmelnitksy-2 and Rovno-4 
reactors.23 Yet irrespective of the final outcome of the K2/R4 project, the Western donors 
could celebrate one of their biggest successes in the nuclear safety field: On 15 December 
2000 the Ukrainian government ordered the definitive closure of the remaining operational 
unit at the Chernobyl NPP, thereby bringing to an end the seven year struggle between the 
West and Ukraine over the fate of the world’s most infamous nuclear power plant. 
8.4 Assessment 
To which extent did Ukraine change its externality-generating behavior in a direction desired 
by the Western donors? In October 1993 the Ukrainian parliament cancelled its previous 
resolution to close the remaining operational reactors of the ill-fated Chernobyl NPP (units 1 
and 3) by the end of 1993 and approved the government’s plans to upgrade and extend the 
service lives of these two units. Moreover, in early 1994 the Ukrainian government approved 
plans by the Ukrainian nuclear industry to prepare the restart of Chernobyl unit 2 which had 
been closed in October 1991 due to a fire in the unit’s turbine hall. Kiev’s decision not to 
close the Chernobyl NPP as previously scheduled and its plans to grant the troubled facility a 
new lease on life was greeted with loud dismay in the West. The Chernobyl NPP, equipped 
with inherently unsafe RBMK nuclear reactors and crippled by the effects of the 1986 
disaster, did not only constitute a serious nuclear safety threat, but was also a powerful 
international symbol of the dangers associated with the exploitation of nuclear power. The 
leaders of various Western countries therefore insisted that Chernobyl units 1 and 3 be shut 
down as soon as possible, and that unit 2 not be restarted. 
                                                 
22 Shortly after the EBRD board had voted in favor of funding the K2/R4 project, the European Commission 
approved on 13 December a $585 million Euratom loan towards the completion of the two reactors (NW, 21 
December 2000: 13). 
23 According to the international financing plan for the K2/R4 project, the EBRD is to provide $215 million, 
Euratom $585 million, various Western export credit agencies $348 million and the Russian government 
$124 million. Ukraine is expected to provide the balance of the estimated $1.48 billion project costs (NW, 14 
December 2000: 1). 
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Despite the urgency of the nuclear safety problem in Ukraine, it took over a year of 
diplomatic wrangling until the G-7 and EU gained a closure commitment from the Ukrainian 
government. In April 1995 Ukrainian President Kuchma finally agreed in principle to close 
the Chernobyl NPP by 2000—but only on the condition that Ukraine receive around $4.5 
billion in compensation. After much haggling over the amount of compensation the West 
would have to pay in exchange for the premature closure of the Chernobyl NPP, the G-7, the 
European Commission and the Ukrainian government concluded a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) in December 1995. On the basis of the MoU, the Western donors 
agreed to provide $2.3 billion in assistance in exchange for the closure of the Chernobyl NPP 
by 2000. The closure date stipulated in the MoU was rather vague in the sense that it did not 
clearly specify whether the Chernobyl NPP was expected to be closed before the year 2000 or 
in 2000. Nevertheless, given the critical safety situation at the Chernobyl NPP, the Western 
donors no doubt preferred to see the ill-fated plant closed as soon as possible, i.e. anytime 
before 2000. 
Implementation of the December 1995 MoU proved to be a bumpy and protracted 
process. After the Ukrainian government had agreed to close Chernobyl unit 1 in November 
1996, it became increasingly irritated by the slow disbursement of Western assistance, in 
particular by the apparent reluctance of the Western donors to approve loans for the 
completion of the Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 reactors (K2/R4) which had been foreseen by 
the MoU as the principal Chernobyl power replacement project. As a result, Ukrainian 
officials repeatedly threatened to restart unit 2 and to postpone the closure of unit 3 if the 
K2/R4 project was not completed on schedule. To render its latter threat more credible, the 
Ukrainian government undertook strenuous efforts to keep Chernobyl unit 3 running, despite 
the fact that the debilitated reactor was in constant need of repairs and clearly unfit for 
continued operation. Moreover, Kiev also warned the Western donors that if funding for the 
K2/R4 project was not delivered on time, it would complete the two partly built nuclear 
reactors at lower cost—and hence at less strict safety standards—with Russian technical and 
financial assistance. In March 1999 the Ukrainian government finally abandoned its plans to 
repair and restart Chernobyl unit 2, most likely because it lacked the necessary funds for this 
complex and costly task, but continued to insist that the closure of unit 3 depended on 
Western funding for the K2/R4 project. Not least to preserve its remaining bargaining chip in 
negotiations with the West, the Ukrainian government approved in November 1999 the restart 
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and continued operation of Chernobyl unit 3 which had previously been shut down for various 
months for additional repairs. 
Nevertheless, the Ukrainian government eventually realized that its threat to upgrade 
unit 3 for long-term operation was unlikely to entice the Western donors to approve loans for 
the K2/R4 project and, even more alarming to the cash-strapped country, might jeopardize 
Western funding for other Chernobyl-related projects, in particular for the reconstruction of 
the shelter over the destroyed fourth unit of the Chernobyl NPP. As a result, on 5 June 2000 
Ukrainian President Kuchma announced that the last operational unit of the Chernobyl NPP 
would be definitively closed by mid-December 2000. The Chernobyl NPP was duly shut 
down on 15 December 2000, a couple of days after the EBRD board had voted in favor of 
funding the K2/R4 project provided that a set of stringent loan conditions was met. In short, 
Ukraine more or less changed its externality-generating behavior in a direction desired by the 
Western donors. The Ukrainian government did not only close Chernobyl unit 1 in November 
1996, but also abstained from modernizing and restarting unit 2. Moreover, although the 
Ukrainian government made every effort to keep Chernobyl unit 3 on line as long as possible, 
which was certainly undesirable from the Western donors’ point of view, it ultimately did 
close the last operational nuclear reactor of the Chernobyl NPP in mid-December 2000. 
Which cooperation strategies and what kind of measures were employed by the 
Western donors to influence Ukraine’s behavior? The principal cooperation strategy by which 
the Western donors sought to enable and induce Ukraine to close the Chernobyl NPP as soon 
as possible was a positive incentive strategy. In June 1994 the EU offered to provide $600 
million in grants and loans in exchange for a Ukrainian closure commitment. At their summit 
meeting in July 1994, the G-7 countries pledged an additional $200 million in assistance for 
Chernobyl’s premature closure. After Ukrainian President Kuchma had finally agreed in 
principle to close the plant by 2000 under the condition that the West footed the $4.5 billion 
bill, the Western donors gradually increased their compensation offers. In the December 1995 
MoU the Western donors promised to provide $2.3 billion—$500 million in grants and $1.8 
billion in loans under favorable conditions—to assist the hard-pressed country with the 
solution of various Chernobyl-related problems and to compensate Ukraine for the power 
foregone by the plant’s closure. Western grants, which ultimately exceeded the $500 million 
envisaged by the MoU, were slated for a wide array of measures designed to improve nuclear 
safety at the Chernobyl NPP, decommission the closed plant, reconstruct the ailing 
sarcophagus over the destroyed fourth unit (alone for this complex and costly task about $720 
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million has so far been pledged by various donors), and to mitigate the social consequences of 
the plant’s closure. Moreover, between 1995 and 2000 the World Bank, the EBRD and 
bilateral donors disbursed or tentatively approved approximately $700 million in favorable 
loans for the realization of various energy projects aimed at restructuring the Ukrainian power 
sector, modernizing existing hydroelectric and thermal power plants and enhancing energy 
efficiency. Finally, after much delay the EBRD announced on 7 December 2000 its tentative 
approval of a loan for the K2/R4 project. Provided that the Ukrainian government does meet 
the stringent loan conditions spelled out by the EBRD, Ukraine will receive over $1.2 billion 
in favorable loans for the nuclear completion project—$215 million from the EBRD, $585 
million from Euratom, $348 million from various Western export credit agencies, and $124 
million from the Russian government. 
Apart from providing a comprehensive package of positive incentives, the Western 
donors also resorted to negative incentive strategies at least twice during the protracted 
negotiation process. In the fall of 1994 the EU had grown so incensed about the Ukrainian 
government’s apparent reluctance to compromise on the Chernobyl closure issue that it froze 
an already approved ECU 85 million balance of payments loan, releasing the loan only after 
Ukrainian President Kuchma had agreed in principle to close the Chernobyl NPP by 2000. 
Moreover, in late 1995 a number of G-7 countries sought to entice the Ukrainian government 
to sign the MoU by threatening to withhold an unspecified amount of Western loans. In 
addition, at one stage of the negotiation process the Western donors also employed a positive 
issue-linkage strategy. In May 1995 the EU linked the disbursement of around ECU 200 
million in macro-economic assistance to Ukrainian progress with its Chernobyl closure plan. 
Finally, the Western donors also employed cognitive and normative strategies. By conducting 
a series of nuclear safety studies and least-cost investment analyses the Western donors 
sought to furnish the Ukrainian authorities with more reliable information concerning both the 
risks of keeping the Chernobyl NPP in operation and the costs and benefits of alternative 
energy strategies. Moreover, during various rounds of negotiations and talks Western 
government officials and nuclear safety experts sought to persuade the Ukrainian authorities 
to attach higher priority to nuclear safety issues and hence to abandon their plans to grant the 
Chernobyl NPP a new lease on life. 
To which extent was the observed behavioral change on the part of Ukraine influenced 
by the provision of positive incentives and how high was the effectiveness of the transaction? 
Although the Western donors employed various cooperation strategies in parallel to secure the 
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premature closure of the Chernobyl NPP, it is plausible to suggest that the observed 
behavioral change on the part of Ukraine was predominantly determined by the provision of 
positive incentives. From the outset of the negotiation process, the Ukrainian government had 
made it clear to the G-7 and EU that the closure of the Chernobyl NPP would entail severe 
political, financial and social costs which the cash-strapped country was both unable and 
unwilling to bear on its own. Indeed, although the power generated by the Chernobyl NPP 
accounted for only about 6 percent of the country’s total electricity supply, this was still a 
considerable amount of energy to forego at a time when Ukraine was struggling to cope with 
a severe energy and economic crisis and when Russia was eager to exploit Ukraine’s massive 
debts for natural gas imports to gain political concessions in other outstanding bilateral issues. 
In addition, even if ways could be found to replace the power produced by the Chernobyl 
NPP, Ukraine would still have to cope with a number of costly and complex problems 
associated with the plant’s closure that clearly exceeded its technical and financial capacities. 
These costly and complex problems included the safe decommissioning of the Chernobyl 
reactors, the reconstruction of the sarcophagus over the destroyed fourth unit, the resettlement 
of the plant’s workforce, and the decontamination of the surrounding zone. 
Against this backdrop, it is rather unlikely that the alternative cooperation strategies 
employed by the Western donors significantly influenced Ukraine’s willingness to 
prematurely close the Chernobyl NPP. To be sure, the negative incentive strategy employed 
by the EU in the fall of 1994, i.e. the temporary suspension of an ECU 85 million balance of 
payments loan, did entice the Ukrainian government to get back to the negotiating table and to 
agree—at least in principle—to close the Chernobyl NPP by 2000. Similarly, the threat by 
various G-7 countries in late 1995 to withhold an unspecified amount of Western loans most 
likely raised the pressure on the Ukrainian government to sign the MoU. And the EU’s 
positive issue-linkage strategy—i.e. its May 1995 offer to provide ECU 200 million in macro-
economic assistance provided that Ukraine stuck to its Chernobyl closure plan—may have 
contributed to the Ukrainian government’s willingness to adopt a more cooperative stance 
during the negotiation process. Nevertheless, since these alternative cooperation strategies did 
not directly address the key cooperation problem in negotiations with Ukraine—i.e. the 
latter’s insufficient financial and technical capacities to prematurely close the Chernobyl 
NPP—and were employed only after the Western donors had pledged to provide a significant 
amount of positive incentives, it is plausible to suggest that their effect on the final outcome 
of the negotiation process was small. In short, on the basis of these considerations, and with a 
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view to the fact that Ukraine did comply—after some delay—with the West’s closure 
demands, we can conclude that the effectiveness of the transaction was rather high. 
How high was the efficiency of the transaction? First dimension of efficiency: The 
transaction was efficient in the sense that it was highly unlikely that an alternative cooperation 
strategy could have led to comparable or superior behavioral changes on the part of Ukraine 
at a lower or comparable cost. The Western donors could have sought to increase the 
incentives on the part of the Ukrainian government to comply with Western closure demands 
by tying the disbursement of additional economic aid or the improvement of trade relations to 
the premature closure of the Chernobyl NPP. However, such positive issue-linkage strategies 
were unlikely to be more cost-effective than positive incentive strategies because they would 
have not directly addressed the Ukrainian government’s key cooperation problem—i.e. the 
country’s critical energy situation and its insufficient financial and technical resources to cope 
with the costly and complex tasks of closing and decommissioning the Chernobyl NPP. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that the Western donors would have secured the premature closure of 
the Chernobyl NPP by resorting to negative incentive strategies. As a matter of fact, it is 
highly likely that the imposition of economic sanctions or other punitive measures would 
have only exacerbated Ukraine’s destitute economic situation, thereby forcing the hard-
pressed country to rely even more heavily on the cheap, but unsafe power produced at the ill-
fated Chernobyl NPP. Finally, it is difficult to see how the employment of normative or 
cognitive strategies could have led to a more favorable outcome from the Western donors’ 
point of view. Indeed, given the strong asymmetric capacities and preferences underlying the 
nuclear safety problem in Ukraine, it is evident that neither persuasion attempts nor the 
provision of more complete information concerning the risks of keeping the Chernobyl NPP 
in operation or the relative benefits and costs of alternative energy strategies would have 
prompted the Ukrainian government to prematurely close the Chernobyl NPP. 
Second dimension of efficiency: Since alternative ways of employing positive 
incentives could have led to at least a comparable behavioral change on the part of Ukraine at 
lower cost, the transaction did involve serious inefficiencies. To be sure, the Western donors 
employed a considerable amount of resources for various cost-effective measures designed to 
enable Ukraine to prematurely close the Chernobyl NPP, such as for the decommissioning of 
the plant, the reconstruction of the shelter over the destroyed fourth unit or for the 
implementation of a number of conventional energy projects aimed at rehabilitating the 
country’s ailing power sector. On the other hand, the Western donors tentatively agreed in 
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December 2000 to provide over $1.2 billion in loans—a significant part of the total amount of 
assistance pledged by the West in the December 1995 MoU—to complete the controversial 
K2/R4 project. 
Considering that Ukraine faced a critical energy situation, it is certainly plausible to 
suggest that the Western offer to help offset the shortfall in Ukraine’s electricity supply 
following the closure of the Chernobyl NPP did entice the Ukrainian government to comply 
with the West’s closure demands. However, it is rather debatable whether the provision of 
over $1.2 billion in loans for the completion of the two partly built nuclear reactors was the 
most cost-effective way to enable and induce the Ukrainian government to prematurely close 
the Chernobyl NPP. Indeed, as the independent panel commissioned by the EBRD had 
pointed out in its 1997 economic assessment of the K2/R4 project, Ukraine’s energy problems 
did not stem from a lack of power generating capacity (the country actually faced a surplus in 
power generating capacity due to its distressed economic situation), but rather from serious 
inefficiencies in electricity production, distribution and consumption. The independent panel 
had therefore concluded that financing the completion of the two partly built Ukrainian 
reactors did not represent the most cost-effective use of Western funds. Rather, the least-cost 
approach to Ukraine’s energy problems was to enhance the operational reliability and 
efficiency of the country’s existing power plants and transmission and distribution grid and to 
reduce excess demand by promoting energy efficiency schemes among industrial and 
residential energy consumers. In short, the efficiency of the transaction (second dimension) 
was rather low because the Western donors could have likely secured a comparable 
behavioral change on the part of Ukraine at lower cost by refraining from financing the 
expensive K2/R4 project and instead funding alternative, more cost-effective capacity-
building measures. 
To which extent did the theoretically predicted problems in designing and 
implementing positive incentives shape the effectiveness and efficiency of the transaction? At 
first sight it appears that extortion problems negatively affected the efficiency of the 
transaction. Indeed, throughout the negotiation and MoU implementation process the 
Ukrainian government had repeatedly threatened to prolong the service life of the unsafe 
Chernobyl NPP—i.e. to expose the Western countries to significantly enhanced levels of 
environmental risk—unless the Western donors provided sufficient assistance and/or 
delivered the pledged assistance more swiftly. Moreover, the Ukrainian government was 
probably not genuinely interested in the prolonged operation of the Chernobyl NPP—most 
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Ukrainian decision-makers were most likely aware of the serious safety risks posed by this 
course of action—, but rather used the threat to modernize the ill-fated plant for long-term 
operation as a powerful bargaining chip to gain as much compensation as possible in 
exchange for the plant’s premature closure. Finally, the Ukrainian bargaining strategy appears 
to have been relatively successful in extracting a considerable amount of compensation from 
the West: Even though the Ukrainian government did not gain all of the assistance that it had 
originally demanded, it certainly received more compensation than it could have expected in 
late 1993. 
Despite these observations, the Ukrainian government’s bargaining strategy does not 
strictly speaking qualify as extortion because Kiev would have likely delivered on its threat to 
resuscitate the Chernobyl NPP if the Western donors had refrained from providing 
compensation. This key assumption is based on the following reasoning. A refusal of the 
West to help pay for the closure of the Chernobyl NPP would have forced the Ukrainian 
government to chose between two unappealing options: Either the continued operation of the 
unsafe Chernobyl NPP or the costly decommissioning of the plant without external assistance. 
Given Ukraine’s critical economic and energy situation, it is likely that the Ukrainian 
government would have opted for the continued operation of the Chernobyl NPP, simply 
because this option was less “bad” than the remaining alternative. Indeed, the unilateral 
decommissioning of the Chernobyl NPP would have not only resulted in lost energy 
production and social dislocation, but would have left the cash-strapped Ukrainian 
government to cope with a number of environmental problems that exceeded all available 
resources. In short, the Ukrainian government did not bluff the Western donors into offering 
“money for nothing”: If the West had refused to provide compensation in exchange for the 
closure of the Chernobyl NPP, the Ukrainian government would have likely carried out its 
threat to resuscitate the ill-fated plant. As such the efficiency of the transaction was not 
negatively affected by extortion problems. Moreover, the Ukrainian government’s bargaining 
strategy did not hamper the effectiveness of the transaction in the sense of discouraging the 
Western donors from providing positive incentives in exchange for the premature closure of 
the Chernobyl NPP. 
Moral hazard problems did not negatively affect the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the transaction. At first sight this conclusion may be surprising. Indeed, it is plausible to 
suggest that by postponing the scheduled closure date of the Chernobyl NPP in late 1993 and 
by subsequently making every effort to keep the ailing third unit of the plant in operation, the 
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Ukrainian government had engaged in risky activities, i.e. activities which exposed the 
Western countries to an elevated level of environmental risk. Moreover, it seems that the 
Ukrainian government undertook these risky activities—at least in part—in the expectation or 
hope that they would lead to the provision of external assistance. However, the Ukrainian 
government did not postpone the closure of the Chernobyl NPP and seek to keep the decrepit 
third unit of the plant in operation because it expected that these risky activities would entice 
the Western donors to provide the resources required to reduce to an acceptable level the risks 
connected with the continued operation of the Chernobyl NPP. Rather, the Ukrainian 
government undertook these activities in the expectation that they would induce the Western 
donors to provide the assistance required to close the Chernobyl NPP, i.e. to eliminate the 
safety threat posed by the continued operation of the unsafe plant. As such the behavior of the 
Ukrainian government does not qualify as moral hazard. 
The effectiveness of the transaction was to a certain extent hampered by distribution 
and information problems. From the outset of the negotiation process, the Ukrainian 
government sought to extract the maximum amount of compensation from the G-7 and EU by 
exaggerating the costs of complying with Western closure demands—Ukrainian estimates of 
the costs involved in closing and decommissioning the Chernobyl NPP varied between $4.5 
billion and $12 billion—and understating the benefits of solutions proposed by the Western 
negotiating parties. Not surprisingly, the intense conflicts between the negotiating partners 
over the costs and benefits of cooperation seriously protracted the negotiating process. Indeed, 
it took nearly two years of diplomatic haggling over the amount and type of compensation 
until a closure deal could be finally concluded in the framework of the MoU. Moreover, 
despite the apparent resolution of the conflict in December 1995, implementation of the 
Chernobyl closure plan subsequently stalled as a result of Ukrainian dissatisfaction with the 
terms of the MoU, in particular with the size and composition of the Western assistance—
Ukraine insisted on a greater grant portion—and with the slow disbursement of the pledged 
aid. Information problems contributed to the delays in concluding and implementing the 
closure deal. The negotiation and MoU implementation process was protracted not least due 
to the difficulties the Western donors encountered in determining how much the closure of the 
Chernobyl NPP would cost and which specific measures were the most cost-effective to 
enable and induce Ukraine to comply with Western closure demands. 
The effectiveness of the transaction was not negatively affected by enforcement 
problems. As a matter of fact, since the Ukrainian government ultimately complied with its 
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closure commitments, it proved unnecessary for the Western donors to enforce the MoU. It is 
interesting to note that even if the Ukrainian government had reneged on its closure 
commitments, the Western donors would have not faced serious enforcement problems. 
Indeed, a considerable amount of the pledged Western assistance was earmarked for long-
term projects, such as for the reconstruction of the sarcophagus, or for projects that were 
inextricably linked to the closure of the Chernobyl NPP, such as for the decommissioning of 
the plant. Under these circumstances it would have been relatively unproblematic for the 
Western donors to threaten to withhold the earmarked funds in case the Ukrainian 
government backtracked on its closure commitments. And given Ukraine’s strong interest in 
the realization of these Western-funded projects, it is rather likely that a Western threat along 
these lines would have been sufficient to secure Ukrainian compliance with its closure 
commitments. 
The specific problem-definition adopted by the Western donors did have a negative 
impact on the efficiency of the transaction. In determining how to help Ukraine cope with its 
energy problems and hence overcome an important obstacle to the premature closure of the 
Chernobyl NPP, various Western governments adhered to a pro-nuclear problem-definition 
that precluded the funding and implementation of more cost-effective capacity-building 
measures. Indeed, even though various opportunities existed to address Ukraine’s energy 
problems more effectively and at lower cost than completing the Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 
reactors, various important Western donors were reluctant to abandon the K2/R4 project in 
favor of alternative energy projects and used their political influence to ensure that the costly 
nuclear completion project, after much delay, was tentatively approved for loan financing in 
December 2000. 
This pro-nuclear problem-definition was clearly a result of the strategic and in 
particular commercial interests of a number of influential Western donor states and their 
respective nuclear industries. On the one hand, various Western donors, in particular the 
United States, considered the completion of the K2/R4 project as an appropriate strategic 
means to reduce Ukraine’s reliance on Russian fossil fuel deliveries—a source of political 
vulnerability that Russia had been eager to exploit—and thereby to safeguard Ukraine’s 
precarious independence. It is telling in this respect that the G-7 had rejected the Ukrainian 
government’s proposal in early 1995 to replace the Chernobyl NPP with a new thermal power 
plant on the grounds that this option threatened to deepen Ukraine’s dependence on Russian 
gas imports and increase its debt with Russia. On the other hand, various important Western 
 Case Study V 227 
governments viewed the nuclear completion project as a convenient way to subsidize their 
ailing nuclear industries. Indeed, the realization of the K2/R4 project would not only provide 
the leading Western nuclear engineering firms with much needed nuclear upgrade and 
completion work, but also promised to pave the way for the Western-led completion of other 
partly built VVER-1000 reactors in the FSU. In short, due to the strategic and in particular 
commercial interests of various Western governments, the Western donors adhered to a pro-
nuclear problem-definition that precluded the funding and implementation of potentially more 
effective and less expensive capacity-building measures. 
The “slippery slope effect” did not hamper the effectiveness of the transaction. At first 
sight this conclusion may be surprising when taking into account that the Western donors—
via the NSA—had agreed to provide around ECU 13 million for near-term safety upgrades at 
the third unit of the Chernobyl NPP. However, since the amount of safety-enhancing 
equipment installed at Chernobyl unit 3 was minimal and did not significantly alleviate the 
reactor’s severe safety deficiencies, it is plausible to suggest that the implementation of this 
specific capacity-building measure did not tempt or enable the Ukrainian government to 
extend the service life of the third unit of the Chernobyl NPP. 
The effectiveness of the transaction was to a certain extent negatively affected by 
coordination problems. Indeed, coordination problems among the Western donors seriously 
delayed the provision of Western loans for the K2/R4 project, which in turn hampered the 
effective implementation of the MoU. From the outset of the negotiation process, the Western 
donors were confronted with the controversial issue over how to compensate Ukraine for the 
shortfall in electricity that would result from the early closure of the Chernobyl NPP. After 
much debate over this issue both within the group of Western donor states and between the 
Western donors and Ukraine, the governments of the G-7 countries and the European 
Commission decided in late 1995 to fund the completion of the two partly built Khmelnitsky-
2 and Rovno-4 reactors as the principal Chernobyl power replacement project. Following the 
inclusion of this investment target in the MoU, the G-7 countries instructed the EBRD to 
assume the leading role in financing the K2/R4 project. 
However, the EBRD subsequently proved both unable and unwilling to promptly 
comply with this request. This was especially true after the independent panel had concluded 
in early 1997 that the plan to complete the two unfinished Ukrainian VVER-1000 reactors did 
not represent the most cost-effective use of Western funds. Since the EBRD was obliged 
under its own charter to adhere to stringent banking principles, the panel’s conclusion in 
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effect barred the EBRD from funding the nuclear completion project. The resulting impasse 
over loan financing for the K2/R4 project did not only jeopardize the early closure of the 
Chernobyl NPP, but also threatened the strategic and commercial interests of various Western 
donor states and their nuclear industries. The leading Western donor states hence prevailed 
upon the EBRD to commission a second external review of the project’s cost-effectiveness. 
This second economic assessment concluded in May 1998 that there was a 50 percent 
probability that the completion of the Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 reactors constituted the 
least-cost approach to Ukraine’s energy needs. Although the conclusions of the second 
external review, combined with the ongoing political pressure from the major Western donor 
states, saved the K2/R4 project from certain demise, the EBRD continued to have serious 
doubts about the project’s financial viability and remained rather reluctant to shoulder the 
considerable financial risk of the project. As a result, the EBRD did not only insist on 
increasingly stringent loan conditions, but also repeatedly delayed its final decision on loan 
financing for the project. 
In addition, a widening fissure among the major Western donor states contributed to 
the delayed provision of Western loans for the K2/R4 project. In June 1999, just days before 
the G-7 was expected to endorse the project and hence pave the way for a positive EBRD 
board decision, the Bundestag voted against German participation in the funding of the K2/R4 
project and called on the German government to support non-nuclear options in Ukraine 
instead. As a result of this domestic political pressure, the new German government under 
Gerhard Schröder subsequently opposed the nuclear completion project. In sum, coordination 
problems among the Western donors seriously delayed the provision of loans for the K2/R4 
project. These repeated delays, in turn, hampered the effective implementation of the MoU by 
prompting the Ukrainian government to keep the remaining operational unit of the Chernobyl 
NPP in operation as long as possible. 
 9 CONCLUSIONS 
In the past decades both the growing number of transnational environmental problems and 
their relentless aggravation have increased the need for successful international environmental 
cooperation. After various attempts at the international level during the 1970s and 1980s had 
failed to solve a number of outstanding transnational environmental problems, a major change 
in strategy occurred in the early 1990s. Since then the provision of positive incentives, i.e. 
transfers of positively valued resources such as money, technology and know-how from one 
actor to another, has been increasingly regarded as the most promising policy tool to foster 
international environmental cooperation, in particular in those cases in which the active 
participation of so-called capacity-poor countries is required. With a view to the growing 
popularity of this cooperation strategy in international environmental politics, it comes 
somewhat as a surprise that analysts of international relations have with some rare exceptions 
not yet systematically analyzed the advantages and drawbacks of positive incentives, and the 
conditions under which positive incentives are effective and efficient. Aspiring to fill this 
research gap, this book has sought to find answers to the following research question: When 
and how can positive incentives foster international cooperation so as to solve transnational 
environmental problems in effective and efficient ways and what are the problems that 
typically arise when bringing positive incentives to bear. 
Drawing and expanding on existing theoretical insights into the role of positive 
incentives in fostering international cooperation, this book has developed an analytical 
framework that guides the empirical research on the question outlined above. The outcomes to 
be explained in this study are the effectiveness and efficiency of positive incentives. Positive 
incentives are conceptualized as transactions, i.e. as transfers of positively valued resources, 
such as money, technology and know-how, from one actor to another with the aim of driving 
the behavior of the recipient in a direction that is desirable from the point of view of the 
provider. The effectiveness of a transaction denotes the extent to which the provision of 
positive incentives drove the behavior of the recipient state in a direction desired by the 
provider state. The efficiency of a transaction refers to the cost-effectiveness of positive 
incentives. In other words, the efficiency of a transaction relates to the question of whether 
the providers of positive incentives paid too much for what they gained in terms of 
environmental benefits resulting from the behavioral changes on the part of the recipient. The 
concept of efficiency used in this study encompasses two related, nevertheless distinct 
dimensions. The first dimension of efficiency relates to the question of whether the 
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employment of cooperation strategies other than positive incentives—i.e. positive issue-
linkage, negative incentive, cognitive and normative strategies—could have led to comparable 
or superior behavioral changes on the part of the recipient country at a lower or comparable 
cost. The second dimension of efficiency relates to the question of whether alternative ways 
of employing positive incentives—i.e. the funding and implementation of other capacity-
building measures—could have resulted in comparable or superior behavioral changes on the 
part of the recipient country at a lower or comparable cost. The explanatory concepts of the 
analytical framework are operationalized in terms of problems that typically arise when 
designing and implementing positive incentives and that may have an impact on the 
effectiveness and/or efficiency of a transaction. These problems, which are derived from 
various social science theories and build upon the results of empirical research on incentives 
in various areas of international relations, are outlined below. 
Both the effectiveness and efficiency (first dimension) of transactions may be 
hampered by problems of extortion and moral hazard. On the one hand, a recipient state may 
seek to extract payments from provider states by bluffing the latter into believing that it would 
engage in some externality-generating or externality-enhancing behavior if not rewarded for 
refraining from doing so. On the other hand, the prospect of external environmental assistance 
may induce a would-be recipient state to engage in overly risky behavior because it expects 
that other countries will provide the necessary resources to reduce the harmful effects of its 
risky behavior to an acceptable level. Moreover, both extortion and moral hazard problems 
may deter provider states from engaging in mutually beneficial transactions. Information and 
distribution problems are two closely related problems that may hamper transactions. Indeed, 
negotiations on the exchange of positive incentives for externality-reducing behavioral 
changes on the part of the recipient may falter as a result of “stingy” bargaining behavior by 
the negotiating parties or due the absence of sufficient information on the exact value of the 
object under negotiation. Enforcement problems can also negatively affect the effectiveness of 
transactions. Provider states may lack the means to enforce international environmental 
agreements, or they may be reluctant to do so for normative or practical reasons, or because 
such action often inflicts considerable economic and political costs on the enforcing states as 
well. The efficiency (second dimension) of transactions may be seriously hampered by the 
specific problem-definition adhered to by the providers of positive incentives, i.e. by the 
specific way the donors chose to define and hence address an environmental problem. The 
“slippery slope effect”, which may hamper the effectiveness of transactions, relates to the risk 
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that resources transfers aimed at enabling a recipient state to renounce an undesirable 
behavior and adopt a new desirable behavior may unintentionally induce and/or enable the 
recipient state to continue its previous undesirable behavior, albeit at marginally less 
detrimental levels. Finally, coordination problems among the provider states may negatively 
affect the effectiveness of transactions by leading to a sub-optimal provision of resources or 
by frustrating efforts to establish a united donor front capable of imposing conditions on 
environmental assistance programs. 
The analytical framework developed in this book is built upon the following basic 
hypothesis: The more the designated problems crop up in a transaction both in terms of their 
occurrence and intensity, or conversely, the less successful the provider states are in coping 
with these problems, the lower the effectiveness and/or efficiency of the transaction. That 
said, it must be emphasized that the basic analytical framework is not so much designed to 
allow for rigorous hypothesis testing but rather aims to provide a checklist of problems that 
typically arise when employing positive incentives. Indeed, this caveat should not be 
surprising with a view to the fact that it is difficult if not impossible to precisely gauge the 
exact influence of each problem on the outcomes to be explained. Hence, the analytical 
framework is best viewed as a useful analytical tool to evaluate and explain in empirical cases 
whether and how the theoretically predicted problems individually or collectively affected the 
effectiveness and/or efficiency of a transaction. 
The propositions of the analytical framework have been investigated by means of case 
studies derived from one specific issue-area of international environmental politics: The 
transboundary safety threat posed by the continued operation of unsafe Soviet-designed 
nuclear reactors in CEE and the FSU. In 1990/1991 a series of IAEA fact-finding missions 
had shocked the governments and populations of Western Europe and other countries with the 
alarming judgment that a serious accident at one of the 58 operational Soviet-designed 
nuclear reactors in CEE and the FSU could occur unless safety conditions were improved 
immediately. Moreover, Western nuclear safety experts had concluded that certain Soviet-
designed reactor types—i.e. the VVER-230s and RBMKs, or so-called high-risk nuclear 
reactors—could not be upgraded to reach acceptable safety standards and hence should be 
shut down as soon as possible. Widespread concern about the transboundary environmental 
and political effects of a further Chernobyl-style nuclear catastrophe in the East was the 
driving force behind the subsequent actions of various Western governments and international 
organizations to address the nuclear safety problem in CEE and the FSU. Indeed, the April 
232 Conclusions 
1986 nuclear accident at the Chernobyl NPP in Ukraine had not only exposed the populations 
of various Western European countries to sharply elevated levels of radiation and caused 
considerable economic damage, but had also nearly destroyed public acceptance of nuclear 
power in the West. 
In addressing the nuclear safety problem in CEE and the FSU, Western governments 
and international organizations did not only seek to secure risk-reducing, but ultimately also 
risk-eliminating behavioral changes on the part of those Eastern countries operating VVER-
230s and RBMKs. In other words, whereas concerned Western governments and international 
organizations could reduce the risk of a nuclear accident in CEE and the FSU to a certain 
extent by helping the Eastern countries to improve safety conditions at their Soviet-built 
NPPs, a lasting and satisfactory solution to the nuclear safety problem in CEE and the FSU 
could only be secured if the Eastern countries closed their operational VVER-230 and RBMK 
reactors as soon as possible. However, the countries of CEE and the FSU were reluctant to 
prematurely close their high-risk nuclear reactors in the near-term because they depended to 
varying degrees on the power generated at these units and lacked the means to cope with the 
economic and social costs of closure. Realizing that the Eastern countries faced severe 
constraints in cooperating in the nuclear safety field, various Western countries and 
international organizations offered significant amounts of nuclear safety and other assistance 
in exchange for commitments on the part of various Eastern governments to improve nuclear 
safety and—most important—to prematurely close their unsafe Soviet-designed nuclear 
reactors. Within the overall international effort to improve nuclear safety in CEE and the 
FSU, seven distinct transactions in which Western donors provided or attempted to provide 
positive incentives in exchange for risk-reducing and in particular risk-eliminating behavioral 
changes on the part of Eastern recipient countries have been selected for analysis. Each case 
study conducted in this book analyzes a transaction over time, with the exception of one case 
study that for practical reasons examines three distinct transactions. The five case studies on 
the seven selected transactions that materialized in the nuclear safety are outlined below. 
Case study I: In June 1993, the NSA concluded a grant agreement with the Bulgarian 
government. The NSA agreed to provide ECU 24 million for near-term safety upgrades at the 
four older VVER-230 units of the Kozloduy NPP and IFIs promised to allocate an unspecified 
amount of favorable loans for various energy projects in exchange for the commitment on the 
part of the Bulgarian government to prematurely close Kozloduy units 1-4 by 1997/1998. In 
early 1998, following the successful implementation of the NSA-funded safety upgrade 
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program, the Bulgarian government refused to comply with its closure commitments on the 
grounds that international funding for the rehabilitation of the country’s energy sector had not 
sufficiently materialized and announced plans to further upgrade Kozloduy units 1-4 for long-
term operation. 
Case Study II: In February 1994, the NSA concluded a grant agreement with the 
Lithuanian government. The NSA agreed to allocate around ECU 40 million for near-term 
safety upgrades at the Ignalina NPP and IFIs promised to provide an unspecified amount of 
low-interest loans for the rehabilitation of Lithuania’s power sector in exchange for the 
commitment on the part of the Lithuanian government to comply with certain measures aimed 
at securing the early closure of the plant’s two RBMK units. By early 1998, and after most 
NSA-funded safety upgrade projects had been implemented, it had become apparent that the 
Lithuanian government was preparing to keep the Ignalina NPP in operation as long as 
possible. 
Case Study III: Throughout 1994 and 1995, the EBRD sought to conclude a deal with 
the Slovak government according to which the Slovak Republic would receive a substantial 
amount of low-interest loans for the completion and upgrading of two modern, partly built 
nuclear reactors at the Mochovce NPP in exchange for the commitment to prematurely close 
two unsafe units at the Bohunice NPP by the year 2000 or once the two Mochovce units were 
completed. After drawn out negotiations, the Slovak government rejected the EBRD’s closure 
deal in late 1995 and subsequently made preparations to prolong the service lives of Bohunice 
units 1-2. 
Case Study IV: Since it had become evident by 1998 that the Slovak Republic, 
Lithuania and Bulgaria were planning to abandon previously made unilateral or international 
closure commitments and to prolong the service lives of their high-risk nuclear reactors, the 
European Commission intervened into the ongoing closure dispute to secure the earliest 
possible closure of these nuclear reactors. From late 1998 on, the Commission sought to 
extract “realistic” closure commitments from the three Eastern European applicant countries 
by linking their prospects to begin EU membership negotiations to a cooperative stance on the 
closure issue. Moreover, from mid-1999 on the Commission also offered each country a 
substantial amount of decommissioning aid in exchange for the establishment of “realistic” 
closure commitments. In late 1999 the closure negotiations were concluded with the 
following results: The Slovak Republic promised to close Bohunice units 1-2 in 2006 and 
2008. Lithuania agreed to close Ignalina unit 1 by 2005 and to decide on a definitive closure 
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date for unit 2 in 2004. Finally, Bulgaria pledged to shut down Kozloduy units 1-2 in 2003 
and to fix a definitive closure date for Kozloduy units 3-4 in 2002. It is expected that 
Kozloduy units 3-4 will be closed in 2006-2008/10. 
Case Study V: From 1994 on, the G-7/EU and Ukraine were engaged in negotiations 
over the premature closure of the Chernobyl NPP. The closure of the remaining operational 
units of the Chernobyl NPP (units 1 and 3) had become an object of contention due to the 
Ukrainian parliament’s October 1993 decision to rescind its earlier resolution to close these 
two units by the end of 1993 and to approve plans to upgrade the ill-fated plant for long-term 
operation. Deeply concerned about the prospect of the crippled Chernobyl NPP being granted 
a new lease on life, the G-7/EU sought to induce the Ukrainian government to close 
Chernobyl units 1 and 3 as soon as possible and to refrain from restarting Chernobyl unit 2. 
After almost two years of diplomatic wrangling over the amount of money requested by the 
Ukrainian government, the negotiating parties concluded in December 1995 a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) in which the Western donors agreed to provide $2.3 billion in 
assistance in exchange for the closure of the Chernobyl NPP by 2000. The MoU envisaged 
around $500 million in grants for various projects related to the plant’s early closure and $1.8 
billion in loans for the completion of the two partly built Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 reactors 
(the so-called K2/R4 project) and the modernization of existing hydroelectric and thermal 
power plants. Implementation of the MoU turned out to be a problem-ridden and bumpy 
process, mainly because disagreement prevailed over the question of whether the Western 
donors should fund the K2/R4 project. As a result of the impasse over the K2/R4 project, the 
Ukrainian government repeatedly threatened to restart Chernobyl unit 2 and to postpone the 
closure of unit 3 if funding for the nuclear completion project was not provided on schedule. 
Moreover, Kiev undertook strenuous efforts to keep Chernobyl unit 3 running, despite the fact 
that the debilitated reactor was in constant need of repairs and clearly unfit for continued 
operation. Nevertheless, on 15 December 2000, a year later than anticipated by the MoU and 
only days after the Western donors had tentatively approved loans for the K2/R4 project, the 
Ukrainian government ordered the definitive closure of the Chernobyl NPP. 
In this final chapter of the book I summarize and compare the results of the empirical 
case studies and proceed as follows. I first explore the extent to which the various Eastern 
recipient countries changed their behavior in a direction desired by the Western donors. 
Second, I describe the various cooperation strategies and capacity-building measures 
employed by the Western donors to influence the behavior of the Eastern recipient countries. 
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In a third step I determine the extent to which the observed behavioral changes on the part of 
the recipient countries was influenced by the provision of positive incentives—controlling for 
the possible effects of other employed cooperation strategies—, and evaluate the effectiveness 
of the seven examined transactions. In a fourth step I assess the efficiency of the examined 
transactions by evaluating whether the Western donors could have secured comparable or 
superior behavioral changes on the part of the Eastern recipient countries at a lower or 
comparable cost by resorting to a cooperation strategy other than positive incentives and/or by 
employing positive incentives in different ways. Finally, I assess the extent to which the 
theoretically predicted problems in designing and implementing positive incentives shaped 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the seven examined transactions. 
The extent to which the Eastern recipient countries changed their behavior in a 
direction desired by the Western donors varied significantly in the seven examined 
transactions. In those two transactions in which the NSA was the principal Western donor, the 
Eastern recipient countries—Bulgaria and Lithuania—did carry out measures to reduce the 
risk of a nuclear accident at their unsafe NPPs, but ultimately refused to comply with their 
closure commitments. In other words, in these two transactions the Eastern recipient countries 
adopted risk-reducing, but no risk-eliminating behaviors. In the attempted transaction between 
the EBRD and the Slovak Republic, the would-be recipient country—by rejecting the 
EBRD’s closure deal and subsequently making preparations to prolong the service lives of 
Bohunice units 1-2—failed to change its behavior in a direction desired by the Western 
donors. In those three transactions in which the European Commission sought to extract 
“realistic” closure commitments from the Slovak Republic, Lithuania and Bulgaria, the three 
Eastern recipient countries more or less changed their behavior in a direction desired by the 
Western donors. Indeed, even though only Lithuania’s new closure commitments were fully 
in line with the European Commission’s original closure demands—the closure schedules 
conceded by the Slovak Republic and Bulgaria were somewhat delayed compared to what the 
Commission had initially demanded—, all three Eastern recipient countries did firmly commit 
themselves to the premature closure of their high-risk nuclear reactors. Finally, in the 
transaction between the G-7/EU and Ukraine aimed at securing the premature closure of the 
Chernobyl NPP, the Eastern recipient country also more or less changed its behavior in a 
direction desired by the Western donors. Indeed, the Ukrainian government agreed to close 
Chernobyl unit 1 in November 1996 and refrained from modernizing and restarting Chernobyl 
unit 2. Moreover, although the Ukrainian government made every effort to keep the 
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debilitated third unit of the Chernobyl NPP on line as long as possible, it ultimately did close 
this unit in mid-December 2000. 
In seeking to induce and enable the Eastern recipient countries to adopt risk-reducing 
and in particular risk-eliminating behaviors, the Western donors employed predominantly 
positive incentive strategies. In its two closure agreements with Bulgaria and Lithuania, the 
NSA agreed to provide ECU 24 million in grants for near-term safety upgrades at Kozloduy 
units 1-4 and around ECU 40 million in grants for a near-term safety upgrade program and an 
in-depth safety assessment at the Ignalina NPP. In addition, both NSA grant agreements were 
based on the understanding that various IFIs such as the EBRD or the World Bank would 
provide an unspecified amount of favorable loans for the rehabilitation of these countries’ 
energy sectors. By offering a substantial amount of low-interest loans under long-term 
repayment conditions for the completion and upgrading of the two partly built Mochovce 
reactors, the EBRD sought to employ a positive incentive strategy to induce and enable the 
Slovak government to prematurely close Bohunice units 1-2. In its attempt to extract 
“realistic” closure commitments from the Slovak Republic, Lithuania and Bulgaria, the 
European Commission eventually offered each applicant country a substantial package of 
positive incentives predominantly in the form of decommissioning aid: Whereas the Slovak 
Republic was granted Euro 110 million for decommissioning activities at Bohunice units 1-2, 
Lithuania was expected to receive at least Euro 100 million for the decommissioning of 
Ignalina units 1-2 and additional decommissioning aid at a forthcoming pledging conference. 
Bulgaria, on the other hand, was offered Euro 200 million in decommissioning aid plus a 
Euratom loan of up to Euro 250 million for the modernization of Kozloduy units 5-6. 
Finally, in seeking to induce and enable Ukraine to prematurely close Chernobyl units 
1 and 3 by 2000 and to refrain from modernizing and restarting the plant’s second unit, the G-
7/EU provided a substantial package of positive incentives. After having gradually increased 
their compensation offers, the Western donors agreed in the December 1995 MoU to provide 
$2.3 billion—$500 million in grants and $1.8 billion in loans—to assist the hard-pressed 
country with the solution of various Chernobyl-related problems and to compensate Ukraine 
for the power lost by the plant’s closure. Western grants, which ultimately exceeded the $500 
million envisaged by the MoU, were earmarked for a wide array of measures designed to 
improve nuclear safety at the Chernobyl NPP, decommission the plant, reconstruct the ailing 
shelter over the destroyed fourth unit, and to mitigate the social consequences of the plant’s 
closure. Moreover, a number of IFIs and bilateral donors disbursed or tentatively approved 
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approximately $700 million in favorable loans for the realization of various conventional 
energy projects. Last but not least, after much delay the EBRD tentatively approved in 
December 2000 loan financing for the K2/R4 project. Provided that the Ukrainian 
government does meet the EBRD’s stringent loan conditions, Ukraine will receive over $1.2 
billion in favorable loans from various IFIs and bilateral donors for the nuclear completion 
project. 
In the seven examined transactions, the Western donors did not only provide positive 
incentives, but also employed a number of other cooperation strategies to secure risk-reducing 
and risk-eliminating behavioral changes on the part of the Eastern recipient countries. The 
Western donors employed a positive issue-linkage strategy at one stage of the negotiation 
process over the premature closure of the Chernobyl NPP: In May 1995 the EU linked the 
disbursement of around ECU 200 million in macro-economic assistance to Ukrainian 
compliance with its Chernobyl closure plan. In four examined transactions the Western 
donors also resorted to negative incentive strategies. In the transaction between the G-7/EU 
and Ukraine, negative incentives were employed at least twice during the protracted 
negotiation process: In the fall of 1994 the EU had grown so incensed about the Ukrainian 
government’s apparent reluctance to compromise on the Chernobyl closure issue that it froze 
an already approved ECU 85 million balance of payments loan. And in late 1995 a number of 
G-7 countries sought to entice the Ukrainian government to sign the MoU by threatening to 
withhold an unspecified amount of Western loans. Furthermore, the European Commission 
employed a negative incentive strategy to induce the Slovak Republic, Lithuania and Bulgaria 
to close their high-risk nuclear reactors as soon as possible. Indeed, from late 1998 on the 
Commission had repeatedly warned the three Eastern European applicant countries that their 
EU membership prospects was contingent upon the establishment of “realistic” closure 
commitments. 
The employment of cognitive strategies was explicitly foreseen in the NSA agreement 
with Lithuania. By conducting an in-depth safety assessment of the Ignalina NPP, the 
Western donors sought to provide the Lithuanian nuclear safety authority with the necessary 
technical information to decide on whether the continued operation of Ignalina unit 1 beyond 
mid-1998 could be justified on safety grounds. Moreover, the Western donors also sought to 
provide the Lithuanian authorities with more reliable information on the full economic costs 
of operating the Ignalina NPP by commissioning least-cost studies of the country’s energy 
needs. Cognitive strategies were also employed in the transaction between the G-7/EU and 
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Ukraine: By conducting a series of safety studies and least-cost investment analyses the 
Western donors sought to furnish the Ukrainian authorities with more reliable information 
concerning both the risks of keeping the Chernobyl NPP in operation and the costs and 
benefits of alternative energy strategies. Finally, all seven examined transactions included the 
employment of normative strategies. At countless rounds of negotiations and talks, Western 
officials and nuclear safety experts sought to persuade the Eastern recipient governments 
through dialogue and education to attach higher policy priority to nuclear safety issues and to 
prematurely close their high-risk nuclear reactors on safety grounds. The following table 
summarizes which cooperation strategies were employed in which transactions. 
TABLE 9.1: COOPERATION STRATEGIES EMPLOYED BY WESTERN DONORS IN THE EXAMINED 
TRANSACTIONS 
Case Study 
Donor — 
Recipient(s) 
Positive 
Incentive 
Strategies 
Positive 
Issue-Linkage 
Strategies 
Negative 
Incentive 
Strategies 
Cognitive 
Strategies 
Normative 
Strategies 
Case Study I  
NSA — 
Bulgaria 
     
Case Study II 
NSA — 
Lithuania 
     
Case Study III 
EBRD — 
Slovak Republic 
     
Case Study IV 
European Commission — 
Applicant countries 
     
Case Study V 
G-7/EU — 
Ukraine 
     
 
The empirical analysis of the seven transactions suggests that the observed behavioral 
changes on the part of the Eastern recipient countries were to a large extent attributable to the 
provision of positive incentives. This assessment is based on the following observations. On 
the one hand, the provision of positive incentives appears to have been a necessary, if not 
always a sufficient means to drive the behavior of the Eastern recipient countries in a 
direction desired by the Western donors. Indeed, in all examined transactions, the Eastern 
recipient countries demanded and—to varying degrees—required positive incentives to adopt 
risk-reducing and risk-eliminating behaviors. Bulgaria and Lithuania neither disposed over 
the financial and technical means to reduce the risk of a nuclear accident at the Kozloduy and 
Ignalina NPPs, nor were they willing and/or able to cope with the costly implications of 
prematurely closing their high-risk nuclear reactors without external assistance. The Slovak 
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government, in turn, had credibly signaled to the Western donors that it would be willing and 
capable to prematurely close Bohunice units 1-2 only if international loan financing for the 
completion of Mochovce units 1-2 was forthcoming. Moreover, as the European Commission 
sought to extract “realistic” closure commitments from the Slovak Republic, Lithuania and 
Bulgaria, the three applicant countries argued—and quite credibly so—that they would not be 
willing and/or able to prematurely close their high-risk nuclear reactors if the Commission 
refused to provide some sort of compensation. 
Finally, the Ukrainian government had made it clear to the Western donors that the 
closure of the Chernobyl NPP would entail severe political, financial and social costs that the 
cash-strapped country was both unable and unwilling to bear on its own. Indeed, although the 
power generated by the Chernobyl NPP accounted for only about 6 percent of the country’s 
total electricity supply, this was still a considerable amount of energy to forego at a time when 
Ukraine was struggling to cope with a severe energy and economic crisis and when Russia 
was eager to exploit Ukraine’s massive debts for natural gas imports to gain political 
concessions in other outstanding bilateral issues. In addition, even if ways could be found to 
replace the power produced by the Chernobyl NPP, Ukraine would still have to cope with a 
number of costly and complex problems associated with the plant’s closure that clearly 
exceeded its financial and technical capacities. 
On the other hand, it is plausible to suggest that the employment of other cooperation 
strategies did not significantly influence the observed behavioral changes on the part of the 
Eastern recipient countries. Indeed, whereas the EU’s May 1995 offer to grant ECU 200 
million in macro-economic assistance provided that the Ukrainian government stuck to its 
Chernobyl closure plan may have induced Kiev to adopt a more cooperative stance during the 
negotiation process, it is rather unlikely that this positive issue-linkage significantly enhanced 
the Ukrainian government’s willingness and capacities to prematurely close the Chernobyl 
NPP. Similarly, while the EU’s temporary suspension of an ECU 85 million balance of 
payments loan to Ukraine and the threat by various G-7 countries to withhold an unspecified 
amount of loans may have enticed the Ukrainian government to return to the negotiating table 
and to sign the December 1995 MoU, the effects of these negative incentive strategies on the 
final outcome of the negotiation process were probably small. It is somewhat more difficult to 
assess the extent to which the three applicant countries altered their behavior as a result of the 
negative incentive strategy employed by the European Commission. On the one hand, there 
seems to be little doubt that the Commission’s negative incentive strategy had a significant 
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impact on the applicant countries’ willingness to cooperate in the nuclear safety field. Indeed, 
since these three countries were strongly interested in securing the economic and strategic 
benefits of EU membership as soon as possible, the Commission’s strategy of linking their 
EU membership prospects to the establishment of “realistic” closure commitments exerted 
considerable pressure on them to compromise. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether the 
negative incentive strategy was sufficient for inducing the applicant countries to establish 
“realistic” closure commitments. In other words, it is possible that the three applicant 
countries would have refused to cooperate, or would have conceded far less favorable closure 
schedules, if the Commission had resorted exclusively to the negative incentive strategy and 
had not provided positive incentives in the form of decommissioning aid. As such the 
negative incentive strategy employed by the European Commission was perhaps a necessary, 
yet insufficient means to extract “realistic” closure commitments from the three applicant 
countries. 
The employment of cognitive strategies in the transactions between the NSA and 
Lithuania, on the one hand, and the G-7/EU and Ukraine, on the other, did not have any 
discernible effects on the behavioral changes of the recipient countries. Finally, the 
employment of normative strategies in the seven examined transactions, while possibly 
enhancing the willingness of the Bulgarian and Lithuanian governments to carry out 
externally funded safety upgrades at their high-risk nuclear reactors and to attach higher 
priority to nuclear safety matters, clearly failed to induce the Eastern recipient countries to 
adopt risk-eliminating behaviors. 
Based on the considerations outlined above, we can summarize the effectiveness of the 
seven examined transactions as follows. The effectiveness of the transactions between the 
NSA and Bulgaria, on the one hand, and between the NSA and Lithuania, on the other, was 
rather low. Indeed, although positive incentives resulted in reduced risk-levels at the 
Kozloduy and Ignalina NPPs, they ultimately failed to secure the premature closure of these 
high-risk nuclear reactors. The effectiveness of the attempted transaction between the EBRD 
and the Slovak Republic was low: Since the Slovak government rejected the EBRD’s closure 
deal and subsequently made preparations to prolong the service lives of Bohunice units 1-2, 
the attempted transaction failed to drive the Slovak Republic’s behavior in a direction desired 
by the Western donors. The effectiveness of the transactions between the European 
Commission and the three applicant countries varied slightly: Whereas the effectiveness of 
the transaction between the Commission and Lithuania was high, the effectiveness of the two 
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transactions in which the Commission sought to extract “realistic” closure schedules from the 
Slovak Republic and Bulgaria was rather high. This assessment is based on the following 
considerations. On the one hand, it is plausible to suggest that the provision of positive 
incentives was ultimately a necessary and effective means to extract “realistic” closure 
commitments from the applicant countries. On the other hand, it must be taken into account 
that in contrast to the closure commitments conceded by the Lithuanian government, the 
closure commitments offered by the Slovak and Bulgarian governments were not fully in line 
with the Commission’s original closure demands. Finally, the effectiveness of the transaction 
between the G-7/EU and Ukraine was rather high: Although the Ukrainian government 
undertook strenuous efforts to keep the debilitated third unit of the Chernobyl NPP in 
operation as long as possible, which was certainly undesirable from a nuclear safety point of 
view, it ultimately did close the ill-fated plant in late 2000. 
How high was the efficiency of the examined transactions? As far as the first 
dimension of efficiency is concerned, the empirical analysis suggests that the examined 
transactions were all efficient in the sense that the employment of no other cooperation 
strategy could have secured comparable or superior behavioral changes on the part of the 
Eastern recipient countries at a lower or comparable cost. Generally speaking, the provision 
of positive incentives proved to be the most cost-effective strategy to solicit recipient 
cooperation in the nuclear safety field because none of the other cooperation strategies 
analyzed in this study could have adequately addressed the key cooperation in the seven 
examined transactions, i.e. the Eastern countries’ insufficient financial and technical resources 
to improve nuclear safety and—most important—to cope with the costly and complex 
implications of prematurely closing and decommissioning their high-risk nuclear reactors. 
Indeed, whereas the employment of positive issue-linkage strategies may have increased the 
recipient countries’ incentives to cooperate, such strategies would have not enabled the 
Eastern recipient countries to reduce the risk of a nuclear accident at one of their Soviet-built 
NPPs or enhanced their capacities to deal with the potentially severe socio-economic and 
political costs and technically complex task of prematurely closing and decommissioning 
high-risk nuclear reactors. Moreover, in most if not all examined transactions there were no 
easily identifiable positive issue-linkages that the Western donors could have readily agreed 
upon and that would have generated sufficiently large incentives for the Eastern recipient 
countries to adopt risk-eliminating behaviors in the near-term. 
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Similar reasons explain why negative incentives were unlikely to be more cost-
effective than positive incentives. Economic sanctions were unlikely to entice the Eastern 
recipient countries to develop the necessary technical and financial means to improve nuclear 
safety or to prematurely close and decommission their high-risk nuclear reactors. Moreover, 
while the threat or imposition of economic sanctions may have enhanced the Eastern 
countries’ perceived costs of non-cooperation, it is debatable whether such measures would 
have been sufficient to induce the Eastern governments to adopt risk-eliminating behaviors. In 
fact, the imposition of economic sanctions risked being counterproductive by exacerbating 
these countries’ economic problems and thereby possibly forcing them to rely even more 
heavily on cheap, but unsafe nuclear power. In addition, it is doubtful whether the Western 
donors would have been prepared to bear the potential costs involved in imposing sanctions. 
Indeed, it is plausible to suggest that the major Western donors would have been reluctant to 
put at risk their economic and strategic interests in a smooth transformation process for the 
sake of securing the premature closure of high-risk nuclear reactors. 
Finally, it is difficult to see how the employment of normative or cognitive strategies 
could have led to a more favorable outcome from the Western donors’ point of view. Indeed, 
given the strong asymmetric capacities and preferences underlying the nuclear safety problem 
in CEE and the FSU, it is rather unlikely that persuasion attempts or the provision of more 
complete information concerning the risks of keeping unsafe nuclear reactors in operation or 
the relative benefits and costs of alternative energy strategies would have induced the Eastern 
countries to adopt risk-reducing and risk-eliminating behaviors. In sum, the efficiency (first 
dimension) of all examined transactions was high. 
As far as the second dimension of efficiency is concerned, the empirical analysis 
suggests that various transactions involved potentially serious inefficiencies in the sense that 
the Western donors could have possibly secured comparable or superior behavioral changes 
on the part of the Eastern recipient countries at a lower or comparable cost by employing 
positive incentives in different ways. Indeed, in the two transactions between the NSA and 
Bulgaria, on the one hand, and between the NSA and Lithuania, on the other, the Western 
donors could have probably secured a more favorable outcome by refraining from funding 
near-term technical safety upgrades at the Kozloduy and Ignalina NPPs—which ultimately 
had the effect of prolonging the service lives of these high-risk nuclear reactors—and instead 
channeling all available financial and technical assistance towards the rehabilitation of these 
countries’ energy sectors and the promotion of energy efficiency schemes. Such an alternative 
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way of employing positive incentives would have probably been more successful in 
facilitating the premature closure of these high-risk nuclear reactors, and would have certainly 
avoided the risk of increasing the incentives and capacities of the recipient governments to 
keep these slightly improved, nevertheless still unsafe units in operation beyond the scheduled 
closure dates. Of course, the drawback of such an alternative funding strategy was that the 
Western donors would have had to endure higher levels of risk in the short-term. However, in 
the mid- to long-term the Western donors would have probably secured larger and more 
lasting safety benefits by pursuing such an alternative funding strategy. 
The efficiency of the attempted transaction between the EBRD and the Slovak 
Republic suffered from similar problems. Instead of offering to finance the completion of the 
two partly built Mochovce units, the EBRD could have proposed to fund the construction of a 
new gas-fired power plant in exchange for the premature closure of Bohunice units 1-2. On 
the one hand, it is rather likely that this alternative investment option would have been less 
costly than the Mochovce completion project. On the other hand, it is not impossible that a 
closure deal involving this alternative investment option—which was far less controversial 
than the nuclear completion project—might have materialized. Indeed, the strong controversy 
surrounding the Western-led Mochovce completion project did not only undermine the 
Western donors’ bargaining position, but may have prompted the Slovak government to 
consider the Czech and Russian counter-offers to complete the two Mochovce units without 
any substantial loan conditions. 
The transaction between the G-7/EU and Ukraine involved similar inefficiencies. 
Indeed, it is rather debatable whether the (tentative) approval of over $1.2 billion in loans for 
the completion of the K2/R4 project represented the most cost-effective way to induce and 
enable the Ukrainian government to prematurely close the Chernobyl NPP. The independent 
panel commissioned by the EBRD to assess the cost-effectiveness of the K2/R4 project had 
made a compelling case that the construction of new power generating capacity in Ukraine 
was not needed and that the least-cost approach to Ukraine’s energy problems was to enhance 
the operational reliability and efficiency of the country’s existing power plants and 
transmission and distribution grid and to reduce excess demand by promoting energy 
efficiency schemes. Thus, in this transaction the Western donors could have probably secured 
a comparable behavioral change on the part of Ukraine at lower cost by refraining from 
funding the K2/R4 project and financing alternative, more cost-effective capacity-building 
measures instead. 
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In contrast, it is reasonable to suggest that the decommissioning aid pledged by the 
European Commission represented the most cost-effective way of employing positive 
incentives to extract “realistic” closure commitments from the three applicant countries. 
Indeed, by offering to defray a significant part of the decommissioning costs, the Commission 
addressed one of the main reasons why the applicant countries had been reluctant to close 
their high-risk nuclear reactors. Moreover, since the decommissioning aid was inextricably 
linked to the closure of high-risk nuclear reactors, it did not involve the risk of unintentionally 
encouraging and enabling the recipients to continue to engage in undesirable behaviors. In 
sum, the examined transactions were not equally efficient in terms of the second dimension of 
efficiency: Whereas the efficiency of the three transactions between the European 
Commission and the applicant countries was high, the efficiency of the other four examined 
transactions was rather low. 
The discussion so far has shown that both the effectiveness and efficiency of the seven 
examined transactions aimed at securing risk-reducing and in particular risk-eliminating 
behavioral changes on the part of the Eastern recipient countries varied considerably. How 
can we explain this variation in outcomes? In the following I discuss whether and how the 
theoretically predicted problems in designing and implementing positive incentives shaped 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the examined transactions. 
The empirical analysis suggests that neither the effectiveness nor the efficiency (first 
dimension) of the examined transactions were negatively affected by extortion problems. 
Indeed, since the Eastern recipient countries did not bluff the Western donors into providing 
resources for behavioral changes that they would have undertaken even in the absence of such 
resource transfers, the efficiency of the examined transactions was not hampered by extortion 
problems. In other words, the Western donors were not misled into offering “money for 
nothing”. In addition, this potential problem in designing and implementing positive 
incentives did not affect the effectiveness of the examined transactions in the sense of 
deterring the Western donors from engaging in transactions with the recipient countries. 
That said, it should be noted that the extent to which the recipient countries’ behavior 
approximated extortion varied across the seven examined transactions. In those three 
transactions in which the NSA and the EBRD sought to secure risk-reducing and/or risk-
eliminating behavioral changes on the part of the Slovak Republic, Lithuania and Bulgaria, 
the behavior of the Eastern recipient countries clearly did not qualify as extortion. Indeed, the 
three recipient countries did not threaten to adopt risk-enhancing behaviors unless rewarded 
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for not doing so. Rather, they simply signaled—and rather credibly so—that they lacked the 
financial and technical means to change their behavior in a direction desired by the Western 
donors. In the three transactions between the European Commission and the applicant 
countries, the behavior of the Eastern recipient countries came somewhat closer to extortion. 
By signaling their intention to renege on their unilateral and/or international closure 
commitments and to keep their high-risk nuclear reactors in operation unless compensation 
was forthcoming, the three applicant countries had implicitly threatened to adopt risk-
prolonging behaviors if not rewarded for refraining from doing so. However, their behavior 
fell short of extortion. Indeed, with a view to the fact that the three applicant countries had a 
genuine interest in prolonging the service lives of their high-risk nuclear reactors—not least 
due to the fact that the previous safety upgrade programs funded by the Western donors had 
reduced the risk of a nuclear accident at one of these units—, it is rather likely that they would 
have delivered on their implicit threat to adopt risk-prolonging behaviors if the Commission 
had refused to provide some sort of compensation. 
Finally, in the transaction between the G-7/EU and Ukraine, the behavior of the 
Eastern recipient country verged on extortion. Indeed, throughout the bargaining process, the 
Ukrainian government had repeatedly threatened to prolong the services lives of Chernobyl 
units 1 and 3 and to modernize and restart the plant’s crippled second unit—i.e. to expose the 
Western countries to significantly enhanced levels of environmental risk—unless the Western 
donors provided sufficient assistance and/or delivered the pledged assistance more swiftly. In 
addition, it appears that the Ukrainian government was not genuinely interested in adopting 
such risk-enhancing behavior, but rather used the threat to resuscitate the ill-fated Chernobyl 
NPP as a powerful bargaining chip to extract as much compensation from the Western donors 
as possible. Yet also in this transaction, the behavior of the recipient did not strictly speaking 
qualify as extortion in the sense that the Ukrainian government bluffed the Western donors 
into providing resources for behavioral changes that it would have undertaken even in the 
absence of resource transfers. Indeed, if the Western donors had refused to provide 
compensation, it is rather likely that the Ukrainian government would have delivered on its 
threat to resuscitate the ill-fated Chernobyl NPP, simply because the remaining option—
unilateral closure and decommissioning of the plant without external assistance—would have 
been even less appealing to Ukraine than the continued operation of the plant. In sum, 
whereas the behavior of the Eastern recipient countries verged to differing degrees on 
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extortion, this potential problem in designing and implementing did not negatively affect the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the examined transactions. 
Neither did moral hazard problems negatively affect the effectiveness and efficiency 
(first dimension) of the examined transactions. Indeed, the empirical analysis did not uncover 
any compelling evidence that the Eastern recipient countries engaged in moral hazard 
behavior in the sense that the prospect of gaining risk-reducing nuclear safety assistance from 
the Western donors induced the recipient countries to refrain from unilaterally improving 
safety levels at their Soviet-designed nuclear reactors or to adopt otherwise overly risky 
behaviors. Moreover, in none of the examined transactions did this potential problem in 
designing and implementing positive incentives discourage the Western donors from 
engaging in transactions with the Eastern recipient countries. It should be noted that these 
conclusions hold despite the fact that in some transactions—i.e. in the two transactions 
between the European Commission and the Slovak Republic and Bulgaria and in particular in 
the transaction between the G-7/EU and Ukraine—the Eastern recipient countries did in fact 
engage in risky activities. Indeed, it is plausible to suggest that by postponing the scheduled 
closure dates for their high-risk nuclear reactors and—in the case of Ukraine—by making 
every effort to keep the debilitated third unit of the Chernobyl NPP in operation as long as 
possible, the Slovak, Bulgarian and Ukrainian governments engaged in activities that exposed 
the Western donors to elevated levels of environmental risk. 
However, the recipient governments did not engage in such activities in the 
expectation that they would thereby entice the Western donors to provide the necessary 
resources to reduce to an acceptable level the risks associated with these activities. In fact, the 
willingness of the Slovak and Bulgarian governments to invest a considerable amount of their 
own resources in the modernization of their high-risk nuclear reactors suggests that they did 
not expect to obtain risk-reducing nuclear safety assistance from the Western donors by 
postponing the scheduled closure dates. Moreover, the Ukrainian government did not engage 
in risky activities in the expectation that it would thereby gain nuclear safety assistance to 
guarantee the continued operation of the Chernobyl NPP at lower levels of risk. If the 
Ukrainian government had any ulterior motives, it was the expectation that such risky 
behavior would induce the Western donors to provide the necessary financial and technical 
resources to definitely close the ill-fated plant. In short, although various Eastern recipient 
countries engaged in risky activities, their behavior cannot be characterized as moral hazard. 
 Conclusions 247 
The extent to which information and distribution problems shaped the effectiveness of 
the examined transactions varied. The effectiveness of the two transactions in which the NSA 
was the principal donor were unaffected by these two problems. Indeed, negotiations between 
the NSA and the Bulgarian and Lithuanian governments were concluded rather swiftly, 
without much haggling over the costs and benefits of cooperation. This outcome had much to 
do with the fact that it did not make sense for the recipient governments to bargain for 
extensive compensation because the sources of the NSA were in any case limited. Moreover, 
the NSA had based its closure deals on rather long-term and vague conditions, thereby 
allowing the recipient governments to discount future closure costs and granting them 
sufficient room for maneuver in complying with future closure commitments. 
The effectiveness of the three transactions in which the European Commission was the 
principal donor was also unaffected by information and distribution problems. To be sure, the 
Commission may have encountered difficulties in determining the applicant countries’ “real” 
preferences, and the three applicant countries did in fact seek to gain the maximum amount of 
compensation in exchange for the latest possible closure schedules. However, these problems 
did not seriously delay or prevent the conclusion of closure negotiations. This outcome can be 
at least partly attributed to the fact that the Commission had set a tight deadline for the 
establishment of “realistic” closure commitments, thereby limiting the time to haggle over the 
costs and benefits of cooperation. 
In contrast, information and distribution problems did hamper the effectiveness of the 
transaction between the EBRD and the Slovak Republic. Incomplete information regarding 
the long-term development of fossil fuel prices and the Slovak Republic’s future energy 
demand as well as widespread doubts about the Slovak government’s sincerity to close 
Bohunice units 1-2 in the near future intensified the controversy surrounding the Western-led 
Mochovce completion project and thereby hampered the timely conclusion of a closure deal. 
Moreover, the repeated efforts by the Slovak government to extract more favorable terms 
from the EBRD—terms that the bank was unwilling or unable to concede—had the effect of 
protracting negotiations. The effectiveness of the transaction between the G-7/EU and 
Ukraine was also to a certain extent hampered by information and distribution problems. The 
difficulties the Western donors encountered in determining how much the closure of the 
Chernobyl NPP would cost and which specific measures were the most cost-effective to 
enable and induce the Ukrainian government to comply with Western closure demands led to 
delays in concluding and implementing the MoU. In addition, both the negotiation and 
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implementation of the MoU were protracted as a result of the stingy bargaining over the costs 
and benefits of cooperation. Indeed, it took nearly two years of diplomatic haggling over the 
amount and type of compensation until the MoU could be finally concluded. And even 
thereafter, implementation of the MoU stalled as a result of Ukrainian dissatisfaction with the 
size and composition as well as the slow disbursement of the pledged Western aid. 
The occurrence of enforcement problems varied across the examined transactions. 
Enforcement problems played no role in the two transactions between the EBRD and the 
Slovak Republic and between the G-7/EU and Ukraine, either because the negotiating parties 
had failed to conclude a closure deal or because the recipient country ultimately did comply 
with its commitments. In contrast, enforcement problems hampered the effectiveness of those 
two transactions in which the NSA was the principal donor. In these two transactions the NSA 
clearly lacked the means to induce the Bulgarian and Lithuanian governments to abide by 
their commitments. Indeed, once the funds earmarked for the safety upgrade programs at the 
Kozloduy and Ignalina NPPs had been disbursed, the NSA could no longer threaten to 
withhold the further disbursement of grant money to ensure that the recipient governments 
complied with their commitments. In addition, the NSA had no control over the long-term 
investment activities of the EBRD and the World Bank, both of which proved unwilling to 
increase the recipient countries’ perceived costs of non-compliance with the terms of the NSA 
grant agreements by threatening to suspend loan financing and assistance programs. This 
reluctance on the part of IFIs to enforce the NSA’s closure agreements was at least in part a 
result of the widespread perception that the capacities of the Eastern recipient countries to 
cooperate in the nuclear safety field were constrained and that the imposition of punitive 
measures such as the suspension of loan financing programs risked not only being ineffective, 
but possibly even counterproductive. 
Enforcement problems also negatively affected the effectiveness of two transactions 
between the European Commission and the applicant countries, i.e. the Slovak Republic and 
Bulgaria. On the one hand, the Commission’s attempt to enforce these countries’ unilateral or 
international closure commitments by employing a combination of negative and positive 
incentives was somewhat hampered by the lobbying efforts of the Western European nuclear 
industry. Indeed, since this domestic producer group was bound to incur considerable costs 
from the near-term closure of various nuclear reactors in the Eastern applicant countries—for 
example in the form of fewer subsidies from Western nuclear safety assistance programs and 
reduced business opportunities—it lobbied the Commission to abandon or at least relax its 
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early closure policy. On the other hand, the Commission faced growing internal pressure to 
relax its closure requirements from those EU Member States that for strategic reasons favored 
a swift eastward enlargement of the EU. Indeed, since the Commission’s uncompromising 
stance on the closure issue risked to protract or even derail the EU accession process, it is 
plausible to suggest that various EU Member States exerted pressure on the Commission to 
adopt a more flexible bargaining stance and accept compromises so as to minimize the 
strategic risks involved in enforcing the applicant countries’ closure commitments. In short, 
the efforts of the Western European nuclear industry and various EU Member States to 
safeguard their commercial and strategic interests gave rise to enforcement problems that 
negatively affected the effectiveness of those two transactions designed to secure “realistic” 
closure commitments from the Slovak Republic and Bulgaria. It should be noted that even 
though the Commission’s attempt to enforce Lithuania’s closure commitments posed similar 
risks to the commercial and strategic interests of the Western European nuclear industry and 
various EU Member States, the effectiveness of this transaction was not negatively affected 
by enforcement problems. This finding has much to do with the fact that the Commission did 
not have much room for maneuver to relax its closure policy vis-à-vis Lithuania. Indeed, the 
Commission either insisted that the Lithuanian government close the Ignalina NPP in line 
with its NSA commitments, or it yielded to the Lithuanian government’s plans to rechannel 
the plant’s two RBMKs and accepted the long-term operation of the Ignalina NPP. Given the 
alarming prospects of the latter option, it is plausible to suggest that the Commission faced 
less internal pressure to relax its closure requirements in this transaction. 
The efficiency (second dimension) of most of the examined transactions was seriously 
affected by the specific problem-definition adhered to by the Western donors. Indeed, in all 
examined transactions apart from the three transactions between the European Commission 
and the applicant countries, the Western donors adhered to a rather pro-nuclear problem-
definition that in effect precluded the employment of potentially more cost-effective funding 
strategies. This rather pro-nuclear problem-definition was reflected in the specific capacity-
building measures the Western donors chose to fund and implement in the various examined 
transactions: Whereas the main thrust of the Western response to the nuclear safety problem 
in Bulgaria and Lithuania involved the funding and implementation of near-term safety 
upgrades at the Kozloduy and Ignalina NPPs, the EBRD was bent on funding the completion 
of Mochovce units 1-2 in exchange for the premature of Bohunice units 1-2, despite 
widespread objections that the construction of a new gas-fired power plant would be both 
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more economical and environmentally safe. Moreover, even though various opportunities 
existed to address Ukraine’s energy problems and hence enable the hard-pressed country to 
prematurely close the Chernobyl NPP more effectively and at lower cost than completing the 
Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 reactors, the major Western donors were reluctant to abandon 
the K2/R4 project in favor of alternative energy projects and used their influence to ensure 
that the costly nuclear completion project was tentatively approved for loan financing in 
December 2000. 
The propensity on the part of the Western donors to define the nuclear safety problem 
in CEE and the FSU in nuclear friendly ways and the resulting pro-nuclear bias in the 
Western funding strategies were largely determined by the commercial, political and strategic 
interests of the Western nuclear industry and their governmental supporters. On the one hand, 
Western nuclear engineering firms had been quick to realize that the nuclear safety problem in 
CEE and the FSU did not only represent a threat to their commercial survival, but also 
provided a tremendous commercial opportunity to secure much needed business contracts. As 
a result, they used their considerable political weight—nuclear utilities and suppliers are 
generally very large, well-organized, often state-owned, and thus politically influential—to 
lobby their respective national governments into defining the nuclear safety problem in ways 
that served their commercial interests, i.e. as a problem that could be solved by technical 
safety upgrade programs or by the construction of new nuclear power generating capacity. 
Various Western governments, on the other hand, proved to be susceptible to such lobbying 
efforts. Indeed, by granting assistance for technical safety upgrades or by providing loans for 
the completion of partly built nuclear reactors in the East, pro-nuclear Western governments 
had a politically convenient opportunity to subsidize their own suffering nuclear industries 
and to help them gain a foothold in the potentially lucrative Eastern nuclear market. In 
addition, strategic considerations such as the desire of various Western countries to reinforce 
Ukrainian independence by reducing the country’s reliance on Russian fossil fuel imports 
enhanced the propensity on the part of the Western donors to define the nuclear safety 
problem in pro-nuclear ways. In short, due to the commercial, political and strategic interests 
of the influential Western nuclear industry and various pro-nuclear Western governments, the 
Western donors adopted in all but three examined transactions a problem-definition that in 
effect thwarted the funding and implementation of more cost-effective capacity-building 
measures aimed at securing risk-reducing and in particular risk-eliminating behavioral 
changes on the part of the Eastern recipient countries. 
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The “slippery slope effect” seriously hampered the effectiveness of those two 
transactions in which the NSA was the principal donor. The empirical analysis of these two 
transactions has shown that the successful implementation of the NSA-funded safety upgrade 
programs at the Kozloduy and Ignalina NPPs had the unintentional effect of enhancing both 
the incentives and capacities of the Bulgarian and Lithuanian governments to keep their high-
risk nuclear reactors in operation beyond the scheduled closure dates. Indeed, the externally 
financed modernization of these units did not only make their long-term operation technically 
more feasible and economically more profitable, but also allowed the Bulgarian and 
Lithuanian authorities to argue that the achieved safety improvements had removed all cause 
for concern about prolonging these units’ service lives. The effectiveness of the other 
examined transactions was unaffected by the “slippery slope effect”. Indeed, even if the 
EBRD’s closure deal with the Slovak Republic had materialized, the provision of Western 
loans for the completion and upgrading of Mochovce units 1-2 could not have had the 
unintentional effect of enhancing the incentives and/or capacities of the Slovak Republic to 
continue to engage in undesirable behavior, i.e. to prolong the service lives of Bohunice units 
1-2. Similarly, since the aid pledged by the European Commission in exchange for the 
establishment of “realistic” closure commitments was earmarked for decommissioning 
activities and was as such inextricably linked to the closure of high-risk nuclear reactors, it 
did not enhance the incentives and/or capacities of the applicant countries to keep their high-
risk nuclear reactors in operation. Finally, even though the Western donors agreed to provide 
around ECU 13 million for near-term safety upgrades at the third unit of the Chernobyl NPP, 
the implementation of this specific capacity-building measure did not tempt and/or enable the 
Ukrainian government to extend the service life of the third unit of the Chernobyl NPP, most 
likely because the amount of safety-enhancing equipment installed at Chernobyl unit 3 was 
minimal and did not significantly alleviate the reactor’s severe safety deficiencies. 
The occurrence of coordination problems among the donors and the extent to which 
these problems negatively affected the effectiveness of the examined transactions varied 
significantly. The effectiveness of the transaction between the NSA and Bulgaria was to a 
certain extent hampered by two coordination problems. One coordination problem appears to 
have occurred between the NSA and the IFIs that were expected to provide loan financing for 
the so-called “trigger projects”, i.e. the various energy investment projects designed to 
facilitate the premature closure of Kozloduy units 1-4. Not least to secure the repayment of 
disbursed funds, these IFIs had made the approval of loans for the designated energy projects 
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contingent on far-reaching market reforms in the Bulgarian energy sector. The Bulgarian 
government, however, was often unwilling to comply with such loan conditions, which in turn 
delayed the scheduled implementation of the various “trigger projects”. Moreover, the 
modernization of Kozloduy units 5-6 was delayed due to the reluctance of the EBRD to 
provide the necessary funds. Hence the failure to secure risk-eliminating behavioral changes 
on the part of Bulgaria may be partly attributed to the fact that IFIs were entrusted with 
fulfilling a major part of the conditions stipulated by the NSA agreement, and that these IFIs 
proved to be reluctant to subordinate their own interests to the NSA goal of securing the 
premature closure of Kozloduy units 1-4. However, this assessment must be qualified in two 
respects. First, the implementation of far-reaching and socially painful market reforms was in 
effect a necessary means to restructure Bulgaria’s ailing energy sector and to improve energy 
efficiency. Second, the Bulgarian authorities proved to be rather uncooperative in loan 
negotiations with the IFIs. 
A further coordination problem took place among those donor countries and firms 
capable of funding and conducting upgrade work at Kozloduy units 1-4. Indeed, even though 
these units were scheduled for closure in 1997/1998, the Russian nuclear industry, backed by 
loans from the Russian government, repeatedly offered to upgrade these units for prolonged 
operation. These aggressive Russian bids strengthened the Bulgarian government’s resolve to 
prolong the service lives of Kozloduy units 1-4 and prompted Western nuclear firms to 
consider conducting life-extending modernization work at these units. The effectiveness of 
the transaction between the NSA and Lithuania, on the other hand, was not negatively 
affected by coordination problems. The rehabilitation of Lithuania’s energy sector was not 
delayed because IFIs lacked the flexibility and/or willingness to provide funds for this 
purpose, but rather because Lithuania—facing large surpluses of cheap electricity produced 
by the Ignalina NPP—had only little incentive to invest scarce resources in a more efficient 
use and production of power. Moreover, the NSA-led attempt to secure risk-eliminating 
behavioral changes on the part of the Lithuania was not hampered by offers from Russian or 
Western nuclear firms to upgrade and prolong the service lives of the two RBMK units. 
Coordination problems seriously affected the effectiveness of the attempted 
transaction between the EBRD and the Slovak Republic. To begin with, the whole 
controversy surrounding the Western-led Mochovce completion project—which ultimately 
had the effect of impeding the conclusion of a closure deal—was to a large extent the result of 
a coordination problem. Indeed, whereas the French and German governments strongly 
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supported the project not least in order to promote the commercial interests of French and 
German firms, a vigorous opposition movement spearheaded by the anti-nuclear Austrian 
government and various Western environmental pressure groups sought to prevent 
international funding for the project since this would have likely created a precedent for the 
completion of other partly built Soviet-designed nuclear reactors in CEE and the FSU. 
Uncoordinated actions by Western nuclear firms also hampered the conclusion of a closure 
deal. While the EBRD was seeking to make international funding for the Mochovce 
completion project contingent on a Slovak commitment to prematurely close Bohunice units 
1-2, the German firm Siemens signed a $150 million contract to modernize these two unsafe 
units. Even though Siemens argued that its modernization program did not include life-
extension work, in the end it did have the effect of increasing the Slovak government’s 
incentives to keep Bohunice units 1-2 in operation for as long as possible. The most serious 
coordination problem in this examined transaction took place among those potential donor 
countries and firms capable of financing and completing Mochovce units 1-2. Indeed, the 
Czech-Russian counter-offer to complete the Mochovce NPP both at lower costs and without 
substantial loan conditions such as electricity price increases and the premature closure of 
Bohunice units 1-2 was probably the most important reason why the EBRD’s closure deal 
failed to materialize. 
In contrast, the effectiveness of the examined transactions between the European 
Commission and the three applicant countries was unaffected by coordination problems. This 
finding has much to do with the fact that the Commission was authorized to negotiate over 
closure commitments on behalf of all EU Member States, which in turn prevented both 
burden-sharing problems and the pursuit of conflicting national strategies aimed at securing 
“realistic” closure commitments from the applicant countries. 
Finally, coordination problems also hampered to a certain extent the effectiveness of 
the transaction between the G-7/EU and Ukraine. After much debate over how to compensate 
Ukraine for the closure of the Chernobyl NPP, the G-7 and the European Commission 
resolved in late 1995 to fund the completion of the two partly built Khmelnitsky-2 and 
Rovno-4 reactors as the principal Chernobyl power replacement project. Following the 
inclusion of this investment target in the MoU, the G-7 countries had instructed the EBRD to 
assume the leading role in financing the K2/R4 project. However, the EBRD subsequently 
proved both unable and unwilling to promptly comply with this request, in particular after the 
independent panel had concluded in early 1997 that the plan to complete these two nuclear 
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reactors did not represent the most cost-effective use of Western funds. Since the resulting 
impasse over loan financing for the K2/R4 project did not only jeopardize the successful 
implementation of the MoU, but also threatened the strategic and commercial interests of 
various Western donor states and their nuclear industries, the leading Western donor states 
prevailed upon the EBRD to commission a second external review of the project’s cost-
effectiveness. Although the somewhat more positive conclusions of the second external 
review, combined with the ongoing political pressure from the major Western donor states, 
saved the K2/R4 project from certain demise, the EBRD continued to doubt the project’s 
financial viability and remained rather reluctant to shoulder the considerable financial risk. As 
a result, the EBRD did not only insist on increasingly stringent loan conditions, but also 
repeatedly delayed its final decision on loan financing for the project. The provision of loans 
for the K2/R4 project was further delayed due to a widening fissure among the major Western 
donor states. Indeed, just as the loan financing process had been gaining momentum, the 
Bundestag voted against German participation in the funding of the K2/R4 project and called 
on the German government to support non-nuclear options in Ukraine instead. In short, 
coordination problems among the Western donors seriously delayed the provision of loans for 
the K2/R4 project. These repeated delays, in turn, hampered the effectiveness of the 
transaction by prompting the Ukrainian government to keep the remaining operational unit of 
the Chernobyl NPP in operation as long as possible. 
The following table summarizes the results of the empirical analysis and depicts in 
which transaction which problems hypothetically associated with designing and implementing 
positive incentives had an influence on the outcomes to be explained. 
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TABLE 9.2: SYNOPSIS OF PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND/OR EFFICIENCY OF THE 
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Case Study I 
NSA — 
Bulgaria 
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Case Study II 
NSA — 
Lithuania 
Rather 
Low 
High Rather 
Low 
        
Case Study III 
EBRD — 
Slovak Republic 
Low High Rather 
Low 
        
Case Study IV            
European 
Commission — 
Slovak Republic 
Rather 
High 
High High         
European 
Commission — 
Lithuania 
High High High         
European 
Commission — 
Bulgaria 
Rather 
High 
High High         
Case Study V 
G-7/EU — 
Ukraine 
Rather 
High 
High Rather 
Low 
        
Note: Shade of the squares depicts the degree to which the respective problems influenced the outcomes to be 
explained (bright shade = slight influence; dark shade = large influence). 
The empirical analysis of the various transactions that materialized in the nuclear safety field 
suggests that the employment of positive incentives can be an effective and efficient policy 
tool to foster international environmental cooperation. To begin with, in four examined 
transactions the employment of positive incentives was rather effective in driving the 
behavior of the recipient in a direction desired by the donors. In addition, I did not find any 
outright failures in the sense that when positive incentives were provided they did not have 
any impact on recipient behavior. Finally, all examined transactions were efficient in the 
sense that the donors could not have secured comparable or superior behavioral changes on 
the part of the recipient countries at a lower or comparable cost by employing other 
cooperation strategies (first dimension of efficiency). This finding has much to do with the 
fact that under conditions of strong asymmetric preferences and capacities, the employment of 
positive incentives is often the only practical cooperation strategy. 
In addition, the efficiency of the examined transactions was not negatively affected by 
extortion or moral hazard problems. Indeed, although various recipient countries threatened to 
adopt risk-enhancing behaviors if not compensated for refraining from doing so, their 
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behavior did not amount to extortion because they would have likely delivered on their threats 
if compensation had not been provided. In this respect it is important to note that the recipient 
countries’ willingness to engage in risk-enhancing behaviors—even if such behaviors were 
not in their genuine interest—was strongly determined by their insufficient capacities to adopt 
desirable, risk-eliminating behaviors in the absence of external compensation. Similar 
conclusions can be drawn with respect to the occurrence of moral hazard problems: Even 
though some recipient countries engaged in risky activities, the rationale behind such action 
was not the expectation of thereby enticing the donors to provide the necessary assistance to 
reduce the risks of their behaviors to an acceptable level. Indeed, if the recipient countries had 
any ulterior motive to engage in risky activities, it related to the expectation of thereby 
enticing the donors to provide the necessary assistance so as to enhance their capacities to 
adopt desirable, risk-eliminating behaviors. It hence appears that the risk of extortion and 
moral hazard problems hampering the efficiency of transactions is rather low, at least in 
situations involving strong asymmetric capacities. 
On the other hand, this rather optimistic assessment of the potential of positive 
incentives in fostering international environmental cooperation must be qualified in various 
respects. To begin with, positive incentives proved to be most effective in enticing recipient 
cooperation when employed in combination with other cooperation strategies, in particular 
with negative incentives. In this respect, the possibility of the European Commission to link 
the EU membership prospects of the three applicant countries to a cooperative stance on the 
closure issue proved to be a window of opportunity that was not available in the other 
examined transactions. 
Second, it cannot be denied that the effectiveness of the examined transactions varied 
significantly, and that all but one of the seven examined transactions failed to be fully 
effective. As discussed above, the varying degrees of ineffectiveness in the seven examined 
transactions can be attributed to a host of theoretically predicted problems in designing and 
implementing positive incentives, i.e. in particular to cooperation problems and the “slippery 
slope effect”, and to a lesser extent to enforcement, information and distribution problems. It 
should be further noted that depending on the circumstances there might be no adequate 
strategies that the donors can pursue to alleviate or overcome these problems. For example, a 
promising strategy to minimize cooperation problems is to pool the resources of the various 
donors under the custody of an international funding agency. Yet it may prove difficult or 
impossible to bind all potential donors into such a united donor front, in particular if 
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considerable private benefits can be gained from uncoordinated actions. And even if a united 
donor front can be established, coordination problems are likely to resurface when there are 
many donors and/or many possible investment targets. Or to avoid another problem that 
seriously affected the effectiveness of the examined transactions, i.e. the “slippery slope 
effect”, the donors have to ensure that resource transfers aimed at enhancing the recipient’s 
capacities to adopt a desirable behavior are contingent upon the recipient both adopting such 
desirable behavior and refraining from engaging in a undesirable behavior. Yet if this is not 
feasible, which might often be the case in international environmental affairs, the only 
strategy that the donors can pursue to avoid the “slippery slope effect” is to refrain from 
funding certain capacity-building measures. The drawback of such a strategy is that the 
donors may have to endure continued or higher levels of environmental risk in the near- to 
mid-term, which might not be possible for domestic political reasons. 
Third, it is important to note that the efficiency (first dimension) of positive incentives 
might not be so high under different circumstances. Indeed, in externality situations involving 
less pronounced asymmetric preferences and capacities, the employment of other cooperation 
strategies might be a more cost-effective response to transnational environmental problems. 
Finally, it must be emphasized that all but three of the examined transactions involved 
potentially serious inefficiencies in the sense that the Western donors could have possibly 
secured comparable or superior behavioral changes on the part of the Eastern recipient 
countries at a lower or comparable cost by employing positive incentives in different ways. 
The most important problem that shaped the efficiency (second dimension) of the examined 
transactions relates to how the donors defined the environmental problem at hand, or in other 
words to the specific problem-definition adhered to by the donors. Indeed, in most examined 
transactions the Western donors adopted a rather one-sided problem-definition that was 
closely geared to the commercial interests of their domestic nuclear industries and to their 
own political and strategic interests. This specific problem-definition resulted in a rather 
strong pro-nuclear bias in the Western donors’ funding strategy that ultimately precluded the 
funding and implementation of other, potentially more cost-effective capacity-building 
measures designed to solve the nuclear safety problem in CEE and the FSU. In this respect it 
is important to note that it may be difficult to avert the potential inefficiencies inherent to the 
way donors define an environmental problem since there appears to be a trade-off between the 
effectiveness of a transaction in terms of the amount of resources the donors are willing to 
allocate and the efficiency of a transaction in terms of the specific problem-definition adhered 
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to by the donors. Indeed, the prospect of securing commercial benefits for their domestic 
industries and promoting other political and strategic interests is often an important reason 
why donors are willing to provide a substantial amount of resources for international 
environmental assistance programs and to engage in transactions, in particular then when they 
are not strongly or directly exposed to transboundary environmental pollution or risks. But a 
one-sided problem-definition and policy implementation may involve serious efficiency 
problems. 
Thus with a view to the caveats outlined above, a more cautious conclusion regarding 
the role of positive incentives in international environmental politics is warranted: While 
positive incentives can indeed contribute significantly to driving the behavior of recipient 
countries in a direction desired by provider countries, they are not a panacea for solving 
transnational environmental problems in effective and efficient ways. In social science 
terminology, positive incentives are often a necessary, but not always a sufficient condition 
for fostering successful international environmental cooperation. 
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 11 APPENDIX 
TABLE 11.1: NATIONAL DEPENDENCE ON NUCLEAR POWER (1992-1995) 
Nuclear Contribution to Total Electricity, in 
Percent 
Country 
1992 1993 1994 1995 
Total Nuclear TWh 
Generated in 1995 
Lithuania 60.0 87.2 76.4 85.6 10.6 
France 72.9 77.7 75.3 76.1 358.6 
Belgium 59.9 58.9 55.8 55.5 39.2 
Sweden 43.2 42.0 51.1 46.6 66.7 
Bulgaria 32.5 36.9 45.6 46.4 17.3 
Slovak Republic 49.5 53.6 49.1 44.1 11.4 
Hungary 46.4 43.3 43.7 42.3 13.2 
Switzerland 39.6 37.9 36.8 39.9 23.5 
Slovenia 34.6 43.3 38.0 39.5 4.6 
Ukraine 25.0 32.9 34.2 37.8 65.6 
South Korea 43.2 40.3 35.5 36.1 63.7 
Spain 36.4 36.0 35.0 34.1 53.1 
Japan 27.7 30.9 30.7 33.4 286.9 
Finland 33.2 32.4 29.5 29.9 18.1 
Germany 30.1 29.7 29.3 29.1 154.1 
Taiwan 35.4 33.5 31.7 28.8 33.9 
United Kingdom 23.2 26.3 25.8 25.0 77.6 
United States 22.3 21.2 22.0 22.5 673.4 
Czech Republic 20.7 29.2 28.2 20.1 12.2 
Canada 15.2 17.3 19.1 17.3 92.3 
Argentina 19.2 14.2 13.8 11.8 7.1 
Russian Federation 11.8 12.5 11.4 11.8 99.4 
South Africa 6.0 4.5 5.7 6.5 11.3 
Mexico 3.2 3.0 3.2 6.0 8.4 
Netherlands 4.9 5.1 4.9 4.9 3.7 
India 3.3 1.9 1.4 1.9 6.5 
China 0.1 0.3 1.5 1.2 12.4 
Brazil 0.7 0.2 0.01 1.0 2.5 
Pakistan 1.2 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.5 
Kazakhstan 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.1 
Source: NN, June 1995: 48; NN, June 1996: 36. 
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FIGURE 11.1: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS (NUCLEAR SAFETY 
ASSISTANCE REPORTED TO NUSAC) 
384
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Note: The donor contribution amounts in this table are lower limits since some donor contributions have not yet 
been reported to NUSAC. Source: G-24 NUSAC Database, April 2000. 
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TABLE 11.2: DONORS INVOLVEMENT 
Donor Contribution (in Million Euro) Percentage of Total Contributions
EC 754.23 37.8 
Belgium 6.01 0.3 
Denmark 4.03 0.2 
France 87.74 4.4 
Germany 181.51 9.1 
Italy 23.63 1.2 
Netherlands 4.74 0.2 
Spain 2.87 0.1 
United Kingdom 48.13 2.4 
Austria 0.10 0.0 
Finland 17.50 0.9 
Norway 16.37 0.8 
Sweden 45.05 2.3 
Switzerland 12.68 0.6 
Canada 26.73 1.3 
Japan 145.01 7.3 
United States 569.21 28.6 
EBRD 0.58 0.0 
World Bank 0.51 0.0 
OECD 0.38 0.0 
IAEA 45.73 2.3 
Total 1'992.75 100 
Note: Contributions to the NSA have been allocated to the individual donors. Source: G-24 NUSAC Database, 
April 2000. 
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TABLE 11.3: RECIPIENTS INVOLVEMENT 
Recipient Million Euro Percentage of Total 
Bulgaria 133.18 6.7 
Slovak Republic 57.50 2.9 
Czech Republic 51.89 2.6 
Other CEE Countries 62.00 3.1 
Regional (CEE)/Unspecified 56.86 2.9 
Russian Federation 744.18 37.3 
Ukraine 659.69 33.1 
Lithuania 132.54 6.7 
Other FSU Countries 69.36 3.6 
Regional (FSU) 25.55 1.3 
Total 1’992.75 100 
Source: G-24 NUSAC Database, April 2000. 
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TABLE 11.4: OVERVIEW OF DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS AND PROJECT STATUS FOR G-7 TECHNICAL 
AREAS 
Technical Area Project 
Complete
d 
Project 
Underway 
Financing 
Decision 
Taken 
Sub-Total Firm 
Commitm
ent 
Interest, 
Proposals 
Total 
Operational Safety 
Improvement 
207.0 
(10.4%) 
473.5 
(23.8%) 
34.2 
(1.7%) 
714.7 
(35.9%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
32.3 
(1.6%) 
747.0 
(37.5%) 
Near-Term Safety 
Improvement of NPPs 
124.9 
(6.3%) 
329.5 
(16.5%) 
30.8 
(1.5%) 
485.1 
(24.3%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
5.5 
(0.3%) 
490.6 
(24.6%) 
Enhancing Regulatory 
Regimes 
111.3 
(5.6%) 
148.6 
(7.5%) 
53.2 
(2.7%) 
313.1 
(15.7%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
3.2 
(0.2%) 
316.4 
(15.9%) 
G-7 Near-Term Action 
Programme Sub-
Totals 
443.2 
(22.2%) 
951.6 
(47.8%) 
118.2 
(5.9%) 
1’513.0 
(75.9%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
41.0 
(2.1%) 
1’554.0 
(78.0%) 
Energy Strategy Studies 5.2 
(0.3%) 
4.4 
(0.2%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
9.6 
(0.5%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
9.6 
(0.5%) 
Long-Term Upgrading 
of NPPs 
44.7 
(2.2%) 
22.8 
(1.1%) 
13.1 
(0.7%) 
80.6 
(4.0%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
80.6 
(4.0%) 
G-7 Overall 
Programme Sub-
Totals 
493.2 
(24.7%) 
978.8 
(49.1%) 
131.2 
(6.6%) 
1’603.2 
(80.5%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
41.0 
(2.1%) 
1’644.3 
(82.5%) 
Radiation Protection 23.0 
(1.2%) 
38.8 
(1.9%) 
7.3 
(0.4%) 
69.0 
(3.5%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
3.1 
(0.2%) 
72.1 
(3.6%) 
Fuel Cycle and 
Radwaste Projects 
21.4 
(1.1%) 
96.4 
(4.8%) 
14.5 
(0.7%) 
132.2 
(6.6%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
2.3 
(0.1%) 
134.6 
(6.8%) 
Other 34.4 
(1.7%) 
93.6 
(4.7%) 
12.0 
(0.6%) 
139.9 
(7.0%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
1.9 
(0.1%) 
141.8 
(7.1%) 
Grand Totals 571.9 
(28.7%) 
1’207.6 
(60.6%) 
164.9 
(8.3%) 
1’944.4 
(97.6%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
48.3 
(2.4%) 
1’992.7 
(100.0%) 
Note: The financial contribution for projects concerning more than one area has been equally divided, unless 
specific information was provided on the actual allocation. The amounts in this table are lower limits since some 
donor contributions have not yet been reported to NUSAC. Contributions in Mio Euro. Source: G-24 NUSAC 
Database, April 2000. 
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TABLE 11.5: INSTALLATION TYPE—PROJECT STATUS OVERVIEW FOR ALL PROJECTS HELD IN THE 
NUSAC DATABASE 
Installation Type Project 
Completed 
Project 
Underway 
Financing 
Decision 
Taken 
Sub-Total Firm 
Commitme
nt 
Interest, 
Proposal 
Total 
VVER-440/230 111.6 
(5.6%) 
130.5 
(6.5%) 
13.1 
(0.7%) 
255.2 
(12.8%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
4.0 
(0.2%) 
259.2 
(13.0%) 
VVER-440/213 52.0 
(2.6%) 
80.7 
(4.0%) 
22.7 
(1.1%) 
155.4 
(7.8%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
4.1 
(0.2%) 
159.4 
(8.0%) 
VVER-1000 117.0 
(5.9%) 
259.9 
(13.0%) 
40.7 
(2.0%) 
417.6 
(21.0%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
17.0 
(0.9%) 
434.6 
(21.8%) 
VVER (All) 33.1 
(1.7%) 
49.4 
(2.5%) 
8.1 
(0.4%) 
90.6 
(4.5%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
90.6 
(4.5%) 
RBMK-1000 49.8 
(2.5%) 
230.3 
(11.6%) 
23.9 
(1.2%) 
304.0 
(15.3%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
7.1 
(0.4%) 
311.1 
(15.6%) 
RBMK-1500 36.8 
(1.8%) 
62.4 
(3.1%) 
1.8 
(0.1%) 
101.0 
(5.1%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
3.1 
(0.2%) 
104.1 
(5.2%) 
RBMK (All) 26.3 
(1.3%) 
44.5 
(2.2%) 
6.3 
(0.3%) 
77.2 
(3.9%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
3.6 
(0.2%) 
80.8 
(4.1%) 
BN (Fast 
Reactor) 
10.7 
(0.5%) 
9.0 
(0.5%) 
3.0 
(0.2%) 
22.8 
(1.1%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
2.9 
(0.1%) 
25.7 
(1.3%) 
PHWR 2.6 
(0.1%) 
1.6 
(0.1%) 
1.0 
(0.0%) 
5.1 
(0.3%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
5.1 
(0.3%) 
All Types of NPP 58.5 
(2.9%) 
129.4 
(6.5%) 
10.7 
(0.5%) 
198.7 
(10.0%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
0.3 
(0.0%) 
199.0 
(10.0%) 
Research 
Reactor 
1.5 
(0.1%) 
2.3 
(0.1%) 
0.2 
(0.0%) 
4.0 
(0.2%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
4.0 
(0.2%) 
Enrichment 
Plant 
0.1 
(0.0%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
0.1 
(0.0%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
0.1 
(0.0%) 
Reprocessing 
Plant 
0.5 
(0.0%) 
0.3 
(0.0%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
0.7 
(0.0%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
0.7 
(0.0%) 
Fuel Storage 2.7 
(0.1%) 
31.8 
(1.6%) 
0.5 
(0.0%) 
35.0 
(1.8%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
0.3 
(0.0%) 
35.3 
(1.8%) 
Radwaste 
Storage 
6.4 
(0.3%) 
48.2 
(2.4%) 
8.5 
(0.4%) 
63.1 
(3.2%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
1.0 
(0.1%) 
64.2 
(3.2%) 
Other 
Installation 
7.7 
(0.4%) 
58.5 
(2.9%) 
8.2 
(0.4%) 
74.4 
(3.7%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
1.4 
(0.1%) 
75.8 
(3.8%) 
All Installations 39.2 
(2.0%) 
44.5 
(2.2%) 
15.4 
(0.8%) 
99.1 
(5.0%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
3.4 
(0.2%) 
102.4 
(5.1%) 
Unknown or Not 
Specified 
15.5 
(0.8%) 
24.2 
(1.2%) 
0.9 
(0.0%) 
40.5 
(2.0%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
40.5 
(2.0%) 
Total 571.9 
(28.7%) 
1’207.6 
(60.6%) 
164.9 
(8.3%) 
1’944.4 
(97.6%) 
0.0 
(0.0%) 
48.3 
(2.4%) 
1’992.7 
(100.0%) 
Note: The financial contribution for projects addressing more than one installation type has been equally 
divided over all installation types. Contributions in Mio Euro. Source: G-24 NUSAC Database, April 2000. 
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TABLE 11.6: APPROVED INTERNATIONAL FINANCING FOR ENERGY PROJECTS IN UKRAINE (1995-
2000) 
Lender Loan (in 
$ mio.) 
Project Description 
 
Approval 
Date 
World Bank 114 Hydropower Rehabilitation and System Control Project 
The project aims to improve the quality of electricity supply by 
rehabilitating hydropower plants and improving power system control. 
April 1995
World Bank 317 Electricity Market Development Project* 
The project supports the development of a competitive electricity 
market in Ukraine by: 1) building up stocks of fuel and spare parts and 
providing overdue maintenance at 14 thermal power plants, 2) 
installing metering and communications equipment to improve 
recording and billing of electricity use and 3) providing technical 
services and training for implementing the project, managing the 
finances, and developing a privatization program. 
*The World Bank cancelled this loan in mid-1999 (PEE, 25 June 1999: 
14). 
October 
1996 
Germany 80 Chernobyl Replacement Project 
This project, which is being supported by the German government in 
the form of federal export insurance, will upgrade unit 8 of the Smijev 
coal-fired power plant. This pilot project will help to replace Chernobyl 
power by improving the capacity of the Smijev station from 270 MW 
to 325 MW. 
October 
1996 
EBRD 113 Starobeshovo Power Plant Modernization 
Defined as a priority investment to advance the restructuring of 
Ukraine’s   energy sector and the ultimate closure of the Chernobyl 
NPP, the loan will finance the replacement of an old coal-fired boiler 
with a more efficient and less polluting 210 MW unit. The project will 
contribute to a significant improvement in energy efficiency, as the 
new boiler will use a waste product, replacing expensive local coal and 
imported gas and fuel oil. 
December 
1996 
EBRD 30 Ukrainian Energy Service Company 
The loan will be used to identify and implement energy-saving 
investments in small and medium-sized enterprises and public sector 
institutions and to encourage the development of broader energy saving 
activities in Ukraine 
May 1998 
World Bank 200 Heat Supply and Energy Efficiency Project 
The objectives of this project are threefold: 1) extend the life of, 
increase the efficiency of, enhance conservation of, and improve the 
reliability and service levels in heating systems in Kiev and Sevastopol 
through rehabilitation work; 2) improve the energy efficiency of public 
buildings and reduce heat demand and thus the need for expansion of 
heat production capacity in Kiev; and 3) support the commercialization 
and development of District Heating companies. 
May 1998 
World Bank 
 
 
18 Kiev Public Buildings Energy Efficiency Project 
This project is designed to help implement the Ukrainian Government's 
Comprehensive State Energy Conservation Program, which aims at 
achieving annual savings, by the year 2010, in coal equivalency, or a 
third of the total energy consumption in Ukraine, through targeted 
investments. The components call for: 1) energy efficiency 
improvements in institutional buildings, 2) technical audits, to yield 
engineering estimates of the buildings' present energy consumption, 
and provide feasible retrofit actions for energy efficiency, 3) consulting 
services for project management, and 4) financial audits, to cover 
incremental audit costs. 
January 
2000 
EBRD 100 Ukraine Fuel Purchase Loan 
This loan is designed to enable Ukraine to purchase additional supplies 
of oil and gas following the closure of the Chernobyl NPP. 
October 
2000 
Source: Project Descriptions at the Websites of the EBRD and the World Bank; SVA-Bulletin, no. 16, 1996: 8.
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